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Context for research  Privatisation of water services in developing countries has expanded through the period  from  the  early  1990s.    The  programme,  incorporating  various  forms  of private  sector  involvement  in  service  provision,  has  been  implemented  as  a means  of  attempting  to  redress  the  issues  encountered  in  many  developing countries’ systems of service provision.  The history of service provision in many developing countries can be characterised by a post‐colonial period of escalating underinvestment  in  and  degradation  of  infrastructure,  together  with  poor management  of  services  threatening  the  sustainability  of  the  systems  of provision  (Nellis,  2006;  Smith,  2004).    These  conditions  of  service  provision combine with broader trends of increasing population and urbanisation, placing increased pressure on existing infrastructure and impelling the consideration of service expansion (Nellis, 2006; Lobina & Hall, 2003).  Experiencing these trends and conditions  in  the 1980s, developing countries have been  further subject  to financial  aid  and  debt  programmes  facilitated  by  international  financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  The  requirement  to  finance  improvements  in  service  provision  combined with financial  aid  or  debt  restructuring  provided  an  opportunity  for  those international  financial  institutions  to  implement  programmes  conceived  to improve provision through means alternate to those previously attempted, with a shift from state‐oriented provision to that involving the increased utilisation of the private sector (ibid.).      In  professing  solutions  to  these  conditions  and  for  the  improvement  of water  service  provision  in  developing  countries,  international  financial institutions  have  supported,  through  conditionalities  attached  to  financial  aid and debt relief, reform of services through the incorporation of the private sector in  their  operation.    Proponents  of  the  programme  of  privatisation  find substantiation  for  their  position  in  the  body  of  neo‐classical  economic  theory, with public choice (e.g. Niskanen, 1975; Krueger, 1974) and property rights (e.g. Alchian & Demsetz, 1973) theories being primary components.  Such component theories  find  a  basis  in  the  consideration  of  the  optimal  mode  of  economic organisation,  and  the  resolution  of  externalities  occurring within  transactions.  Private or government resolution of externalities, the proposition of efficiency of the  former  and  costs  associated  with  the  latter  (e.g.  Coase,  1960),  give  a foundation  for  property  rights  and public  choice  theories.    The  introduction  is thus  rationalised  by  the  inherent  efficiency  of  operation which  is  proposed  to follow, contributing to greater sustainability of provision, commercial operation and subsequently investment necessary for the expansion of services.      Financial aid or debt relief provided by the IMF and World Bank, together with  the  condition  of  water  services  within  the  host  countries,  typically determines  the  incidence  of  the  introduction  of  the  private  sector.    Utility contracts  with  these  sponsoring  agencies  have  been  implemented  in  35 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countries globally, taking the form of divestitures, concessions, and management and  lease  contracts  –  each  with  varying  associated  risk  for  the  private  sector (PPI,  2009).    Privatisation  of  water  services  under  the  aegis  of  international donor agencies has been attempted variously  in South America,  in Asia,  and  in Africa  (PPI,  2008a).    The  ‘reform  window’  established  by  the  combination  of desperate  need  for  funding  and  related  willingness  of  developing  country government to acquiesce to alternative reform, together with altered direction of donor  agencies  conditionalities,  provided  the  basis  for  initial  water  sector programmes  with  long  term  contracts,  with  private  sector  investment  for infrastructure (Hall et al, 2002).  Subsequent programmes, particularly from the late 1990s onwards, feature a reduced private sector commitment together with an  increasing  recognition  of  local  conditions  and  institutions.    This  temporal trend in the change in form of private sector participation (PSP) in the sector is consequential of the performance and operation of contracts implemented, with many instances of dispute, renegotiation and cancellation (Hall & Lobina, 2006b; PPI, 2008a).    Of  the  regions  noted,  the most  extreme  conditions  of  service  provision typically  exist  in  sub‐Saharan  Africa,  where  shortages  in  water  resources combine  with  decaying  infrastructure,  considerable  indebtedness,  population growth  and  urbanisation  (Lobina  &  Hall,  2003;  UNECA,  2006;  Bayliss,  2009).  Concession contracts have been attempted in Mali, Gabon and Cape Verde; lease contracts  in  Senegal,  Central  African  Republic,  Gambia,  Guinea,  Niger,  and Tanzania; and management contracts  in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, and Chad (PPI, 2008a).   Privatisation in these countries thus represents a cross section  of  the  various  forms  of  privatisation,  each  with  varying  levels  of commitment required of the private partner.  These cases of privatisation further follow  the  temporal  trend  of  decreasing  commitment,  with  the  move  from concession  contracts  to management  contracts over  time.   Where privatisation has  been  implemented,  there  has  frequently  been  a  failure  of  contracts  to proceed as intended, with a majority of contracts globally entering some form of dispute,  renegotiation  or  cancellation.    80  per  cent  of  concession  and  lease contracts  in  sub‐Saharan  Africa  have  been  “terminated  or  are  the  subject  of major disputes between the public authorities and the operator over investment levels”  (Hall  &  Lobina,  2006b),  with  other  management  contracts  also  being characterised  by  dispute  between  parties  (e.g.  South  Africa,  Guinea,  Niger (ibid.)),  and  certain  disputes  advancing  to  international  arbitration  (e.g. Tanzania (ICSID, 2010)).  The process of dispute, renegotiation and cancellation comes  about  typically  through  tariff  rises  and  public  opposition,  strategic misrepresentation by contract parties, distorted risk allocation, sub‐optimal and incomplete contracts, failure to comply with terms, and shortfall in institutional and administration capacity (Lobina & Hall, 2003; Harris et al, 2003; Kirkpatrick et al, 2004; Guasch & Straub, 2006).     Increasingly,  and  as  a  response  to  these  trends  in  performance  and operation, reforms of water service provision and the introduction of the private sector  in  that  provision  has  been  integrated  into  broader  reform  programmes that seek to revise wider institutional, economical and political conditions within the host country.  This is most easily observable in ‘Poverty Reduction Strategies’ 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established under the directives of international donor agencies (e.g. IMF, 2003; 2005;  2009).    While  these  broad  programmes  ostensibly  attempt  to  improve conditions of poverty within host countries, their design seeks to do so by means of revision of governance and institutional structures for better coherence with those  agencies  and  associated  funding  mechanisms.    This  process,  a  ‘post‐Washington consensus’, considers the state as an ‘enabler’ for the private sector, as  providing  conditions  for  the  operation  of  the  private  sector  (Fine,  2003b; Smith,  2004).    This  revision  remains  however  aligned  with  the  underlying theoretical  foundations  of  privatisation,  with  technical  facilitation  of  private sector operation lacking recognition of local political, social and cultural factors determining performance and operation of the programme (ibid.).      The  history  of  the  donor‐sponsored  privatisation  programme  in developing  countries  demonstrates  a  shift  in  sector  investment  trends,  with parallel  trend  of  performance  characterised  by  dispute,  renegotiation  and cancellation  of  contracts.    Considering  the  need  for  improvements  in  water service  provision  in  developing  countries,  the  purported  improvements associated with  the privatisation programme appear  to be significantly at odds with the experience of privatisation where implemented.   Where efficiency and sustainability of operation, investment and improved management are proposed, the privatisation programme deriving  from  the body of neo‐classical  economic theory  in  fact  manifests  itself  as  something  quite  different,  with  frequent disputes,  renegotiations  and  cancellations.    The  performance  and  operation  of privatisation  where  implemented  in  the  water  sector  in  developing  countries appears  to  diverge  significantly  from  those  propositions  of  the  rationalising theory of privatisation.      
Motivation for research  The conditions encountered in the water services in many developing countries are proposed  to be  improved  through  the  introduction of  the private  sector  in systems of provision: poor management,  low  levels of  investment or  increased demand  for  services  is  proposed  to  be  resolved  through  improved  efficiency, sustainability, better management and utilisation of resources results.   Equally, privatisation reduces the impact on service provision of the public sector, of the purported  inefficient and political or personal utilisation of resources  in a non‐optimal  manner.    Yet,  in  practice  what  results  from  the  introduction  of  the private  sector  in  water  service  provision  is  problematic  implementation  with frequent  disputes  and  subsequent  renegotiations  or  cancellations  of  contracts.  This divergence in proposed and actual performance and operation of PSP in the water  sector  motivates  the  consideration  of  the  basis  for  such  a  divergence.  Considering  the  programme  of  privatisation  of  water  service  provision rationalised by efficiency of operation of  the private sector,  to what degree are those  determining  factors  observable  in  practice  integrated  within  the rationalising framework?  Does the rationalising of the privatisation programme, by  referring  primarily  to  the  efficiency  of  operation  of  the  private  sector, necessarily exclude the recognition of those determining factors from the outset?  To  what  degree  do  the  assumptions  and  weaknesses  associated  with  the 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rationalising theory contribute to divergence in operation and performance from that proposed?  The assessment of the underlying rationale for privatisation, and subsequently  factors  that  determine  performance  and  operation  of  the programme, provide a basis for addressing these questions, as outlined here.      The conceptual basis for privatisation derives from the conception of the individual and state, the particular capacities and associated constraint of each.  The  economic  theory  underlying  privatisation  incorporates  the  concept  of  the individual as homo economicus, with self‐interest and maximisation of personal utility  providing  the  basic  tenets  of  this  conception  of  the  individual  and  their motivation (Persky, 1995).  Such an abstraction provides a powerful tool within economic modelling and subsequently theory, and underlies the characterisation of  the  individual  in public and private sectors.   A second  important conception underlying  the  privatisation  framework  is  that  of  the  limited  rationality  of  the individual, based on limited knowledge, and subsequently the limitation of state authority  where  such  fallible  individuals  operate  in  government  (e.g.  Hayek, 1976).  Counterpart  to  this  conceptualisation  of  the  individual  and  state  is  the consideration  of  the  appropriate  mode  of  economic  organisation,  that  which provides  optimum  total  welfare.    Where  externalities  are  consequent  of  a transaction, their resolution may be best served through government or private sector  processes.    With  the  establishment  of  appropriate  property  rights  and minimal  transaction  costs,  market  resolution,  it  is  proposed,  provides  a  more efficient means by which to resolve externalities (Coase, 1960).  It further avoids the  proposed  inherent  inefficiencies  and  costs  of  government  intervention (ibid.).    The  basis  of  privatisation,  in  both  theoretical  and  ideological  terms,  is established: the inherent characteristics have inevitable consequences where the individual  is  active  in  the  public  and  private  sectors,  the  scope  of  government should  be  restricted,  and  market  resolution  of  externalities  provides  a  more efficient mode of economic organisation than government.    Property  rights  theory  advances  the  purported  advantages  established: ownership  of  rights  distributed  across  a  collective  results  in  a  potentially inefficient  use  of  resources,  free‐rider  problem,  and high  costs  of  negotiations, while  private  ownership  focuses  the  consequences  of  action  on  the  individual, with externalities associated with action being factored into decision making by that  individual,  and  with  resultant  efficiency  of  operation  and  resource utilisation (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973).  Counterpart to this, public choice theory proposes that the public sector has inherent costs related to both the activity of bureaucrats  themselves  and  to  the  bureaus  they  operate.    This  includes  the personal  gains  available  in  bureaucracy  (perks  of  the  office,  power  and  public reputation),  and  the  inefficient  operation  of  bureaus  which  follows  from  this, including the maximising of bureau budgets by those operating them.  The public individual  functions with  limited  capacity  for  profit  as  a motivating  factor  and thus  seeks  to maximise  their utility  through opportunities available  to  them  in public  office  (Niskanen,  1975).    Rent‐seeking  further  compounds  the  negative effect on economic efficiency (Krueger, 1974).    The  theoretical  framework  rationalising  privatisation  has  not,  however, developed  without  a  certain  complement  of  critique.    While  the  theoretical 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foundation  for  privatisation  describes  particular  conceptions  of  the  individual, the  state,  and  the  public  and  private  sectors,  these  conceptions  and  theories make various assumptions, and contain various weaknesses and inconsistencies that  make  their  application  in  the  water  sector  in  developing  countries potentially  problematic  in  terms  of  proposed  outcomes.    The  adequacy  of property rights theory may be questioned where complexities are introduced to the  model,  primarily  deriving  from  asymmetric  information,  and  subsequent principal‐agent  problems.    Asymmetric  information  and  incomplete  contracts entail  the  distortion  of  transfer  of  objective  and  risk  from  principal  to  agent, providing  the  possibility  of  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection.    Costs  are associated  with  these  problems,  and  their  resolution  may  require  the intervention  of  external  agencies  (Williamson,  1979;  Grossman & Hart,  1981).  With respect to public choice theory, the proposed link between bureaucrat and bureau  budget  maximisation  are  questioned,  together  with  the  supposed bilateral  relationship  of  bureau  and  sponsor  (Breton  &  Wintrobe,  1975; Conybeare, 1984).  The conception of bureaucrats as rent‐seekers is also subject to criticism concerning the necessary consideration of the social impact of each rent‐seeking activity and the subjectivism inherent therein (Hindmoor, 1999).     The water sector is characterised by conditions and qualities which entail that the privatisation of service provision takes a form which deviates from that proposed  in  the  theoretical rationale  for privatisation, and  it  follows that  these various  aspects  of  critical  appraisal  may  be  applicable.    The  reasons  for  this deviation  can  be  found  in  the  two  forms  of  particularity  of  the  water  sector: conditions of natural monopoly which characterise  the sector; and conceptions of  water  as  a  public  and merit  good,  and  as  a  human  right.    The  presence  of incomplete  contracts  and market  failure  entails  the  presence  of  the  principal‐agent problem, with distortion of risk transfer, opportunistic activity, transaction costs  and  the  inevitable  intervention  of  regulatory  agencies.    Restricted competition  under  conditions  of  monopoly,  and  subsequent  government intervention,  contradict  assumptions  made  in  the  theoretical  rationale  for privatisation.  If monopoly  provision  simply  alters  form  from public  to  private, then  the  private  enterprise  comes  to  act  as  their  bureaucratic  predecessors  in assuming  a  rent‐seeking  position,  and  information  asymmetry  is  likely  to continue  (Florio, 2004).    Institutional  consideration  is  therefore  integral  to  the application of the model to the water sector in the form of regulation, to attempt both surrogate competition and for reasons relating to the nature of water access as  citizen  and  human  right,  as  a  public  and  merit  right,  and  therefore  as  a responsibility  of  state  provision.  It  should  be  considered  therefore  that  the simple transfer of management from public to private does not necessarily result in improved efficiency.  The improved performance of privatised water services cannot therefore be derived from the proposition of public choice and property rights theory, but is heavily dependent on the conditions found in the sector and in particular the regulation of private firms.      A further level at which the theoretical rationale for privatisation may be assessed  is  that which  considers  the more  substantial  underlying  assumptions associated  with  the  above  economic  orthodoxy.   Where  the  conception  of  the individual as self‐interested, utility‐maximising and best  judge of  their needs  is 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Aims and objectives  So,  the performance of privatisation where  implemented  in  the water sector  in developing countries frequently diverges from that advanced by the proponents of  the  programme,  together with  underlying  body  of  theory  rationalising  their propositions.    Inconsistencies,  weaknesses  and  problematic  assumptions,  and their alignment with conditions typical in the water sector, are paralleled by the performance  and  operation  of  the  programme  where  implemented:  many contracts are characterised by dispute,  renegotiation and cancellation,  risk and liability  increasingly  remains with  the  government,  and  there  is  a  decrease  in private  investment  in  the  sector.    The  divergence  in  practical  implementation from  that  proposed  within  the  theoretical  rationale,  and  that  utilised  by proponents of the programme, thus provides a phenomenon and a contradiction which motivates the research of this thesis.   The following discussion describes the  examination  of  this  apparent  phenomena,  and  in  particular  the  potential linkages between, and causality of, diverging performance of privatisation from rationalising  theory  that  forms  the  basis  of  this  thesis,  and  describes  the exploration of these connections in the case study context of Ghana.    The  apparent  disconnect  between  intended  programme  operation  and that  which  is  manifest  in  reality  in  developing  countries,  suggests  the requirement for the construction of the case of privatisation in the water sector with a focus on the empirical observation of implementation of the programme, and  the  interpretation  and  mutation  of  the  policy  at  the  local  level.  The divergence  in  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed  suggests  it  is necessary not only to look at the concrete objectively observable characteristics of conditions  in  the water sector, but also the actions and conceptions of  those operating therein.   The scope and nature of research is thus determined in part by  this  necessary  form  of  investigation,  and  as  such  takes  place  within  a constructivist and interpretivist research framework.  Subsequently,  it  is  possible  to  establish  more  detailed  scope  and particular lines of investigation by which to examine phenomena associated with water  privatisation  in  developing  countries.      This  is  primarily  defined  by  the overarching  hypothesis which  subsequently  guides  further  research  questions, that  which  states  that  the  weaknesses,  inconsistencies  and  problematic assumptions of the rationalising theory of privatisation provide a foundation for the  divergence  in  performance  and  operation  of  the  programme  from  that proposed within  this  rationale,  and,  subsequently,  the  validity  of  this  rationale for application in the water sector in developing countries should be questioned.  Questions  to  be  addressed  within  such  an  examination  are  various,  covering connections  between  theory  and  practice.    The  disparity  between  the propositions and reality of privatisation is the motivating context for this thesis: 
why  is  there  a  divergence  in  the  propositions  associated  with  the  theoretical 
rationale  and  actual  performance  and  operation  of  the  programme  where 
implemented  in  the  water  sector  in  developing  countries?    Subsequently, considering  the particular aspects of  this rationale:  to what extent, and  in what 
ways,  do  the  component  theories  of  this  rationale,  and  their  weaknesses, 
inconsistencies  and  problematic  assumptions,  contribute  to  this  divergence? 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Relating  to  the  contextual  implementation:  in  what  respects  do  the  conditions 
typically found in the water sector in developing countries undermine the validity 
of  the  theoretical  framework  for  application  in  this  context?    Regarding  the implementation of  the programme:  to what  extent  are  local  conditions  –  social, 
political and institutional norms and capacities – recognised in the form and mode 
of implementation of the privatisation programme?  More speculatively then: does 
ideological  commitment  to  the  programme,  founded  on  an  inherently  flawed 
theoretical  model  and  applied  in  contradictory  conditions,  negatively  affect  the 
likelihood  of  coherence  with  local  environmental  conditions  and  thus  more 
successful  operation?    Finally:  does  the  theoretical  framework  rationalising 
privatisation provide a valid basis for application in the water sector in developing 
countries?   Identifying potential linkages between these factors – flaws in theoretical rationale  and performance diverging  from  that proposed – provides  an  insight into role of contract design, implementation and administration in performance and operation,  and  subsequently  the means by which policy development may be revised to address such diverging performance.    It  is  intended that,  through this process, this thesis identifies the particular aspects of implementation of PSP which  contribute  to  the  process  of  dispute,  renegotiation  and  cancellation  of contracts  which  characterises  the  programme  where  attempted  in  the  water sector.    In  providing  examination  of  such  details  of  PSP  in  the  water  sector, research  here  provides  a  counterpart  to  other  studies  considering  various aspects  of  provision  as  noted  above.    In  this  endeavour,  the  thesis  intends  to highlight aspects of the underlying rationale for privatisation that contradict the intended aims of the reform programme, prove problematic in implementation, and subsequently provide a basis for revised policy development.     Subsequent to the determination of a hypothesis and associated research questions, the scope and nature of the research framework is further determined by  consideration  of  appropriate  and  practical  data  collection.    Considering  the mode  of  implementation  of  the  privatisation  programme,  and  the  scope  and nature of investigation as determined above, the scale of research is necessarily coherent.    Research  is  undertaken within  a  case  study  context  at  the  national scale, providing specific advantages when attempting to assess the privatisation programme in developing countries.  The reception, interpretation and mutation of  privatisation  in  developing  countries  contribute  to  its  differential performance.  Similarly, the activities associated with privatisation – those which derive  from  the  ideological  commitment  to  the  programme  in  contradictory conditions – are  implicit within the policy framework, yet also contribute to  its performance.  These factors are only evident within the national context, and as such  require  study  at  this  level.    The  approach  further  provides  the interpretative framework essential for the understanding of the implementation of  privatisation  in  the  national  context  of  the  developing  country.    The opportunity that is afforded by the case study for the contextualised appreciation of a broad programme, such as privatisation, is important, and it is the intention for the case study to be an instructive example of a more general phenomena. 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 Sub‐Saharan  Africa  is  typically  characterised  by  the  most  acute conditions,  in  terms  of  resource  wealth,  infrastructure  condition,  requirement for  expansion  of  service  provision,  or  institutional  capacity.    Data  collection  is aided  significantly  by  the  contemporaneity  of  operation  of  PSP  (in  terms  of engaging  actors  involved  in  PSP,  for  example),  hence  the  investigation  of  PSP contract  active  at  the  time  of  study  is  thus  preferable.    Just  as  location  and contemporaneity inform the selection of study, the scale of the study requires to be consistent the intended aims of investigating implications for performance of the rationalising theory.  The consideration of implementation of privatisation at the national scale  is  the most obvious and coherent scale at which to study the performance of  the programme,  in terms of assessing  integration with national institutional and policy environment for example.      The selection of Ghana as the case study country provides an opportunity to  examine  one  of  the  most  recent  instances  of  the  implementation  of  the privatisation programme.   The privatisation contract was initiated in 2006, and implementation is ostensibly in the form of a management contract with various agencies and institutions being formally involved in its operation – including the government, regulator, state holding company, private company, state enterprise commission  –  together with  other  agencies  informally  involved,  such  as NGOs.  The  form  of  contract  and  the  methods  utilised  in  implementation  provide  an instance  of  the modified  approach  of  programme  sponsors which  follow  from previous experiences which characterise privatisation  in  the sector as  typically diverging  from  proposed  performance.    This  therefore  adds  to  the  value  of researching  this  particular  case.    Fieldwork  was  undertaken  in  2009,  with examination  of  the  performance  and  implementation  of  the  contract  involving primarily  qualitative  data  collection  substantiated  and  contextualised  with analysis of broader secondary and quantitative data.  Interviews were conducted with individuals working for various agencies noted above, with the intention of assessing  the  extra‐economic  factors  which  appear  determinant  of  contract completion  and  performance.    Further  analysis  of  secondary  data  regarding performance  of  the  service  provider  permits  the  assessment  of  technical performance,  and  analysis  of  contract  and  policy  documentation  complements the technical and extra‐economic analysis.    
Organisation of thesis  The  thesis will  be  organised  as  follows.    Chapter  two describes  the  theoretical rationale  underlying  the  privatisation  programme,  together  with  the  various established critiques of  this  rationale,  and  their  relation  to  conditions  typically found  in  the  water  sector.    The  chapter  further  offers  a  review  of  the  more substantial  critique  of  theory  deriving  from  conditions  of  the  sector  –  the conditions of natural monopoly, public and merit good status, which undermine basic  conceptions of  the underlying economic  theory.    Chapter  three  considers the implementation of privatisation in the water sector in developing countries, covering  the  change  in  form  of  privatisation  (dependent  on  performance  and investor  interest),  and  the  operation  and  performance  (characterised  by disputes,  renegotiations and cancellations of contracts).   The chapter considers 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Theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation:  associated  underlying 
inconsistencies,  weaknesses  and  problematic  assumptions,  and  their 
correlation with water sector particularities   When assessing the performance of privatisation of water services in developing countries,  it  is necessary  initially  to consider  the  theoretical  foundations of  the policy  programme.    Privatisation  finds  its  theoretical  rationale  in  a  particular conception  of  the  inherent  capacity  of  the  public  and  private  sectors,  deriving from  the  inherent  capacity  and  tendencies of  those  individuals working within each sector, and the necessary scope of government intervention.   Neo‐classical economic  theory  provides  the  basis  for  this  conception,  and  includes  the centrality  of  the  self‐interested,  utility  maximising  individual,  and  the  self‐determination  of  this  individual  both  in  relation  to  their  needs  and  in  their relation  to  the  state  structure.    The  mode  of  economic  organisation,  and  the associated  scope  of  government  intervention,  thus  finds  a  basis  in  such  a conception of the individual.   The limitation of state intervention which follows from  this  conception  of  the  individual  is  advanced  where  externalities  are considered,  where  the  greater  efficiency  of  resolution  through  market transaction is proposed (Coase, 1960).  The basis for the conception of inherent capacities  of  private  and  public  sectors  is  thus  established,  with  further particular theories extending this analysis.     Further specific  theories describe  the  intrinsic superiority of  the private sector,  with  parallel  inherent  problems  associated  with  the  public  sector. Property rights theory provides an assessment of the performance of individuals under varying systems of rights ownership, concluding  that  the externalities of individual  action,  which  do  not  impact  on  individual  decision‐making  under communal  rights  systems,  are  internalised  under  private  property  rights  (e.g. Demsetz, 1967; Alchian & Demsetz, 1973).   Public  choice  theory proposes  that under  public  ownership,  the  welfare  cost  is  increased  through  inefficient resource use and costly monitoring procedures (Niskanen, 1968; Krueger, 1974).  The combination of these fields of theory therefore provides a foundation for the implementation of privatisation of service provision.      As  will  be  maintained  here,  the  somewhat  rudimentary  theoretical rationale  for  privatisation  may  be  questioned  where  basic  assumptions  are abandoned.  Primarily deriving from the abandonment of complete information, propositions  of  property  rights  theory  may  be  undermined  where  applied beyond  this  abstraction.    Where  this  is  the  case,  assumed  propositions  of property  rights  theory  may  be  attenuated  through  a  complication  of  the principal‐agent  relation,  increased  transaction  costs,  and  moral  hazard  and adverse  selection problems  (e.g. Grossman & Hart,  1981 & 1983a; Williamson, 1979).    Regarding  public  choice  theory,  there  are  inconsistencies  in  the particular theories, for example relating to manifestation of personal utility (e.g. Sigelman, 1986), or to total utility following from rent‐seeking (e.g. Khan, 2000a; Hindmoor,  1999).    Coherence  and  consistency  of  the  theoretical  rationale  for 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privatisation may  therefore  be  questioned  in  general  terms.    This  is  furthered where  the  basic  conception  of  the  individual  as  central  to  the  neo‐classical framework  is  brought  into  question,  and  as  will  be  noted  in  this  chapter, conceptions  of  universal  need,  as  contrasting  to  individual  self‐determination, undermine this conception.  A final consideration to be made when assessing the underlying  theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation  is  the  likely  correlation  of assumed conditions,  and  those various aspects of  the  critique of  this  rationale, with conditions found in the water sector.  It will be maintained here that these conditions  typically diverge significantly  from those assumed  in  the underlying rationale,  and  frequently  correspond  to  the  identified  weaknesses, inconsistencies  and  assumptions  of  the  rationalising  theory.    This  divergence may be attributed to two aspects of water service provision: natural monopoly, entailing market failure; and, water as a resource is characterised by qualities of public and merit good, and as a human right.    The chapter will be structured as follows.  The first section considers the basis  for  the  rationale  for  privatisation,  including  the  conception  of  individual and state and particular rationalising theories.  The second section considers the weaknesses  of  each  theory  in  general  terms, where  assumptions  are  removed, and where  inconsistencies  assessed.    The  third  section  offers  a  critique  of  the underlying  conception  of  the  individual,  and  the  fourth  section  considers  the correlation of these various aspects of critique with conditions typically found in the water sector.     
2.1  Theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation:  conceptual  basis  and 
particular theories  Privatisation,  as  a  preference  of  private  over  public  modes  of  production  or service  provision,  incorporates  a  particular  view  of  each  of  private  and  public sectors,  and  an  associated  conception  of  state  capacity.    At  the  foundation  of propositions regarding the superior capacity of the private sector and associated inferiority of the public sector, and limitation of state intervention, is a particular conception  of  the  individual  and  their  inherent  tendencies.    The  innate propensity  for  self‐interest  and  maximisation  of  personal  utility  provides proponents of privatisation a foundation for claims regarding efficient resource utilisation where the individual operates in the private sector and corresponding inefficient utilisation where in the public sector.  The intervention of government in  the  economy,  on  the  basis  of  resolution  of  externalities,  further  provides  a basis  for  the  proposed  efficiency  of  private  sector  operation  incorporated  in public choice and property rights theories.    
Conceptual basis for privatisation: the individual and state  Initially, it is necessary to consider the theoretical basis to the conception of the state‐individual relationship that underlies the privatisation programme, and the conception of  the  individual  as homo economicus,  as  central  to much economic modelling.    Self‐interest  and maximisation of personal utility provide  the basic tenets  of  this  conception  of  the  individual  and  their  motivation,  with  an 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associated  concept  of  rationality  of  action.    As  shall  be maintained  here, while this  conception  establishes  the  basis  of  individual  action within  each  of  public and  private  sectors, when  considering  the  implications  of  bounded  rationality, limited  capacity  for  knowledge  and  subsequently  constrained,  the  implications for privatisation theory may be twofold.    The  basis  of  economic modelling  in  the  conception  of  the  individual  as self‐interested and seeking to maximise their personal utility provides the field with a powerful tool by which to assess resource utilisation and exchange.  Homo 
economicus,  frequently  considered  to  find  origins  in  early  neo‐classical  work such  as  those  of  John  Stuart  Mill  (Persky,  1995),  is  a  powerful  tool  in  the abstraction  of  social  relations  and  resource  transfer  for  the  purposes  of economic  modelling.    The  conception  of  the  individual  as  motivated  by  self‐interest  and  maximisation  of  personal  utility  simplifies  motivation  of  action, entailing  predictability  and  thus  modelling.    Associated  with  these  proposed character traits is rationality of choice within those alternatives available to the individual.    Such  a  characterisation of  the  individual  is  acknowledged,  even by those purported  to be principal  advocates of homo economicus as a  conceptual tool  (including  Mill),  to  be  an  abstraction,  with  alternate  motivating characteristics pertinent in individual action (ibid.).  Regardless, this abstraction provides  a  potent  force  in  economic  theory  and  its  subsequent  application beyond the realm of abstract modelling.    Relevant application may be seen first in Hayek (1976), whose conception of  the  individual  as  limited  in  rationality  provides  a  basis  both  for  the incorporation of market failures but also limitations to state intervention.  Hayek provides  an  assessment  of  the  limitations  of  individual  knowledge  and rationality  which  can  be  countered  against  that  assessment  central  to  the rational  choice  model,  and  which  he  formulates  as  a  departure  of  the  ‘true individualism’ of the British theorists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from  the  ‘so‐called’  individualism  of  the  Cartesian  school.    Regarding  ‘true individualism’, Hayek considers  this  to be “an antirationalistic approach, which regards man not as a highly rational and intelligent but as a very irrational and fallible being” (ibid. 8).  Furthermore, it is “a product of an acute consciousness of the limitations of the individual mind [while the Cartesian School] is the product of  an  exaggerated belief  in  the powers of  individual  reason”  (ibid.).    Following from the limited rationality of the individual, the responsibility of those in power should be  limited, and that where  institutions  intervene  in economic processes they should evolve organically  rather  than be planned.   Reason, as  the basis of individual  action,  is  a  socially  developed  concept  and  therefore  no  individual should be allowed unilaterally to “pass final  judgement on the capacities which another possesses or  is  to be  allowed  to  exercise”  (ibid.).    It  follows  from  this, firstly,  that  imposition  of  centrally  defined  laws  should  be  prevented  and organically  developed  laws  preferred,  and  secondly,  that  unilateral  and potentially  authoritarian  or  coercive  power  should  be  restricted.    Such characteristics of government are easy to identify with the characteristics of the ideological programme of which privatisation is typically part, where the state is conceptualised  rather  as  a  medium  for  the  establishment  of  the  conditions  in which individual freedom may be exercised. 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 Thus  a  privatisation  programme  is  presented  with  two  aspects  of validation in the particular conceptions of the individual presented here.  As self‐interested  and  pursuing  maximisation  of  personal  utility,  the  individual possesses  characteristics  at  the  foundation of  purported  inherent performance of public and private sectors, to be discussed below.  The capacity and extent of state  intervention  is  further  described  by  the  limitation  of  rationality  of  the individual, and thus the limitation of those individuals within the state structure.  The  ideological  potency  of  this  conception  of  the  individual  and  their  freedom relative to the state offers a further tool by which promotion of any privatisation programme may be advanced.  
Economic organisation and government intervention: resolution of externalities  The  consideration  of  the  appropriate  degree  of  government  intervention  in economic  transactions  finds a basis  in  the analysis of externalities.   Where any activity  has  an  associated  impact  on  individuals  not  party  to  the  contract,  this may be considered as a positive or negative externality dependent on the nature of  this  impact.    Common  examples  of  negative  externalities  include  pollution resulting  from  factory  activity,  or  where  positive,  improved  environmental conditions  consequent  of  private  forests,  parks,  land  etc.  (e.g.  Pigou,  2010).  Those theorists working within the  field debate the means by which to resolve such externalities to achieve equalisation of private and social net products, with a divergence between  those proposing  resolution  through market mechanisms and  those  maintaining  the  necessary  intervention  of  government  (e.g.  Pigou, 2010;  Coase,  1960).    Proponents  of  market  resolution,  as  associated  with  the subsequent conceptions of property rights and public choice theories, maintain the greater efficiency of this mode of resolution.      The proposed resolution of externalities through market interaction, and subsequent  associated  support  for  property  rights  and  public  choice  theory, finds  its basis  in  the countering of proposed  inevitability of  resolution  through government intervention.  Consideration of externalities can be seen to originate in  the work of Pigou  (2010).   Concerned with  the maximisation of  total utility, Pigou  recognised  the  divergence  of  marginal  social  and  private  net  products negatively  affects  this  potential  maximisation.    Pigou  proposes  that,  due  to externalities affecting those other than contract parties,  the modification to the contractual  relation  will  not  resolve  the  internalisation  of  such  externalities.  Resolution, therefore, must be made through state intervention:   “It  is  plain  that  divergences  between private  and  social  net  product  of  the kinds  we  have  so  far  been  considering  cannot,  like  divergences  due  to tenancy  laws,  be  mitigated  by  a  modification  of  the  contractual  relation between any two contracting parties, because the divergence arises out of a service or disservice rendered to persons other than the contracting parties. It  is,  however,  possible  for  the  State,  if  it  so  chooses,  to  remove  the divergence in any field by ‘extraordinary encouragements’ or ‘extraordinary restraints’ upon investments in that field.”  (Pigou, 2010) 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The  proposed  required  government  intervention  for  the  internalisation  of externalities is thus established.      Contrary to Pigou’s interpretation of the resolution of externalities, other theorists  maintain  that  market  interaction  may  provide  an  alternate  means.  Such a proposition finds its basis primarily in the work of Coase (1937 & 1960), where, for the resolution of externalities by negotiation between affected parties, Coase relies on the requirement of the appropriate attribution of property rights and a minimal incidence of transaction costs (ibid.).  Coase in this sense counters Pigou’s  reliance  on  government  intervention  through  the  proposition  of  the alternative reliance on common law remedies and property rights:    “Coase,  in  contrast  to  Pigou,  assumes  a  Lockean  system of  property  rights where rights evolve from and are enforced by private action and private law.  Property  rights  are  endogenous  to  the  market  process.  Like  Pigou,  Coase focuses on transaction costs, but because of his recognition of actions taken at  common  law,  Coase  sees  far  fewer  instances  of  unaddressed  external costs.  Coase  provides  profoundly  important  insights  as  to  how  markets operating  within  a  rule  of  law minimize  all  forms  of  cost,  including  those termed externalities.”  (Barnett & Yandle, 2009: 133)  Thus,  where  property  rights  are  attributed  appropriately,  internalisation  of externalities  is  more  likely,  and  thus  there  is  an  improved  condition  of  total utility, of social product relative to private product (Coase, 1960).  This provides a basis for the advancement of property right attribution for the improvements of total utility through the reduced impact of externalities.      What  has  become  known  as  the  Coase  theorem  is  premised  on  this requisite attribution of property rights, together with the absence of significant transaction costs.   Coase recognises the implications of such constraints for the likelihood of  resolution and  internalisation of  externalities  through  the market mechanism.  The potential costs associated with market transactions incorporate market research, contract design and monitoring, and negotiations.  Where these costs are significant, and where  they are greater  than the potential gains made from  the  transaction,  the  transaction  will  not  take  place.    At  this  point  the consideration  of  alternate  means  of  resolution  should  be  made,  whether  by organisation  within  a  single  entity  the  firm  –  which  has  associated administrative costs, or ultimately through government intervention.  The latter may be particularly  appropriate where  there  are  significant  costs,  for  example due to large numbers of affected parties (Coase, 1960).   However, the nature of government and potential exposure to political influence entails costs:   “[T]he governmental administrative machine  is not  itself costless.  It can,  in fact,  on  occasion  be  extremely  costly.    Furthermore,  there  is  no  reason  to suppose  that  the  restrictive  and  zoning  regulations,  made  by  a  fallible administration  subject  to  political  pressures  and  operating  without  any competitive  check,  will  necessarily  always  be  those  which  increase  the efficiency  with  which  the  economic  system  operates.    Furthermore,  such general  regulations  which  must  apply  to  a  wide  variety  of  cases  will  be 
  16 
enforced in some cases in which they are clearly inappropriate.  From these considerations  it  follows  that  direct  governmental  regulation  will  not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm.”  (Coase, 1960: 18)  While emphasising comparison of costs of each mode of economic organisation in  resolution  of  externalities,  the  emphasis  on  the  costs  associated  with government intervention provides a basis for the subsequent centrality of these costs within public choice theory (Barnett & Yandle, 2009).      The  centrality  of  potential  costs  of  government  intervention  and  the potency of  appropriate property  rights,  and  the  assumptions necessary  for  the efficiency of market resolution, provide a basis for the utilisation of the issue of externalities  resolution  to  advance  either  market  or  government  resolution.  Those proposing the necessary intervention of government in many instances of externality  identify the assumptions necessary for the more efficient resolution through  market  transactions  to  be  so  significant  as  to  render  the  analysis impotent in real world conditions:   “It is clear […] that transactions costs are a crucial variable in the selection of suitable institutional mechanisms for the modification of externality. Unless ways can be found to reduce the transactions costs associated with market solutions,  market  solutions  […]  will  remain  the  plaything  of  academic economists,  largely  ignored  by  policy  makers  and  the  general  public.”  (Randall, 1972: 182)  The  significance  of  transaction  costs  noted  here  by  Randall,  and  their implications  for  the  intervention  of  government,  are  countered  elsewhere  by proponents of market resolution.  As noted by Barnett & Yandle, the intervention of  government  should  be  weighed  against  the  benefit  resulting  from  that intervention – a point they maintain  is overlooked by many social scientists, as “the  concept  of  externality  is  so  powerful  and  so  pervasive  as  to  relegate neoclassical welfare analysis to the academic dustbin” (Barnett & Yandle, 2009: 135).    The  failure  to  consider  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  implications  of externalities by proponents of government intervention combines with the likely public choice issues:   “[G]overnment  agencies  are  not  perfect  institutions,  and  public  decision‐makers are neither omnipotent nor pure public servants. Hence, even a clear instance of market failure may not justify a government attempt at remedy.”  (ibid.: 146)    The  consideration  of  the  resolution  of  externalities  provides  further conceptual background to the subsequent particular theories that are utilised in the  validation  of  privatisation.    The  attempts  to  assess  the  form  of  economic organisation  appropriate  to  particular  transactions,  and  subsequently  the optimisation  of  total  utility,  establishes  the  basis  by  which  to  promote  the importance  of  property  rights  attribution  and  the  potential  negative  impact  of public  sector  intervention.    Despite  the  necessary  assumptions which  underlie 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the ‘Coase theorem’, this analysis provides a potent foundation for proponents of the programme.   
Particular theories rationalising privatisation: public choice theory  Public  choice  theory  considers  the  operation  of  publicly  managed  and  owned goods and service production, and maintains that it has inherent costs related to both the activity of bureaucrats themselves and to the bureaus they operate.  The former concerns the personal gains possible  in holding a bureaucratic position, and  includes  perks  of  the  office,  power  and  public  reputation.    The  latter concerns the inefficient operation of bureaus which follows from this, including the  maximising  of  bureau  budgets  by  those  operating  them.    Public  choice theorists argue further that the frequent misguided consolidation of bureaus in state  formations  leads  to  the  formation  of  a  ‘bilateral  monopoly’  with government, with  the  consequence of  absence of  competition  and measures of performance.      The central proposition of public choice theory is that the self‐interested, utility maximising individual, where active in a role of public office, will use their position  in  a  way  that  negatively  affects  economic  efficiency.    The  public individual  functions with  limited capacity  for profit  as a motivating  factor,  and thus  seeks  to maximise  their utility  through opportunities available  to  them  in public  office.    As  Niskanen  (1968:  293)  notes,  “the  several  variables  that may enter the bureaucrat’s utility function are the following: salary, perquisites of the office,  public  reputation,  power,  patronage,  ease  of  managing  the  bureau,  and ease  of  making  changes”.    Thus  inefficiencies  of  public  ownership  and management derive from the utility maximisation available to the public sector individual.    In  the  course  of  maximising  personal  utility,  bureaucrats  are  also inclined to maximise the budget of their bureau, aiding the ease of operation of the bureau and  the  improvement of  their personal power  and public  standing.  However,  the  tendency  to  inflate bureau budgets  is not  generally  conducive  to their  efficient  operation,  furthering  the  inefficiencies  apparent  in  the  personal utility  maximising  of  public  officials  (Niskanen,  1968).    The  maximising  of bureau  budgets  often  takes  the  form  of  overcapitalisation,  as  “a  bureaucrat's rewards  are  specific  to  his  tenure  in  that  position;  this  leads  him  to  prefer present  spending  to  future  spending  and,  thus,  to  prefer  production  processes with  higher  capital  costs  and  lower  operating  costs”,  with  short‐termism  thus characteristic (Niskanen, 1975: 639).      Inefficiencies of  operation of public bureaucracies  are  intensified where the actions of private  firms are subject  to  regulation or state approval of  some function of their operation.  Krueger (1974), in an assessment of import licensing as a case of inefficiencies resulting from state intervention, maintains that firms expend  resources  competing  for  a  limited  numbers  of  licenses  or  licenses apportioned  relative  to  firm  size  –  resources which  are  non‐productive.   Most importantly  for  public  choice  theory,  Krueger  further  maintains  that  in  the competition for licensing, resources are devoted to less formal or illegal means of influencing  public  officials  with  the  intention  of  gaining  favour  for  their  firm.  The  firms  active  in  such  transfers  thus  divert  resources  from  productive 
  18 
operations to competition with other firms for rents sought by public officials: a welfare  cost  incurred  through  the  intervention  of  the  state  and bureaucrats  in economic transactions (ibid.).    Public  choice  theory  further  describes  the  inefficiencies  resulting  from the typical structural formation of public bureaucracies.  Niskanen (1975) notes the  tendency  in  state  structures  for  bureaucracies  to  be  consolidated,  with production of a particular good or service being limited to one bureaucracy.  This is final contention of public choice theory: the cost of monitoring bureaucracies.  Where competition between producers of goods and services is present, the cost of  monitoring  is  reduced  or  eliminated  through  the  increased  incentive  for efficiency.  Conversely, where production is restricted to monopoly agencies as is the  case  for  public  bureaucracies,  the  cost  of  monitoring  increases.    The incentives for monitoring are reduced as the costs increase, a process increasing the  potential  for  inefficiency  of  operation  of  the  bureaucracy.    Costs  of monitoring public agencies is thus further reason for proponents of public choice theory to oppose the operation of such agencies, favouring instead the inherently efficient private sector.      The  costs  of  rent‐seeking,  of  the  lack  of  competition,  and  of monitoring public bureaucracies entail  a welfare cost which  impact on  the performance of public production and services (Tullock, 1967).  Public choice theorists therefore recommend  that  where  public  production  is  deemed  necessary  following consideration  of  externalities,  their  operation  should  be  modified  to  better resemble  the operation of  the private sector.   Where services have been under public  ownership  and  management  and  their  performance  has  come  under scrutiny,  public  choice  theory  provides  an  explanatory  framework  for  this performance.   
Particular theories rationalising privatisation: property rights theory  Just  as  proponents  of  privatisation  may  cite  public  choice  theory  in  a  critical appraisal  of  the  operation  of  services  under  public  control,  they  may  further refer to property rights theory in calling for the expansion of private operation of services.   Property rights theory maintains that ownership of rights distributed across a collective results in a potentially inefficient use of resources, free‐rider problem, and high costs of renegotiations of rights where circumstances change.  On  the  contrary,  private  ownership  focuses  the  consequences  of  action  on  the individual, with externalities associated with action being factored into decision making by that individual.     Just  as  the  existence  of  externalities  provides  the  basis  for  potential government  intervention  and  therefore  public  choice  issues,  they  further provide  the  basis  for  the  consideration  of  the  importance  of  property  rights.  Coase  (1960)  noted  the  importance  of  the  definition  of  these  in  the  market resolution  of  externality  problems,  and  this  importance  attributed  by  Coase mirrors  that  of  Hayek.    The  concept  of  the  state  and  individual  of  Hayek incorporates  ‘abstract  principles’,  including  the  concept  of  private  property, 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which  promotes  in  the  individual  responsibility  for  their  actions,  including negative externalities:   “The  endeavour  to make man  by  the  pursuit  of  his  interests  contribute  as much as possible to the needs of other men leads not merely to the general principle  of  ‘private  property’;  it  also  assists  us  in  determining  what  the contents  of  property  rights  ought  to  be  with  respect  to  different  kinds  of things.  In order that the individual in his decisions should take account of all the physical effects caused by these decisions, it is necessary that the ‘sphere of responsibility’ of which I have been speaking be made to comprise as fully as possible all  the direct effects which his actions have on  the satisfactions which other people derive from the things under his control.”  (Hayek, 1976: 17)    The importance of property rights as alluded to by Hayek is taken up by other  theorists  in  the  development  of  property  rights  theory,  in  particular Demsetz (1967) and Alchian & Demsetz (1973).  Differential systems of property rights – be they communal, private and a mixture of these – provide a basis for the differential operation of social structures.   Property rights  theory therefore defines ownership as “socially recognised rights of action”, whereby the right to use resources is defined by the ability to benefit from resources or, alternatively, the proscription  from harming others by use of  resources  (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973:  17).    The  incorporation  in  property  rights  of  both  positive  and negative effects of resource use, for both the individual and others, entails that the effect of  externalities  on  individual  action  is  dependent  on  the  degree  to  which ownership is allocated to the individual.    Where communal property rights exist, maintains Demsetz (1967), there is no means by which externalities associated with resource use can be brought to bear on the individual which make use of the resource.   Communal property rights determine that resources may be used on a ‘first come first served’ basis, with neither  the  state or  individual  able  to  restrict use by any  individual.   The result of this system, argues Demsetz (1967), is both inefficient resource use and potential  harm  to  other  individuals.    Furthermore,  the means  by which  such  a system  of  property  rights  is modified  relies  on  the  consent  of  each  individual within that society, with the result that transaction costs of such negotiations are significant  (Alchian  &  Demsetz,  1973).    Ultimately,  the  costs  of  inefficient resource use, harm associated with  that use, and high costs of  transactions are not borne by the individuals which engage in the use of those resources.      Consequently,  proponents  of  this  theory  consider  a  system  whereby private property rights are allocated to individuals to be superior.  In legislating a system of private property rights,  the “community recognises the right of  the owner  to  exclude others  from exercising  the owner’s private  rights”  (Demsetz, 1967:  354).    Referring  to  land  use,  Demsetz  (1967)  describes  the  benefits  of private property rights:    “In  effect,  an  owner  of  a  private  right  to  use  land  acts  as  a  broker whose wealth depends on how well he takes into account the competing claims of 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the  present  and  the  future.    But with  communal  rights  there  is  no  broker, and  the  claims  of  the  present  generation will  be  given  an  uneconomically large weight in determining the intensity with which the land is worked.  … [P]rivate  ownership  of  land  will  internalise  many  of  the  external  costs associated with  communal  ownership,  for  now  an  owner,  by  virtue  of  his power  to  exclude  others  can  generally  count  on  realising  the  rewards associated with husbanding the game and increasing the fertility of his land.  This  concentration  of  benefits  and  costs  on  owners  creates  incentives  to utilise resources more efficiently.”  (Demsetz, 1967: 355‐356)  
Implications in privatisation policy  The above discussion describes the various aspects of the theoretical framework which  rationalises privatisation programme.   The  foundation  is  established  for the  propositions  regarding  efficiencies  and  costs  of  private  and  public  sectors, contained  in  property  rights  and  public  choice  theories  respectively, subsequently  advancing  the  optimal  utilisation  of  resources  as  is  the  central concern of  this body of  theory.    This  theoretical  basis provides  various  factors which  may  inform  privatisation  policy  where  implemented  in  practice.    The determination  of  policy  may  be  seen  to  derive  from  aspects  of  theory  which describe  the particular mode of  economic  organisation,  including  the  extent  of activity  of  public  and  private  sector,  but  furthermore  the  role  of  such  a  policy within broader political and social programmes.     Regarding  the  former,  the  particular  mode  of  economic  organisation  is intended  to  bring  about  greater  efficiency  of  operation,  and  subsequently  the more productive utilisation of resources, as the primary objective of the policy.  Thus,  following  from  the  above  theoretical  basis,  privatisation  policy  should incorporate  the necessary  factors  of  competition,  flexibility  of  operation of  the private  sector,  the  sufficient  attribution  of  property  rights,  and  the  parallel reduction  in  the  scope  of  intervention  of  political  actors.    The  transfer  to  the private  sector  affords  the  more  efficient  operation  or  production  through competition  between  firms,  both  for  consumers  and  in  the  capital  market (Parker,  1993).    In  addition  the  attribution  of  property  rights  to  those responsible for the operation of privatised enterprises entails the internalisation of  externalities  associated  with  the  operation  of  that  enterprise  by  those responsible, thus ensuring that costs and benefits associate with the standard of operation  are  borne  by  those  responsible.    It  is  intended  therefore  that  the interests  of  the  enterprise  become  purely  commercial,  with  the  political  and personal  interests purportedly  inherent  to  the public  sector bureaucrat  absent from the incentive to act (Vickers & Wright, 1989).   Thus inefficiency following from the alternative, non‐commercial, incentives of the public sector is removed, permitting the more efficient and productive utilisation of resources within the concern  of  the  enterprise  (ibid.;  Parker,  1993).    Costs  associated  with  the monitoring  of  public  agencies  are  removed,  with  transaction  costs  associated with market provision and resolution of externalities proposed  to reduced and subsequently contributing further to the improved efficiency under this mode of economic organisation. 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In  turn,  this  shift  from  public  to  private  sector  and  the  associated alteration  of  incentives,  is  intended  to  remove  further  aspects  of  the mode  of operation  of  public  sector  agencies.    Further  efficiencies  are  proposed  to  be realised through the change in culture, associated with the change in incentives, to that of enterprise, not restricted by bureaucratic red tape (Vickers & Wright, 1989; Healey,  1993).    In  parallel  the mode  of  operation  as  determined  by  the, typically unionised,  labour  force of  the public sector,  is  to be modified  through the change to the private sector, with the removal of  the purportedly  inflexible nature  of  modes  of  operation  of  unionised  labour  –  a  further  inhibition  to enterprise and improved efficiency (ibid.; Heald, 1989; Florio, 2004).    The  various  aspects  of  the  rationalising  theoretical  framework  may therefore be  formulated  in a policy programme that  is designed  to bring about the  efficiency  that  is  the  central  concern  of  this  framework.    Competition,  the establishment  of  sufficiently  well  defined  property  rights,  the  introduction  of flexibility in operation, as well as the parallel reduction in the role of the public sector  and  its  associated  non‐commercial  mode  of  operation  are  all  aspects contained within a privatisation policy programme.    These  particular  factors  which  contribute  to  the  formulation  of privatisation  policy  and  associated  objectives  may  further  be  component  to  a broader programme, the objectives of which are coherent with and aid those of the particular privatisation programme.  Thus, just as the specific objectives of a privatisation programme may incorporate the revision of the mode of operation of an enterprise to remove the inefficiencies associated with a bureaucracy, the broader environment within which privatisation is implemented may be the site of  further  consequential  objectives  of  such  a  programme.    Central  to  the conceptual  basis  underlying  the  theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation  is  the consideration  of  the  individual  as  best  judge  of  their  needs,  against  the determination of need by the state, and as such the concept of public good may be contradictory.  The introduction of the private sector therefore has the further intention  of  the  revision  of  what  is  conceptualised  as  a  common  good,  and therefore  subject  to  subsidisation:  costs  should  be  recovered  within  the operation of that enterprise (Vickers & Wright, 1989; Florio, 2004).    Just  as  the  underlying  concepts  associated  with  the  rationalising theoretical  framework  are  evident  in  the  potential  realisation  of  individual responsibility  and  consumer  choice,  it  may  further  be  effected  through  a privatisation programme and its consequential impact on the mode of operation of the public sector.  Thus, individualism may further be evident in the effect on the  nature  of  the  workforce  and  prior  unionisation  thereof  as  noted  above.  Broader effects deriving from such a policy may be considered as a process of the deconstruction of the state – the revision of conceptions of common good, of the role of the public sector in the provision of such goods, and the extension of the primacy of the market, of commercial operation and the role of the state  in the administration of such a system (Florio, 2004). 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Summary  The  above  discussion  describes  the  theoretical  basis  for  the  promotion  of  a privatisation  programme,  from  the  initial  conceptual  basis,  to  the  particular theories  describing  the  purported  operation  of  public  and  private  sectors,  and the  subsequent  realisation  in  the  form of policy.    The basis  for  the  component theories of public choice and property rights,  is found in, firstly, the conception of  the  individual  as  self‐interested  and  utility  maximising.    The  form  of  state following from the conception of the individual with bounded rationality is that of  limited  intervention.   The  limitation of state  intervention  is  furthered where consideration  of  externalities  is  made,  and  while  costs  of  each  mode  of organisation  should  be  considered  relative  to  gains,  there  is  a  basis  for  the proposed  inherent  advantages  of  property  rights  and  costs  of  public administration.  These conceptions and propositions may be formulated in policy that  implements  competition,  the  definition  of  property  rights  for  the  private sector, flexibility in operation for the private sector and the parallel reduction in scope  of  the  public  sector.    The  central  explicit  concern  of  the  theoretical framework, that of improved efficiency and optimised utilisation of resources, is therefore  promoted.    Beyond  the  particular  aspects  of  the  policy  programme, privatisation  may  have  further  effects  in  the  broader  impact  on  the  political, social and institutional of its environment, with such effects being coherent with a broader ideological programme aligned with the conceptions of the underlying theoretical rationale.     
2.2  Weaknesses  and  inconsistencies  in  the  theoretical  rationale,  in 
general terms  The  purpose  of  the  following  discussion  is  to  assess  the  validity  of  the  above theoretical  framework where basic assumptions are relaxed, where application to  real  world  economic  and  social  conditions  is  considered,  and  where  other theoretical  inconsistencies  are  revealed.    It  will  be  maintained  here  that  the theoretical  framework  rationalising  privatisation,  consequent  of  some  of  those central  assumptions,  offers  an  over‐simplified  conception  of  economic organisation  and  transaction  therein.   Where  complexities  of  exchange,  and  in particular  the  failure  of  transfer  of  property  rights  to  the  private  sector,  are introduced, propositions of the rationalising theory may be undermined.   
Public choice theory  The  consequence  of  the  employment  of  the  self‐interested  individual  in  the public  sector  is  the  diversion  of  resources  from productive  use.    This  happens both in the overproduction that follows from the budget‐maximising bureaucrat conceptualised  in  the  theory  of  Niskanen  (1968),  and  in  the  rent‐seeking developed by Krueger  (1974).    The  theory  regarding bureaucrats  proposed by Niskanen  has  drawn  numerous  criticisms,  notably  regarding  assumptions concerning maximisation  of  bureau  budget  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  the utility  maximising  behaviour  of  the  individual,  and  the  supposed  bilateral relationship  of  bureau  and  sponsor,  amongst  other  issues.    The  conception  of 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bureaucrats as rent‐seekers is also subject to criticism concerning the necessary consideration  of  the  social  impact  of  each  rent‐seeking  activity  and  the subjectivism inherent therein.      The main criticisms made of Niskanen’s (1968; 1975) theory relate to the two  central  assumptions:  firstly,  that  the maximisation  of  the  bureaus  budget follows from utility maximisation of the individual:   “The  central  motivational  hypothesis  of  Niskanen's  model  is  that bureaucrats  maximize  the  size  of  the  budget  under  their  control.    This  is justified on two main grounds: first, on utility‐maximizing ground, since it is asserted that income, prestige, power, emoluments, and other amenities are a positive monotonic function of budget size; and second on survival ground, since  pressure  from  subordinates  for  larger  budgets  on  the  one  hand  and from executive and legislative committees on the other is said to ensure the survival  of  budget‐maximizing  bureaucrats  only  in  the  same  way  that competition  among  firms  dictates  the  survival  of  profit  maximisers  only.”  (Breton & Wintrobe, 1975: 196)  The second assumption regarding the bilateral monopoly relationship of bureau and sponsor can in fact be better characterised as a monopoly position held by the  bureau  –  as  the  agent  holds  information  advantages  (Breton  & Wintrobe, 1975; Conybeare, 1984).     It  follows  from  the  power  of  the  bureau  relative  to  the  sponsor  that Niskanen considers  the  latter  to be effectively  impotent, and  thus  the potential for government to limit the budget maximising of the bureau is considered to be limited.    The  passivity  of  the  government  can  be  questioned  however,  as  the government inherently has an interest in the performance of bureaus tasked to carry  out  services  and will  implement monitoring  of  bureaus  for  this  purpose (Breton & Wintrobe,  1975).    Furthermore,  considering  the  interest  in  efficient operation  of  the  government,  it  follows  that  bureaucrats  may  in  fact  have  an interest  in  the minimisation of bureau budgets.   As  Sigelman  (1986) notes,  for the self‐interested bureaucrat,  the maximising of bureau budget may  in  fact be self‐defeating, and “counterproductive … for the bureaucrat, since it undermines the  credibility of his budget  requests”  (ibid.: 53).   Thus  ‘doing a good  job’ may result  in  budget  minimisation,  and  further  demonstrates  the  notion  of  ‘public service’  and  commitment  to  duty  (ibid.).    Thus  the  transposition  of  a  model which considers the objective utility to encompass only profit to the analysis of the public sector comes to be problematic, as Margolis observes:   “My  unease  with  the  utility‐reward  function  is  compounded  by  the dimensions  of  the  bureau  which  are  used  in  the  analysis:  variables  like quantity of output, minimum costs, marginal valuation functions, and so on which are borrowed from the analytical concepts of a private market system. Output in the market economy is what economists try to explain, and costs and  valuations  are  major  variables.    But  output  may  not  be  the  most interesting  aspect  of  government  and  costs  and  values  may  not  explain 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government  behaviour,  except  as  very  broad  surrogates  for  demand  and supply.”  (Margolis, 1975: 650)  Application of self‐interest and utility maximisation as  the motivation of action may not be applicable in the public sector.    The  validity  of  Niskanen’s  propositions may  be  further  disputed where they  are  applied  to  the  actual  process  of  implementation  of  privatisation.  Dunleavy (e.g. 1985; 1986), with reference to privatisation in the UK, maintains that  the propositions encompassed within  the public  choice model  are at odds with the actual experience in this context.  This is true firstly in the sense that, if bureaucrats enjoyed the degree of control over budgets that Niskanen proposes and  have  an  interest  in  their maximisation,  then  resistance  to  privatisation  of their bureaus activities is likely to be significant (especially with the transfer of high level bureaucrats to the private sector being unlikely).  The capacity of the public  choice model  to  explain  the privatisation  ‘boom’  in  the UK  in  the 1980s may  therefore be questioned, as  this boom “has  taken off  so  fast and met with such  low‐level  resistance  from  the  public  service  bureaucracies”  (Dunleavy, 1986:  17).    Secondly,  the  propositions  of  the  public  choice  model  regarding bureaucratic structures and budgets are far removed from the actual experience in the UK.  Rather than a bureaucratic ‘hierarchical line agency’, bureaucracies in the  UK  take  a  more  fragmented  and  interwoven  structure  (ibid.).    Dunleavy maintains  that  it  is  typical  that  a multitude of  individual bureaucrats  influence budgetary decisions, with consequent collective action problems:   “There  is  likely  to  be  a  collective  action  problem  in  policy  level  officials collaborating  to  advocate  budgetary  expansion,  since  the  net  utilities accruing  to  senior  bureaucrats  will  be  small,  and  discounted  by  the probability that their involvement will be decisive in securing extra funding. Unless this side of the equation exceeds their probably substantial personal advocacy  costs,  rational  officials  would  do  best  to  free‐ride  on  other bureaucrats'  efforts  rather  than  to  actively  budget‐maximize.”    (Dunleavy, 1986: 19)   The work of Dunleavy presents therefore further evidence that the public choice model  provides  an  over‐simplified  account  of  the  connection  between bureaucrats’ self‐interest and the supposed growth of bureau budgets, with little regard for the other avenues in which self‐interest may be served.      Public  choice  literature  is  further  developed  through  the  concept  of  the rent‐seeking public official  (Krueger 1974). The central  assumption underlying the rent‐seeking case as presented by Krueger is that rent‐seeking is inherently undesirable – that it necessarily results in an obstruction to the maximisation of social  welfare.    This  may  be  challenged,  firstly,  by  the  contention  that  rent‐seeking  may  contribute  to  greater  social  welfare  when  considering  long‐term economic development (Khan 2000a & 2000b).  Technological advancement, for example,  is  important  for  long‐term  improved  efficiency,  and  patents  may  be necessary  for  the  incentivising  of  investment  in  such  advancement.    The necessarily  static  analysis  of  the  neo‐classical  model  cannot  incorporate  such 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long‐term  factors,  and  thus,  while  rent‐seeking  in  this  case  produces  a potentially beneficial outcome (in welfare maximisation terms), it would not be considered so under Krueger’s conception of rent‐seeking (ibid.).   Rent‐seeking as  a  process  necessitates  that  any  analysis  of  such  activity  incorporates  the factors which influence the particular individual active in rent‐seeking.     A second challenge to rent‐seeking considers the theoretical consistency of the literature underlying the rationale for privatisation, and whether this can be  questioned  through  the  reassessment  of  the  implicit  centrality  of  the subjective  interpretation  (Hindmoor,  1999).    The  rent‐seeking  argument developed  by  Krueger  centres  on  the  conception  of  rent‐seeking  as  inherently undesirable,  as  an  obstruction  to  maximised  social  welfare.    Rent‐seeking  is necessarily  behavioural  therefore,  yet  considering  the  existence  of  patents,  for example, there is  implicitly a  judgement regarding the desirability of  individual cases  of  rent‐seeking.    Hindmoor  maintains  that  judgements  made  regarding rent‐seeking inherently involves a subjective consideration of the social value of that  activity  –  in  the  case of patents  a positive  social  value  judgement  is made and the rent‐seeking permitted.   However, subjective judgements regarding the social  value  of  rent‐seeking  may  only  be  made  retrospectively,  and  the abandonment  of  subjectivism  contradicts  the  underlying  tenet  of  neo‐classical economic  approach  –  an  “apparent  intellectual  inconsistency”  (ibid.:  440).  Hindmoor concludes:   “Only by abandoning subjectivism is it possible to identify instances of rent seeking  prospectively.    Yet  abandoning  subjectivism  is  not  costless.  It reduces the theory of rent seeking to the expression of personal preference.”  (Hindmoor, 1999: 451)  
Property rights theory  For  the  propositions  of  the  property  rights  theorists  to  be  realised,  there requires to be a complete transfer of rights, and various assumptions are made in the modelling of this process.  Included here are completeness of information and  subsequently  contracts,  together with  a  basic  conception  of  the  principal‐agent relation and subsequently ease of  transfer of  interests and objectives.    In practice however, such assumptions may easily be undermined and shown to be an abstraction of  real world process and contractual  relations.   Various  factors follow  from  this  information  condition  which  undermine  propositions  of  the rationalising theory, including those of adverse selection and moral hazard, and consequent  principal‐agent  problems.    Transaction  costs  associated with  these factors,  together with  those  resultant of  externalities,  further  contribute  to  the divergence  of  real  economic  conditions  to  those  envisaged  within  the rationalising theory.     Much of the critique applicable to property rights theory finds a basis in the  distribution  of  information  between  contract  parties.    Where  this distribution  is  asymmetrical,  and  is  typical,  the  potential  for  contracts  to  be complete, for monitoring to be possible, for objectives to be transferred between principal and agent,  is undermined.   Subsequently, efficiency  is diminished and 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increased  costs  are  introduced.  The  propositions  of  traditional  economic analyses may be undermined where  these  factors  are  taken  into  consideration (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Stiglitz, 2000).      Where  information  is  incomplete,  the  price  system  fails  in  the communication of all relevant information for those involved in the transaction (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 2000).  This is recognised initially by Akerlof (1970) with reference to the used car market, where buyers may be exposed to uncertainty regarding  the  quality  of  the  product  –  and  price  is  determined  by  the  typical market  rate  rather  than  quality.    Thus  whereas  traditional  analysis  considers price to represent all  information required for the buyer’s decision, in this case price  fails  to  distinguish  between  products  of  good  or  poor  quality.    A  further example  concerns  the  loan  market:  where  there  is  an  increased  demand  for loans, traditional analysis would propose those seeking loans would be prepared to  pay  a  higher  rate.    However,  to  the  bank  offering  the  loan,  this  would  be perceived as a higher risk loan, where those individuals willing to pay more do not  intend  to  repay  (Stiglitz  &  Weiss,  1981).    In  this  case  the  price  system provides a mechanism which results in the undersupply of loans, with perceived risk not necessarily aligning with actual risk due to information asymmetry.     This  initial  analysis  is  taken  further by  authors  seeking  to  expand upon what  actions  may  be  taken  to  counter  the  impact  of  asymmetric  information.  Asymmetric  information  plays  a  role  in  the  identification  of  characteristics  of those  involved  in  transactions  –  the  adverse  selection  problem,  and  the subsequent  monitoring  of  individuals  involved  in  the  transaction  –  the  moral hazard problem.   Regarding  the  adverse  selection problem,  it  is  proposed  that screening is utilised by the principal to determine the characteristics of the agent (Stiglitz, 1975b; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), and signalling is, in turn, utilised by the agent  to  confer  those  characteristics  (Spence,  1973).    Concerning  the  latter, Spence (1973) uses  the context of  the  labour market  to demonstrate signalling by the agent, in this case the prospective employee, to the principal, in this case the  employer.    The  characteristics  of  the  potential  employee  may  not  be absolutely  observable  and  calculable  by  the  employer  ex‐ante,  with  the  hiring decision being made under a degree of uncertainty.    It  is  in the  interests of  the potential  employee  to  signal  to  the  employer  their  characteristics,  for  example through  qualifications,  to  improve  differentiation  between  candidates  (Spence, 1973;  Stiglitz,  1975b).    Resources  utilised  in  the  process  of  signalling  are  not necessarily  productive,  with  certain  candidates  remaining  unemployed,  while those  similarly  qualified  are  employed  (Stiglitz,  2000).    Similar  resources  are expended  by  the  employer  in  the  screening  of  potential  employees  –  which concerns  the  mechanisms  by  which  the  principal  may  distinguish  between agents  (education  institutions,  employment  agencies,  appearance,  background etc.) (Stiglitz, 1975b).    Regarding  the  moral  hazard  problem,  asymmetric  information determines  that  actions  of  the  agent  cannot  be  completely  contracted,  and subsequently  that  contracted  actions  cannot  be  assumed.    As  Stiglitz  (1974) notes, regarding labour contracts, labour input is characterised by both time and effort, and while the former is easy to contract and monitor, effort may comprise 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pace of work, thoroughness, efficiency and inventiveness of the individual, with these various aspects being difficult to measure and monitor.  Contracts may be designed  in  such  a  way  as  to  induce  effort  from  the  agent:  risk  may  be distributed more evenly between principal and agent (for example in the form of sharecropping with investment from the agent) (Stiglitz, 1974); or, effort may be induced  through  a  combination  of  time  and  piece  rates  (Stiglitz,  1975a).    The particular  form of contract and remuneration  in  turn affects  the  likelihood and requirement  for  monitoring  of  the  agent.    Supervision  or  monitoring  has associated  costs  however,  and  should  be  evaluated  relative  to  results  (Stiglitz, 1975a).    The consequences of adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and the various mechanisms that may be employed to counter their effects, may be seen  in  increased  transaction costs, multiple equilibria with varying degrees of efficiency, and the importance of institutions in countering these issues.  Where costs  are  expended  in  the  resolution  of  such  issues,  and  such  costs  outweigh benefits, resolution may not occur:   “[W]henever information is  imperfect or markets […] are incomplete – that is,  essentially  almost  always  –  competitive  markets  are  not  constrained Pareto efficient.   Taking into account the costs of  improving information or creating  markets,  some  individuals  could,  in  principle,  be  made  better  off without making anyone else worse off.”  (Stiglitz, 2000: 1458)  Information  asymmetry  thus  underlies  a  significant  contribution  to  the explanation  of  real  economic  phenomena,  as  “[t]he  usual  result  of  economic theorizing:  that  prices  clear  markets,  is  model  specific  and  is  not  a  general property  of markets  –  unemployment  and  credit  rationing  are not  phantasms”  (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981: 409).  Furthermore, the resolution and administration of such  phenomena  resulting  from  imperfect  and  asymmetric  information demonstrated the  importance of  institutions – beyond the assumed efficiencies of the market (Stiglitz, 2000).   The identification of  imperfect and asymmetric information as critical to the  study  of  real  economic  phenomena  provides  a  basis  for  the  subsequent analysis of  the propositions of property  rights  theory.   The potential principal‐agent problems which follow from asymmetric information, and the transaction costs  which  may  be  associated  with  these  problems  contribute  to  the undermining of propositions of this body of theory.   Within principal‐agent and transaction cost economics literature, incomplete knowledge and the subsequent implications for the completeness of contracts underlies the problematic transfer of  interest  and  liability,  and  the  potential  for  opportunism where  information gaps exist (Klein et al, 1978).    If there is complete information, then transfer of interest  from  principal  to  agent  may  be  possible  in  any  organisational  mode (Schmidt, 1996).  Thus where incomplete information and contracts exist, there are consequences for the potential alignment of  interest of principal and agent, with potential  for opportunism on  the part of  either party  (Williamson, 1979).  Consequently,  whichever  non‐contracted  aspects  of  the  transaction  exist,  the 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party  with  ‘residual  control  rights’  may  determine  the  outcome  with  respect those aspects:   “One  of  the  insights  of  the  recent  literature  on  the  firm  is  that,  if  the  only imperfections  are  those  arising  from  moral  hazard  or  asymmetric information, organisational form ‐ including ownership and firm boundaries ‐ does not matter: an owner has no special power or rights since everything is specified in an initial contract (at least among the things that can ever be specified).  In  contrast,  ownership  does  matter  when  contracts  are incomplete:  the  owner  of  an  asset  or  firm  can  then  make  all  decisions concerning the asset or firm that are not included in an initial contract (the owner has 'residual control rights').”  (Hart, 2003: C70)    The existence of incomplete contracts and the potential for opportunism creates particular problems for the principal  in the transfer of objectives to the agent.   This could be  in  the  form of a  failure  to exert  the agreed upon effort  in their duties, with the principal being unable to monitor such a possibility (moral hazard), or the ex‐ante misrepresentation on the part of the agent of their ability and  capacity  to  engage  in  the  contracted  obligations  (adverse  selection) (Eisenhardt,  1989;  Grossman  &  Hart,  1981).    In  each  case  the  opportunism exhibited by the agent is consequent of their knowledge of incomplete contracts, of  their  residual  right  of  control with  respect  those  aspects  of  the  transaction.  For example, an agent may be cognisant of the potential for ex‐post renegotiation of  terms,  or  of  other  forms  of  opportunism,  they  may  ex‐ante  ‘low‐ball’  their contract bid (Williamson, 1971; Hart & Moore, 2006).      Opportunism as a mechanism by which transfer of interest and objective from  principal  to  agent  is  distorted  is  mirrored  elsewhere  by  factors  such  as limitation of liability and risk.  In practice, in order to attract the agent to take on the  contract,  the  degree  of  risk  transferred may  be  limited, with  the  principal retaining some element of risk.   The resultant outcome may not therefore align with the principal’s goals:   “Risk sharing between principal and agent can also act as a form of insurance for the agent.  When he is effectively insured against bad outcomes under the optimal  contract,  the  agent  will  exert  less  effort  to  avoid  these  bad outcomes.” (Sappington, 1991: 49‐50)  Furthermore, where  the agent has  to bear  risk,  a premium may be paid  to  the agent  to  compensate  them  for  the  risk  they  bear.    As  Sappington  and  Stiglitz (1987) note, when  the sub‐optimal performance of  the agent  is combined with the risk premium which may be paid, the costs to the principal may be significant (ibid.).     In addition, the environment within which the contract exists may impact on the likelihood of opportunism, with factors such as trust, reputation, identity and  potential  future  business  offering  implicit  mechanisms  of  control (Williamson, 1979; Arrow, 1969; Klein et al, 1978; Hart & Moore, 2006).  Where risk is high there is greater potential for integration of tasks within the firm, to 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avoid  contract  opportunism  –  “one  would  expect,  accordingly,  that  vertical integration  would  be  more  complete  in  a  low  –  trust  rather  than  high  trust culture” (Williamson, 1971: 122).  Or, as Arrow (1969: 14) speculates:   “Nonmarket  action  might  take  the  form  of  a  mutual  agreement.    But  the arrangement of  these  agreements  and especially  their  continued extension to new individuals entering the social fabric can be costly.  As an alternative, society may proceed by internalization of these norms to the achievement of the  desired  agreement  on  an  unconscious  level.    There  is  a  whole  set  of customs and norms which might be similarly  interpreted as agreements  to improve  the  efficiency  of  the  economic  system  (in  the  broad  sense  of satisfaction  of  individual  values)  by  providing  commodities  to  which  the price system is inapplicable.”    Williamson  and  Arrow  here  indicate  the  potential  role  of  the  social  and institutional  environment  within  which  contracts  are  executed,  and  their determination  of  the  impact  of  opportunistic  behaviour.    The  specificity, frequency  and  degree  of  uncertainty  determine  the  nature  of  governance structures and their associated costs (Williamson, 1979).     A  final  component  of  the principal‐agent  relation  that  is  relevant  to  the analysis  of  the  validity  of  property  rights  theory  for  rationalisation  of privatisation is the potential complexity introduced through multiple principals.  Where multiple principals exist, the subsequent negative effect on the proposed benefits of private ownership is increased where the principal cannot be defined as a singular entity.  Multiple principals exist, firstly, in the form of shareholders, in the case of joint stock companies, where the short term interests in profit may contradict  those  long  term  interests  of  the  management  and  the  future prosperity of the firm.   Secondly, where the government exists as a principal,  it should  not  necessarily  be  considered  as  a  singular  entity.    As  Laffont &  Tirole (1991: 103) note, “the formalization of the government as a single principal is an oversimplification. In practice, the executive, legislative, and judiciary, as well as the  interest  groups  that  lean  on  them,  act  (or  do  not  act)  on  behalf  of  the electorate”.    Where  the  private  manager  is  exposed  to  multiple  principals, whether  private  shareholders  or  various  government  entities  (or  both),  a differentiation  in  the  goals  of  these  principals  negates  the  inherent  efficiency, following from the singular goal of profit, claimed under property rights theory.  
Summary  It  has  been  demonstrated  that  in  the  case  of  both  property  rights  and  public choice  theories  that  the  relaxation  of  assumptions  and  the  introduction  of additional  layers of complexity undermine  the propositions of  the rationalising framework.    In  the  case  of  property  rights  theory,  assumptions  regarding complete  information and  contracts  are  shown  to be problematic, with  limited transfer of objectives, risk and liability from principal to agent as a consequence.  Costs associated with contractual relations are  further aspects contradictory  to the propositions of  the theory,  including those of  the  institutional environment within with economic transactions are executed.  Regarding public choice theory, 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inconsistencies  are  shown  to  exist,  with  inherent  bureaucratic  budget maximisation  being  questionable  –  on  the  grounds  of  self‐interest  of  the bureaucrat,  who  is  interested  in  career  advancement  for  example,  and  on  the grounds  of  public  service  motivations  contradictory  to  the  assumed  interest associated with  the neo‐classical model.   Propositions of  rent‐seeking  theorists may be questioned when considering positive rent‐seeking such as patents, and the subjective judgements associated with such instances.  It is therefore evident that there is substantive work that contradicts the proposed benefits of a move from public  to private production and service provision.    Increased complexity necessary  for  the  application  of  models  to  real  world  social  and  economic conditions undermines these propositions.     
2.3  Critique of the underlying assumptions of the neo­classical model  In  addition  to  the  problems  associated with  the  specific  theories  as  described above,  there  remain  further  broader  assumptions  underlying  the  theoretical framework of privatisation.   These assumptions relate  to  the conception of  the individual,  and  to  the  judgement  of  need  for  services  remaining  with  the individual.    The  conception  of  the  self‐interested  utility maximising  individual underlies  the  subsequent  consideration  of  their  being  best  judge  of  their  own needs with the market as a means of expressing such preferences.   However, in practice  normative  objective  judgements  are  frequently  made  regarding minimum  human  needs.    This  is  particularly  true  for  services  and  water provision  in particular, where market prices may determine provision may not be universal.    It  has  been  noted  above  that  the  limited  information  and  knowledge  of the individual necessarily limit their scope for decision‐making.  While bounded rationality thus underlies the conception of the individual‐state relation which is counterpart to the rationalising model, Simon (1978 & 1986) also maintains that the limited rationality is problematic where economic theory is applied beyond the  traditional  sphere  of  abstract  economic  modelling.    While  the  concept  of rationality exists in other social sciences, and is in fact critical to their operation, there  is  significant  deviation  in  the  understanding  of  the  concept  outside  neo‐classical economics:   “In  its  treatment  of  rationality,  neoclassical  economics  differs  from  other social sciences in three main respects: (a) in its silence about the content of goals and values; (b) in its postulating global consistency of behaviour; and (c)  in  its  postulating  ‘one world’  –  that  behaviour  is  objectively  rational  in relation  to  its  total  environment,  including  both  present  and  future environment as the actor moves through time.”  (Simon, 1986: S210)  Consequently,  where  applied  in  differential  contexts,  the  approach  encounters differential conditions that require a modification of the approach:    “As  economics  expands  beyond  its  central  core  of  price  theory,  and  its central concern with quantities of commodities and money, we observe in it 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this  same shift  from a highly quantitative analysis,  in which equilibrium at the margin plays a central role, to a much more qualitative analysis, in which discrete structural alternative are compared.”  (Simon, 1978: 6)  Simon  (1978  &  1986)  further  maintains  that  the  necessary  modification  of economic  theory,  where  applied  in  qualitative  analysis,  is  a  move  from substantive to procedural rationality.   The latter conceptualisation incorporates a shift toward the approach of other social sciences that focus not on the choices resultant  from  rationality,  but  the  processes  employed  in  rational  decision‐making.      In  contrast  to  this  theorising  within  the  economic  framework,  other authors  offer  a  broader  critique.    The  accuracy  and  validity  of  the  numerous theories  offered  as  support  for  privatisation  can  be  called  into  question  by  a critical  assessment  of  their  common  underlying  assumption  regarding  the motivations  of  individual  action.    The  conception  of  the  individual  as  self‐interested  and  utility‐maximising may  aid  the  theorising  of  abstract  economic problems,  but  its  application  to  the  real world may  be  limited.    As  Sen  (1977: 318) asks: “why would one choose an assumption which [is] believed to be not merely inaccurate in detail but fundamentally mistaken?”  Economists operating with this assumption, necessarily limiting the scope of their work to the abstract questions which they propose to answer:   “The primary concern here  is not with the relation of postulated models to the  real  economic world, but with  the accuracy of  answers  to well‐defined questions posed with preselected assumptions which severely constrain the nature  of  the  models  that  can  be  admitted  into  the  analysis.    A  specific concept of man is ingrained in the question itself, and there is no freedom to depart  from  this  conception  so  long  as  one  is  engaged  in  answering  this question.   The nature of man  in  these  current  economic models  continues, then,  to  reflect  the  particular  formulation  of  certain  general  philosophical questions posed in the past.  The realism of the chosen conception of man is simply not a part of this inquiry.”  (Sen, 1977: 322)   While the assumption of the self‐interested, utility‐maximising individual is acknowledged by those theorists working within the neo‐classical framework, the consequent  limited application of the results of  their theory  is perhaps  less explicit.    Buchanan  &  Tullock  (1962)  admit  the  limitation  of  his  work  in  this sense:  “…  only  if  the  economic  motivation  is  sufficiently  pervasive  over  the behaviour  of  all  participants  in  market  activity  can  economic  theory  claim  to have  operational  meaning”.    The  implicit  acceptance  here,  therefore,  is  that economic theory cannot  incorporate  in  this  form the  factors  that are necessary for  an  accurate  analysis  of  social  reality.    The  admittance  of  problematic assumptions  underlying  neo‐classical  economic  is  however  frequently  absent where theory is utilised (e.g. Shirley & Walsh, 2001).    In  furthering  his  critique  of  neo‐classical  economic  theory,  Sen  (1977) goes  on  to  assess  an  instance  of  ‘non‐egoistic’  individual  action  which demonstrates  the  inadequacy  of  the  theory.    In  demonstrating  this,  Sen 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distinguishes  between  sympathy  and  commitment  based  action.    The  former does  not  impact  individual  utility  while  total  welfare  improves:  empathetic action  which  remains  to  be  egoistic.    Contrasting  with  this  however,  is  the individual  that  has  a  preference  for  an  alternative  that  results  in  a  lower personal  utility  than  another  alternative.    In  this  circumstance,  the  individual anticipates  that  total  welfare  will  be  increased  through  their  preference  for lower personal utility.   Action such as this on the part of the individual indicate the assumption underlying neo‐classical economic theory is inadequate:   “On  the  other  hand,  commitment  does  involve,  in  a  very  real  sense, counterpreferential choice, destroying the crucial assumption that a chosen alternative must  be  better  than  (or  at  least  as  good  as)  the  others  for  the person  choosing  it,  and  this  would  certainly  require  that  models  be formulated in an essentially different way.”  (Sen, 1977: 328)  Sen’s concept of commitment therefore “drives a wedge between personal choice and  personal  welfare,  and  much  of  traditional  economic  theory  relies  on  the identity  of  the  two”  (ibid.:  329).    Sen  proposes  that  the  while  concept  of commitment  may  not  enter  many  day‐to‐day  interactions  of  individuals,  it  is particularly  important  when  considering,  for  example,  voting  decisions  or decisions regarding public goods.     In  the  individual‐state  relationship  noted  previously,  the  individual remains the determinant of their action, with the state acting not as the enforcer of predetermined, centrally defined laws, but as the facilitator of freedom under the  law  (Hayek,  1976).    Objective  or  normative  conceptions  of  need  are  thus theoretically  incompatible with  the  neo‐classical  economic model.    As Doyal & Gough (1991: 3) note, “we are thus faced with the paradox that an idea which is still regularly used in the practice of social policy and in much political discourse is  regularly  rejected  in  the  domain  of  theory”.    Thus,  theoretical  framework underlying  privatisation  in  fact  lacks  the  theoretical  framework  for  the incorporation of normative  judgements  regarding,  for example, public or merit goods.    Furthermore,  where  rationality  is  accepted  as  being  limited  then  the judgement of the individual as being the best in determining their needs may be questioned.    Thus,  the  measurement  of  the  individual  want‐satisfaction  by reference  to  individual  preferences may  never  be  adequate  due  to  incomplete subjective  knowledge.    Where  an  objective  measure  of  want‐satisfaction  is introduced, the premise of subjective determination is shown to be problematic.  Doyal & Gough go on to assess potential characteristics of objective needs, noting that  a  limited number of physiological needs may be  considered as objectively definable needs.  A particular case is that of water, whereby a minimum amount of water can be determined as a ‘need’ for which provision may be determined to be  necessary.    The  objectivity  of  such  a  need  is  aided  by  the  common  cross‐cultural  understanding,  developed  through  interaction,  of  basic  needs  of  a human being.   Water can be conceived of as a basic precondition for  individual action,  and  as  such  the  provision  of  such  a  resource  can  be  linked  to  the avoidance of harm to the individual (Doyal & Gough, 1991).   Physiological need for water may be objectively definable and therefore implemented through state 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policy,  rather  than subjectively defined with  the potential  for harm against  the individual without access to the resource.      The  concerns  regarding  the  capacity  of  the  neo‐classical  economic framework  to  encompass  differential  conditions  in  analysis  of  real  world contexts is echoed by Udehn (1996).  Udehn emphasises the conceptions of homo 
oeconomicus  and  homo  sociologicus,  with  the  former  focusing  on  rationality oriented to outcome, the latter on norms which “tell us what is right to do, or not to do,  in a certain situation,  irrespective of outcome” (ibid.: 7).   For the former, “[e]conomic man is one, and constant; human nature and humanity consequently a  homogeneous  population”  (ibid.).    It  follows  that  the  potential  for  each approach  to  social  science,  deriving  from  homo  oeconomicus  and  homo 
sociologicus, to provide a valid and useful analysis of real world social events and processes diverges.     Despite  the  concerns  regarding  the  concept  of  the  individual  outside abstract modelling,  the  strength  of  the  approach  still  derives  from  its  notional universality and objectivity.  However, the assumptions and idealised conditions central to the neo‐classical approach have taken on a particular potency deriving from its supposed qualities, and that what was proposed as a positive approach with an  inherent advantage over normative welfare economics, has  itself  taken on  normative  characteristics.    As  Udehn  notes  citing Weber,  “theoretical  ideal types easily turn into normative ideal types” (1996: 174):     “Public choice, we recall, started as a movement against welfare economics.  The  latter  was  accused  of  being  normative,  and,  above  all,  of  lacking  in realism.    Public  choice,  on  the  contrary, was  launched  as  uncompromising realism,  depicting  man  as  the  selfish  creature  he  really  is.    Today  public choice itself appears no less ‘idealistic’, both descriptively and normatively.”  (Udehn, 1996: 181)  Considering  this  development  of  neo‐classical  economics,  property  rights  and public  choice  theory  take  on  a  meaning  and  power  in  their  reception  and utilisation  in  broader  social  analysis  and  beyond  which  is  not  explicit  in  the theoretical detail.   This development has broader social repercussions, with the neo‐classical  approach  having  a  status  not  as  an  objective  and  positive theoretical  basis,  but  as  an  ideological  force.    Citing  Mannheim’s  concepts  of ideology, Udehn describes the economic approach (what he terms public choice):    “Ideology may be defined as a  ‘system of values and beliefs about the good society’,  an  ideal  to  be  realised.    Ideology  may  be  defined  as  a ‘misrepresentation  of  social  reality,  biased  in  a  certain  way  to  serve  the interests  of  a  social  class,  or  social  group’.    Public  choice  is  an  ideology  in both  these  senses.  […]    I  discussed  public  choice  theory  as  a  normative theory, or  ideology, based on  the value of  individualism and  the belief  that this  value  is maximised by  voluntary  exchange  –  the market  as  utopia.    In this section, I suggest that certain elements of public choice make it into an ideology also  in  the Marxist  sense:  a  theory  that misrepresents  reality  and introduces bias in order to justify a free market society.”  (Udehn, 1996: 189) 
  34 
  
2.4  Practical  implementation  of  privatisation:  policy  assumptions, 
particularities of the water sector and correlations with theory  Where assessing the implementation of privatisation it  is necessary to consider the nature of the policy as formulated in practice and the environment in which implementation is made, which subsequently provides a basis for the assessment of  their  contribution  to  the  divergence  between  proposed  and  actual performance and operation.  This may be performed in relation to more general assumptions  made  where  policy  is  formulated,  and  furthermore  where particular  conditions  of  the  water  sector  are  considered.    The  following discussion considers the general assumptions made in the formulation of policy, and  subsequently  focuses  on  the  particular  conditions  found  in  the  sector,  the implications  of  these  conditions  in  terms  of  the  necessary  operation  of  a regulator,  and  how  this  structuring  of  the  sector  relates  to  the  conditions assumed within the rationalising theory.  
General assumptions in the formulation of privatisation  In  the  formulation  of  a  privatisation  policy  various  assumptions  may  be necessary  for  the alignment with  idealised conditions central  to  the underlying theoretical  framework  for  the  programme,  and  subsequently  for  the  potential realisation  of  proposed  outcomes.    These  assumptions  derive  from  the conceptions basic  to  this underlying  framework, with  implications  for  the  form of economic organisation necessary, and furthermore the specificity of policy for diverse conditions.      The formulation of privatisation policy is significantly determined by the presumption  of  idealised  conditions,  as  deriving  from  underlying  theory, regarding  the  conditions of market, of  goods,  and of  environmental  conditions.  This may be seen primarily in the assumptions regarding the existence of perfect market  conditions,  include  competition,  information,  and  the  utilisation  of  the price  mechanism  as  the  determinant  of  transactions.    Transfer  to  the  private sector is intended to realise efficiency through the allocation of property rights, with subsequent improved interest of those enterprises in the improved of their utility  through  efficient  operation  and  associated  profit.    This  assumes  a competitive market structure, both in terms of product competition and capital market  competition.    It  further  assumes  the  sufficient  definition  of  property rights,  necessary  for  the  transfer  of  interest  to  the  enterprise  with  the subsequent internalisation of externalities associated with their operation.      Concomitant  to  this  is  the  condition  of  information  necessary  for  the operation  of  privatised  enterprises  as  proposed.    For  the  propositions  of  the rationalising theory to hold true where policy is formulated, information should be  sufficiently  complete  and  symmetrical  so  as  to  be  uninhibitive  to  the operation  of  the  enterprise  and  the  transfer  of  interest  from  the  principal.  Subsequently  it  is  assumed  that  contracts  are  sufficiently  complete  in  their determination of agent behaviour  in the interest of the principal.    Incorporated 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within  this  assumption  are  several  further  significant  implications  that  may affect the operation of such a programme.  This may firstly include the transfer of risk from the principal to the agent, and where this is absent or insufficient the consequence  is  the  introduction  of  further  incentive  structures  for  the  agent beyond those which would exist ordinarily in the market.  What may secondly be included  is  the  monitoring  of  agent  where  information  and  contracts  are incomplete,  contrary  to  the  assumed  exercising  of  principal  interests  by  the agent.      The  conceptualisation  of  the  individual  as  best  judge  of  their  need,  and the consequent rejection of the concept of objectively definable human need – of which  public  and merit  goods  are  typical,  leads  to  further  assumptions  in  the basis for policy.  The failure to incorporate a basis for public and merit goods in the  underlying  theory  may  contribute  to  a  failure  to  consider  the  inevitable continued  role  of  political  agencies  in  the  provision  of  such  goods.    Thus,  the assumption  regarding  reduced  political  intervention  where  privatisation  is introduced may undermine the proposition which follow from this proposition.  What follows from this is the responsibilities of the agent where engaged in such enterprises, which may  incorporate non‐market and non‐commercial  factors  in their operation.  This further may affect the degree of risk willing to be taken on by the private sector.   Such distortions thus result  from assumptions regarding the conditions of  implementation of privatisation.   The  intervention of political agencies  in  enterprises  engaged  in  the  production  of  public  and  merit  goods indicates  a  further  assumption  –  that  of  the  coherence  of  the  institutional environment of privatisation, which is implicit in the rationalising theory.      Wherever  such  assumptions  are  incorporated  in  the  formulation  of privatisation  policy,  the  consequences  are  transaction  costs  that  are  not incorporated in the underlying rationalising framework for the programme, thus contributing  to  the  divergence  in  performance  and  operation  from  that proposed.   The central motivating proposition associated with the privatisation programme,  that  which  concerns  the  improved  efficiency  of  operation  with subsequent  contribution  to  the maximisation  of  total  utility, may  therefore  be undermined.    These  various  factors  in  policy  formulation,  which  derive  from those  aspects  of  theoretical  rationale  and  its  critique  as  described  above,  are therefore likely to impact on the performance and operation of the programme where implemented.  The nature of their likely appearance in the water sector is now considered.    
Particularities of the water sector  The water  sector  is  characterised by  conditions and qualities which entail  that the  privatisation  of  service  provision  takes  a  form  which  deviates  from  that proposed  in  the  theoretical rationale  for privatisation, with potential effects on performance and operation.   The reasons for this deviation can be found in the two  characteristics  of  the  water  sector:  conditions  of  natural  monopoly;  and conceptions  of  water  as  a  public  and merit  good,  and  as  a  human  right.    The following  review  considers  each  of  these  particularities  in  turn,  providing  a 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background  to  the  necessary  intervention  of  a  regulatory  agency  as  discussed below.   “Natural monopolies exist where  there are  sufficient economies of  scale or scope  in  production  so  that  competition  raises  supply  costs.    This  is most likely  where  there  are  important  sunk  costs  in  the  form  of  networks, pipelines and similar high‐cost infrastructure.”  (Parker, 2002: 496)   The  water  services  provision  sector  is  characterised  by  conditions  of natural  monopoly,  low  cost  of  sourcing  together  with  high  cost  of  the development  of  supply  networks.    Consequently  the  initial  construction  of supply networks is a significant cost relative to the subsequent supply of water through  the  established  network.    The  provision  of  water  services  is  thus typically  characterised  by  monopoly  suppliers  of  either  a  public  or  private nature: the high cost of development of rival supply networks proves restrictive to  market  entry  (ibid.).    Economies  of  scale  are  significant  in  water  services provision,  and,  considering  technological  advances  are  unlikely  to  have  a significant impact on supply networks (Littlechild, 1988), it is likely to remain a natural monopoly sector across varied global contexts.      Parallel to the condition of water service provision as a sector of natural monopoly,  is  the  conception  of  water  as  basic  human  need  –  with  associated qualities  of  merit  good,  public  good  and  human  right.    Regarding  merit  good status,  the  provision  of  clean  water  to  each  individual  within  a  population improves the health of the whole – provision has positive externalities (Parker, 2002) – and the role of the state in ensuring provision of water is consequently in the public interest.   The nature of water as a public good is dependent on its non‐rivalry and non‐excludability in consumption – although these qualities are subject to alteration subject to the nature of the provider, as the marketisation of resource  provision  threatens  potential  exclusion  of  those  without  means  to purchase (Kaul et al, 1999).  The state therefore has a significant role to play to secure the provision of water in this eventuality.    Considering  the  characteristics  of  water  as  a  resource,  access  to  water services  are  typically  incorporated  in  various  levels  of  legislation  and international  declarations  in  an  attempt  to  ensure  the  continued  provision  of basic  levels  of  water  provision  to  those  without  the  means  to  pay.    Such assurances may be seen  in  international declarations on human rights,  such as those of  the UN,  of which  access  to  clean water  is  part.    Countries which have ratified  this  declaration  are  required  to  “take  the  necessary  steps  towards  the progressive  achievement  of  the  right  of  everyone  to  an  adequate  standard  of living, including access to water and sanitation” (UN Economic & Social Council, cited  in  Budds  &  McGranahan,  2003:  94).    Thus  basic  access  to  water  supply outlined  in UN declarations on human  rights,  supposedly,  limits  the possibility denial  of  supply  through  privatisation.    International  declarations  may  be mirrored in national level legislation, such as that in the UK where the Water Act 1998 outlawed  the disconnection  of water  provision  to  non‐paying  consumers (Lobina & Hall, 2001).  The state thus has a role in the provision of the service at a universal level, with provision either free, or at a cost which does not preclude 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its availability (Komives et al, 2005; Al Jayyousi, 2007).  Water is thus typically a right encompassed by citizenship of a given state, which thus mitigates economic inequality with  respect  scarce  resources  that  have  the  quality  of  human  right, and this process becomes institutionalised, as “citizenship controls the access of individuals  and  groups  to  scarce  resources  in  society.    These  legal  rights  and obligations, once they are institutionalised as formal status positions, give people formal  entitlements  to  scarce  resources  in  society”  (Turner,  1997:  6).   Where changes  threaten  access  rights  and  entitlements  associated  with  citizenship rights,  there  is  the  potential  for  public  opposition  to  those  changes.  Public opposition  to  the  privatisation  of  water  services  may  be  particularly  strong (Lobina & Hall,  2001),  reflecting  the distinctiveness of  the  resource.   Decisions regarding the pricing of water provision are therefore made with consideration of what is socially and politically acceptable within that particular environment.    
Necessity and forms of regulation  Considering  the  particularities  of  the  water  sector,  regulation  of  privatised service  providers  has  accompanied  the  implementation  of  the  policy.    As  a natural  monopoly,  the  sector  requires  regulation  to  better  align  conditions  to those  assumed  in  the  theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation.    The  regulator  is important  in  effecting  competition which would  otherwise  be  absent, with  the proposed  benefits  of  the  private  sector  potentially  realised  (Parker,  2002).  Regulation is further necessary for reasons relating to the nature of water access as human right, as a public and merit good, and therefore ensuring provision to the population (Parker, 2002).  Where regulation has been implemented, it takes a  form which most  closely  aligns  to  the  ideals  of  the  theoretical  rationale  for privatisation:  independence  from  potential  governmental  intervention  and discretion.      The  various  theories  which  underlie  the  rationale  for  privatisation assume the introduction of competition to accompany that of the private sector in service provision.   They conclude that “state ownership is inherently inferior to  private  ownership,  especially  where  there  is  a  competitive  capital  market [and]  this  is  supported  by  reference  to  the  efficiency  attributes  of  competitive product  markets”  (Parker,  1998).    However,  according  to  Bakker  (2005), although  there  are  five  potential  types  of  competition  available  in  the  water services industry, most of these are restricted because of the nature of the sector.  Firstly, water service provision is characterised by natural monopoly due to the vertical integration of supply networks, and thus direct competition is restricted.  This  is  limited  further  by  the  guarantees  against  competition  written  into contracts  at  the  time  of  privatisation  to  improve  initial  commercial  viability, restricting  one  potential  type  of  competition.    Second,  while  procurement competition  is  a  possible  area  for  competition,  this  is  typically  restricted  to  “a limited proportion of companies’ overall costs and activities” (ibid.: 553).  Third, the  competition  for  corporate  control  is  restricted,  as  noted  by  Bakker  with reference to England & Wales:    “[M]ergers and acquisitions resulted  in a concentration of  the  industry and mergers reduced the original thirty‐nine companies down to twenty‐two by 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2004.    As  a  result,  all  water  companies  are  now  large  enough  that  any proposed merger would  result  in  an  automatic  referral  to  the Competition Commission.” (Bakker, 2005: 554)  The  fourth  potential  avenue  is  competition  for  the  market,  through  the competitive  tendering  for  PSP  contracts.    However,  considering  the  length  of contracts for the privatised enterprises (initially twenty‐five years in England & Wales),  franchise  tendering  is  infrequent  and  this  form  of  competition  is therefore restricted.   Finally therefore, the primary means for the realisation of competition  is  through  regulation  by  comparison  of  franchise  performance, effectively “surrogate competition” (ibid.).    Considering  the  role  of  the  regulator,  its  form  in  implementation  is  one which derives from the theoretical rationale underlying the privatisation model.  The  form  of  regulation  is  therefore  one  which  attempts  to  address  issues  of political  intervention  deemed  problematic  in  public  choice  theory,  and  further seeks to   “establish a policy environment that sustains market incentives and investor confidence. For this to be achieved, the regulator needs to be shielded from political  interference,  and  the  government  needs  to  support  a  regulatory environment  that  is  transparent, consistent and accountable.”    (Kirkpatrick et al, 2006: 152)  The emphasis is on the execution of rule enforcement by an independent agency working within an  institutional and  legal  environment which provides  suitable methods  of  judicial  recourse  should  these  rules  be  contravened.    Where  an independent  regulatory  agency  operates  within  a  supporting  institutional framework,  the  private  operation  of  services  is  further  assisted  as  it  provides credibility of intended regulatory outcomes, and commitment of the regulator to regulatory rules, therefore providing stability and predictability which investors seek (Kirkpatrick et al, 2006).    
Privatisation in the water sector: implications for theory  The  conditions  found  in  the water  sector provide  an environment  significantly inconsistent with those assumed within the underlying theoretical rationale for privatisation.    Such  conditions  and  the  necessary  intervention  of  a  regulator undermine the assumptions central to the rationalising theory, and are coherent with the critical assessment of this rationale as described above.  As will be noted here, market failure as is typical in the water sector makes various aspects of this critical assessment relevant.     The  conditions  typically  found  in  the water  sector may be  seen  to  align with  those  conditions  anticipated  within  the  critical  assessment  of  property rights  theory,  with  associated  propositions  potentially  undermined.  Assumptions  regarding  complete  information  and  contracts  are  likely  to  be undermined in the water sector: this can be seen with respect to water pricing, which  is  likely  to  be  amended  ex‐post  subject  to  performance  and  political 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sensitivity.    In  this  sense,  contracts  may  be  designed  with  known  gaps  in information,  but  with  procedural  contingencies  incorporated  –  in  the  form  of regulation and associated legislation.  This provides a degree of understanding of ex‐post  behaviour  of  each  party,  but  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of opportunistic  behaviour  resulting  from  incomplete  information  and  contracts.  Because  of  the  potential  for  changes  in  government,  with  the  potential consequence of changes in approach to service provision in a politically sensitive area such as water provision, and because of the potential for public opposition, commitment on the part of the principal cannot be assumed.      Opportunism on the part of the principal may be mirrored by that on the part of the agent.  Considering the limited potential for competition which exists in the sector, the most likely being surrogate competition effected by a regulator, the disciplining effect of the market cannot be assumed.   Thus, where contracts are incomplete and leave the possibility for opportunism, the private sector may engage in this opportunistic behaviour – a moral hazard problem thus exists for the  principal.    The  failure  to  internalise  externalities  on  the  part  of  the  agent impacts  social welfare maximisation proposed  to derive  from private property rights  (Demsetz,  1967;  Coase,  1960;  Alchian  &  Demsetz,  1973).    Furthermore, the predictability of moral hazard within water sector contracts may contribute to adverse selection ex‐ante.  Where the private sector predicts the likelihood of opportunistic  behaviour  is  significant,  there  is  the potential  for  ‘low‐balling’  in the  process  of  selection  of  private  sector  contract  partners.    Thus,  the  private sector  submits  contractual  terms  which  underplay  ex‐ante  their  predicted  ex‐post  costs,  in  the  knowledge  that,  due  to  contractual  incompleteness,  they  can recoup these costs through non‐contracted processes.      The  existence  of  possibilities  of  opportunism  of  each  party,  of  moral hazard and adverse selection, increases the importance of the administration of the contract to ensure alignment with proposed performance improvements.  As has  been  noted  above,  transaction  cost  economics  provides  a  mechanism  by which  to  understand  this  process.    Administration  may  incorporate  the government  role  in  the  establishment  of  the  contract  ex‐ante,  including  the selection of  the private  sector contract partner,  and  the ex‐post  regulation and monitoring of performance of the private sector.   The necessary intervention of the  regulator  for  reasons  of  effecting  competition  and  administering  price adjustments entails not only  costs of  the operation of  such an agency, but also potential costs deriving from deviation of operation from such an idealised role.  This can be seen firstly in the supposed independence of the regulatory agency: considering  the  nature  of water  as  a  citizen  and  human  right,  as  a  public  and merit  good,  the  regulatory  agency  is  subject  to  possible  capture  (political  or private) (Stigler, 1971; Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005).  While the establishment of an  ‘independent’  agency  is  an  attempt  to  pre‐empt  such  capture,  with  the inevitability  of  government  intervention  for  the  purposes  of  adjustment  of prices,  for  example,  the  goals  of  the  regulatory  agency  are  realigned  to  more closely resemble those of the government (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005).   Furthermore, the introduction of a regulatory agency is demonstrative of the  potential  for  the  intervention  of  multiple  principals  in  the  principal‐agent 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relation,  thus  obfuscating  the  transference  of  objectives  to  the  agent.    The regulator  has  potentially  conflicting  objectives,  including  acting  to  maintain affordable  service provision –  and  therefore political  pressure,  or  alternatively pressure from service providers for improved revenue and profit margins.   The agent  is  thus  faced  with  a  regulator  whose  objectives  may  differ  from  the government,  in  addition  to  pressure  from  shareholders  of  the  firm  (Parker, 2002).     As a counter‐tendency to the negative effects of these various aspects of the principal‐agent problem in the context of the water sector, it is noted above that there may be implicit control mechanisms – alongside those explicit control mechanisms of regulation or monitoring – providing a disincentive for the agent to act opportunistically.   In the case of the water sector this may present in the form  of  an  interest  on  the  part  of  the  agent  for  a  long‐term  contractual relationship, with contractual renewal where this is possible.  It should be noted that  due  to  the high  sunk  costs  typical  in  the  sector,  this  is  likely  to  provide  a basis  for  this  implicit  control mechanism  –  effectively  locking  the  agent  into  a long  term  relationship.    This  is  of  course  dependent  on  the  transference  of responsibility for investment from principal to agent.  Where contracts exist that deviate from effecting transference of ownership to the agent, and where there is reduced transference of ownership as a means of reducing risk transfer and thus attracting private sector partners, the presence and effect of this implicit control mechanism will be reduced.    
Summary  It has been attempted here to provide a review of the factors which may impact the formulation of privatisation policy, and the derivation of these factors from particular  aspects of  the  theoretical  rationale  and  its  critique.    Considering  the nature of the assumptions made where policy is developed for application in the water sector, it is likely that various aspects of these assumed conditions, and the implications  which  follow,  are  to  be  present  in  the  water  sector.    Natural monopoly, and the nature of water as a public and merit good and as a human right,  entail market  failure and  the divergence of  conditions  in  the  sector  from those assumed within the rationale.  The introduction of a regulatory agency as a means  of  countering  this  divergence  –  effecting  competition  and  securing politically  appropriate  pricing  –  presents  a  complexity  which  undermines  the propositions  of  improved  performance  associated  with  privatisation.    The undermining of property rights theory in particular is apparent where principal‐agent  problems  are  present,  and  significant  transaction  costs  further  diminish any proposed advantages.  Conceptions of water as a public and merit good, and as  a  human  right  also  appear  contradictory  to  the  underlying  theoretical framework  associated  with  privatisation  –  universal  service  provision  being contradictory  to  conceptions  of  limited  state  intervention  and  individual  self‐determination.     The  review  provided  here  establishes  a  means  by  which  to  assess  the performance  of  privatisation:  principal‐agent  problems  and  significant transaction  costs,  deriving  from  the  market  structure,  appear  to  undermine 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assumed performance of  the private sector, and may  therefore  indicate a basis for the divergence of performance where the programme has been implemented.  Furthermore, where institutional coherence and capacity  is assumed, though at cost,  where  this  is  absent  in  practice  operation  of  private  provision  may  be undermined.  Thus, the factors noted above may be utilised in an assessment of the performance and operation of privatisation of water services  in developing countries.    Where  these  factors  are  manifest  in  practice,  the  validity  of  the programme and its rationalising theoretical framework may be questioned.    
Conclusions and discussion  The assessment of privatisation in developing countries, and the understanding of the reasons behind its apparent poor performance relative to the assertions of proponents  of  the  programme,  requires  an  initial  consideration  of  the rationalising  theory  and  its  critical  appraisal.    It  has  been  the  purpose  of  this chapter to provide such an assessment, with an appraisal of theory within itself, the  basic  conceptual  framework  queried,  and  the  correlation  of  the  aspects  of this critique with conditions found in the water sector.  The implications for the theoretical  framework  follow  from  the  (ideological)  power  of  a  particular conception of  the  individual with regard the development of social policy.   The inherent characteristics of the individual as presented within the concept, of self‐interest,  rationality  and maximisation  of  personal  utility,  have  implications  for total social utility dependent on the location of the individual in public or private sphere.  Where located in the private sector such characteristics avail efficiency of  operation  and  internalisation  of  externalities  associated  with  individual activity.    Where  located  in  the  public  sector  such  characteristics  present  the possibility  of maximisation of  public  spending  and of personal utility  that may include corruption or political patronage.  Associated with these propositions is the  conceptualisation  of  the  individual‐state  relation,  whereby,  with  the additional characteristic of bounded rationality, the state should be limited in its capacity and intervention.  The basic conclusion of such a theoretical framework is  therefore:  economic  organisation  is  inherently  better  where  there  is  an increased  role  for  the  private  sector,  the  public  sector  is  inherently  inefficient and should be restricted in its capacity for intervention.    It  has  also  been  demonstrated  in  this  chapter,  however,  that  where  an assessment  is  made  of  the  theoretical  rationale  and  propositions  thereof,  and where  general  economic  and  social  conditions  are  introduced,  the  over‐simplification  which  is  characteristic  of  this  theoretical  framework  is  made obvious.    This  is  most  apparent  in  relation  to  property  rights  theory,  where assumptions  of  complete  information  and  contracts  are  necessary  for  its theoretical  consistency and validity.   Where such assumptions are relaxed, and complexities  of  real  world  economic  and  social  conditions  are  introduced,  the propositions  of  the  theory  become  questionable.    Information  economics  and principal‐agent theory provide mechanisms by which to reveal the implications of  such  assumptions.    The  limited  transfer  of  property  rights  as  a  result  of incomplete information and contracts establishes the possibility for opportunist behaviour,  and  of  problems  of  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection  for  the 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principal.  The costs associated with these possibilities are supplemented by the costs of institutional administration and arbitration.  Theoretical inconsistency is continued when  considering  public  choice  theory.    Assumptions  regarding  the manifestations  of  bureaucrat  self‐interest  have  been  shown  to  be  problematic, limited  control  over  budgets  contradicts  their  assumed  increase,  and  public‐spirited operation remains a possibility that would counter tendencies assumed within the theory.  The assumed inherent negative consequences of rent‐seeking are  further problematic,  as  is  the  apparent  subjective  judgement necessary  for the implementation of rent‐seeking in the form of, for example, patents.  There is, therefore  a  variety  of  inconsistencies,  weaknesses  and  assumptions  which, where analysed beyond abstract modelling are shown to be problematic for the validity of propositions of the underlying theoretical rationale for privatisation.     It  has  further  been  established  that  underlying  conceptions  essential  to the  neo‐classical  framework  providing  a  basis  for  privatisation  theory may  be questioned  –  this  includes  the  inherent  self‐interest  and  maximisation  of personal utility necessary  for  further propositions to be valid.   The founding of social  policy  on  such  abstract  economic  theory  appears  inconsistent  with conditions  and  practice  that  are  typical.    How  can  individual  self‐interest  and maximisation  of  personal  utility  be  coherent with  social  policy which  typically involves  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  some  individuals  for  greater  total  welfare?  Personal welfare may not always coincide with personal  choice. Similarly, how can such social policy, as based on objectively defined human need, correspond with  subjective  determination  of  need  inherent  to  the  neo‐classical  economic model?    The  adequacy of  homo economicus  as  a  foundation  for  social  analysis beyond abstract economic modelling may therefore be questioned.   Subsequent questions  may  be  made  of  the  commitment  of  those  proponents  of  the privatisation programme  to  this  apparently  inconsistent  theoretical basis, with Udehn  (1996)  suggesting  that  the  rhetorical  power  of  the  property  rights  and public  choice  theories  means  they  acquire  ideological  potency  beyond  their capacity for valid social analysis.     Considering the various aspects of critical analysis identified, this chapter has further provided an assessment of the correlation of conditions found in the water sector with these factors.  It has been established that there appears to be several  aspects  of  the water  sector,  its  typical  structure  and  the  nature  of  the resource itself, which correlate with the various weaknesses, inconsistencies and undermined  assumptions  as  previously  noted.    Conditions  in  the  sector  are characterised  by  market  failure,  in  terms  of  both  natural  monopoly  and  the nature  of  the  resource  as  public  and  merit  good,  and  human  right.    Thus, propositions  regarding  transfer  of  property  rights,  and  the  associated  benefits therein,  are  undermined  where  there  is  the  necessary  intervention  of  a regulatory  agency.    The  operation  of  the  regulator  as  effecting  surrogate competition,  and  as  mediating  and  administering  socially  and  politically acceptable  access,  introduces  significant  principal‐agent  problems  and transaction  costs.    Propositions  associated  with  public  choice  theory,  in particular  rent‐seeking,  thus  become  applicable  to  the  private  sector  where market discipline is absent and monitoring is costly or impractical.  Conceptions of  universal  service  provision  further  undermine  the  propositions  of  public 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The privatisation of water services in developing countries   The  theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation  incorporates  various  assumptions regarding the context and conditions in which it operates, and these assumptions impact on the potential performance of the model in contrasting environments.  It is purpose of this chapter to consider the implementation of the model in such environments, and the focus here will be a general review of the privatisation of water services in developing countries, the performance in this context and the implications  for  the  theoretical  rationale  underlying  the  PSP  model.    Such  a review provides a contextualising account for the subsequent development of a framework for analysing performance and operation relative to the rationalising theory.      The performance of PSP in developing countries can be characterised by consistently poor performance, by a decrease  in  investor  interest  in  the sector, and  by  frequent  disputes,  renegotiations  and  cancellations  of  contracts.    This performance  is  associated  with  an  implementation  of  the  PSP  model  that consistently disregards the importance of the contextual environment in which it is employed.   Initial phases of privatisation incorporated a significant disregard for  institutional  framework –  even  the  independent  regulatory  agency deemed necessary  in  developed  countries.    While  PSP  model  has  more  recently  been accompanied  by  an  increasing  acknowledgement  of  the  importance  of  the institutional  environment  in  which  it  is  implemented,  there  remains  an incapacity for the model to incorporate such factors in the determination of the performance of privatised water service providers.  This is demonstrative of the limitations of the theoretical rationale described in the previous chapter.  Where implemented  in  developing  countries,  the  model  typically  encounters environments  that  contain  contradictory  institutional  capacities,  and  may further  incorporate  differing  conceptions  of  water  as  a  resource,  with  the potential resistance to privatisation.    The chapter will be structured as  follows.   The  initial section provides a broad overview of the implementation of the PSP model in developing countries, by  reference  to  three  phases  of  implementation.    The  second  section  here considers in more depth the political economy of water pricing, and the impact of  commercial motives  on  the  conceptions  of water  in  the  developing  country context.    The  third  section  considers  the  process  of  dispute,  renegotiation  and cancellation that is frequently typical of the water sector PSP contract, impacting significantly on the performance of the sector.     
3.1  Privatisation, regulation and investment in developing countries  The privatisation of water  services  in developing  countries  can be assessed by reference  to  three  phases,  each  encompassing  a  modification  of  the  policy  of international  financial  institutions  (IFIs)  in  an  attempt  to  address  previous 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problems.    First  to  be  reviewed  here  will  be  the  initial  phase  of  PSP  in  this context, typically taking a crude form of implementation of privatisation without regard  for  institutions  and  regulation.    Significant  numbers  of  failed  PSP contracts  instigated  a  shift  to  a  second  phase  that  can  be  characterised  by  an improved  recognition  of  the  importance  of  institutional  framework,  and concurrent  with  a  rhetorical  concern  for  improved  governance.    The continuation  in  the  failure  of  contracts  instigates  a  further modification  of  IFI policy,  with  rejection,  at  least  rhetorically,  of  the  ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’  approach, which will be reviewed lastly.  The focus here remains primarily on countries in sub‐Saharan  Africa,  which  typically  demonstrate  the  most  acute  problems  in service provision.  
Early privatisation: minimal regulation and initial investor confidence  The eagerness for extensive privatisation, characteristic of the early stage of PSP, relied on the assumption that efficiencies brought about through private sector involvement would outweigh potential adverse effects.   Motivations underlying the  fervour  for  privatisation  derive  from  the  powerful,  yet  rudimentary propositions of the rationalising theory including the inherent superiority of the private  over  public  contained  in  property  rights  and  public  choice  theories (Paliwala,  2000).    However,  the  acknowledgement  of  institutional  importance was  a  significant  absence  in  the  early  phase  of  private  sector  involvement  in water  service  provision  in  the  developing  country  context.    The  appetite  for deregulation  was  a  parallel  process  to  the  general  reduction  in  barriers  to competition  in  previously  protected  markets  in  developing  countries:  the existence of domestic policies  regarding regulation could potentially contradict the  move  to  expansion  of  trade  embodied  by  introduction  of  the  General Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS).    The  consequences  of  this  IFI  policy framework  were  however  damaging  to  the  development  of  water  service provision  in developing countries, with a significant number of contracts being cancelled or renegotiated.      Supranational agencies effected the transferral of ideas regarding private efficiencies  to  national  governments,  thereby  initiating  privatisation  in  sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA).  With an increasing debt crisis, the circumstances faced by many  SSA  countries  in  the  1980s  combined with  the  renewed  appreciation  of privatisation  becoming  established  in  IFIs,  itself  a  reflection  of  the  changed ideologies of, in particular, the British and American governments of the decade.  Counterpart  to  this, World  Bank  confidence  that  the  circumstances which  had developed should be taken advantage of, as the pro‐reform SSA governments of the time were perceived to be of a limited lifetime and thus the ‘reform window’ available  was  restricted  (Fine  &  Bayliss,  2007).    As  Dolowitz  & Marsh  (1998) assert,  the  expedition  of  policy  transfer  can  also  be  attributed  to  the  desire  of states  to  avoid  falling  behind  competitors  and  to  take  advantage  of  the opportunity to join the international consensus; consequently, privatisation was seen to begin to “acquire a momentum of its own” (Bayliss & Cramer, 2003: 54).  Enthusiasm at supranational and national levels was mirrored by private sector commitment,  with  potential  profits  encouraging  investors  with  contracts covering periods from ten to fifty years (Hall et al., 2002; Bayliss, 2003). 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 The eagerness to privatise without regard for a regulatory framework is indicative of  the  general  approach of  IFIs  and developed  country  governments toward  development  in  this  initial  phase  of  private  water  service  provision.  Even  where  conditions  of  natural  monopoly  were  encountered,  in  contrast  to developed countries, regulation was deemed unnecessary:  “The  rationale  that  certain  sectors  had  to  be  regulated  because  they  were “natural monopolies” vital to national social or strategic interests is no longer considered valid.  […]  If economies of scale exist, a single firm may, in theory, be  able  to  produce  more  efficiently  than  several  competing  firms,  but  its monopolistic power may need to be restrained through regulation.  There is some justification for pursuing these objectives, but experience suggests that such rationales are often not persuasive in practice.”  (Guasch & Hahn, 1999: 137‐138)  This is because of the potentially negative consequences of political intervention through regulation, which would imply greater costs for trade than if there were deregulation:  “When legislators rein in spending and tax levels, regulation can be a useful substitute for achieving political objectives, such as redistributing income to particular  interest  groups  in  exchange  for political  support.    In  this  kind of political  environment,  legislators  adopt  regulatory  requirements  or mandates whose  costs  are not directly paid  for by  taxpayers;  although  less visible, these costs are nonetheless real.”  (Guasch & Hahn, 1999: 138)  Underlying  the  free  trade  approach  employed  here  is  the  conception  of regulation as being ‘self‐generating’, where “as wealth grows as the result of free trade,  the  endogenous  demand  for  higher  standards  grow  as  well”  (Majone, 2006).    However,  as  Majone  maintains,  this  development  of  self‐generating regulation is generally true only for ‘club goods’ – i.e. those which are excludable – and not public goods such as water.   Therefore  “regulation  [had] not  formed part, typically, of policy conditionality in structural adjustment loans” (Bayliss & Cramer, 2003: 62).  Thus the absence of consideration of regulation in this initial phase  of  privatisation  appears  to  align  the  approach  taken  to  the  underlying theoretical  rationale,  with  the  intervention  of  government  agencies  deemed undesirable.     The  consequences  of  this  strident  move  to  privatisation,  prioritising assumed  efficiencies  without  consideration  of  the  requisite  supporting environment  or  adverse  distributional  effects  (Fine,  2003b &  2007;  Fine  et  al, 2003), were that a significant number of PSP schemes came into difficulty in the form of renegotiation of terms or contract cancellation.  Of the contracts begun in 2000 and earlier  in SSA,  the  three concessional projects have all  suffered  from shortfalls  in  investment  expected  from  the  private  provider.    The  concession contract begun in Mali in 2000 was effectively terminated in 2005, quarter way through its intended duration.  This leaves concessions begun in Gabon in 1997 and Cape Verde in 1999, both classed by Hall & Lobina (2006b) as in ‘distressed’ 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status,  primarily  due  to  investment  shortfall.    The  lease  contracts,  where investment  is  taken  from  public  finances  rather  than  private  operator,  fare marginally  better  than  concessional  contracts.    The  Cote  d’Ivoire,  where privatisation was  begun  in  1969  and  has  seen  successful  renegotiations  since, and Senegal, where the 1996 lease has recently been renegotiated, are advanced as success stories for water privatisation in SSA.  Three other examples provide more  nuanced  picture  however, where  contracts  have  been  terminated  due  to contractual issues (Central African Republic and Gambia) or have concluded but without successful renegotiation (Guinea, where disputes hampered the project and expansion of services was not as expected) (Hall et al 2002; Hall & Lobina, 2006b).    
Intermediate  phase:  transferral  of  regulatory  ‘best  practice’  and  falling  investor 
confidence  The consequences of the broad failure of initial models of privatisation instigated a  shift  in  the  approach  of  government  –  at  supranational  and  consequently national level – and a revision in the approach toward water sector reform.  The administrative  or  institutional  problems  encountered  in  many  privatisation schemes were  acknowledged  in  a  change  in  the  policies  and  activities  of  IFIs, especially  the  World  Bank,  relating  to  developing  countries.    The  changes concerning  the  water  sector  are  one  element  of  an  all‐encompassing  revision representing a move away from reliance on purely economic influence to wider interventionism.    This  is  described  by  Fine  (2003a)  as  a  shift  from  the ‘Washington consensus’ to ‘post‐Washington consensus’:  “In a sense, the old consensus was caught in the trap of arguing for minimal state  intervention  and,  hence,  precluding  itself  from  addressing  what  the state  should  do.    In  contrast,  the  new  consensus  can  be  understood  as strengthening  and  extending  the  scope  of  permissible  intervention  in recipient  countries.    For  not  only  is  economic  intervention  justified  on  the basis  of market  imperfections  but  also  the  success  of  such  interventions  is attached to non‐economic factors.  In other words the consensus rationalises intervention by the donor agencies across as wide a remit as possible.  While the  old  consensus  claimed  that  there  was  nothing  wrong  with  its  policies other than they were not implemented, the new consensus is able to push for its command over what the state does and how it should do it. […]  What the new  consensus  does  analytically  is  to  strengthen  and  widen  the  scope  for discretionary  intervention  under  the  guise  of  good  governance  and  the imperative  to  moderate  both  market  and  non‐market  imperfections,  and wrap it up in the guise of local ownership.”  (Fine, 2003b: 15)  Thus,  where  the  Washington  consensus  promoted  the  ideal  of  the ‘nightwatchman  state’,  with  little  direct  economic  or  social  role,  the  post‐Washington consensus promotes the  ideal of  ‘good governance’:  the  facilitation of  the  market  and  private  enterprise  (Paliwala,  2000;  Shirley,  2003).    The primary  role  of  the  state  under  this  conception  is  the  enabling  of  the  market (Phillips, 2006).   This can be seen in the emphasis,  for example  in the policy of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), on good governance 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(Minogue  et  al,  1998)  which  concerns  primarily  a  concern  for  “contracts  and contract enforcement mechanisms, commercial norms and rules” (Shirley, 2003: 3).     The practical implementation of this modified policy was assisted through the imposition in developing countries of independent bodies through which the tenets of governance could be applied (Whitfield, 2006; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Dolowitz  &  Marsh,  1998).    According  to  Paliwala,  this  reflects  an  “underlying mistrust  of  the  state”  on  the  part  of  IFIs,  with  the  proliferation  of  channels through which  ‘expert’  or  ‘technical’  –  and  apparently  neutral  –  advice  can  be administered.  The process involved the  “creation of  legally and politically powerful privatisation quangos which are insulated from government interference.  In practice, these quangos become more  accountable  to  global  agencies  at  whose  initiative  and  with  whose assistance they are created.”  (Paliwala, 2000: 9)   While  the  reaction  of  IFIs  to  the  broad  failure  of  initial  forms  of  PSP contracts  in  the  initial phase was  to  introduce  ‘independent’  regulatory bodies, the  reaction  of  the  private  sector  to  the  was  to  reduce  the  degree  of  risk exposure.  This can be seen in the nature of contracts undertaken.  Firstly, there was a move away from concessional contracts where investment was required of the private sector, towards lease and primarily management contracts.  Secondly the  duration  of  contracts was  significantly  reduced  from  the  ten  to  fifty  years typical  in early privatisation,  to contracts generally between two and ten years (Hall et al 2002; Hall & Lobina, 2006b; PPI, 2008).   Furthermore, popularity of BOT‐type  schemes  had  increased  relative  to  broader  water  supply  projects (Bayliss & Fine, 2007).  This demonstrates rejection of risk associated with water service provision and the political intervention inherent therein.   Infrastructure projects do not, however, address wider structural problems, such as expansion of access (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004).      Concurrent with the trend for ‘good governance’ and reduced investment was,  however,  a  continuation  of  termination  and  renegotiation  of  contracts.  From  200  onwards,  two  lease  contracts  had  been  implemented,  with  one  still operational  (in Niger,  though with disputes  regarding  tariff  increases) and one terminated (in Tanzania, terminated after two years of a ten year contract due to poor  performance  and  shortfall  of  investment).    Of  the  five  management contracts, two remain ongoing (Burkina Faso & Ghana, although with problems), one  ended without  renewal  (Uganda,  two  year  contract),  one  is  in  ‘distressed’ status (Rwanda, several disease outbreaks) and one has been terminated (Chad) (Hall et al 2002; Hall & Lobina, 2006b; PPI, 2008; Mustapha, 2008).    It should be noted that where contracts become encounter difficulties the state is often in a weak position relative to the private operator, for two reasons.  Firstly, where  the  private  company  fails  in  its  obligations,  the  costs  associated with a legal challenge to end the contract and the retendering of a new contract are considerable (Lobina, 2005; Bayliss & Cramer, 2003).  Secondly, because of a reluctance to invest, the threat of re‐tendering, which could otherwise be used by 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the  state  as  leverage  against  a  private  operator,  is  unavailable  (Bayliss,  2003).  The  issues surrounding  the contract dispute‐renegotiation‐cancellation process will be discussed in more detail below.  
Recent privatisation: country specific policy and absence of investors   The most recent phase of privatisation can be identified by a revision, at least at the  rhetorical  level,  of  IFI  policy  regarding  the  administration of water  service privatisation  in  developing  countries.    Whereas  previously  there  was  an emphasis on good governance,  the concern has broadened  to encompass other aspects.  This is summarised by Shirley:   “To meet  the challenge of development countries need two distinct and not necessarily complementary sets of institutions: (i) those that foster exchange by  lowering  transaction  costs  and  encouraging  trust,  and  (ii)  those  that influence the state to protect private property rather than expropriate it.  The first  set  of  institutions  includes  contracts  and  contract  enforcement mechanisms,  commercial norms and  rules,  and habits and beliefs  favouring shared values and the accumulation of human capital.  Among the second set of  institutions  are  constitutions,  electoral  rules,  laws  governing  speech  and education, and legal and civic norms.”  (Shirley, 2003: 3‐4)  Thus,  the  PSP  contract  and  associated  regulation  needs  to  be  “consonant with legal and administrative traditions” of the country (Groom et al, 2006: 30), and set  in  a wider  government  policy  environment which  supports  that  regulation (Ehrhardt  et  al,  2007).    This  is  in  contrast  to  previous  attempts  to  introduce “international best practice” (ibid.: 3):   “Regulatory  design  never  actually  starts  with  a  blank  slate.  Regulation  is generally  introduced  in  an  environment  where  some  sector  organizations already exist; legal and political systems are well developed; some measures for  consumer  protection  have  already  been  introduced;  and  relationships between  politicians,  providers,  and  the  public  have  been  established.  The resulting  complexity  of  structures  and  incentives  is  not  a  backdrop  that regulation  should  seek  to  overcome  or  be  imposed  on  top  of.  Rather,  it provides a framework for regulation to work within.” (ibid.: 16)   In  recognising  the  importance  of  existing  legal  and  political  systems, World  Bank  literature  cites  contradictory  regulatory  and  legal  or  institutional frameworks,  and  this  is demonstrated by  contrasting Francophone and  ‘Anglo‐American’ forms which have resulted in disputes and renegotiations of contracts.  Where  contract‐based  PSP  is  implemented  in  Francophone  countries,  their contractual origins are to be found in French civil legal architecture, and there is therefore consonance between contract regulation and institutional framework.  This  framework  assumes  a  contractual  agreement  between  equals  where  the contract terms define the relationship.  Problems arose where ‘Anglo‐American’ models of  regulation were  ‘imposed on  top of’  the contractual agreement.   The ‘Anglo‐American’ model, based in common law architecture, assumes unilateral power  is  attributed  to  the  public  representative,  i.e.  the  regulator.    Where 
  50 
intervention  occurs  the  contractual  agreement  is  broken.    The  resultant unpredictability threatens contract completion, and has wider repercussions for private sector confidence (Groom et al, 2006).      Examples  which  demonstrate  the  importance  of  regulation  being “consonant with  legal and administrative traditions” (Groom et al, 2006: 38) of the country,  include Senegal and Burkina Faso.   These ex‐French colonies have seen  relatively  successful  PSP  contracts  (for  example  the  Senegalese  contract being renewed in 2006), and their legal architecture ensures that the regulation model  employed was  “well  understood  and  respected  by  the  government  and sector participants” (Ehrhardt et al, 2007: 15).  Success in the case of Senegal is attributed  to  improved  monitoring  and  the  involvement  of  an  intermediary body:   “[A]  combination  of  dedicated  contract  monitoring  units,  ongoing performance monitoring by  the government‐owned asset holding company, and  timely,  independent  mediation  on  disputed  issues  by  an  outside conciliator  provided  the  necessary  support  for  regulation  by  contract  to operate successfully.” (ibid.: 15)   The  intervention  of  IFIs  in  the  form  of  intermediary  bodies  to  improve private  sector  confidence  and  generate  investor  interest  in  water  service provision  is  confirmed  when  assessing  broader  IFI  policy  instruments,  which includes the activities of various ‘advisory’ bodies active in promoting the virtues of  the  private  sector  in  service  provision.    The  ‘Public‐Private  Infrastructure Advisory  Facility’  (PPIAF),  subsidiary  to  the  World  Bank,  provides  ‘technical assistance’  and  ‘disseminates  best  practice’  regarding  PSP,  with  the  aim  of priming  a  country  for  private  sector  involvement,  including  assistance  to “design and  implement policy,  regulatory,  and  institutional  reforms”  (PPI, 2008b).    The  PPIAF  is  complemented  by  other  similar  organisations  such  as ‘Public‐Private  Partnerships  for  the  Urban  Environment’  (PPPUE)  and  the ‘Private  Infrastructure  Development  Group’  (PIDG),  each  endeavouring  to further  develop  a  suitable  framework  within  which  PSP  may  develop.    In particular, the PIDG is concerned to “create a climate in which the private sector can have confidence in the long‐term stability of the programmes in which it  is investing” (PIDG, 2008).  Furthermore,  various  ‘funding  instruments’  are  in  place  to  mitigate,  or provide  guarantees  against,  risks  which  may  otherwise  discourage  private investment  in  projects.    The  World  Bank  affiliated  body  is  the  ‘Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’ (MIGA), which, as well as working in an advisory capacity for PSP advancement, provides risk insurance against breach of contract and war or civil disturbance, amongst other issues (MIGA, 2008a).  It is indicative of  investor confidence regarding water service PSP  in SSA that while  the MIGA website notes that “billions of people live without access to safe drinking water or sewage treatment”, the website shows no active or complete projects relating to  the  sector  (MIGA,  2008b).    Foreign  exchange  insurance  schemes  are  also available  to minimise  risk  through  currency  devaluations  (Baietti  &  Raymond, 2005).    Together  with  guarantees  available  through  other  funds  such  as  the 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African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the involvement  of  these  various  bodies  “gives  a  ‘seal  of  approval’  to  the  projects concerned  because  of  the  additional  monitoring  and  project  evaluation” (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004: 230).  
Public versus private utilities: comparative performance  Considering  the  above discussion  regarding  the progression  of  privatisation  in developing countries, and considering the particularities of the water sector, it is necessary  to  note  whether  evidence  suggests  improved  performance  under private operation, as claimed in the theoretical rationale for the programme.  The various  factors  reviewed  in  the  preceding  chapter  regarding  the  conditions found in the water sector suggest that where competition is typically absent and private  firms  require  regulation,  the proposed benefits of private operation do not necessarily  follow.   The above discussion demonstrates  that  the conditions found  in  the  water  sector,  together  with  the  institutional  forms  found  in  the developing world, do in fact impact on the performance of privatised utilities and proposed benefits should not be assumed.  The comparison of public and private performance  in  service  provision  is  made  more  complex  by  the  differential measures  of  performance  attached  to  each  ownership  structure  (e.g.  efficiency versus universal provision), by the absence of counterfactual performance, and by a lack of data.    As could be expected considering the conditions encountered in the water sector  in  developing  world,  the  performance  of  utilities  pre‐  and  post‐privatisation  are  heavily  dependent  on  factors  other  than  a  simple  change  in ownership.    Studies  that  consider  the  performance  of  utilities  pre‐  and  post‐privatisation  thus highlight  the  importance of  the presence of  competition,  the quality of regulation, management incentives and capital market conditions, and the  performance  of  service  provision  prior  to  privatisation  (e.g.  Bayliss,  2003; Kirkpatrick  et  al,  2004;  Willner  &  Parker,  2002).    Considering  the  problems encountered, it is not surprising that studies show ambiguity in the comparative pre‐ and post‐privatisation performance (Kirkpatrick et al, 2004).  Of course, the terms  by  which  performance  is  judged  vary  across  the  proposed  benefits  of privatisation.    The  first  purported benefit  concerned  the means,  through privatisation, to provide an increase in the amount of  investment made in the water sector – sourced primarily from donor agencies although conditional on the involvement of private firms which also provided a smaller proportion of investment in their particular ventures (Kirkpatrick et al, 2004).  It has been noted above that there has been decreasing private  interest  in providing  financial  contribution  to PSP projects, based on the risk to which they are exposed.  The tendency both for risk to be reduced and private financial commitment to be reduced demonstrates an increasing  failure  for  private  sector  to  match  claimed  performance  in  these terms.  The counterfactual, where public utilities would have benefited from the massive  investment  from donor agencies, has never been demonstrated as  this funding  remains  conditional  on  privatisation  or  commercialisation  (Bayliss, 2003). 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The  second  claim  regards  the  potential  efficiency  gains  made  available through the introduction of private firms in the provision of water services.  This may  be  gauged  by  either  pre‐  versus  post‐privatisation  performance  of  a particular utility,  or by private performance  compared  to  contemporary public counterpart utilities.   Kirkpatrick et al  (2004) provide a study  taking  the  latter form, comparing public and private utilities at a given time in the African context.  Initially, their evidence suggests that private utilities operate more efficiently in terms of labour productivity, operating costs and capital utilisation, although this is  at  the  cost  of  higher  tariffs  (ibid.).    They  consider  however,  firstly,  that  this may in fact be derived from the larger scale operation of private firms vis‐à‐vis public  ones  (this  may  in  turn  be  attributable  to  the  tendency  to  privatise  the most  attractive  utilities).    Secondly,  the  deviation  in  the  data  suggests  a  high degree  of  variance  in  the  performance  of  each  form  of  utility.    Subsequent performance  measures  demonstrate  that  in  fact  there  is  no  statistically significant  difference  in  the  performance  of  each  ownership  form,  and  that efficiency  was  comparable  across  public  and  private  operations  (ibid.).    The results  shown  in  the  study  by  Kirkpatrick  et  al  (2004)  are  representative  of broader studies that attempt to compare public and private.  As Willner & Parker (2002) note,  it  is often factors other than a simple change of ownership impact on the performance of utilities (including institutional or competitive conditions for example).    
Summary  The three phases of PSP in the water sector in developing countries as described above demonstrate that, even where revision has been made to the PSP model, implementation has been consistently problematic and performance worse than that proposed in IFI rhetoric.  Because the PSP model has been transferred from the  developed  to  developing  country  context,  the  assumptions which  underlie the  model  become  explicit  where  the  existent  conditions  contradict  those necessary  for  the  operation  of  the  model.    This  can  be  seen  primarily  in  the assumption  of  a  complementary  and  supporting  legal  and  institutional framework  within  which  privatised  firms  operate.    Where  the  regulation  of privatised  water  providers  was  absent  from  the  initial  phases  of  PSP,  it  was assumed that such a body would develop alongside privatisation.   Through the second phase of PSP the resolution of the regulatory problems was counteracted through  the attempted establishment of  independent  regulatory agencies.   The assumption  of  supporting  legal  and  institutional  environment  therefore remained until  the most  recent phase when  the  importance of  this  framework was at least acknowledged.  The conceptualisation of the variation in institutions, and  the  local  historical  development  of  these  institutions,  remains  severely limited however.   Despite  the apparent problems of  the PSP model,  as  seen by the  recurrent  disputes  and  cancellations  of  contracts,  the  policy  has  remained central  to  the  IFI  approach  to water  service provision  in developing  countries.  Attempts have been made by IFIs to reduce risks to which the private sector  is exposed.   This can be seen in the efforts to establish regulatory agencies which provide  stable  and  predictable  conditions  for  the  private  operators,  and  it  is further  evident  in  the  endeavours  to  reduce  risks  through  the  structures  of 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guarantees  provided  to  investors.    However,  the  risks  associated  with investment in the water sector in developing countries have led to a decrease in the  instances  of  PSP  over  recent  years.    The  proportion  of  contracts  entering some form of dispute, renegotiation or cancellation is significant, and contributes to the declining interest of the private sector.     
3.2  Political  economy  of  water  pricing:  commercial  viability  and  the 
expansion of access  Alongside  regulation  and  associated  difficulties,  concern  for  the  commercial viability  of water  service  enterprises  provides  a  secondary  impediment  to  the successful  operation  of  private  sector  involvement.    The  primary  concern  in many  SSA  countries  is  the  expansion  of  services  outside  the  existing  network, and this requires a particular arrangement of tariffs and subsidies to encourage the  private  sector,  where  involved,  to  satisfy  this  requirement.    The  existent water provision system is often characterised by urban infrastructure networks, with peri‐urban and rural areas served by alternative service providers (ASPs).  The  tradition  in  SSA  countries,  typical  of  a  global  trend,  is  for water  provision from  the  main  network  to  be  underpriced,  and  therefore  the  funding  of expansion of networks to replace ASPs requires considerable subsidy.  Full cost recovery,  as  preferred  by  the  private  sector,  is  impractical  and  governmental intervention in the form of subsidy or cross‐subsidy is inevitable.  The variety of forms  of  subsidy  available  to  the  state  is  considerable,  but  each  has  adverse effects  and  tariffs  or  subsidies  for  expansion  of  access  are  therefore  not inevitable  or  straightforward.    Following  a  review  of  the  tariffs  and  subsidies employed in an attempt to expand connections, there will be a discussion of the implications of these and PSP more generally for the conceptions of water in host countries.    Water  service  networks  in  SSA  countries  are  generally  concentrated  in major  urban  centres  and  capital  cities, with  peri‐urban  and  rural  areas  served typically  by  alternative  service  providers  (ASPs).    The  reasons  for  this distribution are multiple, but  the overwhelming restriction on expansion  is  the inherent  and  considerable  cost  of  infrastructure  development.    A  secondary factor is the refusal of state and local administrators to recognise the peri‐urban or slum developments on the periphery of conurbations as  legal developments.  The residents of these developments therefore have no legal tenure for the land which they occupy, and consequently services cannot be provided (Trémolet & Hunt, 2006).   Where distribution networks are  in place,  the choice of tariff and subsidy has often proved restrictive  to  the potential expansion of  the network.  Firstly,  general  underpricing  of  water  provision,  with  the  requisite  general subsidy to fund services, is a global norm, and SSA is typical in this respect.  The provision  of  a  general  subsidy  to  lower water  prices  is  politically  popular  and socially acceptable, as conceptions of water being a human or  inalienable right are  ubiquitous  (Komives,  2005).    Secondly,  quantity‐based  tariffs  to  penalise excess consumption are ineffective due to patterns of consumption being similar across all income groups – consumption of water is generally inelastic.  Thirdly, where  cross‐subsidies  are  employed,  they  do  not  target  the  poor,  who  are 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invariably  not  connected  to  the  network,  but  rather  middle  or  lower‐middle income groups (ibid.).     The  tariffs and subsidies employed  in  the past were  therefore primarily concerned  with  a  redistribution  of  resources  within  the  population  already connected to the network, consequently excluding those who were most in need of assistance in access to services.  Where a lack of subsidisation for expansion of connection combined with  the PSP contractual  requirement of  such expansion, there was an  inevitable  tendency  for  the private enterprise  to attempt  full cost recovery  from  the  customer  base.    This  is  impractical  even  in  developed countries where subsidies are often provided for capital investment (ibid.), and is  especially  true  for  SSA.    Komives  et  al  (2005)  suggest  that  35  per  cent  of households in SSA would be unable to pay full cost for water, whether measured by  affordability  – water  costs  exceeding  five  per  cent  of  household  income,  or ‘willingness to pay’.  The popularity of PSP contracts that necessitated expansion of  services  inevitably  decreased,  as  is  indicated  by  the  frank  observations  of company representatives:  “[F]rom  a  social  point  of  view,  these  kinds  of  projects  are  viable  but unfortunately  from  a  private  sector  point  of  view  they  are  not.”  (Richard Whiting,  Biwater  country manager  for  Zimbabwe,  quoted  in  Bayliss,  2003: 514)  “The scale of the need far out‐reaches the financial and risk‐taking capacities of  the  private  sector.  […]    Water  pays  for  water  is  no  longer  realistic  in developing  countries.  […]    Service  users  can’t  pay  for  the  levels  of investments required, nor for social projects.” (J.F. Talbot, CEO SAUR, quoted in Lobina, 2005: 77)  However,  even supranational  forums representing pro‐privatisation  interests – the World Water Council – reject the concept of full cost recovery from the poor in  favour  of  greater  equity  through  cross‐subsidisation  (Hall,  2001; Whitfield, 2006).    The  requirement  of  governmental  subsidy  expand  access  was  thus inevitable, with finance typically found through international donor agencies.   The decisions made by state or regulatory bodies concerning tariff rates and  subsidies,  are  made  with  consideration  of  what  is  socially  and  politically acceptable within that particular environment.  As described in chapter two, the common  conception  of  water  provision  is  that  it  should  be  either  free,  or provided  at  rates  which  do  not  preclude  its  availability  to  any  individual (Komives et al, 2005).  Thus, access to water forms not only a human right but a right  encompassed  by  citizenship  of  a  given  state,  whose  government  has  the responsibility  for the allocation of such scarce resources within the population.  Where  PSP  projects  threaten  the  conditions  of  citizenship  with  which  the population  concerned  is  familiar,  for  example by attempting  full  cost  recovery, the legitimacy of both the government and the PSP is threatened.  As the UN and American  Chamber  of  Commerce  recognise,  the  pre‐conditions  for  successful PSP  projects  include  the  need  for  “public  trust  to  be  established”,  and  “public 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acceptance  is  required  at  the  local  political  level”  (cited  in  Grimsey  &  Lewis, 2004: 235).    
Summary  The  requirement  in  the developing countries  for  the expansion of water utility networks  entails  that  the  PSP model  as  transferred  from  developed  countries encounters problems and requires modification for contrasting conditions.  The combination of private sector desire for full cost recovery and the ineffectiveness of conventional tariff structures, has resulted in a reliance on donor funding and the  continued  decline  of  interest  of  investors  in  apparently  ‘unprofitable’ consumers.    The  attempt  to  introduce  private  water  service  provision  in developing  countries  threatens  a  potential  modification  of  the  state‐citizen relationship.   Where there  is an attempt  for  full cost recovery by private  firms, this may  contradict  existent  citizenship  rights  (not  to mention  human  rights), and there is the potential for public opposition.  In addition to the incoherence at an  institutional  level,  this  redefinition  of  the  social  contract  in  developing countries is further evidence of the problematic transfer of the PSP model based in property rights and public choice theory.   
3.3  PSP contract disputes, renegotiations and cancellations  Contracts  may  enter  a  process  of  dispute,  renegotiation  and  cancellation  for various  reasons,  and  these  may  be  classified  by  reference  to  exogenous  and endogenous factors – those originating from outside the water sector and those which have a basis in the water sector PSP contractual process itself.  The factors originating  outside  the  sector,  such  as  macro‐economic  shocks  (e.g.  currency devaluation or recession), political instability (e.g. military coups) or contraction of  service  demand  through  fall  in  real  wages,  will  not  be  considered  here, although their reification in the form of,  for example, public opposition to price increases  through  PSP,  are  significant  where  contracts  do  not  provide  a mechanism  for  this  to  be  expressed  without  resort  to  disputes.    The  factors instigating  dispute,  renegotiation  or  cancellation  specific  to  PSP  contracts themselves will provide the focus here, and these include problems in the initial tender  and  bidding  process,  water  sector  contracts,  weak  or  inappropriate regulation,  public  opposition,  corruption  and  unilateral  redefinition  of contractual  terms  on  the  part  of  one  contract  party.    These  issues  will  be discussed here by  reference  to  stages of PSP  contract  advancement  –  from ex‐ante phases of contract design and the tendering process, to the ex‐post phase of administration of the PSP contract.  
Contract design and the influence of PSP theory  The PSP model as  implemented  in developing countries  through the policies of IFIs shows an obvious derivation  from the rationalising  theoretical  framework.  The model therefore places great emphasis on the reduction of state intervention in service provision, promoting  the benefits of private management.   However, those conditions inherent to the water sector – natural monopoly and the human 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right  nature  of  the  resource  –  necessitate  regulation,  and  dilute  the  purported benefits  of  the  private  sector  where  competition  is  reduced.    Where implemented  in  developing  countries,  PSP  has  frequently  taken  a  form which increases  the  likelihood  of  disputes  and  renegotiations  of  contracts.    Firstly, there must be transfer of risk to private firms for them to operate efficiently, but this has been  limited  in an effort  to attract  investors  into the sector.   Secondly, competition – limited to that for the market and surrogate through regulation – has  been  restricted  due  to  institutional  incapacity  and  power  asymmetry.  Finally,  consumer  participation  has  generally  been  absent  from  the  process, contributing to potential resistance.    Where  PSP  contracts  are  implemented  there  is  an  assumption  that  the attributes of the private sector will be utilised to achieve the efficiencies claimed in the substantiating theories.  This necessitates a transfer of risk from public to private,  such  that  the private sector has an  incentive  to  function  in an efficient manner.    The  inadequate  transfer  of  performance  risk  from  public  to  private, distorted  risk  allocation,  has  important  consequences  for  disputes, renegotiations and cancellations.   Firstly,  there  is  increasing  implementation of currency  risk  reduction  through  the  tying of  tariff  rates  to  the US Dollar.   This becomes problematic when the national currency of the host country is devalued vis‐à‐vis the dollar and the prices of water services consequently increase, often resulting  in  public  concern  and  protest,  and  may  ultimately  lead  to  the renegotiation  of  contract  terms  for  political  reasons  (Lobina,  2005;  Lobina  & Hall, 2003).  Secondly, where a renegotiation process is entered into, asymmetry of  capacity and power relations determines  that  the private sector often yields further  risk  (Estache,  2005),  with  further  potential  consequences  for  the supposed efficiencies gained through assumption of performance risk.      The  limited  potential  avenues  to  introduce  competition  into  the  sector place greater import on the tendering and regulation of contracts.  The forms of competition  available  in  the  sector  have  consequences  for  the  potential  for disputes,  renegotiation  and  cancellations.    The  former,  competition  for  the market (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005), places greater import on the tendering and bidding  process  as  the  means  by  which  to  achieve  optimum  terms  of  service suitable  for  the  lifetime  of  the  contract.    The  second,  surrogate  competition (Harris,  2003),  places  greater  import  on  the  role  of  the  regulator  in  ensuring compliance with contract conditions by each contract private operator.   Where either  the  initial  tendering  process  or  the  regulatory  agency  is  performs inadequately  this may  have  negative  consequences  in  the  form  of  disputes  or renegotiations.    Because  the model of PSP employed relies  for success on  the adherence by each party to their respective contractual terms it ignores the importance of mechanisms  through  which  accountability  and  transparency  of  procedure  of contractual  completion  is  ensured,  and  through  which  public  or  consumer participation  is  possible.    Where  corruption  has  been  characteristic  of  public service and government procedure, public opposition to PSP finds a basis in the assumption that the privatisation of services is a further means by which corrupt government  officials  may  profit  further.    Mechanisms  of  transparency  and 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accountability  are  therefore  important  as  a  means  by  which  this  residual opposition to PSP may be assuaged (Harris, 2003).  Similar mechanisms provide a means by which public participation may be incorporated into the PSP process, and the completion of the PSP contract (Lobina & Hall, 2003; Groom et al, 2006).  Where  price  increases  or  other  public  concerns  create  opposition  to  PSP,  this opposition  is  necessarily  expressed  outside  the  system  of  service  provision.  Because  these  mechanisms  are  not  incorporated  into  the  model  of  PSP,  the likelihood of renegotiation is increased.   
The contract tendering process  So,  the PSP contracts  together with  framework within which are  implemented, are  predisposed,  subject  to  the  right  conditions,  to  problems  of  disputes  and renegotiations.  When these contracts are implemented, the process of tendering and  bidding  further  accentuates  this  predisposition,  and  contributes  further factors which may increase the likelihood of problems ex‐post privatisation.  The highly  concentrated  global  private  water  sector,  conditional  aid  or  debt restructuring,  and  the  risky nature of  investment  combine  to  create  a  contract tendering process which is asymmetrical  in the balance of power between host government and bidding contractors.  The means by which the tendering process accentuates  the  possibility  of  dispute  and  renegotiation  is  ‘strategic misrepresentation’ or  ‘low‐balling’ – unrealistic bids by private companies, and corruption embedded in contracts – resulting in substandard infrastructure and public opposition.   When these factors combine to create sub‐optimal contracts from the outset the potential for dispute and renegotiation is increased.    The tendering process for PSP projects in developing countries is often a lengthy  process, with  associated  costs  representing  a  significant  proportion  of total project cost.  For example, the tendering process in Tanzania proceeded for six years, with  the  tendered  scheme undergoing  repeated modifications  in  this period,  before  a  suitable  bid  was  found  (Bayliss,  2002;  PPI  2008a).    The questionable  appeal  of  contracts  as  profitable  investments,  together  with  the highly concentrated global private water sector and the development of complex contracts  combine  to produce  this  extended process.    This  protracted  contract tendering  contributes  a  significant  addition  to  the  transaction  costs  for  PSP projects.    Transaction  costs  here  include  the  arranging  of  agreements,  the organising of the bidding process and various other legal, consulting and public relations  costs  (Kirkpatrick  et  al,  2004).    A  World  Bank  study  estimates  that these costs can amount to five to ten per cent of the total value of PSP projects (cited in Lobina & Hall, 2003), and their substantial extent is mirrored, at least to a degree, through frequent renegotiation procedures (Harris, 2003).    The  potential  for  disputes  and  renegotiations  is  increased  in  the tendering process  by  strategic misrepresentation  and  the development  of  sub‐optimal  contracts.    Potential  investors  in  the  water  sector  in  developing countries  are  limited  by  the  significant  investment  and  technical  capacity required, and the highly concentrated nature of  the global private water sector (Lobina  &  Hall,  2003).    The  nature  of  investment  and  the  dominance  of multinational  companies  entails  that  market  entry  is  severely  restricted,  with 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few firms bidding for water sector PSP contracts.  A consequence of this market structure  is  that,  where  tenders  have  multiple  bidders,  there  is  significant potential  for  collusion  between  firms  –  negating  benefits  through  ‘competition for  the  market’.    A  further  consequence  is  the  shift  in  power  between  the contracted  parties.    The  pressure  to  instigate  PSP  contracts  –  through  loan conditions or basic need  for  investment – and  technical  incapacity  to  interpret collusion  entail  a  weakening  of  state  position  vis‐à‐vis  private  firms.    Where there are instances of concessions being commenced after only a single bid was made,  the  conditions  resulting  from  bidder  collusion  are  replicated,  with  an associated shift of power toward the private sector.    Where  the  power  balance  between  host  government  and  private  sector companies shifts  in  this way,  the bidding process  is subject  to distortion  in  the form of sub‐optimal bids and opportunistic behaviour on the part of the private company.  According to Kirkpatrick et al (2004: 19),   “The  result  can  be  both  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard.  Adverse selection  takes  the  form  of  sub‐optimal  contracts  at  the  outset,  resulting from  one  of  the  contracting  parties  acting  opportunistically  to  arrange especially  favourable  terms;  while  moral  hazard  occurs  when  one  of  the contracting  parties  renegotiates  the  terms  of  the  contract  in  their  favour during its lifetime.”  Thus, where the private sector  is aware of the asymmetric power relation with the  host  government,  they  “might  ‘low  ball’  bids  in  the  hope  of  successfully renegotiating  more  advantageous  terms  once  they  had  been  awarded  the contract”  (Harris,  2003:  19).    The  potential  for  renegotiation  favouring  the private  partner  is  increased  because  the  financial  cost  to  the  government  of cancellation is significant – both in the form of compensation to the company and the transaction costs including the legal and administration fees accruing should they  choose  to  take  this  route  (Nickson &  Vargas,  2002).    The  capacity  of  the government to take the route of cancelling PSP contracts is further restricted by the  loss  of  technical  capability  –  in  terms  of  labour  for  example  –  having surrendered  the enterprise  to  the private  sector.   The government  is  therefore reluctant  to  terminate  contracts  without  the  means  by  which  to  ensure  the continuation of service provision (Kirkpatrick et al, 2004).   PSP contracts in developing countries provide multiple opportunities for corruption  on  both  a  grand  and  petty  scale.    Evidence  from  various  studies shows that these opportunities for corruption are being utilised by government officials  with  the  collusion  of  private  sector  representatives,  and  this  is widespread practice (Kenny, 2006).  Hobbs (2005: 23) notes, based on interview evidence with private actors in infrastructure projects, that the private sector is well versed  in the corruption process: “All experienced bidders know that  they must  offer  bribes  in  order  not  just  to  win  the  contract,  but  to  successfully implement  it”.    The  implication  of  this  level  of  entrenched  corruption  for  the potential  for disputes  and  renegotiations of  contracts  is  the  significant  level  of public  opposition  which  it  generates.    This  is  recognised  by  Guasch  &  Straub (2006), referring to Latin American public opinion surveys of PSP: 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“Although a number of explanations have been put forward to explain such a public  distrust,  one  major  reason  seems  to  be  the  perception  that  the process  fostered  corrupt  deals  at  the  expense  of  customers,  in  particular through  numerous  renegotiations  of  the  initial  contracts  (Martimort  and Straub, 2006).”  (Guasch & Straub, 2006: 483)  In  addition  to  the  implications  for  public  opposition  to  PSP,  corruption  may constitute  between  five  and  ten  per  cent  of  the  total  value  of  PSP  projects (Kenny, 2006).  When combined with the significant transaction costs associated with  PSP  in  developing  countries,  which  are  repeated  through  the  process  of renegotiation which the existence of corruption makes more likely, the impact of these costs on the productive value of PSP projects is significant.    So,  the  market  structure  of  the  private  water  sector  and  the  power imbalance between private and public partners, together with the frequency and scale of corruption, increases the likelihood of public opposition to PSP projects and  the  probability  of  dispute  and  renegotiation  ex‐post  privatisation.    This likelihood is  increased further by the status of the regulatory framework at the time of  the designing and  inception of PSP contracts.   The review by Guasch & Straub  (2006) of  studies of  renegotiation of  Latin American PSP  infrastructure projects  undertaken  by  Guasch  et  al  (2003  &  2006),  provides  evidence  that where  a  regulatory  agency was  not  in  place  at  the  time  of  the  contract  being signed,  the  likelihood  of  subsequent  renegotiation  increased  significantly  (fig. 3.1).   While  the  information  shown  concerns  cross‐industry performance,  they note  an  example  of  the water  sector  in  Argentina where  the model  employed suggests that the probability of renegotiation would have been reduced from 9.9 per  cent  to  0.3  per  cent  had  a  regulatory  agency  been  present  at  contract inception.   
  Figure 3.1: Hazard rate (government led renegotiation) by existence of regulator at time of signing of contract Source: reproduced from Guasch & Straub (2006) 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Data such as that reviewed by Guasch & Straub has prompted the World Bank to invest heavily in institutional reform and the creation of independent regulatory agencies mirroring those in place where PSP has been implemented in developed countries, with 20 per  cent of World Bank  funding now being devoted  to  such reform (Hobbs, 2005).  The reform programme employed by the World Bank can however  be  problematic  where  form  of  regulatory  agency  implemented contradicts  the  form of  legal or  institutional  framework of  the host  country, as discussed elsewhere.    
Ex­post  administration  and  functioning  of  PSP  contracts:  factors  contributing  to 
renegotiations  Overwhelmingly, where the PSP model is transferred to developing countries it incorporates, implicitly or explicitly, an idealised form of independent regulatory agency.  Independence intends to minimise potential discretion or opportunism on  the  part  of  the  government,  and  provide  stability  and  predictability  for investment.  However,  where  these  models  of  regulation  are  implemented  in developing countries, their form and operation often contrasts with the existent legal and institutional framework, such that the outcomes regulation should not be predicted and may contrast with those intended (Ogus, 2004 & 2005).  As has been  the  case  in  Cochabamba,  Bolivia,  the  independence  of  the  regulator  was breached when rising prices threatened significant public opposition:   “Negotiations  and  decisions  over  tariff‐setting  were  dealt  with  by  central government and not by the water regulator.  The February 2000 decision to reduce  the  tariff  increase  by  11  per  cent  was  taken  by  the  cabinet  (La Opinión,  2000).    Renegotiation  of  the  contract  and  tariff  freezes were  also agreed  between  the  central  government  and  the  Civic  Committee.    The cancellation  of  the  concession  itself  was  a  product  of  political  pressure  to halt the growing social conflict and the decision was taken without reference to  the  termination  clauses  and  procedures  established  in  the  contract.”  (Nickson & Vargas, 2002: 145)  The  example  of  the  Cochabamba  concession  highlights  the  importance  of  the continuation water  service  provision  at  affordable  prices,  due  to  the  nature  of the product as both merit good and human right, to host governments where PSP is  employed.    The  government  in  this  case  considered  it  necessary  to  override the  regulatory  mechanisms  in  place  in  order  to  salvage  its  own  position.  Transparency  and  accountability  of  processes  associated  with  PSP  are  also highlighted, without such mechanisms public resentment and opposition to the PSP scheme further escalated:   “The  lack of  consumer participation  in  the  regulatory process was another factor  that  emasculated  the  legitimacy  of  decisions  by  [the  regulator].  As most  regulatory  decisions  were  determined  by  government  pressure, consumers  did  not  feel  that  their  interests were  being  safeguarded  by  the regulator.”  (Nickson & Vargas, 2002:145) 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Without transparency and accountability there is thus a significant risk that the development  of  public  opposition  through  the  period  of  operation  of  the  PSP contract  will  contribute  to  the  possibility  of  dispute,  renegotiation  or cancellation (Harris et al, 2003).      Opportunism  on  the  part  of  the  government,  as  in  the  case  of Cochabamba,  may  be  mirrored  by  that  of  the  private  sector  which  asserts  its advantage  in  asymmetrical  power  relations  ex‐post  privatisation.    Where contracts  are  developed  that  provide  a  degree  of  imprecision  regarding  the contractual obligations of the private operator, the latter may in effect ‘redefine’ its  obligations  following  commencement  of  the  contract  contrary  to what was intended in the preliminary negotiations.  According to Lobina & Hall, the private operator attempts to   “…  redefine  the  boundaries  of  the  service  to  be  provided.  So  in  Cartagena, Colombia, for example the shanty town areas are treated as not covered by the contract because they are not  in the city area.  In La Paz, Bolivia, where the contract said unequivocally that 100%, including the major shanty town of El Alto had to be connected, Suez subsidiary Aguas de Illimani argues that “connection” does not mean a piped connection but may just mean access to a standpipe or tanker.”  (Lobina & Hall, 2003: 57)    In  addition  to  opportunistic  behaviour,  corruption  evident  in  the operation of PSP contracts affects the potential for disputes and renegotiations.  Just as corruption contributes to public opposition, the quality of services may be affected  also.  The  process  of  auditing  the  output  of  PSP  contracts  invariably remains with  the  host  government  and  its  officials,  and  this  places  substantial power  in  the  hands  of  these  officials  particularly  where  contract  payment  is released on completion of work. There is considerable opportunity and incentive therefore,  as  a  cost‐reduction  measure,  for  the  private  operator  to  bribe  the official  to  ‘sign off’  construction which  is of  substandard quality or  incomplete.  The consequences of this form of corruption are the reduced standard of service or infrastructure being produced under PSP contracts:   “For example, across countries, high perceived general  levels of  corruption are  associated  with  lower  spending  on  proxies  for  operations  and maintenance.   Related  to  this, general perceptions of  corruption have been associated with lower quality infrastructure (a lower percentage of roads in good  condition  and more  frequent  power  outages  for  example).”    (Kenny, 2006: 5)  Where standards of service drop as a consequence of substandard construction, non‐compliance with contractual terms provides grounds for the instigation of a process of renegotiation.  
Summary  It  has  been  shown  that  the  various  factors  originating  in  both  ex‐ante  and  ex‐post privatisation design and processes have real consequences in the incidence 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and frequency of disputes and renegotiation.  Renegotiation frequently results in further  distortion  of  risk  allocation,  service  disruption,  non‐compliance  with targets, and rising prices.  These factors have consequences for investment in the sector,  including  an  increasing  tendency  to  be  selective  both  in  terms  of  the consumers  serviced  within  developing  countries,  and  the  regional  choice  for investment.    The  form  of  PSP  introduced  in  developing  countries  correlates closely  to  the  model  which  has  evolved  in  developed  countries.    A  central element  of  this  is  the  assumption  of  competent  system  of  governance  and concept of the role of a regulatory agency independent from the government and other  institutions.   However, where  this  is  introduced  in  developing  countries, the potential for contractual dispute and renegotiation is increased both ex‐ante and ex‐post privatisation.  Prior to privatisation, asymmetry in capacity results in sub‐optimal  contracts  through  ‘strategic misrepresentation’  on  the  part  of  the private  sector  bidders.    Ex‐post,  it  has  been  shown  that  the  possibility  of opportunism in the  form of political and governmental  intervention remains to be significant, and  frequently produces disputes and renegotiations.   These are accentuated by ex‐post factors including unilateral redefinition of contract terms by private operators, and corrupt auditing of contracted services.   The contract design and tendering process as it is resolved in developing countries therefore contributes significantly to the reduced likelihood of contract completion.     
Conclusion and discussion  It has been shown here that the property rights and public choice privatisation model  encounters  significant  problems  where  implemented  in  developing countries, with performance of privatised enterprises frequently diverging from rhetoric  which  accompanies  IFI  policy.    The  performance  of  the  privatisation model and its development through the phases described here, demonstrate the importance  of  the  differential  environment  within  which  the  model  is implemented for the success of the policy in its intentions.  Contract design, the institutional  framework of the host country and the potential public opposition all  have  a  significant  role  in  the  determination  of  operation  and  performance.  These factors further impact the likelihood of the contract entering a process of dispute,  renegotiation  and  possible  cancellation.    It  has  been  shown  that  the rationalising  theory  contributes  to  the  form  of  PSP  established,  with  an underlying distrust of the public sector and institutions, and a failure to account for  and  incorporate  local  variations  in  such  institutions  where  they  are determinant in differential performance of privatised water service provision.    The  three  phases  of  privatisation  of  water  services  in  developing countries, as described here, demonstrate the attempts to account for and alter the  poor  performance  of  PSP  in  this  context.    The  shift  from  a  crude implementation of the PSP model to increasing acknowledgement of institutional factors  reveals  the  implicit  acceptance of  the  shortcomings  of  the  rationalising theoretical model.   The assumed coherent conditions, which are existent  in  the developed country context within which the model originates, are acknowledged as  playing  a  significant  role  in  determining  privatisation  performance.    The attempt  to  incorporate  the  modelling  of  institutional  factors  in  a  theoretical 
  63 




Research  design:  nature  and  scope  of  investigation,  appropriate 
methodology and quality criteria 
 
 To  this  point,  it  has  been  established  that  the  performance  and  operation  of privatisation  where  implemented  in  the  water  sector  in  developing  countries typically  diverges  from  that  proposed  within  the  theoretical  rationale  for  the programme  and  its  associated  propositions.    Inconsistencies,  weaknesses  and problematic  assumptions,  and  their  alignment  with  conditions  typical  in  the water sector, are paralleled by the performance and operation of the programme where implemented: many contracts are characterised by dispute, renegotiation and  cancellation,  risk  and  liability  increasingly  remains  with  the  government, and  there  is  a decrease  in private  investment  in  the  sector.   The divergence  in practical  implementation  from  that  proposed  within  the  theoretical  rationale, and that utilised by proponents of the programme, thus provides a phenomenon and  a  contradiction which motivates  the  research  of  this  thesis.    This  chapter describes the scope of required research, the particular research questions that follow  from  this  phenomenon,  and  the  means  by  which  research  may  be implemented, in terms of methodology and scope.      The scope for the exploration of the grounds for such divergence can be derived from the preceding chapters.  As will be described in the first section, it is apparent that the two broad areas of study are those relating to the contract itself,  the  specificity  and  terms  thereof,  and  the  environment within which  the contract  is  implemented,  incorporating  the  political,  social  and  institutional framework  determining  performance  and  operation  where  information  and contracts are incomplete.  It will be proposed here that as these areas therefore broadly  align  with,  firstly,  technical  factors  determining  performance  and operation of privatisation, and secondly extra‐economic factors (political, social and institutional), such a bifurcation provides a mode by which to execute study of the phenomenon.  Following from the scope of study required, the range and extent of research questions by which to guide exploration of  these  issues, and which  describe  the  possible  connections  between  theory,  and  its  failings,  and problematic  implementation.    Beyond  the  over‐arching  motivating  question regarding  the  divergence  of  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed, these questions consider: the particular aspects of theory and their contribution to  this  divergence;  the  particular  aspects  of  the  water  sector  in  developing countries  and  their  undermining  of  propositions  of  theory;  the  impact  of  the local  social,  political  and  institutional  conditions,  norms  and  capacities  on performance  and  operation;  and  subsequently  the  potential  impact  of commitment  to  an  apparently  flawed  theoretical  foundation  and  the manifestation in problematic implementation in the sector.      Thus  appropriate methodology  for  the  undertaking  of  study, within  the scope described and with regard these questions, is to be considered, and forms the  second  section  here.    Coherent  with  the  scope  of  privatisation  and  its contextual  implementation,  and  with  the  intended  aims  and  objectives 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established  in  the  research questions,  it will  be maintained here  that  the most appropriate  approach  for  exploration  is  the  case  study.    Implementation  takes place typically at the national scale, and investigation considers a range of actors, agencies  and  institutions  at  this  national  scale,  thus  within  the  practical limitations  of  the  present  thesis  a  case  study  corresponds.    Particular methodologies  are  consistent with  the  range  of  sites  and  actors  to  be  studied, and  thus  incorporates  qualitative  methodologies  including  interview  and document analysis.  Further to these considerations, the practical execution, and the  ethical  principles  to  be  applied,  are  noted  here.    Details  regarding  the particular process of research undertaken, the data sources and actors engaged, can be found in Appendix A.   
4.1  Nature  and  scope  of  investigation:  ontological  and  epistemological 
approach, and research questions  The  discussion  of  theory  and  its  critique,  and  programme  implementation, determines the appropriate nature and scope of investigation of the divergence of  performance  and  operation  of  privatisation  from  that  proposed  within  the rationalising  theory.    This  is  true  both  in  terms  of  the  nature  of  research employed,  in  epistemological  and  ontological  terms,  and  the  scope  of investigation, determined by the research questions formulated.  
Ontological and epistemological considerations  The  nature  of  the  problem,  and  the  phenomena  to  be  explained,  provides  a definite basis upon which considerations of ontological and epistemological can be made.  The apparent disconnect between intended programme operation and that  which  is  manifest  in  reality  in  developing  countries,  suggests  the requirement for the construction of the case of privatisation in the water sector with a  focus on  the  interpretation and mutation of  the policy at  the  local  level. The  divergence  in  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed  may  be researched  by,  for  example,  the  observation  of  requisite  institutions  for  the administration of privatisation.  However, the existence of such institutions does not  guarantee  their  presumed  functioning:  where  individuals  operate  within such  institutions,  their  commitment  and  capacity  to  function  affects  outcomes.  Therefore, it is necessary not only to look at the concrete objectively observable characteristics  of  conditions  in  the  water  sector,  but  also  the  actions  and conceptions of those operating therein.      In  this  sense  the  nature  of  enquiry  has  greater  coherence  with  a constructivist  ontological  position,  and  subsequently  an  interpretivist epistemological position.   The enquiry necessarily  involves  therefore  the scope for the incorporation of these actions, conceptions and opinions of those working in  the  sector,  and  the  potential  impact  on  performance  and  operation.  Considering  the  need  for  such  openness  in  the  nature  of  enquiry,  it  would  be inconsistent  and  inappropriate  to  employ  an  ontological  and  epistemological position which does not permit such space.   The necessary incorporation of the interpretation  of  individuals  is  therefore  contradictory  to  a  purely  objectivist 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approach.    Such  an  ontology  determines  a  positivist  epistemology,  further contrary to the requirement for the incorporation of subjective interpretations at the  local  level  (Guba  &  Lincoln,  1994;  Flick,  2002;  Bryman,  2004).    The employing  of  the  constructivist  ontology  entails  the  potential  for  the incorporation  of  such  subjective  interpretations,  providing  the  conceptual framework for the research enquiry to reconstruct the case of privatisation as is experienced by  those operating  in  the  sector  in developing  countries.    In  turn, the coherent epistemological position is that of interpretivism: the incorporation of  meaning  and  purpose  being  essential  in  order  to  understand  behaviour  of those  operating  within  the  sector,  going  beyond  objectively  observable  data (ibid.).      In  terms  of  the  research  design  process  consequent  to  this,  typically associated  with  the  constructivist  and  interpretivist  ontological  and epistemological approach is the theory generating,  inductive design (Meinefeld, 2004;  Flick,  2002).    In  this  sense  the  interpretive  approach  is  utilised  in  the generation of new theoretical development, the research design therefore having a significant degree of openness.  Accordingly, the research process may follow a circular  strategy,  with  each  aspect  of  researching  informing  the  next  in  turn.  While  this may  be  appropriate  for  an  alternate  study  of more  significant  scale and  with  intentions  for  theoretical  development,  it  may  not  be  appropriate within  this  context.    It  has been established  in  the preceding  chapters  that  the performance  and  operation  of  privatisation  has  frequently  encountered problems  where  implemented  and  these  contribute  to  a  divergence  from propositions  contained  within  the  rationalising  theory.    It  has  further  been established that the rationalising theory has various weaknesses, inconsistencies and  problematic  assumptions  which  may  align  with  conditions  and  problems encountered  in  practice.    This  indicates  therefore  a  linear,  hypothesis  testing, research design process.  While this may be contrary to common conceptions of the  design  which  follows  from  the  constructivist  ontology,  it  is  broadly acknowledged  that  a hypothesis  testing model may be  equally  valid  (e.g.  Flick, 2002 & 2004a; Meinefeld, 2004).  What is necessary however, is the maintenance of  a degree openness within  the hypothesis  for  the  incorporation of  subjective definitions and interpretations within the research process and analysis.  In this sense,  while  the  extent  of  prior  knowledge  permits  the  development  of hypotheses,  it  should  be  coherent  with  the  ontological  and  epistemological framework (ibid.).    
Research questions  It has been established in the preceding chapters that the underlying theoretical rationale  for  privatisation  has  various  associated  assumptions,  inconsistencies and weaknesses, and where applied in the water sector in developing countries it  is  apparent  that  these  various  aspects  may  be  contributory  factors  in  the divergence  of  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed  under  this rationale.    It  is  subsequently  necessary  to  determine,  considering  these correlations, the scope of the research required to provide a greater insight into the  potential  impact  on  performance  and  operation,  and  consequently  the validity  of  the  theoretical  rationale  as  a  basis  for  sector  policy.    The  following 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discussion  reviews  the  parameters  of  research  and  the  particular  aspects  of privatisation  and  service  provision  that  require  examination.    The  scope  of analysis as noted here should consider: the nature and form of the contract, the degree of risk and liability transfer, the specificity of terms and the potential for opportunism that exists  in non‐contracted terms;  the capacity, extent and form of  regulation  in  a  dual  role  of monitoring  the  private  sector  and  as  instituting socially and politically acceptable pricing; the broader institutional environment, its capacity, coherence with  the privatisation programme,  local commitment or resistance  to  the  programme,  and  measures  acknowledging  institutional importance  included  in  the  programme;  and,  coherence  with  expectations  of service  provision  within  the  country,  including  conceptions  of  water  and universal service provision.   Broader  themes of exploration should  incorporate the  implications  of  ideological  commitment  to  the  tenets  of  the  theoretical rationale for implementation.    Considering  the  preceding  chapters,  it  is  obvious  that  the  contractual relationship  between  principal  and  agent  is  of  critical  importance  to  the performance and operation of privatisation.  It is apparent from the privatisation where  implemented  in developing countries, as reviewed in chapter three,  that the  specificity  (or  lack  of)  terms  of  contracts  have  been  shown  to  be  critical factors in determining the likelihood of progression to dispute or renegotiation.  Where contractual terms lack specificity, opportunism on the part of the private sector  has  been  evident  –  for  example  in  the  ex‐post  ‘reinterpretation’  of contractual language.  This may in turn result in ex‐ante opportunism in the form of adverse selection.    The issues noted here provide an indication of the scope of investigation with regards the contractual relationship of the principal and agent, necessary in the determination of  the  transfer of property  rights and subsequent validity of this  theory  in  the  sector.    Exploration  of  this  particular  aspect  of  privatisation should therefore  incorporate: an understanding of the specificity of contractual terms;  performance  and  operation,  and  compliance  with  contract  terms;  the potential for opportunism, ex‐post and thus possible ex‐ante; capacity (technical, financial, human resources)  for administration of contract; aspects of provision where  information  is  incomplete, or deficient, and therefore subject  to dispute; means,  and  extent,  of  transfer  of  risk  and  liability  –  including  distortions incorporated as a means of attracting private sector investment; incorporation of means  by  which  to  reconcile  commercial  operation  (full  cost  recovery)  with social objectives (service expansion), thus the consideration of public opposition.  Exploring such issues contributes to the intended aims of assessing the validity of  the  underlying  theoretical  rationale  for  application  in  the  sector,  most particularly  in  terms  here  of  property  rights  and  transfer  thereof,  and subsequently associated propositions.   But  it will  further be  indicated here  the existence  of  opportunism on  the  part  of  the  public  sector,  and  thus  validity  of certain aspects of public choice theory.     Subsequent to the consideration of the contract itself is the assessment of the institutional environment within which privatisation is located – a significant determining  factor  in  the  performance  and  operation  of  any  privatisation 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programme.    As  is  necessary  in  the water  sector,  intervention  by  a  regulatory agency  constitutes  the  first  obvious  form  of  institutional  importance.    It  is apparent from the implementation of privatisation in the water sector in various developing countries the form of the regulator,  in terms of attributed authority and capacity, varies across dependent on the interests of privatisation sponsors.  Where  distrust  of  the  national  state  is  most  apparent  in  early  forms  of privatisation,  as  is  coherent  with  the  underlying  theoretical  framework  and associated  limitations  on  state  intervention,  regulation  was  deemed  to  be  of secondary  importance  to  the  introduction  of  the  private  sector.    Subsequent programme  failures,  demonstrated  the  implications  of  market  failure  and  the role  of  the  regulator  in  the  counteracting  of  this,  brings  about  the  greater attribution of responsibility and import to such an agency in later programmes.  The  institution  of  ‘best‐practice’  regulation  as  typical  of  this  revised  approach maintains  this  apparent  distrust  of  the  national  state,  as  contradictory  to  the idealised role of the state integral to the rationalising framework.  The capacity, extent and form of regulation may therefore have altered through the history of privatisation  in  the  water  sector  in  developing  countries.    The  nature  of intervention  remains  fundamental  to  the  operation  and  performance  of  the programme.        Beyond  the  regulatory  agency,  the  broader  institutional  environment  is clearly integral to the operation of privatisation contracts in the water sector in developing countries.  The capacity of the host state in the administration of the contract  is  significant  in  the  operation  and  performance  of  the  privatisation programme, and where capacity has been deficient, the likelihood of dispute and renegotiation or  cancellation may  increase.    For example, where ex‐post moral hazard is likely due to non‐contracted items, the capacity of the host government to recognise these ex‐ante may be limited and thus adverse selection is possible.  Furthermore,  the  capacity  of  the  institutional  framework  determines  the likelihood of enforcement of penalties where contracted  terms are not met ex‐post  –  where  the  legal  system  fails  to  enforce  such  measures.    Equally,  the conditions found in developing countries, and the requirement for investment in service provision, disadvantages  the national  government where other  sources of  funding  are  lacking  –  as  a  disincentive  to  enforce  penalties  against  the investor.    Alternatively,  the  commitment  of  national  actors  to  the privatisation programme may affect the implementation and operation: where privatisation is seen as a means of acquiring necessary finance, associated measures and modes of operation may be agreed to only at a superficial level.  Such factors provide a contradictory environment to that assumed, where the  institutional  framework is  assumed  to  be  coherent  and with  adequate  capacity.    The  deficiency  in  the capacity  for  administration,  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  contracts  thus impacts  on  their  operation  and  performance,  in  terms  of  both  contracted  and non‐contracted items.      Thus,  in  addition  to  the  considerations  noted  above  regarding  the contract,  institutional  capacity  and  coherence  forms  an  integral  and  essential part  of  any  exploration  of  the  performance  and  operation  of  privatisation relative  to  those  propositions  associated  with  the  underlying  theoretical rationale.    The  aspects  of  privatisation  to  be  considered  here  are  thus:  the 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establishment  of  a  regulatory  agency;  the  incorporation  of  the  regulator  as component to the privatisation programme, and the prioritisation made thereof; the capacity of the regulator in its monitoring and price setting role; the potential for  regulatory  capture,  political  or  commercial;  the  legal  and  legislative framework  enabling  regulatory  decisions  to  be  implemented;  commitment  or otherwise of actors in the national state institutional framework to privatisation and  its  mode  of  implementation;  the  extent  and  nature  of  transaction  costs associated  with  the  administration  and  monitoring  of  privatisation;  the incorporation of public consultation in the privatisation process and the impact of  public  opposition;  evidence  and  impact  of  contradictory motives  for  action: public  service  and  universal  service  provision;  the  impact  of  contradictory tendencies  of  commercial  operation  and  universal  service  provision  or expansion of  services.   This proposed scope of exploration of performance and operation  correlates  with  the  weaknesses,  inconsistencies  and  problematic assumptions  described  in  the  critical  assessment,  their  manifestation  in  the water sector, and the more substantial problematic assumptions of neo‐classical economic modelling more generally as noted in chapter two.      Having outlined the particular aspects describing the scope of exploration necessary for assessing performance and operation of privatisation in the water sector  in developing  countries,  the  structure of  this  assessment  should  also be considered.    The  above  factors  may  be  considered  by  reference  to  their specificity,  their  inclusion  in or exclusion  from contracted  terms,  their capacity to  be  assessed  by  reference  to  technical  considerations  –  specified  targets, contractual  terms  or  compliance  with  legislative  requirements  for  example.  Beyond  this  there  are  a  multitude  of  extra‐economic  factors  that  may  impact performance and operation.  Thus where technical requirements end, or are not specified,  extra‐economic  factors  play  a  more  significant  role  in  the determination of outcome – opportunism, degree of  ideological alignment with privatisation,  political  patronage  etc.    It  is  beneficial  in  this  sense  to  consider these two aspects in separation.  Final evaluation, following the consideration of these two spheres of analysis, should however be made to the original aspects of critical  assessment  of  the  theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation.    In  this endeavour, the performance and operation in the context of the water sector in developing  countries  may  be  analysed  relative  to  the  theoretical  weaknesses, inconsistencies and problematic assumptions outlined,  including  those broader criticisms  relating  to  the  underlying  conception  of  the  individual.    Thus  the validity of  the  theoretical  framework as a basis  for policy  in  the sector may be better  assessed,  and  the  commitment  to  such  theory  outwith  its  theoretical capacity questioned.     Consequent to the scope of research outlined here, and the establishment in  the  preceding  chapters  of  the  theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation,  its critique  and  the  practical  implementation  in  the  water  sector  in  developing countries,  it  is  possible  now  to  formalise  a  hypothesis  and  the  particular questions  that  are  intended  to  be  answered  within  this  research:  the weaknesses,  inconsistencies  and  problematic  assumptions  of  the  rationalising theory of privatisation provide a  foundation  for  the divergence  in performance and operation of the programme from that proposed within this rationale, and, 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subsequently, the validity of this rationale for application in the water sector in developing  countries  should  be  questioned.    In  investigating  this  hypothesis various research questions may be developed, and the above considerations are integral to the answers sought:  
‐ The over‐arching question motivating  this research  is as  follows: Why  is 







‐ Relating  to  the  contextual  implementation:  In  what  respects  do  the 




conditions  –  social,  political  and  institutional  norms  and  capacities  – 
recognised  in  the  form  and  mode  of  implementation  of  the  privatisation 
programme? 
‐ More speculatively then: Does ideological commitment to the programme, 




a valid basis for application in the water sector in developing countries?  Following from these questions, and the further aspects of study as noted above, it  is  necessary  now  to  consider  the  mode  of  their  implementation,  the methodology  by which  requisite  data may  be  sought,  and  in what  context  this should be applied.     
4.2  Appropriate methodology and case construction  Following  from  the  above  identification  of  the  appropriate  ontological  and epistemological  framework,  and  subsequently  the  development  of  research questions and hypotheses,  it  is necessary to develop a coherent methodological approach.  It will be maintained here that the most appropriate mode of research is  that  of  the  case  study,  considering  the  various  institutions  under  focus,  the national‐scale of implementation and as a context to evaluate validity of theory. The  assessment  of  social,  political  and  institutional  factors  as  necessary  to  the exploration  of  extra‐economic  foundations  of  divergence  of  performance  and operation  from  that  proposed,  infers  qualitative  research,  and  interviewing,  of those actors involved in programme implementation.  Such interviews may also inform the nature of technical performance and operation, though it is likely that this  area  of  research  is  to  be  fulfilled more  comprehensively  be  statistical  and 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documentary  evidence.    Such  documentary  analysis  provides  a  substantial evidentiary framework for the analysis of performance and operation.  
Case study as a research framework  The  utilisation  of  a  case  study  approach  provides  specific  advantages  when attempting  to  assess  the  privatisation  programme  in  developing  countries.  Because  the  proposed  benefits  of  privatisation  differ  so  significantly  from  the outcomes evident in many cases, the disparity cannot be judged from assessment at  a  supra‐national  level.    The  reception,  interpretation  and  mutation  of privatisation  in developing countries contribute  to  its differential performance.  Similarly,  the activities associated with privatisation – those which derive  from the ideological commitment to the programme in contradictory conditions – are implicit  within  the  policy  framework,  yet  also  contribute  to  its  performance.  These  factors are only evident within  the national context, and as such require study at this level.  Differential national contexts determine differential reception and  mutations,  together  with  different  processes  to  ease  privatisation implementation  in  these  contexts.    Considering  these  issues,  a  case  study approach appears to offer beneficial method to the assessment of privatisation in developing  countries.    However,  for  the  very  same  reasons  generalisability  of results  becomes  problematic  –  although  replication  of  method  and  theory remains possible.     Interpretations of  case  study  research,  its nature and  its potential  value show  some  variation  between  those  who  have  utilised  the  approach  – particularly  across  disciplines.    Case  studies  are  commonly  employed  in  the social sciences by those using an anthropological or ethnographic approach, and in  this  sense  they provide an opportunity  for  inductive  research.   While a  case study might find favour in these instances, it does not correlate with the present work  (Burgess,  2000).   With  a  focus  on  the  implementation  of  a  privatisation agenda  based  on  predefined  theory,  the  approach  here  is  primarily  deductive.  The  approach  however  retains  the  interpretative  appeal  of  the  case  study approach, essential for the understanding of the implementation of privatisation in  the  national  context  of  the  developing  country.    The  opportunity  that  is afforded  by  the  case  study  for  the  contextualised  appreciation  of  a  broad programme,  such as privatisation,  is  important.    It  is  the  intention  for  the case study to be an instructive example of a more general phenomena (Flick, 2002). This aspect of the case study is highlighted by Yin (2009: 18), in his definition of the  approach:  “1:  A  case  study  is  an  empirical  enquiry  that:  investigates  a contemporary phenomenon  in depth  and within  its  real‐life  context,  especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.  Yin  further  maintains,  “…  you  would  use  the  case  study  method  because  you wanted to understand a real‐life phenomenon in depth, but such understanding encompassed important contextual conditions …” (2009: 18).  This appears to be evident  for  the  case  of  privatisation,  with  such  a  disparity  between  proposed benefits  and  actual  outcomes  –  a  disparity  not  explained  by  the  theoretical rationale or the theoretical concepts made available within.  The privatisation of water  services  is,  furthermore,  an  instance  of  a  particular  transaction,  as described within  the  critical  economic  literature,  and as  such  the  focus on one 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such  particular  transaction  correlates  with  the  inquiry  of  theoretical  validity based on such critical literature (Adams et al, 2007; Stark & Torrance, 2005).      Furthermore, the implementation of privatisation in its broad ideological form  encompasses  a multitude  of  social  arena within which  the  programme  is carried out.  The case study in this sense further provides an opportunity for the aggregation of data from these various arenas, but which ultimately relate to the same  attempted  implementation  of  privatisation.    This  ‘triangulation’  is component  to  Yin’s  further  definition  of  the  case  study:  “2:    The  case  study inquiry: copes with the technically difficult situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points; and as one result relies on multiple sources  of  evidence,  with  data  needing  to  converge  in  a  triangulating  fashion; and  as  another  result  benefits  from  the  prior  development  of  theoretical propositions  to  guide  data  collection  and  analysis”  (Yin,  2009:  18).    The utilisation of a case study as a component of research methodology thus provides the opportunity to examine the processes by which the privatisation programme is  transferred  to  the  national  context.    It  permits  the  cross  examination  of  the same  process  of  transfer  by  reference  to  various  agencies  within  the  same country active in the same transfer, establishing a rich description of the process of  implementation.    The  consequent  representation  of  the  phenomenon  of privatisation  from  the perspective of  the participants  allows  the possibility  for the understanding of local reception, mutation and transformation of policy and theory,  and  subsequently  the  undermining  of  associated  propositions  (Stark & Torrance, 2005).   
Particular methodologies utilised  The particular methodologies to be utilised are determined by the nature of the research  design  and  questions  established,  and  the  associated  ontological  and epistemological  approach.    The  research  design  and  questions  entail  the requirement  for  the  investigation  of  privatisation  in  developing  countries  to incorporate the reception and interpretations of the policy programme by those working  within  the  sector.    This  necessary  evaluation  as  a  means  to  explain divergence  in  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed  within  the theoretical  rationale  in  turn  entails  a  constructivist  ontology  and  associated interpretivist  epistemology.    Furthermore  the  research  design  takes  a  linear, hypothesis  testing  form.    The  development  of  this  form  of  research  design determines  the  utilisation  of  methodology  which  permits  appropriate  data collection.    In  this  sense  the  research  design  should  incorporate  qualitative methodology,  permitting  the  exploration  of  subjective  experiences  and interpretations  of  the  implementation  of  privatisation,  in  order  to  satisfy  the ontological and epistemological concerns.   The  linear, hypothesis  testing model does not contradict  this methodology.   While conventionally such a model may be  associated with  positivist  research  aligning with  the  natural  science model (Stark & Torrance, 2005; Adams et al, 2007), and as such would utilise primarily quantitative methodology, the utilisation of qualitative methodology as a means to construct a case against which hypotheses are tested remains a valid approach (Flick, 2002 & 2004a; Meinefeld, 2004). 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 The  construction of privatisation within  the  case  study context  requires therefore the incorporation of data provided by sources active in the sector, as a means  by  which  to  establish  the  local  interpretation  and  reception  of  the programme.  Additionally to this however, it is necessary to incorporate broader forms of data  in order  to contextualise and provide a  framework within which such  subjective  interpretations may be  located.    Such  is  the nature  of  the  case study,  and  indeed  its  benefit  in  providing  a  coherent  representation  of  a particular  instance  of  a  broader  phenomenon.    The  utilisation  of  multiple methods in constructing the case of privatisation within a particular developing country is coherent with the technique of ‘triangulation’, providing breadth and depth of data collection (Flick, 2002 & 2004b).      In  constructing  the  case  study  and  utilising  the  triangulation  of  data sources  in  the  field,  the  use  of  interviews  and documentary  evidence provides the primary means of data collection.  It has been identified above the means of analysis  of  performance  and  operation  of  privatisation  by  reference  to,  firstly, technical,  and  secondly,  social,  political  and  institutional  factors.    The  former considers  the  identifiable,  and  quantifiable,  aspects  of  performance  and operation, primarily  relating  to  those  factors appearing  in contract  terms.   The latter  considers  the  social,  political  and  institutional  factors  which  frequently determine  privatisation  outcomes  where  contracts  are  incomplete,  and  where there is necessary intervention in the administration of privatisation.  Inevitably, the latter provides the most significant arena within which subjective reception and  interpretation  provides  a  determining  factor,  with  interviews  being  the appropriate  methodology.    Correspondingly,  technical  aspects  are  more  likely appropriated  through  documentation.   While  this  is  the  inevitable  correlation, each aspect of methodology impacts on each sphere of investigation.   Interviews of  those  actors within  the  field  offers  a  significant means by which subjective opinion, reception and interpretation of policy implementation may  be  acquired.    The  particular  form  of  interview  established  is,  once  again, determined by the nature of enquiry and research questions.  It is appropriate to utilise  semi‐structured  interviewing,  with  a  significant  degree  of  prior knowledge  of  the  topic,  and  the  focus  of  questioning  set  accordingly,  but retaining  the  requisite  flexibility  and  openness  to  incorporate  participant meaning.  (Flick,  2002;  Hopf,  2004;  Bryman,  2004;  Adams  et  al,  2007).    The utilisation  of  interviewing  as  a methodology  is  furthermore  appropriate  to  the scale  of  study.    The  number  of  agencies  active  in  the  sector  is  not  significant: considering  the  evidence  from  chapter  three,  government,  international sponsors  (normally  the  World  Bank),  a  regulatory  agency,  civil  service,  the public service provider where applicable, and NGOs where active, represent the typical range.    Triangulating the data acquired from the interviewing of actors within the sector,  documentary  evidence  provides  not  only  contextualising  evidence broadening and deepening understanding of the implementation of privatisation, it  is  of  significance  in  establishing  technical  aspects  of  performance  and operation.    Documentation  provides  the  most  likely  form  of  evidence  for  the understanding  of  privatisation  within  the  developing  country  context, 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particularly  when  considering  the  technical  aspects  of  performance  and operation.  This is particularly true in the case of a donor sponsored programme such as the privatisation of water, where accountability of those in the national arena  is  typically  required  by  those  sponsors.    As  such,  the  analysis  of documentary  evidence  of  the  performance  and  operation  of  privatisation provides  a  legitimate  institutional  trace,  from  where  to  draw  conclusions  on decision making and activity (Wolff, 2004).  It is further necessary where access to  data  regarding  historical  phenomena  is  required,  where  the  research  and phenomena  are  not  contemporaneous  (Scott,  1990).    Just  as  documentation  of privatisation  provides  a  significant  source  of  data  regarding  performance  and operation,  consideration  of  access  rights  is  required:  where  official documentation exists, there is potential for restricted access (ibid.).     Within  the  context  of  case  study  research,  the  utilisation  of  these particular  forms  of  methodology  involves  a  particular  mode  of  selection  and sampling of data sources.  Selection and sampling in the context of this research is purposive and goal‐oriented (Steinke, 2004; Merkens, 2004).  The selection of the particular country for study is itself a selection decision based on factors that entail  the  case  being  of  particular  interest:  for  example  the  occurrence  of privatisation, the qualification of the case as being a developing country, or the novelty  of  study  and  the  revelation  of  data  previously  un‐  or  under‐studied.  Equally  the  selection  of  case  study  should  have  relevance  for  the  broader phenomenon of privatisation  in the water sector (although each  instance being inevitably unique).  The selection of the location of study is therefore purposive, determined  by  prior  knowledge  of  the  general  conditions  of  privatisation  (as noted  in  chapter  three) and  the particular  instances which meet  these  criteria.  Beyond the selection of the location of study, purposive sampling is continued in the selection of data sources.    In constructing the experience of privatisation in the  case  study,  those  actors  and  agencies  involved  in  the  process  of implementation are the subjects of interest (Flick, 2002).  Therefore, in contrast to  representative  sampling  as may  be  typical  in  quantitative methodology,  the generalisability  of  results  is  maintained  through  replicability  of  sampling  and selection  (Merkens,  2004).    In  addition,  in  the  case  study  context,  while  the population is generally known in advance – and sampling may thus generally be determined  in  advance  –  there  remains  a  requirement  for  flexibility  and openness  for  additional  sources  to  be  incorporated where  encountered  in  the field  (Flick,  2002).    The  sampling  and  selection  of  data  sources  is  therefore purposive and goal‐oriented – coherent with the linear hypothesis testing model, yet  incorporates  flexibility  in  the  field – coherent with  the requirement  for  the inclusion of subjective meaning and further sources where this follows.    
Ethical considerations  Following the determination of the methodological framework, it is necessary to consider the execution of the research in the case study context, and in particular the ethical responsibility in respect to the participants of this research.  Research in the context of the water sector in developing countries, as any social research, requires  the  consideration  of  the  four  ethical  principles,  as  noted  by  Bryman (2004):  the  potential  harm  to  participants;  the  lack  of  informed  consent;  the 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potential for invasion of privacy; and, the potential for deception.   The scope of concern for each principle in the context of this research is determined both by the  requirements  of  methodology,  and  the  code  of  ethics  established  by  the University of Hertfordshire.  The extent to which the principles are applicable in this  context  are  thus  limited  by  these  factors.    As  will  be  described  here,  the requirements of the research do not extend to the deception of participants, and those  individuals  participating  are  doing  so  in  their  professional  function  and thus considerations of personal privacy are not of primary concern.  Thus while unintentional deception should be a consideration, the primary focus in terms of ethical principles in this research should be potential harm and consent.    The potential harm to the participants  incorporates the consideration of the  requirements being made of  those  invited  to partake  in  the  research.    The nature of the study entails that participants are required only to provide insight into  the  privatisation  programme  within  the  national  context  and  their interpretation of  this  implementation,  together with any  information regarding performance  and  operation  beyond  that  which  may  be  acquired  through documentary and quantitative data available elsewhere.  In this sense the nature of potential harm is not conceptualised as physical, but more likely professional or  personal  in  the  nature  and  extent  of  information  that  is  revealed,  and  the potential  repercussions  thereafter.    The  consequent  approach  involves  the assurance of maintaining  confidentiality and anonymity  in  records of  research.  While these procedures are to be upheld and observe as strictly as possible, the nature  of  research  entails  the  possibility  of  context  revealing  identity.    Thus where description of participant is recorded, and their position within the sector, specificity is limited (Bryman, 2004; Piper & Simons, 2005; Adams et al, 2007).      The required confidentiality and anonymity forms part of a further aspect of  ethical  principles  to  be  applied  in  this  research,  as  part  of  the  process  of informed  consent  of  participants.    The  primary  concern when  considering  the consent  of  participants  relates  to  research  conducted  in  a  covert  or  disguised observation  (Bryman,  2004).    Such  methodology  does  not  form  part  of  this research and as such the associated lack of consent is not applicable here.  Thus, where  actors  engaged  in  the  research  process,  informed  consent  is  acquired  – with  consent  letters  indicating:  the  extent,  scope  and  nature  of  research  is indicated to those individuals; the confidentiality and anonymity in recording is noted;  those  undertaking  and  financing  the  research;  and,  compliance  with University ethical guidelines.    
Appropriate quality criteria  The  research  design  established  above,  incorporating  qualitative  research  in  a case  study  context,  requires  a  consideration  of  the means  by which  quality  of research  is  to  be  maintained  and  evaluated.    The  utilisation  of  this  particular approach and methodology entails appropriate criteria should be applied.  It will be noted here that criteria appropriate for qualitative research are less definitive than  those  for  quantitative  approaches,  with  various  proposed  criteria  – although with common themes.  The primary contrast between quantitative and qualitative criteria concerns the proximation to the natural science mode in the 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case of the former, or the validation and development of theory in the case of the latter.  As is noted by various authors, criteria for each form of research differs in accordance with the associated ontological and epistemological approach (Flick, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 2001; Steinke, 2004).    The  value  of  transferring  quality  criteria  deriving  from  those  utilised within  positivist  research  to  qualitative  methodology  is  questioned  (Guba  & Lincoln  2001;  Flick,  2002;  Steinke,  2004).    Within  the  field  of  qualitative research,  and  the  various  authors  writing  on  criteria  to  be  applied,  there  are various propositions as to the appropriate form.  Contrary to the postmodernist rejection  of  quality  criteria  for  qualitative  research,  most  authors  provide  a framework for the maintenance and evaluation within this methodological field which may  be  considered  to  be  parallel  to  equivalent  criteria  in  the  positivist field  (Guba  &  Lincoln  2001;  Flick,  2002;  Steinke,  2004).    Rather  than  a transposition of criteria, appropriate concepts should be developed and applied: those focusing on procedure to facilitate reliability, coherence of representation with facts to facilitate validity, and analytical consistency with broader theory to facilitate generalisation.    Regarding  reliability,  or  associated  equivalent  for  qualitative  research, this typically is composed of a concern for procedural soundness.   According to Flick (2002), this should incorporate the adequate recording and documentation of  data,  and  this  in  turn  should  ensure  the  distinction  of  subject  data  and researcher  interpretation.    Equivalent  criteria  proposed  by  Guba  &  Lincoln (2001),  the  ‘dependability’  of  research,  entail  the  potential  for  external examination  of  the  research  process,  the  record  of  enquiry,  methodology  and decision  making.    This  includes  the  process  by  which  selection  and  sampling decisions  are  made  (Merkens,  2004).    Regarding  validity,  or  associated equivalent for qualitative research, this typically is composed of the requirement for  consistency  between  the  representation  offered  by  the  researcher  and  the data  in  the  field.   As Flick (2002) describes,  this  is  the question of whether the researcher sees what they propose to see.  Threats to validity of research may be seen  where  the  researcher  sees  a  relation  or  principle  to  exist  where  it  is unsubstantiated, or to overlook them where they exist (ibid.).    Where  the  generalisation  of  qualitative  research  is  concerned,  criteria follow from the above criteria: what is typically the concern here is the quality of selection  and  sampling  decisions,  and  the  more  general  research  design  and implementation, and the subsequent consistency and analysis relative to broader theory  (Flick, 2002).   This  is  frequently  the greatest  concern within qualitative research, where there is a greater interest in depth rather than breadth, and with particular cases or small samples (Bryman, 2004).  Selecting one case of a more general  phenomenon  entails  the  potential  implications  and  conclusions  drawn from the case may not be applicable in more general terms.   The particularities of the case may determine the extent of generalisability, but it is also possible to infer elements of common trends or reveal new approaches of those proponents of the programme (Yin, 2009; Stark & Torrance, 2005; Adams et al, 2007).   Yin considers the purported problematic external validity of case study research: 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“Critics  typically  state  that  single  cases  offer  a  poor  basis  for  generalising.  However,  such  critics  are  implicitly  contrasting  the  situation  to  survey research,  in which  a  sample  is  intended  to  generalise  to  a  larger  universe.  
This  analogy  to  samples  and  universes  is  incorrect  when  dealing  with  case 
studies.    Survey  research  relies  on  statistical  generalisation,  whereas  case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytical generalisation.  In analytical generalisation,  the  investigator  is  striving  to  generalise  a  particular  set  of results to some broader theory.”  (Yin, 2009: 43, emphasis original)  Thus, considering the generalised trends that are apparent across the history of privatisation  in  the  sector,  as noted  in  chapter  three,  the exposure of  evidence for  a  particular  case  may  reveal  the  underlying  causes  for  divergence  in performance from that proposed in the rationalising theory.    Regarding other aspects of the selected research design and methodology outlined above, consideration should be made of the utilisation of triangulation and documents as data sources.  Triangulation has been criticised where utilised as  a  means  of  validating  data  (e.g.  Blaikie,  1991).    While  the  employment  of multiple sources through triangulation provides the basis for improved breadth and  depth  of  understanding  of  phenomena,  its  utilisation  as  a means  of  cross‐validation of those multiple sources should be limited (Flick 2002 & 2004b).  The utilisation of documentation as a data source provides potential issues of quality assurance, as the researcher infers historical actuality through these documents: there  is  mediate  or  indirect  access,  contrasting  to  immediately  observable phenomena  where  the  observer  and  source  are  contemporaneous.  Consideration should therefore be made of the authenticity (e.g. errors in copies, forgeries), credibility (e.g. motivations for bias or distortion), representativeness (to  what  degree  is  the  document  representative  of  the  totality)  and  meaning (potential  different  meanings  of  author,  audience  and  researcher)  of  the document  (Scott,  1990).    Content  of  documents  in  this  sense  should  not  be detached from production and publication (ibid.; Steinke, 2004).  
Application of methodology: case study selection and overview of fieldwork process  Having established the scope and appropriate methodology by which to conduct research,  the  selection  of  a  case  study  is  necessary.    The  location  of  the  case study  research  is  limited  by  various  factors:  the  instance  and  form  of privatisation;  the  potential  novelty  of  data  to  be  revealed;  practical considerations  including  the  availability  and  language  of  documentation.    It  is noted in the preceding chapter that the frequency of privatisation is decreasing, a  consequence  of  previous  failed  programmes,  and  an  associated  reduction  in interest  in  investing  in  the  sector  on  the  part  of  private  firms.    The  trend associated with this process of failure and reduced investment is that of a shift in form  of  privatisation  from  long  term  contracts  with  significant  investment requirements,  to  shorter  term  management  contracts  with  inherent  limited transfer  for  of  risk.    It  is  evident  from  the  extent  of  data  reviewed  in  chapter three  that,  as  is  inevitable,  more  recent  forms  of  privatisation  and  those contracts  more  recently  instigated  have  been  less  intensively  studied.  Considering this, and the need and aspiration to contribute to the expansion of 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such  a  field  of  knowledge,  the more  recent  privatisation  contracts  provide  an obvious starting point from which to select an appropriate case study.    The potential locations for case study are thus limited to those countries where  privatisation  has  been  implemented  in  service  provision more  recently.  The  World  Bank  Private  Participation  in  Infrastructure  demonstrates  this reduced  frequency, with  six  provision  programmes  having  been  initiated  from 2003 onwards (PPI, 2010).  Of those initiated, one (Tanzania) has been cancelled thus  limiting  the potential  for research  into operation and performance.   Other practicalities  impinge  on  the  choice  of  case  studies:  language  of  official  and agency  documentation,  and  those  active  in  the  sector,  entails  selection  of Cameroon,  Ivory  Coast,  and  Senegal  would  prove  to  be  problematic.    South African  privatisation  is  that  at  a  municipal  level,  and  thus  not  typical  of privatisation projects more  generally.    The  remaining programme,  in Ghana,  is thus  appropriate  in  the  scale  of  implementation,  and  practical  considerations including language and documentary analysis.      Fieldwork was  undertaken  in  Ghana  in  August  and  September  2009,  in the fourth year of the five year management contract.  The data sources utilised comprise  a  broad  framework  encompassing  relevant  actors  and  agencies responsible  for  the  design,  implementation  and  administration  of  the privatisation programme.   This covers all relevant parties, including the service provider,  the  sponsoring  agency,  sector  institutions,  political  representation, labour  representation, and  the  representation of NGOs and community groups.  In this sense they are coherent with the scope of research determined above, and subsequently  the  theoretical  framework  to  which  results  may  be  generalised.  Actors engaged in interviews include: two representatives of the regulator; two representatives  of  the  World  Bank;  a  representative  of  the  labour  union;  a representative  of  a  coalition  of  concerned  community  groups;  a  member  of parliament previously associated with  the development and  implementation of the programme; two representatives an NGO concerned with transparency and accountability  in  governance;  a  representative  of  consultants  engaged  in  the development  and  design  of  the  programme  and  sector  institutions;  a minister responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  programme;  a  representative  of  an NGO  coalition;  and,  a  representative  of  a  further  coalition  of  NGOs  concerned with  the water sector.    (Repeat  interviews were undertaken  in some cases, see Appendix  a  for  full  details  regarding  data  selection  and  collection.)    Further secondary data was acquired from: the state company; the regulator; the private company;  the  auditor  of  the  contract;  the  World  Bank;  NGOs  concerned  with governance;  coalitions  of  NGOs  concerned with  the water  sector;  the Ministry responsible  for  the  sector;  parliamentary  records;  press  accounts;  the  sector management  unit  for  the  programme;  and  procurement  authorities  (see Appendix a for full details regarding data selection and collection).     Considering the nature of provision of water services, its nature as public and  merit  good,  combined  with  the  history  of  failure  in  implementation,  the process  of  research  and  the  engagement  of  actors within  the  sector  inevitably entails potential resistance.  As has been described in chapter three the history of privatisation in the water sector in developing countries has been the subject of 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public controversy where attempted, primarily due to the nature of the resource, and the qualities which contribute to the characterisation as a public and merit good.  Subsequently the history of attempted implementation contributes further to  potential  controversy,  where  the  record  of  the  programme  demonstrates significant  divergence  from  proposed  improvements,  as  is  the  subject  of  this thesis.   Therefore, where attempted these two factors play a role in the process of  implementation, and  this has certainly been  the case  for  this  research.   This was  most  evident  where  the  research  of  executors  of  the  programme  were concerned,  with  some  resistance  from  state  and  private  companies,  although representation was achieved from other sponsors of the programme (including the World Bank, representative of the Ministry and Government).   Data sources are  further affected, with availability of data  from these agencies  incomplete  in some  respects,  although  through  triangulation  from  other  data  sources  in  the sector this is overcome to some extent.  Sensitivity regarding the performance of the service provider is replicated elsewhere in this context, and this is associated with the concern for broader revisions in the mode of governance.  These issues impact  the  data  production  and  transfer  between  sector  agencies  and subsequently  affect  the  totality  of  information  found  in  the  sector,  as representative of the research process wherever implemented in the developing country context.    Details regarding the particular process of research undertaken, the data sources and actors engaged, can be found in Appendix A.   
Conclusion and discussion  It  has  been  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  form  a  framework  of  research,  the intended  objectives  of  that  research  and  a  strategy  by which  to  approach  this study  and  exploration.    Drawing  together  the  evidence  from  the  preceding chapters, the scope and nature of research has been defined here by reference to this  evidence  and  the  particular  correlations  between  theory,  its  critique,  and implementation of privatisation in the water sector in developing countries.    In ontological  and  epistemological  terms  this  scope  of  research  is  coherent constructivist  and  interpretivist  research:  necessary  for  the  incorporation  of local  reception  of  policy  implementation,  and  the  subjective  interpretation  of those  within  the  sector.    It  has  been  maintained  there  that  the  scope  of exploration  of  privatisation,  its  performance  and  operation,  can  be  studied within two broad spheres of enquiry – that relating to the contract and the terms specified  therein,  and  that  relating  to  the non‐contracted  items,  and  the  extra‐economic  factors  determining  outcomes  here.    Coherent  with  this  scope  of enquiry and providing research objectives are research questions outlined here.  Beyond  the  over‐arching  motivating  question  regarding  the  divergence  of performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed,  these  questions  consider:  the particular  aspects  of  theory  and  their  contribution  to  this  divergence;  the particular  aspects  of  the  water  sector  in  developing  countries  and  their undermining  of  propositions  of  theory;  the  impact  of  the  local  social,  political and  institutional  conditions,  norms  and  capacities  on  performance  and operation;  and  subsequently  the  potential  impact  of  commitment  to  an 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water sector    This  chapter  reviews  the  history  of  reform  in  Ghana,  of  which  PSP  is  a  more recent incarnation as component to a broad reform agenda sponsored by IFIs, as a means of contextualising subsequent analysis.  It describes the contracted and non‐contracted  factors,  evident  in  existing  studies,  which  determine  the operation and performance of PSP  in Ghana.    It  is maintained here  that within these contracted and, in particular, non‐contracted factors, there exist apparent connections with the weaknesses and contradictions of the rationalising theory.  The  connections  established  here  substantiate  a  potential  causality  between weaknesses  in  rationalising  theory  and  problematic  implementation,  and provide a framework for data analysis in subsequent chapters.     Having established the mode of research requisite for this endeavour, as noted in the previous chapter, this chapter considers the implementation of PSP in the case study country of Ghana.  Initially undertaken here is a brief review of the history of reform programmes within Ghana, of which PSP is a more recent incarnation.  The chapter subsequently considers the particular aspects of PSP in the water sector in Ghana, and highlights those that are coherent with the central premise  that  weaknesses  and  inconsistencies  in  the  theoretical  rationale  for privatisation  contribute  to  poor  performance  and  operation.    The  framework established  here  provides  a  basis  for  the  subsequent  analysis  of  the  Ghanaian case  with  particular  exposition  of  the  factors  which  contribute  to  the manifestation of dispute, renegotiation and cancellation which characterises the PSP programme established in the water sector more generally in the developing countries.      In establishing the scope of PSP in the Ghanaian water sector, this chapter initially provides a review of the history to reform in Ghana, and the increasing intervention through financial agreements of  IFIs  in policy development within the country.  The subsequent section describes the form of PSP implemented in the water sector  in Ghana,  the contract established and the  intended operation and performance  following  from  this  contract.   The  third section considers  the particular aspects of the PSP programme and its implementation that undermine performance and operation as intended.   A concluding discussion considers the potential implications those factors impacting performance and operation for the underlying theoretical rationale.     
5.1  Ghana’s  reform  era:  institutional  reform  and  progressive 
liberalisation  The  recent  history  of  Ghana  follows  a  trend  that  is  not  uncommon  to  other developing  countries,  particularly  those  of  sub‐Saharan  Africa,  as  described  in chapter three.   The reform era in Ghana has been characterised by two distinct 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periods, initially under military appointed government and more recently under democratic  government.    The  recent  democratic  era  has  been  subject  to  the increasing  influence  of  IFIs  in  the  policy  programme  of  the  country,  with liberalisation  policies  being  pursued  generally.    Associated  with  liberalisation policies,  IFIs  envisage  institution  and  governance  reform  which  will  aid  the process of liberalisation.  The following discussion considers initially the reform era leading up to the more recent IFI‐inspired reform agenda, which follows.  
History of reform in Ghana  The post‐independence era in Ghana follows a course which is not untypical for developing countries particularly in sub‐Saharan.  Following independence from the  UK  in  1957,  state‐led  development  incorporating  large‐scale  projects  was aligned  with  an  economy  principally  reliant  on  the  production  of  primary materials  for export, notably gold and cocoa.   Political and economic  instability became  increasingly marked  through  the  1970s,  with  a military  coup  in  1972 and an economic crisis in 1978 triggered by global conditions including oil price increases  and  accelerated  by  Ghanaian  reliance  on  few  export  products,  the prices  of  which  decreased  in  this  period.    The  contribution  of  economic  and political  instability  to  the  increasing  problems  in  Ghana  in  the  late  1970s  and early  1980s  was  complemented  by  an  increasing  burden  on  the  government budget  of  the  extensive  public  services  and  civil  services.    To  this  point,  the determination  of  Ghanaian  government  policy  remained  however  primarily within  the national sphere (Bayliss & Amenga‐Etego, 2007;  IMF, 2006; Yeboah, 2006).      The economic conditions present  in Ghana  in  the early 1980s  instigated the  first  phase  of  the  reform  period  that  has  characterised  Ghana  in  the  near three  decades  since.    At  a  governance  level,  the  reform  period  has  taken  the course  of  an  initial  phase  of  administration  government  established  by  the military regime in 1983, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), and a latter period of democratic government from 1992 onwards.   While the explicit form of governance has thus changed over the reform period, the actors present in  the  former military administration phase carried over  to  the  initial phase of democratic government and subsequently determined in part the nature of this phase: JJ Rawlings provided the leadership of both the PNDC government and the subsequent  initial  two  terms  of  democratic  government  from  1992  to  2000 (Aryeetey, 2002; Handley, 2008).      The reform programme undertaken by the PNDC from 1983 provided the first instance of the reorientation of Ghanaian national policy toward the wishes of  IFIs,  an  orientation  which  remains  current  in  the  contemporary  period (Yeboah,  2006).    The  Economic  Recovery  Programme  (ERP)  instigated  the reform of  the Ghanaian  economy and  state  structure  in  such  a way  that  aligns with  the  typical  themes  associated  with  IFI  policy  programmes,  incorporating reduction of the size of government,  the withdrawal of state from the economy and the liberalisation of the economy, particularly oriented to global capital: 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“The ERP included many of the common features of a structural adjustment programme  such  as  the  removal  of  price,  exchange  rate  and  interest  rate controls  as  well  as  regulatory  reform.    It  was  the  urgent  need  to  obtain financial  support  from  donors  that  precipitated  the  adoption  of  the  ERP (Aryeetey  and  Fosu,  2002).    With  the  rubber  stamp  of  approval  from  the Bretton Woods  Institutions,  substantial  amounts  of  aid  began  to  flow  into Ghana.  Under the ERP, management of the public sector budget came under scrutiny as did  the  state’s  involvement  in over 300 parastatals.”  (Bayliss & Amenga‐Etego, 2007: 126‐127)  The  reform  programme  thus  incorporated  various measures  to  invigorate  the Ghanaian  economy.    The  reduction  in  the  scale  of  the  public  sector  budget included reduction in the scale of SOEs, and cuts in health and education budgets.  SOEs  were  subject  to  restructuring,  through  both  the  divestiture  of  some enterprises,  and  the  introduction  of  performance‐based  contracts  for  staff  in other  SOEs  (ibid.;  Amenga‐Etego  &  Grusky,  2005).    This  was  accompanied  by financial  sector  reform  in  1987  with  the  liberalisation  of  import  and  foreign exchange markets (Yeboah, 2006; Guder, 2008).  The operation of the public and civil services were furthermore the object of attempted reform, with corruption being seen as inhibitive of economic development in Ghana (Aryeetey, 2002).   Despite  such  reform attempts,  the underlying  structure of  the Ghanaian economy  remained,  as  in  the  previous  post‐independence  period,  reliant  on export of primary materials.  Furthermore, despite the apparent reorientation of policy  towards  a  neo‐liberal  agenda  dictated  by  the World  Bank  and  IMF,  the political  commitment  to  such  a  reorientation  may  be  questioned.    As  Yeboah (2006)  maintains,  the  PNDC  government  under  Rawlings  had  little  option, considering  the  economic  situation  in  Ghana,  but  to  accept  aid  and  associated conditions  from  IFIs,  “despite  Rawlings’  initial  political  orientation  towards socialism”  (ibid.: 52).   The  reform program was  thus  increasingly at odds with the governmental leadership and authoritarian methods of governance:   “With  the  increased  level  of  economic  activity  and  associated  economic independence  for  various  agents,  the  sense  of  empowerment  that  evolved was  one  that  appeared  incompatible  with  the  authoritarian  political structures.    In  a  sense,  economic  liberalization  and  diversification  were perceived to be  increasingly  incompatible with autocratic rule.”    (Aryeetey, 2002: 5)  The  consequent  pressure  for  political  reform  to  accompany  the  loans  and associated economic reforms toward the  latter years of the period of the PNDC administration, together with external events including the collapse of the Soviet Union,  instigated  the  inception  of  the  democratic  period  of  government  from 1992 (ibid.).      The second period of reform, under democratic government has taken a path  of  increasing  liberalisation  of  the  economy,  with  associated  institutional reforms,  with  these  developments  having  been  influenced  significantly  by  the conditionality of loans made available to Ghana by IFIs.  While Ghana has become 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increasingly  committed,  through  various  reform  programmes,  to  neo‐liberal ideals  promoted  by  IFIs,  the  nature  of  governance  has  retained  elements  of previous  structures  –  with  authoritarian  practices,  corruption  and  political patronage  remaining  a  constant  adjunct  to whichever  liberalising  policies may be  introduced  through  reform  programmes.    The  degree  to  which  these governance  tendencies  are  evident  has,  it  is  argued  by  some  (for  example Handley,  2008),  reduced over  the  latter democratic  government under Kufour, from  2000  onwards.    What  has  been  constant,  however,  through  each formulation  of  democratic  government  –  both  the  Rawlings  (1992‐2000)  and Kufour governments – is that there has been general consensus on the direction of  the  reform  agenda.    The  commitment  to  the  various  reform  programmes associated with IFI aid has thus been constant – attributable to the levels of debt accrued by Ghana.     While  the  democratic  reform  period  has  seen  a  level  of  stability  in government  commitment  to  a  particular  reform  path,  increased  liberalisation has failed to structurally revise the Ghanaian economy has resulted in what has been  termed  an  economy  with  a  “missing  middle”:  a  service  sector  exists alongside  primary  commodity  production  and  agriculture,  with  a  lack  of  a middle  stratum  of  manufacturers  and  industrialists  (Handley,  2008;  Guder, 2008).    Such  an  economic  structure  can  be  seen  to  be  consequential  of  the approach of government, particularly that of the Rawlings era, towards business.  The Rawlings era, both autocratic and democratic, has been described as using “an array of non‐democratic and authoritarian political practices in combination with  neo‐corporatist  arrangements  to  gird  its  rule”  (Gyimah‐Boadi  cited  in Amenga‐Etego & Grusky, 2005: 276).  The approach of the Rawlings government to  business  had  been  typically  neo‐patrimonial,  and with  a  general  regard  for liberal  business  as  a  ‘political  enemy’  (Handley,  2008).    Where  economic liberalisation was implemented, rather than remove control from the state as its intended  consequence,  in  the  case  of  Ghana  divestitures  typically  benefited  an elite  affiliated  with  the  government  (ibid.).    The  reform  programme  did  not therefore align with the neo‐liberal ideals of the international sponsors:   “The result was a state‐driven reform program, dominated by rent‐seeking and patronage despite the efforts of business to shape policy.   Some fifteen years  after  the  start  of  the  economic  reform  program,  far  from  the  state’s involvement  in  the  economy  decreasing,  almost  the  reverse  had  occurred. […]    Throughout  the  decade,  far  from  the  state  being  reformed  in  a  neo‐liberal  direction,  the  economic  reform  program  confirmed  the  neo‐patrimonial nature of the Ghanaian state.”  (Handley, 2008: 199&200)  Where  the  neo‐liberal  ideals  are  evident  are  those  areas  of  the  economy  that have  been  subject  to  the  conditionality  associated  with  IFI  aid.    In  particular, former  SOEs  have  been  subject  to  conditional  divestiture,  particularly  services including  telecoms,  energy  and  water.    Loan  conditionality  instigated  policy revision  so  that  by  the  mid‐1990s  ‘consultation’  had  begun  to  determine  the nature of water service provision in Ghana, and more specifically the form of PSP contract to be established (Fuest et al, 2005). 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 The activities of  the Ghanaian state and private sector remain subject to the greater influence of IFI policy programmes by virtue of the financial power of the latter (Handley, 2008).  The influence of IFIs can be seen especially from the mid‐1990s,  with  loan  conditionality  being  associated  not  only  with  this restructuring  of  the  economy,  but  furthermore  the  restructuring  of  the institutional  environment  in  Ghana  –  including  the  legal  framework,  forms  of regulation,  parliamentary  activity  and  broader  activity  of  civil  society  –  and subsequently  modes  of  governance  existent.    The  institutional  reforms  made conditional  through  loans  to  Ghana  have  as  their  central  concern  the establishment  of  an  ‘enabling’  environment:  the  role  of  government  and associated  institutions  being  primarily  the  enabling  of  the  private  sector  to operate  with  as  little  hindrance  as  practical.    Incorporated  within  such  a programme  is  the  establishment  of  institutions  which  ensure  predictable  and stable  conditions  for  private  operation,  with  the  minimisation  of  potential political intervention.   Consequently, IMF and World Bank documents show the prioritisation  of  decentralisation  of  control  to  local  authorities  and  the establishment of (superficially) independent agencies such as the Public Utilities Regulatory  Commission  (PURC)  (IMF,  2000,  2003  &  2006;  World  Bank, 2004a&b).    However,  despite  the  attempted  institutional  reform  through  loan conditionality,  the  degree  of  control  exercised  by  central  government  remains high,  with  nepotism,  patronage  and  corruption  typical  (Aryeetey,  2002;  ODI, 2007).   Parallel  to this attempted reform and resistance in central government, the  broader  processes  of  democratic  society  are  evident  in  press  freedom and increased activity of civil society (Aryeetey, 2002; DFID, 2003).   
The role and influence of IFIs in Ghana through the latter reform period  Through the liberalising reform period, IFIs have had an increasing influence on the nature and formation of institutions and governance in Ghana.  This influence takes the form of various attempts to alter the nature of public institutions, from technical assistance to specific agencies to more comprehensive modifications of the  conception  of  governance  and  the  role  of  the  state.    Specific  policies  have been  pursued  which  seek  to  streamline  the  operations  of  agencies  within  the public  sector  or  civil  service,  both  through  retrenchment  and  technical  and managerial assistance  for  the more efficient operation of  these agencies.   More recently,  IFIs have sought  to  further such  influence, extending policies  to cover more  comprehensive  attempts  to  change  the  culture  of  governance  within Ghana, recognition of continued  impact of nepotism, patronage and corruption.  The  nature  of  influence  has  progressed  from  individual  programmes  to  the conditional  implementation of comprehensive programmes associated with  the Heavily  Indebted  Poor  Country  (HIPC)  status  Ghana  attained  in  2000  (DFID, 2003; IMF, 2006).    Initial  attempts  at  institutional  revision  came  within  the  National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) begun  in 1994, which  focused on  the better  and more  efficient  operation  of  public  institutions  and  the  civil  service.  Alongside  the  general  retrenchment  of  workforces  in  these  areas,  the  NIRP encompassed  the  Public  Sector  Management  Reform  Programme,  the  Public Finance  Management  Reform  Programme  and  the  Civil  Service  Performance 
  87 
Improvement  Programme  (Fuest  et  al,  2005).    Corresponding  to  these  various measures  for  the  reform of  the  operation  of  the  public  administration,  further programmes  have  subsequently  been  implemented  to  improve  the  capacity  of the  public  institutions  and  separate  their  operations  from  the  interests  of  the central  government  in  Ghana.    As  the  IMF  (2003)  recognised,  the  previous implementations  alone  do  not  provide  significant momentum  in  the  reform  of the  public  administration,  with  continued:  “lack  of  sustained  political commitment to the reforms and to the  institutions responsible for carrying out the  reforms;  lack  of  strong  leadership  in  the  public  service;  failure  to  enforce rules,  regulations  and  instructions  […];  dysfunctional  relationship  between political  and  public  service  decision  makers;  [and  an]  apparent  lack  of institutional ownership of reforms” (IMF, 2003: 120).    This  appraisal  of  the  Ghanaian  public  service  by  the  IFIs  provides  a rationale  for  the  revision  of  their  approach  to  reform,  and  the  more comprehensive, and the implementation of a more comprehensive and coercive programme.    This  revised  programme  focuses  on  the  capacity  of  the  central government  to  exercise  power  throughout  the  public  administration,  and furthermore  accountability  of  those  within  the  administration  (IMF,  2003  & 2006; DFID, 2003; ODI, 2007).   The central concerns of the revised approach of IFIs are therefore the independence of institutions of public administration, the reduced  influence  of  nepotism,  patronage  and  corruption,  the  improved mechanisms  of  accountability  and  transparency,  and  the  improved  political commitment  to  the  reform  agenda  proposed  by  IFIs.    The  programme  thus comprises a  shift  to a  comprehensive programme of attempted modification of governance within Ghana:     “Ghana  must  redefine  the  role  of  the  state  as  the  policy  manager  for development and the economy, enforcer of law, rules and regulations and a provider of public utilities and services.   Public sector reform involving the right‐sizing of the public service, restoring competitive conditions of service and SOE reform is a sine qua non for provision of an enabling environment for  private  sector  development  and  the  effective  provision  of  public services.”  (IMF, 2003: 40‐41)  The  IMF here  hints  at  the  scope  of  the  revised  reform programme which  they wish to be  implemented.   A revised mode of governance encompasses not only the performance of public  administrative bodies and  their  separation  from  the political leadership of the country, but it further describes the relationship of the broader  population with  the  institutions  of  the  state.    The  integration  into  the programme proposed by  the  IMF of civil  society demonstrates a  recognition of the  importance  of  the  coherence  of  a  reform  programme  with  its  broader environment.    The  intended  increase  in  the  role  of  civil  society  and  the  public more generally in the reform programme is rationalised on the desire of the IMF for  the  reduction  in  the  degree  of  control  exercised  by  central  government.  Increasing  activity  of  civil  society  firstly  provides  a  mechanism  by  which accountability  of  state  institutions,  and  their  performance  in  stated  goals  of reform, may be improved.  The integration of civil society and the broader public in  the  reform  programme  furthermore,  the  IMF  rationalises,  will  provide  a 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mechanism by which national ‘ownership’ of the programme will increase – thus improving the consensus for reform (IMF, 2000, 2003 & 2006).      The  implementation of  the revised programme of reform which the  IMF envisages is aided by the accession of Ghana to HIPC status and the transferral of aid support to one central fund.  This process provides IFIs with a greater degree of  influence over  the domestic policy of Ghana.   This  is  true  firstly  through  the tying of HIPC aid to the MDGs adopted by the UN, thus transforming them into a “mandatory  framework  of  domestic  economic  policy  in  return  for  the  grant  of debt relief” (IMF, 2006: iv).  Secondly, the move, in 2003, by the main aid donors to Ghana  to pool  resources  into a  fund under  the moniker Multi‐Donor Budget Support (MDBS) programme, provides increased control of Ghana’s performance with  regards  the  Growth  and  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  (GPRS)  (ODI,  2007).  The  GPRS  covers  the  broad  reform  programme  that  the  IMF  intends  to  be implemented,  and  from  which  the  above  citations  regarding  governance  are taken.   Where progress  towards  the goals of  the GPRS  is  sufficient,  funds  from the MDBS are released.  Funds were partially withheld for the first time in 2006 (ibid.).      The policies of the IMF and related donor agencies would appear here to be  at  least  partly  contradictory.    At  one  level  the  strategy  of  the  reform programme  is  to  increase  the  integration  of  the  broader  population  in  the programme, with  a  corresponding  reduction  in  central  government  control,  in the  interests of  improving  the performance of  the programme and providing a degree of national ‘ownership’ of the programme.  At the same time however, the primary  concern  of  the  MDBS  strategy  is  to  ensure  the  compliance  of  the Ghanaian  government  with  the  GPRS  programme.    The  balance,  and  contrast, between  national  ‘ownership’  and  compliance  with  externally  derived  reform programme cannot be assumed:   “The  MDBS  encouraged  the  creation  of  the  new  Ministry  and  its  PAF [Performance  Assessment  Framework]  provisions  were  helpful  in translating general objectives into specific actions.  Beyond this, donors have been careful to avoid attempting to exert undue influence.  This has created a dilemma  because  the  Government  is  reluctant  to  grasp  the  nettle  of  the overall  size  of  the  public  service.    Because  of  concerns  over  policy ownership, it has not been possible to address this issue through MDBS, and illustration of its limitations.”  (ODI, 2007: 2)  The attempt to influence the broader mode of governance in Ghana, in particular by  the  incorporation of  civil  society  and  the broader population  as  a means of curbing the actions of the Government, is necessarily restricted by the potential appearance,  to these very bodies, of excessive IFI  influence.   This describes the general  condition of  the  IFI  approach  to  reform  in Ghana,  of which divestiture and PSP are an integral part.      The broader reform programme, as part of what may be considered  the ‘post‐Washington  consensus’  (section  3.1),  thus  indicates  a  recognition  of systems  of  governance  that  determine  the  institutional  environment  within 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which privatisation is  implemented.   However, as  is noted in chapter three,  the post‐Washington  consensus  remains  inherently  limited  as  a  programme  of reform,  with  a  focus  on  the  imposition  of  externally  derived  conceptions  of governance  within  host  countries.    Two  consequences  follow:  the  reform programme  contains  little  or  no  specificity  for  the  particular  country  where implemented;  and,  there  is  potential  resistance  to  the  programme  within  the host country, due to the lack of self‐determination of policy agenda.  As is noted above in the case of Ghana, the reform programme applies a generic conception of the state as enabler of the private sector, with associated component features (as is common to the post‐Washington consensus).   As a consequence of this,  it further  entails  a  reaction  of  either  resistance  to  implementation  or  lack  of commitment (‘ownership’), inhibiting the operation of the programme.     
5.2  PSP  in Ghana: contracted and non­contracted  factors, and potential 
connections with underlying theory  The reform agenda is thus established, together with the economic and political environment in which privatisation is located.  Within this context, the following section  reviews  the particular  form of  privatisation  in Ghana,  the  contract  and terms, and the various factors establishing the framework for the programme.  
Privatisation in Ghana: contract development  The  introduction  of  PSP  in  the  water  sector  in  Ghana  follows  a  period  of attempted reform in the sector through restructuring of the public provider.  The Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC), originally established in 1965, was  responsible  for  the  provision  of  water  supply  and  sewerage  services  in Ghana,  in  both  rural  and  urban  locations.    The  performance  of  GWSC  prior  to reforms had  “deteriorated  rapidly during  the economic  crisis of  the  late 1970s and early 1980s when Government's ability to adequately operate and maintain essential services was severely constrained” (World Bank, 1998: 1).     “While  GWSC  performed  reasonably  well  in  terms  of  engineering  and technical  effectiveness,  revenue  management  was  not  so  successful.    The company made persistent losses and accumulated large debts over the years despite  several  attempts  at  reform.    GWSC  suffered  from  numerous institutional  deficiencies  including  weak  billing  systems,  poor  state  of infrastructure and overstaffing.”  (Bayliss & Amenga‐Etego, 2007: 138)  Considering the performance of GWSC in operating water services, together with the economic environment in which the public operator was situated, reforms of service  provision  were  encompassed  within  the  aid  packages  made  available through  IFIs.    Through  the  early  reform  period  under  the  PNDC  government, restructuring was attempted through the commercialisation of GWSC operations.  Government subsidies were restricted and improvements in cost recovery were implemented  to  reduce  reliance  of  the  supplier  on  government  debt.    Such restructuring  in  the  early  reform  period  had  little  effect  on  the  performance (Bayliss & Amenga‐Etego, 2007). 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 Subsequent reforms in the early period of democratic government further restructured  the  GWSC,  and  provided  a  basis  for  the  subsequent  proposed transferral  to  the private sector.   Firstly  there was retrenchment of staff  in  the GWSC.    Secondly,  there  was  a  division  of  responsibility  for  urban  and  rural services.    In  rural  areas  the  Community Water  and  Sanitation  Agency  (CWSA) assumed responsibility for both water supply and sanitation, with responsibility for management  and  operation  decentralised  to District  Authorities.    In  urban areas,  water  supply  responsibilities  were  transferred  to  the  Ghana  Water Company  Limited  (GWCL),  with  sanitation  responsibilities  deferring  to  the public  authorities  (Aryeetey  &  Ahene,  2005;  Fuest  &  Haffner,  2007).    Despite these,  and  previous,  attempts  at  reform  of  the  water  sector,  the  persistent condition  of  GWSC  and  performance  in  operating  water  services  in  Ghana provided the World Bank with sufficient grounds to press for the introduction of private operators in service provision:   “Over  the  period  1973  to  1998,  the  IDA  invested  US$152.4  million  to improve  Ghana’s  urban  water  supply  infrastructure.    The  results  over  25 years of public sector management have been disappointing, and the urban water  sector  remains  in  a  poor  condition  with  the  trend  in  service  and sustainability currently worsening.  Thus, the continuing with a public sector only  regime  for  a  new  project  was  not  recommended  by  IDA,  nor  was  it chosen by the Government of Ghana.”  (World Bank, 2004b: 7)  Indeed,  the  latter  forms  of  restructuring  of  GWSC  were  an  obvious precursor, under the influence of IFIs, to the proposed involvement of the private sector  (Aryeetey & Ahene, 2005; Fuest & Haffner, 2007).   The division of  rural and  urban  provided  the  basis  for  commercial  operation  in  the  latter, with  the former  typically  not  being  profitable  for  a  private  operator.    The  same motivation  is  true  for  the division of water  supply  and  sanitation  in  the urban GWCL,  with  cost  recovery  typically  being  more  difficult  to  establish  for sanitation.    Retrenchment  of  staff  in  public  utilities  prior  to  privatisation  has typically been used as a mechanism for improving the appeal of the enterprise to private investors (Amenga‐Etego & Grusky, 2005).      The  latter  restructuring  of  the  Ghanaian  water  supply  sector demonstrates the influence of IFIs in the policy development process within the Ghanaian national  sphere.    Such  influence was  formalised  institutionally  in  the establishment of the Water Sector Restructuring Secretariat (WSRS), which had support from both the World Bank and DFID (Fuest et al, 2005).  This influence of  foreign  donors  and  associated  agencies  was  further  evident  in  the  policy development process:   “Improvement of  the urban water  sector by means of  a  lease  contract had been  envisaged  since  1994.    In  1994/95  foreign  consultants  had  been commissioned by  the World Bank  to deliberate on several combinations of PPP  contract  options  (Halcrow  &  Partners,  1995).    After  “stakeholder consultations” a “consensus” was reached in 1995 to adopt the lease option (MWH, 1999).  A review of the organisational framework of GWSC aimed to 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strengthen  management  at  the  top  level  and  the  regional  level,  thereby giving  more  autonomy  to  the  regions.    Two  lease  packages,  designed  to promote competition in urban water supply, were opened for bids in 1999.  The conversion of the GWSC, including a programme of staff rationalisation, was expected to be completed in 2000 (IMF, 1999).”  (Fuest & Haffner, 2007: 176)  The  nature  of  policy  development  and  implementation  is  thus  subject  to  a significant degree of  influence by those donor agencies  that sponsor the WSRS.  This  influence  is  furthered  by  the  consultants  engaged  to  develop  the  PSP contract, which, according to Whitfield (2006), have a record of pro‐privatisation policy development in alliance with the World Bank:   “…  the  1995 workshop  to  consider  the  Halcrow  Report  did  not  represent public participation (contrary to claims by the Secretariat [WSRS]), because it included a selected group of ‘stakeholders’.  The findings of the study were not reported publicly, precluding public discussion on restructuring options.  Second,  the  consultancy  studies  that  formed  an  integral  part  of  the restructuring  process  and  the  selection  of  the  lease  arrangement  were commissioned  and  funded  by  the World  Bank,  Japan  and  the  UK.    The  six consultancy  firms  employed  are  foreign  and  known  to  be  favourable  to privatisation,  with  some  possessing  a  history  of  working  with  the transnational  water  corporations  or  for  the  World  Bank  on  privatisation projects.”  (Whitfield, 2006: 435)  The  degree  of  participation  in  the  policy  development  process  was  thus restricted, with incorporation of both the domestic Ghanaian water sector agents and  the  public  and  civil  society  more  generally  apparently  excluded  from  the process.      The  result  of  the  policy  development  process  described  here  was  the initial  preference  for  a  lease  contract  to  be  split  geographically  across  the country.  The original contract, for 20 years in each region, was further designed to  shift  responsibility  for  investment  for  rehabilitation  and  renewal  to  the private  operator.    This  division  of  responsibility  for  investment  entailed  the more  costly  undertaking  of  the  expansion  of  the  network  remained  with  the Ghanaian  authorities.    Considering  the  minimal  risk  transfer,  and  when considering the urban/rural and water/sanitation separations, there is evidence on multiple  counts  that  shows  the  restructuring  of water  services  in  Ghana  in such a way that improves their potential commercial profitability.  The appeal to investors was thus improved, yet the potential operators of such contracts were restricted.     The  lease contract  initially proposed attracted  three bidders: Azurix  (an Enron subsidiary), Suez and Vivendi.  Azurix was selected by the Government of Ghana, however, the history of corruption and patronage of the Rawlings regime was evident once more in the process of selection suspicions of corruption noted in media at the time (Amenga‐Etego & Grusky, 2005).  Following this collapse of the first attempt at the privatisation of the process of devising PSP was restarted. 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However,  in parallel  to  the development of  the PSP contract and  the  tendering process,  two  processes  determined  a  decreasing  possibility  of  a  successful tender being found.   The global performance of water sector PSP contracts had typically  been  poor  with  many  disputes,  renegotiations  and  cancellations, prompting  a  lack  of  interest  in  contracts,  or  alternatively,  the  interest  only  in contracts  where  risk  was  reduced  significantly.    Furthermore,  in  Ghana,  as elsewhere where PSP had been attempted in the water sector, public opposition to the process was significant and increasing (Amenga‐Etego & Grusky, 2005).      Considering the conditions in the global private water sector, the desire of private  firms  for  reduced  risk  exposure,  and  the  substantial  opposition  to  the PSP process, the form of PSP contract in Ghana was altered in 2003 in an attempt to engage the private sector in water service provision in the country.  The form of  the  contract  was  altered  to  a  five  year  management  contract,  with responsibility  for  all  investment  –  including  rehabilitation,  renewal  and expansion  –  remaining  with  Ghanaian  authorities  (Fuest  &  Haffner,  2007; Eguavoen & Spalthoff, 2008).  The alteration of the form of contract reflects the revised  expectations of  the private  sector with  regard water  sector divestiture contracts.    The  level  of  risk  transferred  to  the private operator under  the new management  contract  is minimal, with  the management  fee guaranteed  for  the first four years of the contract, with the fifth year being 75 per cent guaranteed – the  remaining 25 per  cent  coming  from  increased  revenues proposed  to  result from private operation (World Bank, 2004b).    The contract design has  thus been subject  to significant criticism within Ghana (e.g. NCAP, 2002).  The primary concerns (in addition to those relating to the policy development process) relate to the marginalisation of the urban poor (neither  the  lease  or  management  contract  made  special  consideration  for expansion of the network – the desire for the commercial viability of the contract determined  that  existent  networks  in  urban  areas  were  the  subject  of  the contract), the minimal risk transfer, the separation of water from sanitation, and the  loss  of  potential  cross‐subsidy  between  urban  and  rural  (Fuest  &  Haffner, 2007; Eguavoen & Spalthoff, 2008).    Following  the  protracted  and  controversial  development  of  the  PSP programme  in Ghana, a management contract was  finalised and commenced  in 2006.   The trend for decreased investor  interest  in engagement  in the sector  is demonstrated  with  the  absence  of  traditional  private  investors  in  Ghana.  Whereas early PSP programmes globally were dominated by a limited number of multinational  water  companies  –  including  those  evident  in  tendering  for  the initial lease contract – the management contract has been established with non‐traditional  investors, with  Vitens  of  the Netherlands  and Rand Water  of  South Africa operating in Ghana under the moniker Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL) (ibid.).   Each partner company comprising the private sector operator in Ghana is publicly owned within  their  country of origin: Vitens being owned by public municipal shareholders in Holland (Vitens, 2010), and Rand Water being wholly owned  by  the  South  African  Government  (Rand  Water,  2009).    However,  it remains the case, as will be demonstrated below and in subsequent chapters that in  the  context  of  the Ghanaian water  sector  the operator  is  a private  company 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and  the  contract  established  is  coherent  with  such.    It  will,  furthermore,  be demonstrated  that  the  PSP  programme  in  Ghana  indicates  the  broad  basis  of diverging  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed,  and  that  the framework of contract design and administration, and political and institutional environment provide the determining dynamics of PSP.    
Formulation of privatisation: realisation of intended objectives  The introduction of privatisation in this form in Ghana therefore seeks to realise the  purported  benefits  of  the  operation  of  the  private  sector with  a  particular emphasis  on  the  management  of  the  service  provider.    The  central  explicit concern  of  the  underlying  theory,  that  of  the  improved  efficiency  of  the privatised enterprise and the consequent increase in total utility, is to be realised in this instance through the improved management of the service provider, and in particular the contribution this is intended to make to the commercial viability and sustainability of operation.   As noted above,  frequent reference  is made by analysts  and  sponsors  of  reform  in  the  sector  of  the  failure  to  operate  on  a commercial,  sustainable  footing,  with  significant  unaccounted  for  water  and billing  and  collection  issues  being  typical  of  this.    Subsequent  to  the  failure  to attract  private  sector  investment  in  the  lease  form  of  contract  and  the  more substantial  associated  risk,  the  chosen  option  for  pro‐privatisation  sponsors  is the management contract, which tackles the operation of  the provider with the interest  being  long  term  sustainability.    Through  the  improved  efficiency  of operation of the service provider, including reduced unaccounted for water etc., through efficient and commercial, sustainable operation, in turn the service gains in  appeal  to  private  investment  in  the  future.    The  programme  thus  has  the potential to provide a basis for the satisfaction of the other need of the sector in this  context,  through  investment  from  the  private  sector  in  the  long  term (subsequent to the completion of this contract).    The  formulation  of  privatisation  policy  in  this  instance  implements  the intended  objectives  through  various  means.    It  is  intended  that  improved operation of the service provider, its improved sustainability through efficiency offered  by  the  private  sector,  is  to  be  realised  through  the  formulation  of  the programme  in  line  with  the  basic  concepts  and  theoretical  framework  as described in earlier chapters.  The first factor of such a programme here aligned to  the  underlying  principles  is  the  reduced  role  of  the  public  sector,  with  the management  of  the  service  provider  being  transferred,  thus  restricting  the capacity  of  the  purportedly  inefficient  public  sector  to  continue  unsustainable operation.   The assumption here, of course, and as  identified  in chapter  two,  is that  the  privatisation  contract  delimits  such  intervention  of  political  agencies.  The capacity to delimit inherent political interest in the sector is however subject to  the  specification,  nature  and  extent  of  the  contract  and  associated administration framework, which is subject to scrutiny in subsequent chapters.    The realisation of efficiency is further brought about by the establishment of  property  rights,  with  associated  incentives  and  the  internalisation  of externalities.   In this formulation of privatisation, this is brought about through the contracted performance and operation of  the company,  the  specification of 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its  activity  and  incentive  structures.    With  the  absence  of  competitive market structures, the regulatory agency acts to monitor and determine performance, in the implementation of surrogate competition.   An additional monitoring agency is  provided within  the  framework  of  this management  contract,  with  auditing agencies established (World Bank, 2004b; GWCL, 2005).  It is assumed here, and this  is  in  line  with  the  assessment  of  implementation  of  privatisation  in  this context  noted  in  chapter  two,  that  the  contract  is  sufficiently  specified  for  the establishment of property rights, and subsequently the transfer of interest from the  principal  to  the  agent.    Similarly,  it  is  assumed  that  the  institutional  and administrative environment within which  the contract operates, here  including for  example  the  regulator,  has  sufficient  capacity  to  function  as  intended  and ensure the operation of the private sector  in an efficient manner as contracted.  The  formulation of  privatisation  in  this  instance  relies  on  these  factors  for  the implementation of property rights and the application of incentive structures for the private sector to ensure the interests of the principal, the state company, are realised (World Bank, 2004b; GWCL, 2005).    
Contracted issues determining operation and performance  The contract developed for the introduction of the private sector as operator of water  services  in  Ghana  thus  took  the  form of  a much more  limited  degree  of privatisation  than  originally  intended,  with  limited  risk  exposure  for  the operator.  The underlying rationale for the introduction of the private sector, and the  proposed  efficiency  of  operation  following  from  this,  is  formalised  in  the Ghanaian  case  as  a  contract  that  offers  incentive  to  the  operator  for  profit through efficient operation and reduced cost under a fixed management fee.  The focus of the contract is therefore the improved operation of the services within the  remit of  the present  service provider.   Most  significantly,  these  include  the reduction  of  non‐revenue  water,  improved  collection  rates,  and  reduced chemical and power consumption.  While the contract relies on these aspects for the improved efficiency of the operator under a fixed management fee, it further allows  for  the  private  operator  to  engage  in  repair  and  maintenance  of  the network  utilising  revenue  funds, which  the  operator manages.    These  aspects, together  with  requirement  for  data  reporting  and  the  establishment  of  data baselines, cover the contracted requirements of the operator (GWCL, 2005).     Whereas previously urban areas in Ghana were divided into two zones for competing  operators,  the  contract  implemented  specifies  one  operator  for  all urban  areas  in Ghana.    This  single  operator  is  responsible  for  the  provision  of water  in areas serviced by 80 systems, spread across various regions in Ghana.  The majority of provision occurs, however, in two areas in the capital city Accra and its neighbouring city Tema.   These two urban regions compose 57 per cent of  capacity of urban water  service provision  in  the country  (GoG, 2004a).   The majority of  the remaining systems are proportionally significantly smaller  than these city water systems, with potential implications for focussing on larger and potentially more profitable systems at their cost.  As noted above, responsibility for  service  provision  lies  with  the  Community  Water  and  Sanitation  Agency (CWSA).  Expansion of service provision of the formal piped network, under the management of  the private operator,  remains with  the public  authorities.   The 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private  operator  is  however  responsible  for  the  provision  of  ‘suggested investment  programmes’,  ‘suggested  capital  investment  reports’  and  market surveys,  each  proposing  the  most  suitable  mode  of  expansion  given  the operators knowledge and experience (GoG, 2004a; GWCL, 2005).  The provision of  this  information comprises one aspect of  the required data reporting  for the private operator.    As the operator, the private company has a contract with the state holding company, as grantor of the contract.   Thus, GWCL, as the state service provider, remains  existent,  responsible  for  investment  for  expansion  of  services,  for provision  of  management  funds  to  the  operator,  and  as  asset  holder  (GWCL, 2005).  The structures of GWCL thus remain in place, although the vast majority of staff are seconded to the operator for the purposes of service provision, with the  private  company  employing  their  own  management  staff.    Through  the period  of  the  contract  the  private  company  are,  firstly,  required  to  establish  a training programme for  the seconded staff, and secondly, may suggest revision to the staffing structures of the company.  The latter possibility remains however subject to the approval of the grantor (ibid.).      While  the  operator  has  day‐to‐day  management  of  service  provision, there  exists  no  formal  relationship  with  the  regulator,  PURC.    Regulatory functions  are  executed  by  PURC  subject  to  their  relationship with  the  grantor GWCL.    Data  transfer  therefore  exists  between  the  operator  and  grantor,  and between  the  grantor  and  regulator.    The  operator  remains  however  subject  to the  various  laws  and  regulations  established  by  PURC,  including  customer service standards, water quality and so on.   One aspect of this regulation is the PURC  Regulatory  Social  Policy,  which  requires  the  operator  to  consider  best means  of  provision  for  low‐income  households  within  their  suggested investment  reports  (GWCL,  2005;  PURC,  2005c;  GoG,  2004a).    Operation  of regulation is thus subject to the requisite transfer between parties.      While the contract between grantor and operator is conceptualised as one of a management form, there exists one particular aspect that means the form in fact  diverges  from  the  management  contract  in  a  strict  sense.    In  the  case  of Ghana,  the  operator  remains  responsible  for  the  investment  and  procurement necessary for the repair, replacement and rehabilitation of infrastructure to the degree  required  for  the  continued  operation  of  service  provision  (GoG,  2004a; GWCL,  2005).    Financing  for  this  required  investment  is  provided  within  the World Bank Urban Water Project (2004b) of which the PSP programme is part (the  ‘repair,  replacement  and  rehabilitation’  (RRR)  fund).    The  operator  is subject to World Bank procurement procedures for the acquisition of  funds for repair,  replacement  and  rehabilitation.    Corollary  to  this,  the  operator  is  in control  of  revenue  accounts,  which  are  contracted  to  finance  operation  of  the service provider  to  the extent of  staff  funding, administrative costs, power and chemical  costs  together  with  ‘reasonable  and  prudent  maintenance  costs’ (GWCL,  2005).    The  intention  is  that  the  performance  of  the  operator  is  not inhibited  by  potential  delay  by  national  agencies  which  would  otherwise  be responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  infrastructure  in  a  condition  required  for continued service provision. 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Non­contracted,  political,  social  and  cultural  factors  determining  operation  and 
performance  Alongside  those aspects determining performance and operation of  the private provider deriving from the terms and structure of the contract, there are various others which deriving from pre‐existing conditions evident in the country prior to contract implementation.  This includes the relationship between the grantor and  operator,  the  existing  institutional  and  organisational  culture  and environment, the persistence of political interference and management of public and  civil  services,  the pre‐existing  conceptions of water  as  a  resource,  and  the conceptions  of  privatisation  both  in  general  and  in  relation  to  the  particular sector.  These various aspects each provide potential to impact on the operation and  performance  of  the  privatisation  programme,  with  potential  divergence from that intended.      Due to the nature of the structuring of the contract in Ghana, the private operator  works  alongside  its  state  counterpart  with  each  having  ongoing responsibilities.    The  nature  of  this  relationship may  be  influenced  by  various forces, and two in particular.  The first has been noted in the preceding section, regarding the nature of the contract and potential ambiguities therein.  Secondly, parallel operation determines divided responsibilities for various aspects of the sector, each with different impact on performance and operation.  The outcomes of  service  provision,  and  improvements  or  failures  therein,  are  thus  equally divisible  between  state  and  private  companies.    Such  a  structure  provides  the basis  for  potential  dispute  between  parties where  contracts  are  incomplete  or where provision for the successful execution of responsibilities diverges.    The  structuring  of  the  contract  further  entails,  as  noted  above,  that  the private company operates with a primarily national staff seconded form the state holding company.  The degree to which the private operator may determine their organisational  structuring  is  thus  limited,  with  the  state  holding  company inherently  retaining  a  significant  degree  of  control  over  the  seconded  staff.  Furthermore, where the private company operates  in an environment  in which its  management  or  organisational  methods  are  alien,  comprehension  and coherence  may  be  limited.    The  import  of  existing  institutional  and organisational  cultures  plays  out  not  only  in  the  sphere  of  the  company  itself, where  seconded  staff  encounter  private  management,  but  also  where  private firms operate in cooperation with public and civil services, as with the grantor‐operator relationship.      Further determining factors may be identified in the broader institutional environment  within  with  the  private  company  operates.    As  previously described, the nature of governance in Ghana has typically been characterised by strong  central  control,  with  power  exercised  through  political  patronage, corruption  or  more  recently  a  neo‐patrimonial  structuring  contrary  to  the propositions of those donor agencies interested in the shift to a state as enabler for the private sector.  The manifestation of the concern of the sponsor agencies for  revised  governance  entails  therefore  the  requirement  for  coherence  with 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existing  institutional  bodies  and  modes  of  operation.    It  further  requires  the requisite and coherent institutional capacity and structure within the sector as a basis  for  the  successful  implementation of  the programme with  respect  to  this area of concern.     
Conclusion and discussion  The  preceding  discussion  provides  an  evaluation  of  the  establishment  of privatisation  in  the water sector  in Ghana,  together with  the particular  form of the  privatisation  and  subsequently  the  potential  factors  which  may  inhibit performance and operation as proposed within the underlying rationale for the programme.  Privatisation is the most recent component to a history of reform in the water sector following the onset of conditions of low levels of investment and degradation of services from the 1970s onwards.  The long history of reforms in the  sector  is  furthered  by  the  protracted  development  of  the  private  contract from  its  initial  lease  form  in  1998  to  eventual  finalisation  as  a  management contract  in  2005.    It  is  maintained  here  that  this  development  and  the subsequent  form  of  contract,  together  with  pre‐existing  political,  social  and institutional conditions in Ghana, provide various factors which may inhibit the performance  and  operation  of  privatisation  as  envisaged  in  the  underlying theoretical rationale for the programme.    The  factors  cited  here  furthermore  provide  a  framework  by  which  the data gathered in Ghana may be assessed.  The assessment of contracted and non‐contracted  factors  allows  for  the  consideration  of  data which  primarily  to  the technical  aspects  of  performance  and  operation  of  the  private  sector,  that specified  under  contractual  terms,  as  distinct  from  those  aspects  best characterised  as political,  social  and  institutional.   Within  each  category,  it  has been demonstrated there exist various  factors  that  impact on performance and operation,  which  subsequently  may  substantiate  those  critiques  of  the underlying  rationale  for  privatisation.    Such  substantiation  provides  further basis for the questioning of the validity of this rationalising theory as a basis for social policy in this sector.       Within  each  sphere,  contracted/technical  and  non‐contracted/political, social  and  institutional,  there  exist  factors which may  substantiate  established critique  of  the  underlying  rationale  for  privatisation.    Assumptions  regarding contract  completion  and  perfect  information  as  component  to  the  abstract economic  model  central  to  the  rationalising  theory  may  be  undermined.  Alternatively,  the  grantor‐operator  relationship  necessary  to  the  smooth operation of the programme especially where ambiguities or deficiencies in the contract  exist, may  be  defined  by  contrary  responsibilities  and  capacity.    Such factors, as  intrinsically extra‐economic  in nature, are not considered within the framework  of  rationalising  theory.    Similarly,  pre‐existing  cultures  of  political management  and  intervention  that  may  impact  on  the  performance  and operation  of  the  contract,  inherently  deviate  from  the  assumptions  perfect market  conditions  assumed  within  the  underlying  theoretical  model.    These examples provide a depiction of  the potential connections  to be made between 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Technical  issues  contributing  to  the  divergence  in  performance  of  the 
private operator from that envisaged by the rationalising theory   The preceding chapter outlines the history of reform and privatisation in Ghana, together with the potential  factors  in the PSP programme in the country which contribute its operation diverging from that envisaged.  These factors may be of a  political,  social  or  institutional  nature,  or  deriving  from  technical  issues  that undermine  performance  and  operation.    It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to consider the latter.  The performance of the private company, reviewed initially here, demonstrates that while not extreme in the divergence from that proposed (when  considered  in  relation  to  other  cases  reviewed  in  chapter  three),  there remains  considerable  disparity.    It  is  further  the  case  that  the  nature  of implementation,  in  terms  of  the  instance  of  dispute  and  renegotiation,  is consistent with the causes of more extreme divergence elsewhere.  In the case of Ghana,  the PSP programme takes  the  form of a management contract, with  the focus  being  the  improved  sustainability  of  the  service  provider  through  this management,  subsequently benefiting  consumers  and  increasing  the  likelihood of  consequent  investment.    The  focus  on  the  sustainability  of  the  provider determines  that  improvements  in  factors  such  as  non‐revenue water,  revenue collection to billing ratio, reduced chemical and power consumption are central to the contract.  To achieve such intentions, it is necessary to incorporate targets regarding  these  factors  into  the  contracted  terms  of  the  grantor‐operator relationship.    As will  be  described  in  this  chapter, while  the  contract  contains references  to  these  measures  of  performance,  the  degree  of  ambiguity  is significant,  with  various  essential  aspects  being  absent.    This  is  most  notable where baseline data,  from which to measure performance, has been contracted to  be  established  after  the  commencement  of  the  contract.    Further  technical issues  contributing  to  the  deviation  of  operation  of  PSP  from  that  envisaged includes  the  attempt  to  establish  a  degree  of  independence  for  the  private company,  to operate without undue  intervention and delay due  to  the grantor.  Evidence demonstrates this has in fact allowed the company the opportunity to operate in an inefficient manner, to the detriment of the grantor and consumers.  Further assumptions concerning the capacity of institutions to administrate the contract, and poor data transfer and reporting, contribute to the PSP programme diverging from the operation envisaged.  The exposition of these various aspects of PSP in the Ghanaian water sector permits the assessment of performance and operation by reference to derivation from rationalising theory, and furthermore the contribution thereof to the dispute and renegotiation process as manifest in Ghana.      This  chapter  will  be  structured  by  analysis  of  these  various  technical factors  which  contribute  to  this  trend.    An  initial  section  considers  the performance of the private company, both in relation to contracted targets, and to  the  prior  performance  of  the  service  provider  under  the  guise  of  the  state company.    Subsequent  sections  consider  technical  factors  affecting  operation.  The decision in the contract to establish baseline data, from which performance 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is to be measures and penalties applied, after the commencement of the contract is the focus of the second section.  Following this, the financial independence of the  private  company  is  considered,  with  control  over  revenue  accounts providing a threat to the sustainability of the grantor.  The fourth section looks at the capacity of the sector institutions to administer the PSP contract, in terms of their technical, financial and human resources.  Subsequently, a consideration of the data transfer and reporting is made.  At each stage, the connections with the critical  appraisal  of  the  underlying  theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation  are noted, providing a basis for more extensive analysis in subsequent chapters.    
6.1  Performance  of  the  private  company  relative  to  the  previous  state 
company, and to contracted terms  Gauging  the  technical performance of  the private operator of water  services  in Ghana is possible by two methods: by comparison with targets established in the contract  between  the  private  company  and  the  state  holding  company;  or  by comparison with the performance of the state company prior to the introduction of  the private  sector.   This  section  considers each of  these potential means  for determining performance of the private company.  Within each of these potential means  however,  exist  various  obstacles  to  the  absolute  determination  of performance, and subsequently the evaluation of the privatisation with regards these technical factors remains limited.    Following from the underlying rationale for privatisation, the programme established  in  Ghana  focuses  on  the  improved  sustainability  of  the  service provider through the  improved efficiency of operation proposed to be  inherent to the private sector.   As such, the contract between private operator and state holding company highlights various aspects of service provision which provide a means by which to incentivise the operator to improve efficiency.  Included here are  the  reduction  of  non‐revenue  water  (NRW)  (which  itself  incorporates reduced  leakages  and  illegal  connections,  and  improved metering  and  billing), the  reduction  of  energy  and  chemical  consumption  in  production,  and  the reduction  in  water  consumption  by  public  institutions  (GWCL,  2005).    The contract  furthermore  includes  some  financial  penalties  and  incentives  for  the additional  motivation  of  the  private  operator  to  achieve  these  intended improvements in operation, beyond that already inherent to the management fee (deriving from efficiencies and potential profit within this fee) (ibid.).  While the contract  incorporates  these  various  aspects  intended  for  the  evaluation  of performance, and subsequent payment or penalty to the operator, the design of the contract in fact undermines the potential of any of the factors to be evaluated to any sufficient degree.      The  measurement  of  performance  of  the  private  company  against intended improvements in operation is problematical due to the lack of specific targets  within  the  contract.    It  is  typical  that  the  specific  rate  of  intended improvements  in operation under the private sector are absent  in the contract, with  the  actual  rates  of  improvement  to  be  established  ex‐post  by  agreement between the contract parties.  This is typically within three, six or twelve months 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from the commencement of  the contract, and covers such  factors as NRW (and its  component  features),  metering,  public  sector  consumption,  energy  and chemical  consumption,  together with  the  financial  penalties  and  incentives  for the  achievement  of  these  targets  (GWCL,  2005).    For  example,  with  regard  to NRW, including penalty reductions for this factor:   “Schedule 4: Service Standards […] C. REDUCTION IN NON‐REVENUE WATER    (a)  Within  twelve  (12)  months  of  the  Commencement  Date,  the  Operator shall  submit  to  the  Grantor  for  discussion  and  approval  a  plan  for  the systematic measurement and reduction of non‐revenue water in the Service Area.”  (GWCL, 2005: 38)  Or, with regard the metering of treatment plant operations:   “Schedule 4: Service Standards […] D. TREATMENT PLANT OPERATIONS.     (a) Within sixty (60) days from the Commencement Date, the Operator will provide  the  Grantor  with  the  specifications  for  meters  and  the  required location thereof. Installation of new meters, rehabilitation of old meters and connections shall be payable from the Project Funds.”  (GWCL, 2005: 38)  Or, with regard to the incentive compensation for improved efficiency in energy and chemical consumption, and reduced public sector water consumption:   “Schedule 5: Payments to the Operator […]  B.  INCENTIVE COMPENSATION […] B2. Chemical usage   (a) Within twelve (12) months from the Commencement Date, the Operator shall  present  a  plan  to  the  Grantor  for  the  optimization  of  chemical  usage while maintaining Treated Water quality standards as well as a proposal for incentive compensation for such reduction.   (b)  The  Parties  shall  discuss  and  reasonably  agree  on  such  plan  and corresponding incentive compensation.   B.3 Power consumption   (a) Within twelve (12) months from the Commencement Date, the Operator shall present a plan to the Grantor for the reduction of power consumption as well as a proposal for incentive compensation for such reduction.  (b)  The  Parties  shall  discuss  and  reasonably  agree  on  such  plan  and corresponding incentive compensation.   B4.  Public sector water consumption   (a) Within six (6) months from the Commencement Date the Operator shall present a plan to the Grantor for the reduction of water consumption by the public sector entities within such System by at least three (3) per cent over a baseline annual consumption to be established by the Operator pursuant to Section 3.6.1 of the Management Contract, as well as a proposal for incentive compensation for such reduction.”  (GWCL, 2005: 40‐41) 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 It  is obvious  from the above  instances  that  the contract and subsequent determination  of  performance  of  the  operator  is  dependent  on  the  ex‐post establishment of baseline data demonstrating  the  technical performance of  the service provider at the commencement of the contract.  Indeed, the conditions of the service provider, facilities and infrastructure prior to the commencement of the  contract  were  such  that  the  incoming  private  operator  was  contracted  to review the existing facilities within six months of the start of the contract:   “3.  OPERATOR'S  AND  SUCCESSFUL  BIDDER'S  RIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS […] 3.4 Existing Facilities and Initial Review   The  use  of  Existing  Facilities  is  granted  to  the  Operator  "as  is"  with  no warranty  as  to  state  of  repair.  Within  six  (6)  months  after  the Commencement  Date,  the  Operator  will  conduct  a  review  of  the  Existing Facilities (the "Initial Review") to determine if such Existing Facilities need to be repaired, replaced or rehabilitated and the eventual presence of Snag Items.”  (GWCL, 2005: 9‐10)  The baseline data from which the performance of the operator is to be assessed is therefore absent from the initial contract, with the understanding that it is to be established and agreed within a short period post‐contract.  This changeover period  from  state  to  private  operator  is  anticipated  in  the  documentation relating  to  the development of  the  contract,  its  inevitability  accepted.   Bids  for the  contract were  to  “contain  a  detailed  plan  (the  ‘Roll  Out’  plan)  on  how  the Operator  will  assume  operating  the  entire  Ghana  Water  Company  Limited system  […] within  a  period not  to  exceed 18 months”  (GoG,  2004b).    It  is  also worth noting here that the ‘initial review’ conducted by the private operator, as stated in the above quote, provides an opportunity for the operator to highlight ‘snag  items’  which  may  prevent  the  achievement  of  intended  targets.    Where these items are not resolvable, the responsibility of the operator is limited (ibid. 13).    This  limited  responsibility,  together  with  the  intended  establishment  of baseline data provides a basis for dispute between parties, and will be returned to in the following chapter.    While  baseline  data  was  to  be  established  following  commencement  of the  contract,  the  rate  of  improvement  for  the  operator  is  noted  within  the contract with respect to some aspects of performance.  These include the rate of improvement of NRW:   “Schedule 4: Service Standards […] C. REDUCTION IN NON‐REVENUE WATER […]  (b)  The  plan  referred  to  in  (a)  above  will  specify  how  to  calculate  non‐revenue water  in  the  absence  of  complete metering  and  determine  yearly targets for reduction in non‐revenue water in the Service Area of at least five (5)  per  cent  per  year  and  shall  propose  relevant  penalty  provisions  for failure to meet such yearly targets.  It will also include how Operator intends to reduce leakage and illegal connections.”  (GWCL, 2005: 38) 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The specification of the rate improvement of performance, despite the deferment of  specification  of  baseline  data,  is  also  seen  in  regard  to  treatment  plant operations:   “Schedule 5: Payments to the operator A. BASE FEE and PENALTY REDUCTION […] A.2.  Subject  to  Section  5.1.3  of  this  Management  Contract,  Operator's performance  below  the  Service  Standards  as  set  forth  in  Schedule  4  will result in the decrease of the Base Fee as follows: […]” 
(GWCL, 2005: 40‐41)    So, the majority of factors by which performance of the private operator may be evaluated are not specified within the contract, but left to resolution ex‐post.    It  remains  possible  however  to  instead  compare  performance  regarding those efficiency  factors noted  in  the contract with  that of  the state company  in previous years.  This comparison is possible only across those factors where data is  available  which  covers  the  operation  of  both  state  and  private  operators.  Availability  of  data  is  limited  firstly  by  the measurement  of  varying  factors  by different  agencies.    For  example  the  state  operator  provided  reasonably comprehensive  measurements  concerning  financial  performance,  metering status, operating costs etc., but GWCL has not released data from 2004 onwards – covering  its own operation as both service provider  (2004 and 2005) and as holding company (from 2006 onwards).   Direct comparisons with performance of  the  private  company  are  thus  not  possible  using  GWCL  data.    PURC  data covers  the  period  to  2007  (PURC,  2009),  but  is  less  comprehensive  than  that provided by GWCL, concerning only data relevant to the regulation of the service provider.    Data  available  from  the  private  company,  AVRL,  covers  the  period 2006‐2008  (AVRL,  2007  &  2008),  though  is  less  comprehensive  than  that  of GWCL, with some differences in data gathered. 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while  Ghana  does  not  demonstrate  extreme  conditions  of  divergence  from proposed  performance  and  operation,  quantifiable  performance  as demonstrated  here  is  consistent  with  the  trend  for  divergence.    More importantly, however, for the performance and operation of the contract are the other  factors  which  inhibit  the  potential  for  proposed  improvements,  those which  contribute  to  dispute  and  renegotiation.    These  will  be  reviewed subsequently.     
6.2  Ex­post establishment of baseline data: rationale and consequences  The  requirement  in  the  contract  for  the  establishment  of  baseline  data  upon commencement  of  the  contract  provides  a  foundation  for  the  lack  of performance monitoring, and ultimately the application of financial penalties or incentives.    In  practice  the  absence  of  baseline  data  from  the  contract  derives from  the  standard  of  metering  in  the  water  infrastructure  in  Ghana,  and  the recognition of  the potential  for dispute which may  follow  the  establishment of baselines using sub‐standard metering.  However, this concern for the potential dispute  of  baseline  data  has  in  turn  led  to  further  problems  ex‐post,  with  a continuation  of  sub‐standard  metering,  and  a  continued  lack  of  baseline  data from which to evaluate performance.      Within  the  design  of  the  contract,  the  rationale  for  the  exclusion  of baseline  data  derives  from  the  condition  of  infrastructure  and  facilities  in  the water sector in Ghana.  It is widely recognised by various actors in the sector that the metering of facilities in the sector is sub‐standard, both in terms of coverage and  reliability  (Fichtner,  2007;  World  Bank  representatives,  2009;  PUWU representative, 2009; PURC representatives, 2009; NCAP representative, 2009).  These  conditions  are  true  for production, distribution and  consumer metering, with these various stages appearing in the contract as included within expected performance  improvements  (GWCL,  2000‐2003;  GWCL,  2005).    Indeed,  where GWCL data is available, for the early period of the state company’s operation, it is shown  that  the  percentage  of  effective  consumer  metering  coverage  varies between 39 and 53 per cent: 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 Indeed,  the  absence  of  sufficient metering  in  the water  sector  in  Ghana has been noted by  respondents  as  critical  to  the  inclusion of  the post‐contract establishment of baselines.  This recognition concerns not only the practicality of establishing  baselines  with  sub‐standard  metering,  but  also  the  potential  for dispute of any baselines established with such metering:   “I know people got confused because we put it under the contract that, when the operator comes he’s going to establish the baseline.  It’s not like we don’t have any baseline, but the thing is that, I am giving this [facility baseline] to you and  I  am saying  ‘this  is  the way  that  it performs’.   You can come back when you start and say ‘no, no, no, what you told me, that is not the way it is performing,  but  it  is  performing  this  particular  way’.    So  I  will  have  my figures  as  baseline,  which  is  concerning  the  NRW,  or  production  or whatever, but you can also come and confirm – compare the baseline, I have mine, and then we’ll see.”  (World Bank representatives, 2009)  Furthermore, where  the  contract  requires  the  rehabilitation  or  replacement  of metering, this would lead to the superseding of those baselines established with the old meters, with further potential dispute:   “… after all, some of  the  facilities, we are going to change them anyway, by the  time  you  are  finished  we may  have  changed  the  pump,  we may  have changed  this,  changed  the  capacity  of  your  treatment  plant  –  so  your baselines will  be  changing,  once  you  have  changed  some  facility.”    (World Bank representatives, 2009)  Thus,  to  ensure  some  requirement  for  improved  NRW  was  included  in  the contract,  despite  the  absence  of  baseline  data,  an  annual  percentage improvement was incorporated in the contract:   “If  you  look  at  it,  the  contract  says  that when  the  operator  comes  in  they should develop a method for assessing the NRW without necessarily 100 per cent metering,  that  is  part  of  it.    So we  had  this  idea,  that  is  why we  put reduction rather than absolutes. […]  So the baselines they were there, only that  I  would  say  that  it  was  not  as  refined  as  one  would  have  hoped  – because  there were  certain  facilities  that were not  in place.”    (World Bank representatives, 2009)  Thus, where sub‐standard metering was present, the compromise was to include a  five  per  cent  annual  reduction  in  NRW,  combined  with  contracting  for  the operator to propose some means of establishing baseline data post‐contract, as well  as  improving  metering.    This  compromise  was  necessary  due  to  the importance  of  NRW  as  a  measure  of  performance  and  sustainability  of  the service  provider.    NRW  had  been  utilised  as  a  primary  tool  to  denigrate  the performance  of  the  state  service  provider  through  the  development  of  the contract  (Public  Citizen,  2002),  and  thus  rationalise  the more  efficient  private sector.    Consequently  its  inclusion  in  the  contract was  essential,  even without baseline data and the problematic establishment ex‐post: 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“In  fact  at  some  point,  […]  the  Bank  really  wanted  to  remove  this  NRW because  it  was  a  grey  area  and  it  will  bring  confusion,  because  truly,  we didn’t have the gadgets and the excuse we used at that time was that if you look through all the Bank reports the main thing they used to accuse GWCL was the NRW.”  (World Bank representatives, 2009)    The  contract  was  therefore  designed  in  such  a  way  that  there  were various  unknowns  regarding  baseline  data,  with  those  designing  the  contract aware of  these unknowns.   The acceptance of  the  impracticality of establishing baselines  with  sub‐standard  metering  determined  the  inclusion  of  the contracting  of  terms  for  the  post‐contract  establishment  of  this  data,  with  a further  acceptance  that  complete  metering  post‐contract  was  impractical  and subsequently baseline data would anyway be incomplete.      These conditions present in the contract design have had repercussions in the operation of the contract, beyond the unfeasibility of evaluating performance as noted above.  One year after the commencement of the contract, the technical auditor of the contract, Fichtner (2007), noted the continued absence of baseline data  in  any  of  the  key  determinants  of  performance.    This  is  true  for  water quality,  chemical  usage,  NRW,  and  treatment  plant  operation  (ibid.).    It  is apparent  within  the  report  of  the  technical  auditor  that  there  is  typically insufficient  data  being  provided  by  the  operator  for  the  establishment  of baselines.   This  is most  likely due  to  the conditions of  facilities as noted  in  the process of contract design, with the effect of sub‐standard monitoring continuing into  the  period  of  private  sector  operation.    For  example,  regarding  treatment and distribution operations:   “The whole distribution process is handled like a black box.   Only few facts are  really known about  the distribution process.   The  technical  figures are derived  from  commercial  figures,  so  that monitoring  of  physical  losses  or optimisation of storage capacities can hardly be achieved.”  (Fichtner, 2007: 8‐5)    The  lack  of  data  made  available  by  the  operator  has  repercussions  in terms of the capacity for the application of financial  incentives and penalties to the private operator (Fichtner, 2007).  This is true for NRW, where the contract required the operator to “propose relevant penalty provisions for failure to meet […] yearly targets” (GWCL, 2005: 38).  The operator in fact suggested a “symbolic penalty of €1000 up to a maximum of €5000 per year for each percentage below the 5%” reduction target, which was rejected by the auditor:   “The technical auditor considers that it is more appropriate to calculate the penalty  prorated  to  the  size  of  the  system  and  the  amount  of  the  ‘lost’ expected revenue income.  The operator should review its suggested penalty and agree it with the grantor.’  (Fichtner, 2007: 7‐8)  Similarly, with regard chemical consumption, the penalty to be applied had been postponed  until  sufficient  baseline  data  is  established  (Fichtner,  2007).    The inhibiting of the capacity to apply penalties for poor performance of the operator 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is  noted  by  NGOs  and  community  groups  active  in  the  sector,  who  express concern  at  the  lack  of  sanctions  available  to  the  grantor,  on  behalf  of  the consumers (NCAP representative, 2009).     Finally, it should also be noted that the requirements for performance for the operator regarding water quality may in  fact be  inferior to those standards operated  by  the  preceding  state  company.    It  is  noted  by  the  consultants employed  by  the  state  holding  company,  at  the  time  of  introduction  of  the contract, that water quality standards contracted may meet Ghanaian minimum standards, but are  in practice  lower  than  those previously employed by GWCL.  While  the  minimum  standards  set  by  the  Ghana  Standards  Board  meets international  standards,  those  of  GWCL  are  higher,  and  this  potential discrepancy may have consequences:    “[One contract] flaw is the setting of the Operator’s minimum water quality standard  lower  than  what  we  think  should  be  the  minimum  operational 
standard  for  water  quality.    The  Schedule  on  standards  indicates  that  the minimum standards should be that set by the Ghana Standards Board (GSB).  The consultant has noted that the current GWCL standards are higher than those of GSB, though GSB based its work on the WHO guidelines.   We again note that the management contract has given the Operator an incentive for cutting down on costs  for example  in the use of chemicals.    If we put these two circumstances together we may argue that will be the tendency for the Operator  to  drive  their  operational  standards  towards  GSB  than  GWCL standards as allowed by the contract.”  (GWCL, 2006b: 3)  The  discrepancy  between  GSB  minimum  standards  and  those  employed  by GWCL  in  practice  is  not  recognised  in  the  contract  or  preparatory documentation.  Reference is made only to “maintaining water at, or above, that required under the laws of Ghana” (GoG, 2004b: 7), or that water should “meet or  exceed  all  relevant  standards  determined  by  the  Ghana  Standards  Board and/or the Consumer Charter requirements, and the Drinking Water Safety Plan” (GWCL, 2005:38) (the latter documents refer back to the GSB standards (GWCL, undated)).    Broader  consequences  of  the  potential  exploitation  of  this discrepancy are recognised by the consultants:  “This will likely have some adverse effect on public acceptance of the water being  produced  (for  example  water  colour  may  change  die  to  use  of  less chemicals).  Should this happen the repercussions will be serious; especially against  the background that  the public has been assured that  the PPP  is  to enhance  service  delivery  quality  and  water  colour.    We  recommend  that GWCL current standards be regarded as  the operational minimum.    In  that light, we think the Operator be made aware from the onset that insistence on the letter more than the spirit of the contract in this case will  likely lead to the creation of grounds for public outcry against the contract and jeopardise its continuation as the political risk will be unbearable for the government.”  (GWCL, 2006b: 3) 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While the instance of public outcry relating directly to a change in water quality as produced and distributed  is not possible  to determine,  it  is  the case  that, as feared by the GWCL consultants, the private company operates to the lower GSB standards.    Comparison  of  GWCL  standards  as  noted  in  the  consultant documents  (GWCL,  2006b)  and  those  evident  in AVRL documentation  (2009a) demonstrates a discrepancy  in  four parameters where evidence  is available (of five in total).    Parameter  GSB standards  GWCL standards  AVRL standards pH  6.5‐8.5  7.0‐9.0  6.5‐8.5 Turbidity  5.0 NTU  1.0‐2.0 NTU  5.0 NTU Colour  15.0 HU  5.0 HU  15.0 HU Residual Chlorine  0.20‐0.50 mg/l  0.10  at  far  end  of distribution network 1.0  at  plants  with long  transmission lines 
0.5 mg/l 
  Table 6.1: Water Quality standards utilised (GWCL, 2006b; AVRL, 2009a)  The discrepancy  in standards used by  the private operator  further exaggerates problematic performance comparison.    It  further permits the operator a means by which to demonstrate apparent improvement in operation, where in fact they work to lower standards than the state operator.   Thus, the claims of improved operation,  according  to  the  operator  to  be  due  to  “better  effective  dosing, competitive  procurement  prices  and  improved  control  on  the  handling  of  the chemicals” (AVRL, 2007), may be disputed.    Considering  the  analysis  of  the  technical  auditor  and  the acknowledgement  of  the  various  issues  underlying  the  failure  to  establish baseline,  effectively  repeating  those  concerns  outlined  in  the  design  of  the contract,  the  progress  in  this  aspect  of  the  contract  remains  limited.    Various respondents active in the sector in Ghana have noted the continued significance of the failure to establish baseline data as an obstacle to progress in the contract and  in  the  evaluation  of  performance  (PUWU  representative,  2009;  PURC representative,  2009; NCAP  representative,  2009; World Bank  representatives, 2009).  Indeed the issues of baseline data provides one of the primary concerns addressed  at  a mid‐term  review by  the Ghanaian Government  in August 2009, three years into the five year contract (NCAP representative, 2009; GWCL, 2009).    
Summary  The inception of the contract before requisite data had been established, which could have been achieved through the utilisation of improved metering indicates the  implementation  of  the  PSP  programme  was  rushed,  was  executed incompetently  or  prejudiciously.    Had  implementation  been  delayed  to incorporate  such  information,  the  programme  may  deviate  less  significantly 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from  the underlying  theoretical  framework.   The decision  to  establish baseline data ex‐post has in practice reduced the timescale of the contract: whereas it was envisaged  such  information  would  be  established  in  the  first  year  of implementation, and therefore not impact on the capacity of the grantor to effect penalties or incentives, in practice the process has not been resolved after three years,  limiting  the  capacity  to  effect  penalties  and  incentives  to  a  significantly shorter  timescale.    The  potential  for  performance  of  the  operator  to  be monitored  and  penalties  and  incentives  to  be  applied  is  therefore  severely restricted, and this undermines the very basis of the introduction of the private sector:  efficiencies  cannot be determined, profit motivations  cannot be applied and  thus  improvements purported  to derive  from  the private  sector  cannot be induced or assessed.      The  incomplete  information  regarding  these  various  aspects  of performance  of  service  provision  is  therefore  significant,  and  the implementation  of  the  contract  regardless  indicates  a  suboptimal  execution  of PSP.    This  provides  a  substantiation  of  various  aspects  of  the  critique  of  the underlying  theoretical  framework  for  the  programme.    The  implementation  of PSP with suboptimal information undermines the attribution of property rights and  subsequently  internalisation  of  externalities  associated with  provision.    It follows  that moral hazard  issues exist, with  residual  control  rights  typically  lie with  the  private  operator,  with  the  potential  for  monitoring  of  and  applying penalties for performance are limited.   Transaction costs are increased through the  necessary  ex‐post  consultation  and  agreement  between  parties,  and  the intervention  of  other  agencies  such  as  the  auditor.    It  is  further  possible  to identify possible adverse selection, where the contract bidder may consider the incorporation  of  ex‐post  agreement  of  such  crucial  data  as  potential  for opportunism  and  low‐ball  the  bid  accordingly.    The  lack  of  penalties  for  the timely  resolution  of  data  ex‐post  furthers  this  possibility.    Commitment  of  the private  sector  for  the  establishment  of  data  is  assumed.    Those  active  in  the design  of  the  contract  recognised  the  potential  for  dispute  between  parties where  unknowns  exist,  yet  ultimately  provided  a  contract  with  significant unknowns  which  have  in  practice  seriously  undermined  the  operation  of  the contract,  with  dispute  regarding  baseline  data  continuing  until  at  least  three years  after  the  commencement.    These  various  aspects  substantiating  the critique of the theoretical rationale of privatisation are taken up in greater detail in chapter eight.   
6.3  Maintenance and operation costs: RRR fund and revenue accounts  The contract between GWCL and AVRL is designed in such a way that day‐to‐day running  of  service  provision  may  be  undertaken  be  the  operator  without unnecessary intervention from the grantor (World Bank representatives, 2009).  The most obvious manifestation of this is the provision of a ‘repair, replacement and rehabilitation’ (RRR) fund in the World Bank Urban Water Project of which the  PSP  programme  is  part.    The  fund  provides  the  operator  finance  for  the maintenance and repair of  facilities  for the continued day‐to‐day functioning of service provision: 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 “"Repair,  Replacement  and  Rehabilitation  Fund"  means  a  five  million (5,000,000) United States Dollars fund financed by the Grantor through the Project  Funds,  operated  solely  by  the  Operator  and  used  for minor works that will be identified during the Management Contract Period, including but not limited to:   (i) urgent System repairs costing in aggregate above ten thousand (10,000) United States Dollars;   (ii) distribution network (i.e., less than or equal to 100 mm/4 inch diameter pipe) repair, replacement or extension;   (iii) non‐office equipment required on an urgent basis costing more than five  thousand (5,000) United States Dollars; and   (iv) plumbing improvements and repairs  in public sector entities.”   (GWCL, 2005: 6)  In  addition,  subsequent  to  the  implementation  of  the  contract  the  RRR  fund, originally  of  $5 million,  has been  supplemented by  $8 million  through  funding from  the  Dutch  Government  (NCAP  representative,  2009; World  Bank,  2008).  The  utilisation  of  this  RRR  fund  is  determined  by  the  operator,  without  the intervention  of  the  grantor,  and  is  subject  to  World  Bank  procurement guidelines:   “3.5 Suggested Capital Investment Report […] 3.5.3 The Operator shall describe its planned use of the Repair, Replacement and  Rehabilitation  Fund  in  each  Suggested  Capital  Investment  Report submitted  by  the  Operator  notwithstanding  that  the  use  of  the  Repair, Replacement  and  Rehabilitation  Fund  is  not  subject  to  approval  by  the Grantor.   3.5.4 Any procurement which shall entail the use of the Repair, Replacement and  Rehabilitation  Fund  shall  follow  the  World  Bank  Procurement Guidelines.  (GWCL, 2005: 11)  Finally,  the  operator  further  has  the  capacity,  through  the  required  ‘initial review’,  to  identify  issues which  they  consider  to  be  outwith  the  scope  of  the fund, subject to the agreement of technical auditors:   “The  Operator  will  conduct  a  review  of  the  Existing  Facilities  (the  "Initial Review")  to  determine  if  such  Existing  Facilities  need  to  be  repaired, replaced or rehabilitated and the eventual presence of Snag Items.  […] 5.1.3 The Operator shall not be  liable  for  failure  to meet Service Standards and shall not be subject to Penalty Reductions where such failure is caused by: […] (vi) the existence of a Snag Item which cannot be reasonably cured by minor works  that  can be  financed by  the Repair, Replacement  and Rehabilitation Fund, as determined by Technical Auditors…”  (GWCL, 2005: 10&13)    In addition to the RRR fund, the operator maintains control of the revenue account from service provision, for the financing of various aspects of operation.  Factors  included here  range  from personnel  costs  and  administration  costs,  to 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maintenance and other ‘necessary costs’.  The following describes the utilisation of the revenue account permitted for the operator:   “6.3.2  The  Grantor  hereby  irrevocably  grants  to  the  Operator  for  the Management Contract Period the care and control of the Revenue Collection Account, which shall be operated exclusively by the Operator pursuant to the terms  of  this  Management  Contract.  Subject  to  the  availability  of  the amounts,  the  Operator  shall  pay  from  the  Revenue  Collection  Account operating  expenses,  including  vendor  accounts  payable  (notwithstanding that they may have been incurred prior to the Commencement Date) under this Management Contract in the following order:   (i) staff salaries;    (ii) staff pensions and benefits;   (iii) Grantors Headquarter Operating Cost (on a monthly basis);   (iv) vendor accounts payable, including cost of chemicals;   (v) reasonable and prudent maintenance costs;   (vi)  operating  costs  (including  Electricity  Costs  pursuant  to  Section  6.5 below  and  insurance  premiums  pursuant  to  6.6  below)  other  than maintenance;   (vii) Raw Water abstraction fees;  (viii) general and administrative costs;   (ix) in year five (5) of this Management Contract, the portion of Base Fee not covered by the Project as set forth in Section 6.1.5;   (x) that portion of the Incentive Compensation set forth in Section 6.1.5 (d) 1.;  (xi)  debt  service  on  Grantor's  Existing  Loans,  as  from  the  Debt Rationalization Date;   (xii)  amounts  payable  to  Technical  and  Financial  Auditors  for  years when the Project is not effective;   (xiii)  Operator  Working  Capital  upon  termination  of  this  Management Contract; and  (xiv)  all  other  reasonable  and  necessary  costs  not  included  in  (i)  to  (xiii) above.  6.3.3 The surplus after the payment of items (i) through (xiv) of Section 6.3.2 above  shall  be paid quarterly  into  an  account determined by  the Grantor.”  (GWCL, 2005: 15‐16)  The  degree  of  specificity  regarding  permitted  use  of  the  revenue  account therefore  remains  limited,  with  the  potential  flexibility  within  terms  such  as ‘reasonable  and  prudent  maintenance  costs’,  and  ‘all  other  reasonable  and necessary costs’, significant.       It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  the  contract  attempts  to  allow  the private sector  to  operate,  as  much  as  possible,  independently  from  the  state  holding company  and  institutional  environment,  and  furthermore provides  a  degree of flexibility  for  the  operator.    Financial  independence  of  the  private  company  is attempted  through  the  provision  of,  the  RRR  fund  and  control  of  the  revenue account.    The  lack of  specificity within  the  terms of  use of  each of  these  funds provides  further  freedom  for  the  operator  in  their  activity.    The  World  Bank 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maintains  that  such  a  contract  design  allows  for  the  smooth  operation  of  the private  sector,  who  are  thus  not  subject  to  the  excessive  intervention  of  the grantor,  together  with  the  flexibility  of  determining  the means  by  which  they wish  to  operate  the  service  provider  (World  Bank,  2004b;  World  Bank representatives, 2009).  Independence of the private operator is furthered by the application of World Bank guidelines for the disbursement of the RRR fund, thus reducing national influence on the process.      The  intended  independent operation of  the private company  is however potentially  undermined  where  consideration  is  made  of  the  requirement  to establish  baseline  data.    As  is  revealed  in  the  draft  contract  framework  paper (GoG,  2004b),  the  company’s  responsibilities  in  this  respect  are  reliant  on  the activity of the GoG, and GWCL, in the utilisation of broader Urban Water Project funding.   Metering,  in  this  case  for  the public  sector  institutions,  necessary  for the  establishment  of  baseline  data,  is  funded  from  the UWP  and  baselines  are thus dependent on the activity of the GoG and GWCL:   “It  is  intended  that  the  annual  capital  works  program  supported  by  the proposed World  Bank  Project  [UWP], which  shall  be  procured  by  the  GoG according  to  World  Bank  Procurement  Guidelines,  would  provide  for adequate metering of public  sector entities  in order  to  timely establish  the baseline.”  (GoG, 2004b)  This demonstrates, firstly, an inconsistent implementation of idealised modes of operation  for  the  private  sector.    It  is  also,  however,  interesting  that  this inconsistency  arises  where  baseline  data  –  necessary  for  the  evaluation  of performance,  application  of  penalties  and  incentives  –  is  concerned.    Such  an inconsistency  undermines  the  very  basis  of  the  purported  aims  of  the introduction of the private sector.     While  independence  of  the  private  sector may  be  proclaimed  to  permit the  efficient  operation  of  the  private  sector,  it  has  other  unintended  or unforeseen  consequences,  including  the  opportunity  for  the  operator  to  utilise finance  in an  inefficient manner.   The  lack of  specificity  regarding  the  terms of use  for both  the RRR and particularly  the revenue account means  the operator can  apply  their  own  interpretation  to  ‘reasonable  and  prudent  maintenance costs’  and  ‘all  other  reasonable  and  necessary  costs’,  and  this  may  be  to  the detriment of the grantor.  The contract is designed in such a way that efficiencies purported  to  be  achieved  through  the  operation  of  the  private  sector  are transferred  via  the  revenue  account  to  the  grantor,  who  may  then  utilise  the funding for investment in infrastructure.    Evidence suggests that this scenario has indeed been realised in the case of Ghana.   It has been suggested by various sources in Ghana that the design of the  contract  as  described  above  has  led  to  the  diminution  of  revenue  finance being transferred to the grantor.  This may have come about in two ways: firstly, the system of procurement and disbursement associated with the RRR fund has seen  significant  delays,  with  revenue  account  finance  instead  being  used; secondly, inefficient use of revenue account funding by the operator.  In the first 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case, it is acknowledged by many parties (MP, 2009; PUWU representative, 2009; NCAP  representative,  2009;  PURC  representative,  2009;  GII  representative, 2009)  that  delays  in  the  procurement  and  disbursement  of  RRR  finance  has meant  revenue  account  finance  has  been  used  in  its  stead.    This  process  is advanced  by  pressure  experienced  by  the  operator,  both  from  the  public generally  and  opposition  groups,  to  ensure  the  standard  of  service  provision does not deteriorate (MP, 2009):   “If  they give you $100m and you want  to access  it  and  it’s  so difficult,  and have  money…    You  see  there  was  major  opposition  from  some,  a  group called ISODEC, to these water people – and so they were supposed to deliver.  If you relied on the World Bank you would deliver nothing.   So  in  the  final analysis,  if  they  have  funds  coming  from  the  income,  then  they  use  it, because as I said, the infrastructure for water production was not to be paid for  it  was  provided  by  government.    So  if  you  have money  and  you  have enough to buy aluminium to clean the system, and by then have some money – you need to use it, so that’s why they were using it.  But if the government, if  the World  Bank  had  been more  flexible  they would  use  [the  RRR  fund], why not?  They needed funds to build things, because when a system breaks down you don’t wait for six months for World Bank to give you the money – and they were constantly under fire by this ISODEC and this socialist group.  So they needed to deliver, so then, and rightly so,  I wouldn’t  fault  them for that,  they used  the  revenue  for  that.   After  all what was  the  revenue  to be used  for  –  because  if  I  have  provided  the  infrastructure,  you  have  paid nothing  for  it,  you  have  the  revenue,  why  shouldn’t  the  revenue  help  the people have water?”  (MP, 2009)    Just as transfer of revenue to the grantor is diminished by the obstacles in slow procurement and disbursement processes associated with the RRR fund, it is  further  affected  by  the  degree  of  control  permitted  to  the  operator  and  it’s determination  of  utilisation  of  revenue.    As  noted  above,  the  potential  for inefficient  use  of  revenue  is  established  under  the  design  of  the  contract,  and certain of those active in the sector in Ghana have observed this may be the case in practice.  Firstly, a Public Utility Workers Union (PUWU) representative:   “[AVRL] are supposed  to do all  the revenue collection.   There  is a  range of payments that have been listed as to what they have to transfer to GWCL in relation to each one, its been stated in the contract.  Then later on there are some differences also to be passed over to GWCL.  But how do you create the difference after paying  the statutory ones?   AVRL could redirect  it  to other areas, AVRL could say that operationally they have not been able to make up a  difference.    And  that  can  create  some  conflict  between GWCL  and AVRL. […]    The  revenue  that  needs  to  be  transferred  has  been  given  in  the hierarchy of payments.  But apart from that there could be excesses, but how you get the excesses depends on how you manage the place.  So if you do too much of other things, operationally, it can eat into what you call the excess, and  that  will  stifle  the  grantor  –  as  the  grantor  controls  no  money.    The grantor will be controlling investment funds, but it needs other monies from 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this other side [the operator] to be doing the extension of mains and other related issues.”  (PUWU representative, 2009)  Similar sentiments are expressed by a representative of the regulator:   “Of  course,  if  [AVRL]  reduce  NRW,  reduce  chemical  consumption,  reduce electricity consumption, all of these create more money, revenue. […]  They get the management fee, and they have the revenue collection account to do operations. […]  After they have used the money to do a certain hierarchy of payments, whatever money  is  left  should  transfer  to GWCL.    GWCL  claims that  the  operator  uses  everything.  […]    Because  the management  contract says ‘prudent operational costs’ – so prudent operational costs can be hire of vehicles, leasing of vehicles, they stay in hotels – so that at the end of the day they don’t have anything to transfer to GWCL.  That has been one of the big confusions  between  GWCL  and  AVRL.    So  they  are  not  doing  their investments…    What  money  they  have,  they  use.”    (PURC  representative, 2009)    While these suppositions cannot be verified absolutely without access to the  accounts  of  AVRL,  they  are  supported  elsewhere  by  documentation  of  the World Bank and the technical auditors of the contract, Fichtner.  Fichtner noted as early as 2007,  that  there were potential problems  in  the definition of  terms relating  to  the  utilisation  of  funds  and  prudent  industry  practice.    Following meetings  between  grantor,  operator  and  auditor,  amongst  the  list  of  problems encountered  in  the  project  were  “problems  with  interpretation  of  the management contract” (Fichtner, 2007:3‐1).    In addition, there was the need to “establish  levels  for  prudent  industry  practice  in  operations”,  and  the requirement  for  the  “definition  in  financial  terms  [of]  ‘capital’,  ‘repairs’, ‘rehabilitate’, and ‘replace’” (Fichtner, 2007: 3‐3).  Despite this acknowledgement at  an  early  stage  of  the  contract,  World  Bank  documents  concerning  the disbursement of funds relating to the Urban Water Project, of which PSP and the RRR fund are part, demonstrate the $13 million allocated to the RRR fund have not been disbursed.   As of August 2009,  the  latest  records available  relating  to the  project,  no  disbursement  has  been made  from  this  fund,  more  than  three years since the commencement of the contract (World Bank, 2009).      Problematic disbursement of  funding and associated transfer of revenue from  operator  to  grantor  is  further  validated  by  press  reports.    The  following extract  demonstrates  the  degree  of  dispute  and  confusion  deriving  from  the purported transfer of revenue to the grantor.    “Management of GWCL has refuted claims by the water operators that a total amount  of  GH¢  35.3  Million  (Thirty‐five  million  three  hundred  thousand Ghana  Cedis)  had  been  donated/paid  to  GWCL  by  the  operators  over  the three year period they have been in the helm of affairs at the water delivery section of the institution.  This  claim  made  by  General  Manager  in  Charge  of  Communication  as reported by one Caroline Boateng in the Thursday February 19, 2009 edition 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of the Daily Graphic had it that the Operators had made profits to the tune of GH¢ 1.9 million, GH¢ 13.4 million and GH¢20 million in the 2005, 2007 and 2008  financial  years.  He  said  this  represented  a  121%  increase  in  the operational surplus over the past two years.  According to the Daily Graphic report, “Mr. Sakyi Addo emphasized that the profit were given back to GWCL to invest in capital investments in the water sector,  such  as  the  water  treatment  plants  and  laying  of  pipes”.  However Managing  Director  of  GWCL,  Kwaku  Botwe  told  the  Financial  Intelligence that his outfit had never received any such money from AVRL. He said if any such  payments  were  to  be  made,  there  was  the  need  for  a  certification process to be undertaken.  […]  Mr. Kwaku Botwe insisted that GWCL has not taken any such sums of money from AVRL.  “If  any  such  profit would  be  declared,  the  certification  should have been done. This is why we have not made any public comments on that statement”.  However,  Mr.  Sakyi  Addo  insisted  when  this  paper  contacted him  that  the money was  given  to  their  counterparts monthly  and  recently quarterly.”  (GhanaWeb, 2009)  Contrary  statements  from  each  party  contribute  to  the  apparent  antagonism which follows from this arrangement.    The  issue  of  revenue  utilisation  and  transferral  was  identified  as  a potential problem, at least in terms of public perception of the PSP programme, in  the development of  the  contract.   Public  relations material published by  the Project Management Unit (PMU) (that established within the Ministry for Water, Works and Housing for the management of the programme), acknowledges such concerns.    In  a  document  intended  to  rebut  claims  made  by  NGOs  and community groups opposing the programme, the PMU states:   “The operator’s contract  is  fee‐based and  is provided from the World Bank grant.    It  will,  therefore,  not  earn  any  remuneration  from  revenues.    Any increases  in  revenues  collected,  and benefits  from  improved efficiency and performance, will go to GWCL, not the operator.”  (PMU, undated)  While this establishes the intended operation of the PSP programme, in practice it may  in  fact be misleading  considering  the  standard of  contract  implemented and the ‘independence’ or leeway provided to the operator.      Further to the obstacles presented by the utilisation of RRR and revenue finances, the contract offers the private company, in practice, the opportunity to determine  the extent of  the system to which  the performance objectives apply, subject to technical auditors approval.  Within six months of the commencement of  the  contract  the  operator was  to  determine,  in  an  initial  review  of  existing facilities, those ‘snag items’ which “cannot be reasonably cured by minor works that  can  be  financed  by  the  Repair,  Replacement  and  Rehabilitation  Fund,  as determined by Technical Auditors” (GWCL, 2005: 10&13).  The technical auditor reports,  one  year  after  the  commencement  of  the  contract,  that  there  was 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insufficient detail provided by the operator to approve snag items, thus delaying approval.  Nonetheless,   “… the snag items presented in the Initial Review Main Report are of such a nature and magnitude that handling or eliminating them cannot possibly be achieved with  the  funds  available  during  the  project.    Therefore,  action  of that  issue had  come  to  a  stop  at  the  time of  arrival  of  the Technical Audit Mission.”  (Fichtner, 2007: 4‐2)  Consequently, the auditor provides the following recommendations:   “Recommendation 4.1:  A  list  of  systems  (list  A)  shall  be  established  and  agreed  between  both parties where all  snag  items  (as  certified by  the Technical Auditor)  can be eliminated  during  the  period  of  the  management  contract  with  the  funds available.  A second list of systems (list B) with snag items which cannot be handled  due  to  whatever  reason  within  the  remaining  period  of  the management contract will be established so  that  the Technical Auditor can certify them. […] Recommendation 4.2:  After  a  period  of  investment,  which  finally  has  to  be  agreed  between operator and grantor and which shall not exceed 6 months,  the systems of list  A  will  be  handled  as  accorded  to  the  [management  contract].    The respective incentives and penalties for performance of the operator shall be applied.    The  systems  of  list  B  will  be  run  by  the  operator  without  the application of incentives and sanctions.  Nevertheless transfer of technology should take place also in these systems and best practice should be applied.”  (Fichtner, 2007: 4‐4)  The  scope  of  the  contract  has  thus  been  reduced  according  to  which  systems contain snag items which are outwith the capacity of the project to address.  The incentives and penalties associated with the efficient, or otherwise, operation of the  private  company  no  longer  apply  to  list  B  systems.    The  potential  for  the operator to move focus from these systems is acknowledged by the auditor with the phrase  “nevertheless  transfer of  technology should  take place also  in  these systems and best practice should be applied” to list B systems.  This exhortation intended to maintain some degree of progress in list B systems is, nonetheless, a poor  substitute  for  contracted  terms  of  performance.    Furthermore,  the weakness in the contract which leads to this scenario are noted by the auditor:   “By analysing the management contract, it is clear that snag items are a tool 
of the operator to avoid penalties imposed in the contract.  In order to achieve good  performance  within  the  execution  of  the  management  contract,  the snag items should be defined in a reasonable way so that they will not form insurmountable  obstacles  which  cannot  be  handled  by  both  parties.”  (Fichtner, 2007: 4‐1, emphasis added)  It  is  interesting  to note  that  the  technical and  financial auditors here  identify a mechanism  for  the  operator  to  act  opportunistically,  thereby  undermining  the 
  120 
intended  outcomes  of  the  programme.    This  is  in  parallel,  however,  with  the auditor’s  previous  recommendation  for  the  effective  reduction  in  scope  of  the contract, which  results  in  the  same undermining of  intended outcomes.   While the  auditor’s  recommendations  are  no  doubt  made  with  the  intention  of practicality  of  implementation,  they  lack  consistency  in  approach  taken  to  the application of the letter and spirit of the contract.    
Summary  The design and implementation of the PSP contract in Ghana is here evinced to be aligned with the underlying theoretical rationale.  It is intended to isolate the activity  of  the  operator  from  the  other  agencies  active  in  the  sector,  primarily those  of  the  public  sector  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  other elements  of  the  UWP.    In  practice  however,  this  commitment  to  a  particular mode  of  implementation,  motivated  by  a  distrust  of  the  host  institutional environment, in fact permits opportunism for the operator.  This is true for those aspects  of  the  programme,  evidence  of  moral  hazard,  which  permit  residual control rights to lie with the operator: asymmetry of information exists with the operator  in  knowledge  of  operating  expenses  and  therefore  required  revenue utilisation; and, monitoring of activities of the operator is problematic and costly (as  shown  by  the  contrary  statements  on  revenue  transfer),  requiring  the intervention of an intermediary agency, with additional transaction costs and the reliance  on  the  institutional  environment.    There  is,  furthermore,  in  the structuring  of  financial  arrangement  in  this  way,  evidence  of  normative judgements  regarding  rent‐seeking  in  this  regard.    The  idealised  ‘independent’ operation permits opportunism on the part of the private sector: rent‐seeking by the private operator is deemed as permissible through the motivation, deriving from the associated rationalising  theory,  for  the  ‘independent’ operation of  the private  sector.    The  particular  form  of  PSP  established  in  Ghana  impacts negatively on the utilisation of resources, and ultimately the sustainability of the service provider and the service consumers.  The attempt to provide the private sector a degree of independence from the national intervention in fact provides the private sector an opportunity  to profit  through  inefficient use of resources. These various aspects substantiating  the critique of  the  theoretical  rationale of privatisation are taken up in greater detail in chapter eight.   
6.4  Institutional capacity: technical, financial and human resources  The  restructuring  of  the  water  sector  in  Ghana  and  the  introduction  of  the private  sector  requires  the  capacity  of  associated  institutions  to  be commensurate with  their  tasks.    This  is  true primarily  for  the  regulator PURC, but also  for other  sector  institutions  including ministries and  the state holding company itself.   Factors that affect  the capacity of sector  institutions may be of financial  or  technical nature,  or  in  terms of human  resources  available.    In  the case  of  Ghana,  there  is  typically  a  shortfall  in  sector  institutions  in  financial capacity,  in  technology  and  ICT,  and  in  personnel  of  sufficient  skill  and experience. 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 For  the  regulator,  PURC,  there  has  been  a  trend  for  under‐financing, despite the repeated requests on the part of the agency for additional funding or change  in  funding  sources  (PURC,  1998 &  2007).    The  shortfall  in  financing  is acknowledged  as  early  as  1998,  the  first  year  of  operation,  together  with  the effect on the activities of the regulator:   “The Commission would also  like  to emphasize  that during  the year under review it was greatly constrained by inadequacy and uncertain funding and its  negative  impact  on  the  Commission's  capacity  building,  material  and equipment base.  Although there was some improvement towards the end of the year the Commission had to be content with the minimum of equipment and logistic support for most part of the year.  Also, a number of projects and activities  ‐  including  technical  studies,  monitoring  of  utility  services, establishing  customer  service  committees,  could not  be undertaken due  to lack of  funds either  from Government of Ghana or donor sources.”    (PURC, 1998: 10)  However, in 2007 conditions have changed little:   “Inadequate  funding  remains  a  grave  concern  ten  years  after  the establishment  of  the  Commission.  The  main  source  of  funding  is  from Government’s  Central  Budget.    Unfortunately,  the  subvention  of  budgets approved  annually  fall  far  short  of  the  Commission’s  requirements  for effective  operations.    Indeed,  from  1998  to  2000,  PURC  received  about 45.7%  of  its  budgetary  requirement,  and  from  2001  to  2002  dropped  to 28.5%.  This  has  been  the  fluctuating  trend.    In  2007,  the  Commission received 57.3% of its budgetary requirements.”  (PURC, 2007: 56)  The constrained finances of the regulator inevitably inhibited its activities, with the  “execution of most of  its planned programmes” hindered  (PURC, 2007:53).  Furthermore,  such  constraints  directly  impact  the  ability  of  the  regulator  to maintain requisite staffing levels, both in number and experience:  “In the  last  few years,  the Commission has began to notice that the  level of motivation  of  its  professional  staff  has  began  to  wane.    It  has  become obvious that the Commission’s remuneration package has been surpassed by most of the comparable institutions and has therefore become less attractive to current staff.   This has resulted in the loss of some well trained staff and made  retention  of  existing  professional  staff  difficult.    It  has  become imperative to take measures to improve significantly the staff conditions of service  including  the  staff  remuneration  package,  if  the  commission  is  to succeed in retaining its core staff.”  (PURC, 2006: 16)  Constrained finances further affect the capacity of the regulator  in terms of the technological facilities available, and this in turn impacts the interaction of sector agencies:    “At times the technology levels are so high in your country, EPA, DWI, Ofwat –  the  coordination  is perfect.   Over here,  the environmental  agency has no 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idea what  is  happening with  the water  sector  –  it makes  information  flow very difficult.”  (PURC representative, 2009)   The  impact  of  financial  constraints  on  the  capacity  of  the  regulator  to perform  intended  functions  is  thus  significant.   While  the Urban Water Project includes  support  for  institutional  capacity  building,  the  financial  support allocated to the regulator does not match the shortfall experienced.  US$900,000 is  allocated  to  the  PURC  for  the  period  of  the  UWP,  five  years  (World  Bank, 2004b).   At  the end of  the  first  full  year of operation,  the Ghanaian  cedi  (GH¢) exchanged  at  approximately  0.93  to  the  US$  (July  2007,  following redenomination of the cedi), with this rate at approximately 1.43 after four years of operation (July 2010) (Bank of Ghana, 2010).  Considering the 42.7% shortfall in Government funding in 2007 (PURC, 2007) – GH¢768,000 – the proportional allocation  of  UWP  funding  would  fail  to  provide  the  regulator  with  sufficient funding  for  its  functioning;  considering  the performance of  the  cedi  relative  to the US$, this is increasingly unlikely as the programme progresses.   In practice, the  PURC  in  2007  acquired  further  funding  from  other  unspecified  donor agencies  which  aided  the  balancing  of  the  national  shortfall  (PURC,  2007), though  this  is  a  precarious  and  unreliable  means  by  which  to  operate  a regulatory agency: donor funding in 2005 showed a reduction of approximately 85% from the preceding year (PURC, 2005d).      Just  as  the  technical,  financial  and  human  resources  capacity  of  the regulator  is  constrained,  the  same  is  true  for  the  state  holding  company.    The operation  of  the  latter  in  its  role  administering  the  contract  with  the  private sector is affected by similar constraints, in particular deriving from altered roles in the company.  Whereas previously the company operated as service provider, its new role as administrator and asset holder makes different requirements of the organisation:   “GWCL has  to  face major changes  in  its core business and position  itself  to adapt to the needed changes required by new demands and responsibilities entrusted to it.   The planned changes will rely heavily on GWCL developing capacity  for  dealing  with  the  flow  of  information  within  and  outside  the organisation.    The  ability  to  deal  effectively  and  efficiently  with  such information  will  be  a  major  factor  in  enabling  GWCL  successfully  play  its new  role  of  a  sector  developer, monitor  and  assets manager.    GWCL must acquire  capacity  to  collect  accurately,  speedily  and  cost  effectively  large amount  of  data  and  process  it  quickly  to  track  performance  in  the  areas ceded  to  the  operator  and  other  segments  of  the  urban  water  sector.”  (GWCL, 2006a: 46)  The modified operation of GWCL and associated requirements are located within the  conditions  experienced  by  the  company,  characterised,  similar  to  the regulator,  by  shortfalls  in  financing,  technical  capacity  and  human  resources.  GWCL  recognises  that  “in  addition  to  catering  for  sector  wide  financial monitoring  issues,  GWCL  needs  to  sustain  its  own  viability  through  sound financial  structures  and  effective  financial  management”,  and  therefore  “the continuous declining financial health of the company has part of its source from 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poor financial data capturing and reporting” (GWCL, 2006a: 23).   The condition of  the  company  derives  therefore  not  only  from  issues  associated  with  low investment  levels  and  increasing  demands  on  its  services,  but  also  from  poor internal performance particularly regarding financial management.  A review of the capacity of GWCL at the initial stage of PSP notes the company’s weaknesses:   “Poor management practices as per best practices; poor MIS  [management information  services]  and  other  logistics;  low  performance  standards relative  to  best  practice  in  developing  world,  especially  in  staff  numbers; poor  staff  and  skills  development  in  financial  monitoring  generally;  poor remuneration of staff in general; inability to attract and retain high calibre of staff in general and especially in ICT, accounting and finance, and chemistry; poor and limited skills development in ICT, monitoring and evaluation, and consumer education.”  (GWCL, 2006a: 7)  This  inadequate  capacity  in  various  aspects  of  GWCL  can  only  be  assumed  to have  a  similar  negative  effect  on  the  operations  of  the  company  as  those conditions have in the operation of the regulator.   The paucity of data available from GWCL permits little analysis of their operations and capacity to undertake revised  functions  through  the  period  of  PSP.    The  very  fact  that  no  Annual Reports or financial data has been made available from the company from 2004 onwards is perhaps a reflection of their capacity to administer service provision as a state holding company.    The  same  factors which  inhibit  the  capacity  of  the  regulator  and GWCL are  similarly  noted  with  regard  to  sector  ministries.    Where  previously  civil service  occupation  had  a  degree  of  prestige  and  commensurate  salaries  and privileges, it has been the case in Ghana that such roles no longer have associated benefits (PUWU representative, 2009; WD Consultant, 2009).  Remuneration has not  kept  pace  with  that  available  in  the  private  sector,  nor  even  with  that  of sector institutions outside the ministries, such as the regulator or state company.  Furthermore,  perks  associated  with  civil  service  occupation  is  no  longer appealing, due to, for example, the state of repair of housing which is attaché to certain roles (the consideration of a Water Directorate Consultant):   “… the thing is here with the sector institutions, the salaries are much higher than in the public sector itself.  For example, if you take an engineer at GWCL or CWSA, their salary would be three times higher than an engineer if he was working  in  the  Ministry  itself.    It  creates  a  kind  of  a  problem  for  the Ministries, because they cannot recruit anybody, they can only recruit people who are newly educated, because as soon as they have been there for a little while  and  they  think  that  they  are  better  they will  try  to  get  another  job.  Three  times  is  a  lot  of  difference,  so  an  engineer  here  in  this Ministry  for example is getting between $150 and $200 a month – you can’t live on that, especially if you have a family, you can’t.”  (WD Consultant, 2009) 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Summary  The  capacity of  institutions,  in  technical,  financial  and human  resources  terms, inevitably  determines  the  environment within which  a  PSP  contract  functions.  In the case of Ghana it has been illustrated here that agencies which provide this institutional  environment  for PSP  typically  experience deficits  in  these  various aspects of  their operation.   The consequences of  these shortfalls may be  in  the form of the diminished ability to monitor the service provider, in the case of the regulator, or the  incapacity to administer the financial management PSP, which in the case of GWCL would include the monitoring of revenue transfers etc. from the operator.  Such institutional capacity providing a framework is necessary for the  functioning  of  contracts,  for  example  in  the  ability  to  regulate  a  company operating  in  a  sector  characterised  by  natural  monopoly.    The  potential consequences  of  deficit  in  capacity  in  the  case  of  Ghana  demonstrates  the significance of the institutional environment for the operation of PSP contracts, significance  which  is  of  course  notably  absent  in  the  theoretical  rationale  for privatisation.    
  The failure to ensure the requisite capacity for the administration of PSP is  a  significant  limitation  in  the  implementation  of  the  PSP  programme.    The intention  to  establish  an  independently  operating  private  sector,  free  from interference from the public sector and government, is paralleled by a failure to consider  the  continued  relevance  and  importance  of  this  institutional environment in the water sector in developing countries.  This is coherent with, and may be derived, from the underlying theoretical rationale, a negative view of the capacity and nature of each of the public sector.  Universal service provision, also  contradictory  to  the  theoretical  framework,  is not  considered at  this basic level.    Thus  regulation  as  an  essential  counterpart  to  PSP  in  the  water  sector appears  to  have  been  overlooked,  with  functioning  of  the  agency  restricted.  Information  asymmetry  in  the  operations  of  the  service  provider  entails  the necessary monitoring to ensure performance and contractual compliance, where this is problematic, inherent transaction costs are increased.  The relation of this evidence to the rationalising theory will be taken up in greater detail in chapter eight.   
 
 
6.5  Data reporting  The  adequate  transfer  of  data  between  operator  and  grantor,  and  grantor  and regulator, is necessary for the functioning of PSP as intended, for the monitoring and regulation of the private company active in a monopoly sector.  In the case of Ghana,  it  is  intended,  through  the structuring of  the contract as being between grantor  and operator,  that  the private operator has no  formal  interaction with any  other  sector  institutions.    Regulation,  therefore,  is  of  the  grantor  and  only indirectly the private company (PURC representative, 2009).   The state holding company  is  further subject  to performance contracts administered by the State Enterprise commission, and the private company subject to auditing performed by the technical auditor of the contract.  The operation of PSP may therefore be 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impacted  upon  where  data  reporting  in  these  various  relationships  is inadequate.   In  the  case  of  Ghana,  the  management  contract  requires  for  periodic reporting on the part of the private operator to the grantor.   It further requires for  information  to  be  made  available  to  the  technical  auditor  where  this  is necessary:  “SCHEDULE 3: PERIODIC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  A.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RECORDING AND REPORTING  […] (b) The Operator shall submit such reports as requested from time to time by  the  Grantor.  As  a  minimum  the  following  routine  reports  shall  be submitted to the Grantor: Title  Frequency Annual  reports  including  audited accounts Collection and costs summary Market surveys Suggested  capital  investment reports 
Annually  Quarterly Annually Annually […] (b)  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Operator  to  co‐operate  with  Technical  and Financial  Auditors  and  to  provide  them with  all  such  information  as  they may reasonably require for the purpose of carrying out any investigation.” (GWCL, 2005: 35)  The frequency of data transfer is thus established in the contract, there remains however  the  potential  for  flexibility  on  the  part  of  the  operator  within  this regime.  In particular, the consequences of delayed or non‐submission of data are not considered in the contract.  This eventuality is recognised in a state holding company consultant’s review of the contract when in its initial stages:   “…   no penalty  is given  for  times when  the operator either  fails  to provide information  required  or  provides  it  beyond  the  time  required  or inadequately provides it.  Literature on best practice indicates that one of the factors cited for the failure of PPP in Conakry, Guinea is the consistent failure of the operator to provide the public regulator with the required information on timely basis.  One of the reasons given for the success of PPP in Senegal is the stringent penalty applied for failure to report regularly and meet agreed performance targets.  There are lessons for Ghana.  In the current case where there  is  no  penalty  for  non‐submission  of  reports  of  late  submission  of reports, the consultant recommends that the matter be raised with the PURC and  it  is  agreed  between  the  parties  that  all  routine  information  (which should be mutually defined) should be put on line and made accessible to the grantor  within  24  hours  of  its  availability  within  the  operator’s organisation.”  (GWCL, 2006b: 48) 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The ambiguity of the contract with respect to data reporting is thus recognised in early  stages of  the PSP programme.    It  is  further  recognised here  the potential consequences  for  the  ability  of  the  regulator  to  monitor  the  activity  and performance of the private company – which would be indirectly through GWCL in  the  case  of  Ghana.    In  addition  to  the  potential  impact  on  the  regulatory function,  the  impact  on  the  ability  of  the  state  company  itself  to  undertake  its own responsibilities, vis‐à‐vis its own monitoring agencies, is recognised:  “Critical success factors and project risks: […] 5.  Though under the contract no penalty is attached to non‐reporting by the operator  as  the  contract  does  not  provide  for  it,  and  understanding  of  the imperative of monitoring reports must be worked out to enable GWCL meet its monitoring mandate  to other  stakeholders  such as GoG  [Government of Ghana],  SEC  [State Enterprise Commission],  and PURC,  among others.   Can GWCL that has a timeline to meet under its Performance Contract to report to the SEC or PURC, plead successfully that the operator has failed to report at all or on some given items or not timely enough?  This issue must be dealt with early.”  (GWCL, 2006b: 2)    Data  transfer  from  the  operator  to  the  grantor  is  thus  recognised  as  a matter  which  may  have  repercussions  for  the  operation  of  the  contract  as intended.  In practice, due to the scarcity of information available from the state company, the degree to which the operator has complied with the requirements regarding reporting of data is not clear.   Nor is  it possible to ascertain whether the  operator  has  taken  advantage  of  the  ambiguity  of  the  contract  in  terms  of penalties for late or non‐submission.  It is possible however, utilising the report of  the  technical  auditor  following  the  first  year  of  the  contract,  to  get  an indication  of  the  data  transfer  relationship  between  grantor  and  operator. Subsequent to a ‘workshop’ held between the parties, which provides a basis for some of the auditor’s report, the following are noted as ‘problems’ in the contract to date:   “Difficulties  in  communication  between  parties;  slowness  in  application  of national  procurement  procedures;  problems  with  interpretation  of  the management contract; delays in report submission by GWCL; long lead time in  grantor’s  decisions;  lack  of  information  to  operator  on  new  planned infrastructure.”  (Fichtner, 2007: 3‐1)  Subsequently, the following improvements are suggested:  “GWCL  submits  all  reports  on  time;  operator  submits  all  reports  on  time; format  for  reporting  agreed  and  also  implemented;  good  communication between partners (regular, beneficial to both, quality information on time).”  (Fichtner, 2007: 3‐2)  The  requirement  for  sufficient  information  flow  between  parties  is  thus established, and this highlights a further oversight in the contract for PSP.   The potential for the restricted information flow from grantor to operator, necessary 
  127 
for the operator to plan for future service provision, to inhibit the performance of the private company is acknowledged here, but absent from contractual terms.      Regarding data flow to the regulator, necessary for the monitoring of the performance  of  service  provision,  it  is  intended  that  the  grantor  provides information directly to PURC.  In practice however, this is only one aspect of data flow  to  the  regulator.    In  performing  its  role  in  tariff‐setting,  PURC  requires verified  data  from  GWCL.    However,  in  terms  of  day‐to‐day  monitoring  of operations,  PURC  in  fact  receives  data  directly  from  AVRL:  “The  information from  AVRL,  we  get  it  on  the  blind  side,  because  the  information  should  go  to GWCL,  […] we get monthly reports  from AVRL,  for our own operations”  (PURC representative,  2009).    The  direct  relationship  established  here  between regulator  and  operator,  outside  that  envisaged  in  the  contracted  relationships, aids day‐to‐day functioning of the PURC:   “So we requested, now we are of  the  technology age, you can copy what  is sent  to  GWCL.    So  we  get  copies  of  those  reports  here,  just  for  our information and maybe if there are some issues we can take it up with them.  We  get monthly  reports,  then  if  there  are  special  situation  reports, we  get them. […]   We have about 82/85 water systems, there  is a system which is three parts – at times they can count it as one, at times they can count it as three.   …   Out of  these 82 water  systems, about 4 of  them gives you about 80%  of  production  of  GWCL.    Accra  is  one,  this  is  one  system  which  we request for daily situation reports, which gives you an idea of the production levels,  various  problems  in  the  system,  which  enables  us  to  respond  to consumer issues.  For example if there is a plant break down, because of that water  is  not  being  produced,  and  because  of  that  water  flow  has  been interrupted somewhere – from the daily situation reports you have an idea.  Then  from  the  regulatory point of  view, we can  respond adequately  to  the consumer  concerns.    So  we  get  daily  situation  report  through  electronic means.”  (PURC representative, 2009)  It  is  further  suggested by  the  regulator  that  disputes  between  the  grantor  and operator  regarding data contributes  to delays  in  submission of verified data  to the  PURC  (ibid.).    To  what  degree  this  derives  from  the  non‐establishment  of baseline  data  for  performance  evaluation,  from  the  sub‐standard  facilities  and metering present in the sector, or from the lack of capacity within the grantor to administer the contract – issues described above – is not clear.      It  should  also  be  noted  that  evidence  in  Ghana  suggests  that  the operations  of  the  private  company  have  included  the  development  of  public relations  strategies which modify  the  relation  of  the  service  provider with  the public  and  other  NGOs  and  community  groups.    Evidence  from  these  groups suggests  public  relations  strategies  are  different  from  those  of  the  state company,  with  the  latter  typically  having  conducted  operations  in  a  closed manner, with  little data  released or  interaction with  the broader public  (NCAP representative,  2009;  CONIWAS  representative,  2009).    As  has  been  noted  in section 6.1 above, data produced by GWCL has  typically not been made public, even where required in the form of annual reports, and this is coherent with the 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more  general  strategy  of  public  information  being  regarded  as  private  (ibid.).  Contrary to this, AVRL has engaged with NGOs in demonstrating the changes to be  introduced by the private sector.   This has  included new data measurement (GPS  technology),  new  training  for  staff,  new  flexibility  of  interaction  with customers,  and  new  modes  of  service  provision  in  peri‐urban  areas  (NCAP representative,  2009;  CONIWAS  representative,  2009;  AVRL,  2009b/c/d/e).  While  this  interaction  is  welcomed  by  NGOs  in  the  water  sector  (CONIWAS, 2009),  it  is  also  true  that  this  interaction  is  part  of  a  means  of  improving perceptions of the private sector.  This is apparent in certain press reports where the operator associates  the activities of a separate charitable organisation with those of the private sector:   “Mr Martey  [Communications Manager  of  AVRL]  said  it was  important  for the  public  and  the  critics  of  AVRL  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  the  final decision on major investments in the urban water sector rested solely with the GWCL Entity Board.  He added that it was therefore improper for critics to hold AVRL responsible for ‘not doing anything to improve the urban water supply system’.  Mr Martey, however, noted that even though AVRL was not required to do so, the company had undertaken some major non‐contractual capital  works  using  some  of  its  own  operational  funds  from  revenue collected  and  from  a  Dutch  charitable  fund.  […]    ‘We  have  also  delivered Water  for  Life  Charitable  Foundation projects  serving  some 48,000 people across  the  country  and  have  also  strategically  placed  'Polytanks'  by  the roadside in deprived areas to serve some 10,000 people.’”   (Modern Ghana, 2009b)  
Summary  The  issues noted here  regarding data  reporting and  transfer between agencies within  the  water  sector  in  Ghana  demonstrate  the  potential  impact  of inadequacies in this area on the capacity to monitor and evaluate PSP contracts.  Ambiguity in the PSP contract in Ghana has contributed to the deficiency in data transfer  between  agencies,  and  this  has  been  compounded  by  the  absence  of penalties  for  late  or  non‐submission  of  data.    Capacity  of  institutions, whether technical, financial or in human resources terms, together with other contractual shortcomings  such  as  the  non‐establishment  of  baseline  data,  has  no  doubt contributed to delays in data transfer.  This is particularly so with respect to the grantor,  where  delays  in  data  reporting  force  workarounds  to  be  established between operator and regulator.  It is notable therefore that where contracts are not  complete,  with  ambiguity  of  terms,  or  absence  of  penalties,  there  is potentially  negative  impact  on  the performance of  privatisation  as  anticipated.  Furthermore, where data reporting and transfer is insufficient, the potential for institutions to enforce contractual terms, or regulate operators, is undermined.      The particular structuring of the PSP in Ghana appears to accentuate such problems in the implementation of the programme.   The indirect and mediated relationship  between  regulator  and  service  provider  contradict  the  intended means  of  operation.    Together  with  the  problems  of  capacity  seen  in  sector institutions,  the  structuring  of  the  programme  in  Ghana  undermines  the 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potential  for  the  functioning  of  the  regulator  –  with  repercussions  for  the effecting  of  monitoring  and  improved  performance  as  intended  through  the regulation  system  in  the  water  system.    In  addition,  the  structuring  of  the programme in Ghana entails  further substantiation of aspects of critique of  the theoretical  framework:  residual  rights  of  control  are  further  assigned  to  the private  operator;  monitoring  is  problematic  and  obfuscated,  increasing transaction costs; multiple principals are  incorporated  in  implementation;  and, information  asymmetry  is  critical  in  the  execution  of  the  programme  in  these various respects.     
Conclusion and discussion  It has been the intention of this chapter to outline the technical factors present in the  programme  of  privatisation  in  Ghana  that  contribute  to  the  divergence  in operation and performance  from that envisaged  in  the  theoretical  rationale  for the programme.  While this performance is not extreme relative to other cases of privatisation,  it  is consistent with the trend for divergence from that proposed, with  the  private  sector  returning  performance  to  levels  achieved  previously under  the  state  provider.    Beyond  quantifiable  performance  change,  what  is more important  in the determination of the implementation of the programme, and  the  divergence  from  performance  and  operation  as  proposed,  is  the incidence of dispute and renegotiation, a trend with which the Ghanaian case is further consistent.     It has been maintained here that  there are various  factors of a  technical nature  which  contribute  to  this  characteristic  divergence  in  performance  and operation.  Most significantly these include those factors relating to baseline data and  control  by  the  operator  of  revenue  accounts.    The  failure  to  establish baseline data before implementation derives from the condition of the facilities of the service provider, a fact acknowledged by those authoring the contract.  It is  further  acknowledged  that  the  potential  to  establish  complete  baseline  data ex‐post is unlikely, for the same reasons, with the contract therefore essentially reduced  in  scope  from  the  start.    An  incomplete  contract  was  therefore recognised,  as  was  the  inevitability  of  continued  influence  of  incomplete  and asymmetric  information.    Regarding  revenue  accounts  and  RRR  funding,  this aspect  of  the  project  was  intended  to  offer  financial  independence  to  the operator.    In practice,  the result has been that  the company has been provided with an avenue by which they can operate inefficiently, to the cost of the grantor and ultimately the consumer.  Without stringent contract terms and without the means by which to control the activity of the company, this situation has led to the  reduction  of  revenue  accruing  to  the  grantor.    Furthermore,  where  the operator  has  been  allowed  the  freedom  to  determine  ‘snag  items’  in  service provision, it has in effect been given reign to determine the scope of the contract, eliminating those items considered problematical.  These factors combine with a shortfall  in  the  capacity  of  sector  institutions  to  administer  and  regulate  the contract,  and  issues  relating  to  data  transfer  and  reporting  which  negatively affect the efficiency of operation in a natural monopoly environment.    
  130 




Extra­economic  and  institutional  factors  affecting  the  performance  and 
operation of PSP in Ghana   In addition to those technical factors outlined in the preceding chapter, there are further factors of a social, political and institutional nature that contribute to the divergence  of  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed  within  the rationalising  theory.    In part  these derive  from  those  technical  factors,  such as ambiguity  in  the  PSP  contract,  which  have  subsequent  repercussions  where contract  partners  are  required  to  cooperate.    In  addition,  there  are  broader social,  political  and  institutional  factors,  historically  specific  and  dependent, which determine the environment within which PSP operates.  Such factors thus determine  the  local  interpretation  and  adaptation  of  the  PSP  programme,  and subsequently  the  performance  and  operation  of  the  contract  within  this environment.    This  chapter  considers  these  various  factors,  with  a  special emphasis  on  their  import  in  the  case  of  Ghana,  and  its  ‘hybrid’  form  of management contract.      As  with  any  management  contract,  that  implemented  in  Ghana determines  the  continued  existence  and  operation  of  two  parties:  the  private operator  responsible  ostensibly  for  the management  of  services;  and  the  state holding company, responsible for  investment, ownership, expansion of services and  so  on.    It  is  thus  necessary  for  these  two  parties  to  having  a  working relationship  through  the  period  of  private  operation,  with  terms  of  this relationship determined by contract.   Where contracts are incomplete however, and this has been shown in chapter six to be significant for the case of Ghana, the terms  of  interaction  between  contract  parties  are  ambiguous  with  potential implications  for  the  performance  and  operation  of  the  contract.    The establishment of a ‘hybrid’ form of contract further impacts on performance and operation,  with  an  exaggeration  of  the  import  of  the  grantor‐operator relationship, with further  implications  in terms of  the operations of  the private sector where working within the public sector framework (seen in, for example the  staffing  arrangements).    Beyond  these  extra‐economic  features manifest  in relationships  and  organisational  structures,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the environment  in  which  the  PSP  contract  operates,  and  the  historically  derived modes  of  institutional  organisation  and  governance  which  provide  a  defining dynamic.    Contractual  performance  and  operation  depends  on  the  assumed existence  of  a  coherent  institutional  environment,  in  terms  of,  for  example, procurement  procedures,  appointments  and  staffing,  and  a  culture  of commercial  operation.    Historically  conditioned  attitudes,  approaches,  and organisational  culture  contribute  to  the  performance  and  operation  of  the contract, and provide a force for the  local reception and mutation of attempted institutional reforms.    This  chapter  considers,  firstly,  the particular  form of  implementation  of PSP in Ghana, the necessary consultation between parties, the associated import of  working  relationship  and  the  extra‐economic  factors  which  determine  the 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nature of relationship established.  Secondly, the operation of the private sector within  the  public  sector  framework  is  described,  with  purported  inherent efficiency  being  inhibited  by  problematic  implementation  and  the  continued relevance of  the public  sector.    Finally,  the  chapter  considers  the nature of  the programme as  implemented with reference to  the broader PSP agenda and the developments  and  trends  therein.    It  is  described  here  the  coherence  of  the Ghanaian PSP programme with  those  others  previously  established  elsewhere, and  reform  programmes  associated  with  such  PSP  programmes:  PSP  in  the water  sector  in  Ghana  demonstrates  a  maintained  coherence  with  underlying economic  theory,  with,  typically,  rhetorical  commitment  to  revised  sponsor approaches  incorporating  greater  consideration  of  institutional  relevance.    A concluding  discussion  indicates  connections  between  the  findings  described  in the  chapter,  and  the  critique  of  the  underlying  theoretical  rationale  for  the privatisation  programme  (to  be  taken  up  in  greater  detail  in  the  following chapter).   
7.1  Extra­economic  determinants  and  the  particular  form  of  PSP:  the 
grantor­operator relationship  It  is  noted  in  chapter  two  that where  the  theoretical  framework  underpinning privatisation  fails  to  consider  incomplete  information,  and  subsequently contracts,  there  may  be  significant  implications  in  terms  of  the  relevance  of extra‐economic  factors  in  the  determination  of  those  areas  of  activity  not comprised within these contractual terms.   It has further been demonstrated in the  preceding  chapter  that,  in  the  case  of  Ghana,  there  are  various  instances where such deficiencies are evident.  It is the purpose of this section to consider the  operation  of  PSP  where  this  is  the  case  –  here  in  terms  of  the  grantor‐operator relationship, and the import of extra‐economic factors in resolution of factors not determined ex‐ante.  The focus of this section is, furthermore, on the particular mode of implementation in Ghana and the exaggeration of the import of these extra‐economic factors in determining operation and performance.  
Factors contributing to the nature of grantor­operator relationship  The PSP contract in the Ghanaian water sector has been designed in such a way so as  to allow the operator  to execute  their contracted responsibilities without undue intervention or delay on the part of the grantor.   Through the process of the development of  the management  in Ghana,  the potential  for  the grantor  to impinge the capacity of the operator to meet contracted targets was recognised.  For  example, World Bank  representatives  note  the  importance  of  allowing  the operator  the  various  functions  of  service  provision  to  be  free  from  undue intervention, and  thus allow the assessment of performance against contracted targets:   “Now, because of this hybrid we have that lease where you have more or less given  you  systems,  your  operations,  you  have  seconded  your  staff  and everything  to  them.    So  at  some  point  it  was  felt  that,  when  we  were discussing  these  things,  it  was  felt  that,  since  they  have  this  management 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contract  lease  the  two should be signatory.   Now,  they began to  think that, what  about,  if  for  some  reason  there  is  some  kind  of  strife  or  some misunderstanding  and  GWCL  says  that  ‘look  for  this  one  I’m  not  going  to sign’  or  there’s  a  delay,  [and]  that  delay  in  signing  is  going  to  affect  the operator.    But  here  you  have  given  him  targets,  you  have  given  him everything to operate, so give him a free hand to be able to operate so that he doesn’t have cause to complain that because of this. […]  So the contract was  couched  in  this  manner  so  that  as  much  as  possible  each  will  work independently…”  (World Bank representative, 2009)  In  reality  however,  as  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  ‘hybrid’  contract implemented  in  Ghana  establishes  various  additional  factors  which  provide  a basis for dispute between the contract parties.  Where the contract allows for the administration of revenue collection and expenditure by the operator, combined with the problematic utilisation of RRR funding, there are grounds for potential dispute  between  parties.    Evidence  indicates  that  the  degree  of  transfer  of revenue to the grantor,  intended to improve sustainability and provide funding for investment, has been limited.  This provides one aspect of the contract which contributes to dispute between the parties:   “GWCL’s  case  is  different,  there  is  the  operator  and  the  grantor.    The operator has  to do certain  things  in consultation with  the grantor who has been  described  as  inefficient.    The  grantor  has  no  access  to  revenue,  any money apart from what has been stipulated in the contract as coming back from AVRL after he has collected all the monies.  Because AVRL is in charge of revenue and the grantor is in charge of expansions and developments and all  these  things,  still  from  the  revenue.    Now,  if  AVRL  decides  to  do  other things with  the revenue  to  justify why there are no excesses.  […]   So  these are the knotty things in the contract that are creating the problem.  There is always tension between AVRL and GWCL. […]  There is a range of payments that have been listed as to what they have to transfer to GWCL in relation to each  one,  its  been  stated  in  the  contract.    Then  later  on  there  are  some differences  also  to  be  passed  over  to  GWCL.    But  how  do  you  create  the difference after paying  the statutory ones?   AVRL could redirect  it  to other areas, AVRL could say that operationally they have not been able to make up a difference.   And that can create some conflict between GWCL and AVRL.”  (PUWU representative, 2009)    Further aspects of the contract intended to provide the private company with the independence to operate services without intervention or delay provide additional  grounds  for dispute between parties,  and  subsequent breakdown  in their  working  relationship.    For  example,  the  existence  of  the  facility  for  the operator to identify ‘snag items’, which are effectively removed from the scope of the contract on the agreement of the contract auditor, entails the attempt at such by  the  private  company  (GWCL,  2005;  Fichtner,  2007).    The  non‐specific information provided to the auditor on the snag items identified by the operator substantiates  criticism  from  the  auditor,  and  further  provides  grounds  for  the subsequent  failure  in  cooperation  between  parties.    The  assessment  by  the technical  auditor  in  2007  provides  further  evidence  that  the  ambiguity  in  the 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contract,  relating  to  information  transfer,  contributes  to  the  poor  working relationship of the parties:   “At  the  beginning  of  the  mission  the  Technical  Auditor  could  state  that between  the  Grantor  and  the  Operator  there  was  a  certain  degree  of aloofness,  mainly  caused  by  a  lack  of  communication.    The  information presented by both sides did not meet the requirements for taking evidence in  order  to  proceed  to  the  certification  of  baselines  and  snag  items.”  (Fichtner, 2007: 3‐1)  In relation to this, the failure to establish baseline data is a continuing obstacle to the  operation  of  the  contract  as  intended.    With  levels  of  non‐revenue  water being a significant issue in service provision in Ghana, the lack of baseline data in relation to this factor is particularly noteworthy:   “NRW issue – they have been arguing about it for the past three years, why is that? …   Amount of water produced  is estimation, amount of water sent  to distribution  is  an  estimation,  billing  is  estimation,  and  there  is  so  much argument about that.”  (PURC representative, 2009)   “One of the things they have big problems with, what they call snag items, is about  the  information  on  baseline  data  –  its  very  contentious,  and  issues about how  to even measure  the performance of AVRL –  it’s  a  crisis  thing.”  (NCAP representative, 2009)  Indeed,  the  obstacle  of  baseline  data  continued  to  be  relevant  in  2009,  three years  into  the  five  year  contract.    The  failure  to  establish  data,  and  the subsequent  contribution  of  this  factor  to  the  contentious  relationship between parties, has been the subject of government review in 2009 (GWCL, 2009).    The  contract,  and weaknesses  and  deficiencies  therein,  thus  provides  a basis for potential dispute between parties and determines the import of extra‐economic  factors  in  the operation and performance of PSP.    It  should be noted here  that  the  relationship  between  parties may  be  further  conditioned  by  the development of the PSP programme in the country.  As described in chapter five, the  development  of  PSP  in  the  country  extended  from  1998  through  to  the eventual institution of the contract in 2006.  A central component of the rationale for the introduction of the private sector in the water sector was the inefficiency of  the  state  company  in  operating  services,  as  coherent  with  the  rationalising theory.  This is true, for example, in relation to the levels of non‐revenue water, collection  rates,  and other  factors which  contribute  to  the  sustainability  of  the operation  of  the  service  provider  (World Bank  representative,  2009).    Thus  in addition  for  the  need  to  increase  investment  in  infrastructure,  there  was  a purported requirement  for  the reform of  the service provider  itself  in  terms of the  mode  of  operation  implemented.    The  Urban  Water  Project  takes  into account  these  aspects  in  the  investment  programme  to  be  established  using World Bank funding, but also in the introduction of the private sector as service operator  for  the  improved,  commercial,  operation  of  provision  (World  Bank, 2004a). 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 It  is apparent through this period of PSP development however, that the state  company  took  a  contrary  view,  and  indicated  that  the  purported inefficiency  of  operation  in  fact  derives  from  the  underlying  condition  of  the infrastructure which provision relies upon.   This is indicated in the response of the state company to the assessment by the regulator of the utility in the period 1998‐2003.  Comparison with potential performance of a future private operator would, according to the state company, be misleading considering the condition of infrastructure available:   “Reducing  water  losses  (technical  and  commercial)  to  25%  of  water produced  has  never  been  a  target  set  for  GWCL  in  view  of  the  age  of  the infrastructure. With  the existing  infrastructure, GWCL’s  target has been set to  progressively  reach  40%  in  2003  as  evidenced  by  the  Performance Contracts signed with SEC over the years.  The 25% target was set for a new operator to attain after being in operation for five years after the infusion of capital for replacement of old infrastructure.  The urban water project due to commence in 2005 clearly spells this out.”  (PURC, 2005a: 21)  Similarly,  improvements  in  production  are  undermined  by  poor  infrastructure downstream:   “Volume of water produced increased by 11.8% but water sold remained at best  static.    From  reports,  water  production  varied  inversely  with  water sales  simply  because  of  the  aged  infrastructure.    With  weak  transmission mains, any  increase  in pressure resulting  from  increased water production ended up with more pipe bursts.  That was exactly what happened after the completion  of  the  Weija  expansion  in  late  2001.    The  issue  was  more prevalent in 2002 when with a water production of 204.6 mm3, water sales recorded 85.08mm3.  This phenomenon was in fact reported to PURC.  This is why  the  replacement of old and weak mains and  rehabilitation of water supply  systems  are  a major  component  of  the  urban water  project  due  to commence with an injection of $103m over a five year period starting from 2005.”  (PURC, 2005a: 22)  Performance of service provision was thus considered by the state company to be significantly due to the condition of infrastructure available.    Of  course,  the  finance  to  be  provided  for  the  improvement  of infrastructure  by  the  programme  sponsor,  the  World  Bank,  is  linked  to  the introduction of the private sector as the means to reform purported inefficiency in  operation.    Thus,  where  infrastructure  financing  is  required,  there  is  an associated  validation  of  the  private  sector  as  counterpart  solution.    The judgement expressed by the state company is consequently a counterpoint to the characterisation  of  the  company  as  inherently  inefficient  and  incapable,  a characterisation utilised in the rationalisation of PSP introduction (World Bank, 2004a),  rather expressing  the concern  that  the necessary  intervention  is  in  the form  of  infrastructure  investment  to  reach  performance  targets  deemed necessary: 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 “Because  for  the  government  to  justify  the  need  for  an  operator,  they demonised the GWCL management as ineffective, and make it  look like it  is they who are responsible for all the shortcomings of the company to justify why  you  should  get  your  funding  and  bring  in  a  new  operator.”  (PUWU representative, 2009)   “There was  no  need  to  categorically  state  that,  but  if  you  have  a  group  of people managing an enterprise, managers  in a particular situation, and say ‘hey I think I need someone else to do it better, it means that it’s a vote of no confidence […].  So although it was not stated in so many terms, that’s what it meant.”  (MP, 2009)  Thus  considering  the  necessary  introduction  of  the  private  sector,  this characterisation of the public sector was emphasised in contrast to the concern for  the  importance of  investment by  the  state  company.   The differentiation  in emphasis  for  sector  reform,  for  the  sponsors  efficiency,  and  for  the  state company  investment,  provides  an  underlying  determinant  of  the  nature  of relationship ex‐post.  
Consequences of  failed cooperation for the performance and operation of the PSP 




• The removal of Challenges within  the contract was  the main  focus of a review  (MTR) by Government – 5‐6 Aug. 2009.”   (GWCL, 2009: 28)  This  admission  by  the  grantor,  combined  with  evidence  from  others  in  the sector, suggests the continuation of the problematic relationship.     Indeed this is confirmed by press reports of interaction between contract parties in 2009.   With performance of the PSP programme being scrutinised by politicians,  NGOs  and  community  groups  (e.g.  Boakye,  2008;  Daabu,  2009; ISODEC  representative,  2009;  NCAP  representative,  2009),  resolution  of  these various issues was the focus of the 2009 review.  The grantor considers there to be  ‘bottlenecks’  to  be  removed  from  the  contract,  with  ‘distortions’  to  be ‘streamlined’ (Daabu, 2009).  The grantor and operator are equally aware of the potential harm resulting from negligible change in performance through the PSP programme.    Each  party  has  sought  to  shift  responsibility  to  the  other,  citing investment  responsibilities  and  failure  to  improve management  as  underlying causes:   “[Mr  Martey,  communications  manager  of  AVRL]  told  the  Ghana  News Agency  in Accra  that AVRL was  enjoined,  basically,  to manage  the  existing urban water treatment plants more efficiently and make it more financially viable  by  reducing  non‐revenue  water  by  25  per  cent  over  the  five‐year contract  period.    He  said  the  procurement  of  capital  equipment  and  other major  capital  investments  rested  with  Ghana  Water  Company  Limited (GWCL).  “Without any prejudice I think it is important to say that the public should  be  asking  GWCL,  instead  of  AVRL,  what  they  are  doing  about  the expansion and rehabilitation of the urban water treatment plants, since that is what will help in the production of more potable water,” Mr Martey said.  […]    He  added  that  it  was  therefore  improper  for  critics  to  hold  AVRL responsible  for  “not  doing  anything  to  improve  the  urban  water  supply system”.”  (Modern Ghana, 2009)  In seeking  to counter  this,  the grantor seeks  to emphasise  the responsibility of the  operator  in  improved  performance,  regardless  of  investment made  by  the grantor:   “Michael  Agyemang,  Public  Relations  Officer  (PRO)  of  GWCL,  also  told  the GNA that it was erroneous for AVRL to keep passing the buck to GWCL when in  fact  AVRL's  five‐year  management  contract  clearly  separated  the performance  of  AVRL  from  expansion  works  and  investments  by  GWCL.  “Section  5.1.6  of  the  management  contract  clearly  states  that  the performance  of  the  operator  (AVRL)  shall  not  be  tied  into  the  investment programme of the grantor (GWCL)”.”  (Modern Ghana, 2009)  Problematic  implementation  of  the  PSP  programme,  and  the  grantor/operator relationship  being  critical  to  this,  therefore  has  an  associated  public  relations programme  deemed  necessary  by  each  party  for  the  maintenance  of representation in the public sphere. 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 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  public  face  of  the  disharmonious relationship between grantor and operator  finds a basis  in  the  roles played by each party in the particular form of PSP established in Ghana.  This returns us to the requirement of both investment and improved operation as necessary to the improvement of performance and operation of service provision.  The division of responsibility  between  parties  provides  an  obvious  basis  upon which  residual rights of control are based, and upon which claims regarding performance may be based.  Where responsibility for each is blurred and disputable, as determined in  this case by the standard of contract, such claims become a manifestation of this  dispute.    This  process  results  in  apparent  resentment  within  the  state company, observed by various actors in the sector.  Relating to the separation of responsibilities noted above,  this may be with regard  the public perceptions of performance  of  the  programme,  and  the  derivation  of  this  from  investment  or efficiency:  “For  example,  AVRL  can make  claims  if  GWCL  does  improvements  –  they repair  a  new water  system  –  it  goes  to  the  credit  of  AVRL.    But when  the system  is  failing,  AVRL  is  quick  to  point  out  that  it  is  the  responsibility  of GWCL.    So  they  take  credit  even when  it  is  not  due  to  them  but when  its collective damage, AVRL pull out and say  this  is GWCL.   So because of  that there’s so much tension between the two [parties] and there have been two meetings  to  resolve  this,  outside  Accra,  [to  resolve  the]  crisis,  the  tension between  GWCL  as  the  grantor  and  AVRL  as  the  operator.”    (NCAP representative, 2009)   “GWCL is supposed to do the asset development, build new treatment plants, redo the networks and when they finish they hand it over to AVRL.  And who will then take the credit when the water is flowing to people?  AVRL. …  So if I want to sabotage you, I will not do the investment.”  (PURC representative, 2009)    The reality of investment in infrastructure under the Urban Water Project demonstrates  that  there  is an apparent delay  in disbursement of  such  funding.  World Bank (2009) data shows that of the $109.15m allocated to this component of  the  project,  $37.74m  has  been  disbursed  with  $71.31m  (65.3%)  remaining undisbursed.  The responsibilities of each party to the contract are subject to the effects  of  sequencing  of  implementation  of  financing  for  such  responsibilities.  While management of service provision has been affected by delays in financing –  disbursement  of  RRR  funds  –  control  of  the  revenue  account  permits  the private company to finance and maintain operations with little effect.   Contrary to this, responsibilities of the state company are affected by lost revenue stream where  this  is  negated  due  to  activity  of  the  private  operator  (chapter  six),  by delays  in  finance  disbursement  for  infrastructure,  and  by  the  inevitable  time taken to implement infrastructure improvements and consequent effects thereof.  Concerns evident on the part of the state company regarding public perceptions of the effectiveness of each contract party through the course of the programme therefore derive from this structuring of responsibilities and the likely delays in the  realisation of  improvements.   This  concern  is evident  in  the perceptions of 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the  programme  of  those  active  in  the  sector,  where,  without  investment, improvements in operation could be disputed:   “The problem as I saw it was that the management of GWCL did not totally agree with the way [PSP] actually turned out in the end, because you could see  that  they  were  not  very  eager  to  cooperate  and  they  didn’t,  it  was  a perception,  that  they  didn’t  want  it  to  be  a  success  as  they  didn’t  want anybody  else  to  prove  that  they  could  run  it when  [GWCL]  couldn’t.    That was the perception that you got, and everybody that you could ask would say it  –  of  course  not  themselves  but  others  would  say  that,  that’s  what  [the Water  Director]  would  also  tell  you.    So  you  had  this  feeling  that  the cooperation spirit was not really there…”  (WD Consultant, 2009)  It  may  be  maintained  that  the  relationship  between  parties,  and  the manifestation in concerns regarding responsibilities as noted above, is coloured by the prioritisation and sequencing of components of the Urban Water project.  Capacity  of  the  remaining  state  company  is  negatively  affected,  relative  to  the responsibilities of the private sector, by the sequencing and likely disbursement of financing through the period of the five year management contract.    
Summary  The necessary relationship of the grantor and operator, the import of which has been  increased  through  a  sub‐standard  contract  of  a  ‘hybrid’  form,  is  thus coloured  by  these  various  issues,  the  perceptions  of  each  party  and  the performance  improvements  resulting  from  divergent  responsibilities.    The antagonistic  relationship  between  the  parties,  demonstrated  in  their  contrary public  statements  regarding  performance  and  responsibility,  has  had  real consequences however in terms of the resolution of factors not finalised ex‐ante.  This  is  true  in  terms of,  significantly,  the  establishment  of  baseline data  –  that which  is  necessary  for  the  application  of  penalties  and  incentives  made necessary where the private sector is active in a monopoly setting.     It  is  further  apparent  from  the  grantor/operator  relationship  described here  that  the  PSP  programme  as  instituted  in  the  Ghanaian  case  provides  a significant  illustration  of  the  critical  nature  of  the  social  and  institutional environment  in  performance  and  operation.    Beyond  the  abstraction  of  the economic modelling underlying the rationalisation of privatisation,  it  is evident that  the market  resolution  of  water  service  provision  in  practice  incorporates significant  instances  of  incomplete  and  asymmetrical  information,  associated substantial  transaction  costs,  and  the  importance  of  the  institutional environment  in resolution.   The  intended  independent operation of  the private sector aligns with the idealised structure associated with this underlying theory: the  efficiency  of  the  private  sector  is  realisable  where  interference  of  the inherently  inefficient  public  sector  is  limited.    In  practice  what  results  in  the implementation  in  the  Ghanaian  water  sector,  with  a  foundation  in  the incomplete  and  asymmetric  information  existing  ex‐ante  and  ex‐post,  is  the increased importance of interaction of the contract parties.   Where the contract fails to incorporate all aspects of operation of the service provider, the resolution 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through  consultation  between  parties  increases  in  importance.    As  has  been demonstrated  here  this  resolution  is  inhibited  by  the  antagonistic  relationship between  parties  in  this  case:  the  implications  of  such  human  and  social interaction  are  not  considered  or  encompassed  by  the  underlying  theoretical framework.    The  transaction  costs  associated with  the  attempted  resolution of the  problems  encountered  may  be  significant:  in  the  Ghanaian  case  the resolution of problems has extended to the third year of  the  five year contract, and  required  the  intervention  of  mediating  parties  (the  auditor  and government).    These  various  aspects  of  performance  and  operation  of  water service provision in Ghana, and their connection with the underlying theoretical framework  of  privatisation  is  considered  in  greater  detail  in  the  following chapter.    
7.2  Extra­economic determinants and the particular form of PSP: private 
sector within the public framework, and constrained ‘flexibility’  Further to the implications of the grantor‐operator relationship for the operation and performance of PSP, other extra‐economic factors impinge on the purported improvements  of  the  programme.      Just  as  the  nature  of  this  relationship demonstrates  the  import  of  factors  not  incorporated within  contracts,  it  is  the purpose  of  this  section  to  consider  the  implementation  of  the  programme  and the  reorganisation  associated  with  privatisation,  and  the  import  of  modes  of organisation of the institutional environment which impinge on this process.   It will be maintained here that the failure to consider the continued and inevitable intervention of  the public  sector  in water  service provision entails  the parallel operation of different modes of organisation, not considered in the rationalising documentation  and  theory.    The  particular  mode  of  implementation,  of  a management contract, and one of a ‘hybrid’ form, exaggerates the effects of this process.   
PSP and inherent benefits of commercial operation  The  establishment  of  a  management  contract  in  the  Ghanaian  water  sector entails the emphasis on purported inherent efficiency of the private sector in the operation  of  the  service  provider.    The  parallel  inherent  characteristics  of  the public  sector  are  considered  by  those  proponents  of  the  programme  to  be inhibiting the sustainability of the service provider.  It is intended therefore that through  the  introduction  of  the  private  sector  the  mode  of  operation  of  the service  provider,  shifting  emphasis  to  commercial  operation,  and  thereby improving profitability with such improved profit being transferred to the state company  for  infrastructure  investment.    This  idealised  structuring  of management  contracts  is  thus  coherent  with  the  underlying  theoretical framework rationalising privatisation: purported inherent characteristics of the individual have diverging results where in public and private sectors – negative and positive, respectively, for total welfare.      The nature of  the public  service provider  in Ghana  is  conceptualised by programme sponsors as being oriented not  towards commercial operation but, 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firstly,  to  engineering  operations.    World  Bank  project  documents  consider necessary  a  “re‐orientation  of  the  company  to  emphasize  commercial  and managerial  expertise,  as  well  as  the  current  engineering  skills  is  required”  (World  Bank,  2004a:  1).    Thus  the  purported  inherent  characteristics  of  the individual in this context are not profit‐oriented, to the detriment of commercial sustainability.    Similarly,  the  individual  in  this  context may  further be oriented towards  activity  defined  by  political  patronage, with  capacity  being  negatively affected  by  loss  of  staff  to  outside  agencies,  and  poor  remuneration,  as  other studies note:   “Weakness  of  management  could  also  in  part  be  ascribed  to  the  fact  that many of the GWCL urban systems were headed by engineers who had little or no training  in management skills.   Some observers maintained that  they had  the habit of mixing management and  technical  issues.    In addition,  the “brain  drain”  from Ghana  has  been  posing  a  cross‐cutting  challenge which also affects the water sector.  On the one hand, well qualiﬁed staff were hard to ﬁnd in large numbers in the public services.  On the other hand, the GWCL was  labelled an overstaffed “typical state enterprise (with) underemployed employees that were recruited according to patronage principles.  There are many drivers where  there  are no  cars;  at  the pay points  you  see 8  people where one or two would be sufficient” (Opoku‐Agyemang, 2003).  According to a consultant study, 50% of GWCL‐staff were considered to be redundant by  industry  standards  (Nii  Consult,  2003).  In  general,  employees  of  GWCL were  paid  badly  and  had  little  incentives  to  repair, maintain,  or  to  obtain material  and  equipment.  There  were  no  effective  internal  sanctioning mechanisms.”  (Fuest & Haffner, 2007: 181)  The mode of operation of the public sector is seen by those within the sector as deriving from the historical development of the civil service in the country:   “Well  it  is  a  public  service,  you  see  GWCL  is  supposed  to  operate  like  a private company, owned by government.   But then, the historical evolution, pre‐ and post‐independence it was part of this ministry directly responsible to the minister, and that kind of thing.   So it had a civil service mentality, it was  then  part  of  the  public  works  department,  where  water  supply, electricity, all those things were seen as, under the public works department – the responsibility of  this ministry.   With time,  this had to change, but the change  has  not  really  engrained  in  the  system,  the  ability  to  view  your actions as providing service from the private sector point of view.   In other words you need to be efficient in delivering services.  But again, the fact that government owns [the company], also inhibits the ability of the management to take certain decisions.”  (Ministry representative, 2009)   Subsequently,  PSP  should  be  structured  in  such  a way  as  to  permit  the private sector to demonstrate efficiency to resolve such inherent problems of the public sector:   “Experience shows that utilities that can bill, collect and keep their revenues, have  their own employees (i.e.,  that are not civil  servants), can employ  the 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best  qualified  people  and  set  salary  levels  free  from  government interference,  and  that  have  the  opportunity  to  develop  their  own procurement rules will generally perform better than utilities that are under close political control or part of a large bureaucracy.  Thus, the Project seeks to  deepen  the  autonomy  of  the  GWCL  through  strengthening  of  the regulatory  framework,  lessening  its  reliance  on  subsidies  (especially  for electricity and debt service) and increasing its commercial capacity.”  (World Bank, 2004a: 6)  The World  Bank  as  sponsors  of  the  programme  recognise  the  risk  associated with the attempted reform of the service provider, in particular the reform of the ‘culture’ of the organisation:   “Risk:  GWCL  does  not  internalize  the  operational  improvements  and corporate  orientation.    Risk  mitigation  measures:  introduction  of  private operator  and  infusion  of  new  corporate  culture  including  performance‐based instruments.   Risk rating with mitigation: substantial.”   (World Bank, 2004a: 9)    The mode of operation of the service provider, and the reforms associated with the introduction of the private sector, are thus considered to be significant in the improvements to result from PSP.  It would follow therefore that the mode of implementation of PSP in Ghana should permit the private sector to alter the operation of the service provider in such a way as to demonstrate such inherent efficiency.    It  is  assumed  furthermore, both within  the  theoretical  rationale  for privatisation, and the project documentation associated with  the PSP  in Ghana, that such flexibility is inevitable where PSP is implemented.  
Particular mode of implementation: continued relevance of the public sector  Indeed through the development of PSP in Ghana, documentation shows that the programme  was  intended  to  provide  the  private  sector  with  the  flexibility considered to be necessary for commercial operation to be established.   This  is demonstrated in Government of Ghana documentation regarding the project, as well as that of the World Bank.  The following passages describe the operation of the  private  company with  regard  its  staffing  and  organisational  arrangements, thus  the organisation  that  is  considered above  to be  inhibiting  the  sustainable, commercial  operation  of  the  provider.    It  is  considered  in  these  documents, dated  2004,  that  the  private  operator  would  have  freedom  to  organise  their operations  and  staffing, with  staff  transferred  and  becoming  employees  of  the private operator:   “Staff: GWCL employees are not civil servants.  All GWCL staff will, after the Staff  Retrenchment  is  complete,  become  the  employees  of  the  Operator without  interruption  in service.   All GWCL staff will  report  to  the Operator (after  Roll  Out  in  the  region  where  they  are  assigned),  except  for  those assigned  to  the  GWCL  Headquarters  prior  to  the  Management  Contract Effective Date.  The Operator will be free to assign duties, work location and to  manage  the  staff  to  accomplish  the  objectives  of  the  Management 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Contract.    The  Operator  will  manage  the  staff  according  to  applicable Ghanaian Law and the collective bargaining agreement, including the right to hire, fire and retrench staff.”  (GoG, 2004b:)  “Operator  hires  all  employees  not  retrenched.  After  the World  Bank  (and GOG,  if  required)  financed  Staff  Retrenchment  Program  is  completed,  then the Operator can retrench workers according to the existing law and union contracts at its own expense.”  (World Bank, 2004a: 76)  It is further noted however that operation of the private sector, and the whatever modifications are to be introduced through the purported commercial operation of the provider, are subject to collective bargaining agreements established with the  relevant  union.    It  is  acknowledged  therefore  that  the  potential  for modification under the private sector is inhibited by this factor.      In  addition  to  this  inherent  obstacle  where  the  private  sector  works, under  a  management  contract,  with  staff  previously  in  the  public  sector,  the eventual  form  of  contract  exaggerates  this  factor  further.    In  reality,  the organisation and staffing of the private operator has in fact been determined by the secondment of staff from the state company – contrasting with the transfer of staff  envisaged  in  the  ex‐ante  project  documentation.    Thus,  the  contractual obligations undertaken by the state company, and associated staff expectations regarding  their  future  development  within  the  organisation,  remain  relevant under the new PSP arrangement.  In addition, however, whatever modifications to operation may be intended by the private sector, as coherent with commercial operation, they are further subject to the approval by the grantor as staff remain in  the employ of  the  latter.   Thus, while  the operator may exercise a degree of organisational freedom, they remain subject to the intervention of the grantor, to a  degree  not  anticipated  or  considered  within  the  PSP  development documentation:   “With  effect  from  the  Commencement  Date  and  subject  to  appropriate Secondment  Contracts,  all  the  employees  of  the  Grantor  listed  in  the Schedule 6 shall be seconded to the Operator, on the terms and conditions of their  current  employment  with  the  Grantor  (the  "Seconded  Staff"); notwithstanding the terms of this Management Contract, such Seconded Staff shall  remain  employees  of  the Grantor.    The  salaries  of  the  Seconded  Staff shall  be  determined  by  the  Operator  in  consultation  with  the  Grantor.  During  the  term  of  this  Management  Contract,  within  the  scope  of  the Applicable  Law  and  collective  bargaining  agreement,  the  Operator  shall assign  duties,  work  location,  manage  and  discipline  the  Seconded  Staff  to accomplish the objectives of this Management Contract.   The Operator may recommend  to  the  Grantor  the  promotion  of  any  Seconded  Staff  and  shall manage  and  update  human  resource  records  and  information  systems  as relevant.    If  the  Operator  has  reasonable  cause  to  be  dissatisfied with  the performance  of  any  Seconded  Staff  or  for  any  other  reasonable  cause,  the Operator  may  recommend  to  the  Grantor  the  suspension,  termination, and/or  retrenchment  of  such  staff.    The  Grantor  may  act  upon  any 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recommendation of the Operator, subject to Applicable Law.”  (GWCL, 2005: 18)    The practical effect of this structuring of PSP in Ghana is manifest  in the reorganisation  of  the  service  provider  proposed  by  the  private  sector.    The ‘culture’  that  is  considered  inhibitive  by  sponsors  of  the  programme,  as  noted above, provides a  force contrary  to  the proposed reorganisation.   Contract and service  expectations  of  employees  of  the  state  company  are  threatened where this  reorganisation  is  proposed,  with  consequent  resistance  from  the  staff concerned.  Certain promotion expectations of staff, which may be considered to be  component  to  a  “civil  service mentality”  (Ministry  representative,  2009)  as part  of  a  hierarchical  and  seniority  based  organisation  (rather  than meritocratic), are threatened by the reorganisation:   “We  are  almost  there  in  implementing.    But we’ve  raised  some objections, because, at a certain point when they started and I realised there might be a problem.    Promotions  have  not  been  effected  for  a  while,  and  when  they bring  in  these  new  organograms  …  it  will  not  be  promotion,  it  will  be conversion and placement, which will not resolve  the promotionary  issues.  Therefore it will come back staring you in the face.  The workers were made to believe that this could resolve their promotional problem, because many positions  were  to  be  created.    When  I  as  a  union  man  told  the  AVRL management that they should be told that they should be careful – they had some people that supported them in what they are doing, they are to benefit –  there was a backlash, with  some workers attacking  the union with  some writing that they didn’t even want to belong to the union any more.   So we went  to  the minister  to  try  to  explain  the  situation  and  got  down  to  some principle to try to implement.  Now they have started implementing, and the very  things  that  I drew attention  to, have started  to  come round.”    (PUWU representative, 2009)  The  representative  of  unionised  workers  in  the  service  provider  here demonstrates  the  shift  in  mode  of  operation  being  attempted  by  the  private company,  with  a  change  in  organogram  in  line  with  the  intended  shift  from engineering  to  commercial  focus.   The change  in organogram  inevitably affects the  prospects  of  seconded  staff,  and  the  union  representative  notes  the resistance and associated delays which follow.  Such resentment is consequential of another aspect of  the  ‘hybrid’  contractual arrangement established, with  the parallel existence of public and private with overlapping responsibilities:   “[W]hat happens if AVRL is not given the contract again?  Do we revert back to where we were coming from, do we stay to manage something when the proponent of  it  is gone? […]   The seconded staff are still workers of GWCL, and  the nature of  the  contract  is  such  that  they have been  seconded  to  an operator, because when it comes to the end of the contract two things may happen, three things.   Either a new operator is engaged, they retain the old one,  or  it  reverts  back  to  GWCL.    So  you  cannot  give  all  the  staff  out  and finish off with  them.   GWCL  is  still  there as  the grantor, with  its particular contract arrangements, so it’s a bit complex.  So it’s just like sub‐letting part 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of your job to someone and you still being in control,  it  is not very smooth, its  not  like  a  lease  arrangement.    If  you  come  and  you  are making  serious policy  changes,  what  happens  if  after  5  years,  they  don’t  retain  you  and there’s  another  company  which  would  want  to  come  in  with  a  different organisational structure – or if they revert back to GWCL.  So definitely, you will have problems.”  (PUWU representative, 2009)   “GWCL  started  as  a  department  of  the  ministry,  so  it  behaved  like  a  civil service.  Gradually, because of the responsibilities it was made a corporation and  now  has  become  a  company.    But  it  is  still  carrying  the  civil  service traits, because it is a public company.  Now, there is a big difference between a public company and a private company.   So the problem is  the new tools and  mechanisms  and  policies  that  AVRL  wants  to  introduce,  are  they  for private  companies  or  public  companies?    If  they  are  private  company arrangement  they  are  going  to  have  a  problem  with  a  company  that  is basically  a  public  company  and  that  is  the  issue.”    (PUWU  representative, 2009)  This  mode  of  implementation  of  PSP  in  Ghana  underlies  delays  in  the restructuring of  the service provider under  the operation of  the private sector.  Delays  in  reorganisation  continue  through  the  period  of  PSP  operation,  with implementation of the process continuing until at least mid‐2009, as noted above by Union representatives, as well as the private company:   “In the year 2008, AVRL realised the need to introduce a new organisational structure to better serve the needs of the key stakeholders, and to help meet the  corporate  objectives.    Among  other  things,  the  new  structure  will introduce  a  stronger  customer  and  commercial  focus.    The  previous structure was built with an engineering emphasis, and therefore needed to be  more  commercial  and  customer  focused.    Under  the  new  structure, promotion will  be  based  not  only  on  academic  ability  but  also  on  attitude and  performance.    The  new  structure  is  a  modern management  structure which is less hierarchical, and places more emphasis on strategies, processes and procedures.”  (AVRL, 2008)  Press  reports  indicate  that  the  secondment  of  staff,  and  the  associated expectations  with  regard  the  conditions  of  employment,  have  caused  various instances  of  worker  unrest  through  the  period  of  the  PSP  contract  to  date.  Pressure for the improvement of conditions was evident  in the first year of the contract,  with  purported  threats  to  strike  (GhanaWeb,  2007).    Such  concerns regarding the proposed improvements in conditions continue into the third year of operations, with demonstrations at the headquarters of the grantor (Amevor, 2009).   The  efficiency  purported  to  derive  from  the  introduction  of  the  private sector  is  thus  inhibited  by  the  parallel  existence  of  grantor  and  operator,  and exaggerated by  the problematic  implementation of  reorganisation  that  follows.  The  move  from  an  engineering‐focused  organisation  to  a  commercial‐focused organisation is considered necessary as a means of improving the sustainability 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of the service provider, and the introduction of the private sector is considered the obvious means by which this change in focus may be achieved.  However, the particular  mode  of  implementation  in  Ghana  contributes  to  the  delay  in realisation of such purported efficiencies, shown here to continue to year three of a five year contract.  This is demonstrative of the failure of the proponents of the PSP programme, in line with the underlying theoretical rationale, to consider the  institutional  environment  of  privatisation.    In  this  instance  such  a  failure concerns the inevitable role of the public sector in water service provision, which has been exaggerated firstly by the establishment of a management contract, and secondly by  the particular  form as demonstrated.   The change to a commercial and  thus  sustainable  organisation  as  intended  by  those  sponsors  of  the  PSP programme is inhibited.   
Summary  The  mode  of  implementation  of  the  PSP  programme  in  Ghana  is  here demonstrated  to  incorporate  a  failure  to  consider  the  implications  of  local reception, interpretation and transmutation of the policy.   It is shown that local variation,  in  this case with regard  the organisational norms of operation of  the host environment, may inhibit the operation of the programme.  Where universal uniformity  in  the environment of economic  transactions  is assumed within  the underlying theoretical framework for privatisation, it is shown here that, where contracts are inevitably not absolute, variations in the host environment impinge on  the  performance  and  operation  of  that  contract.    The  particular  mode  of implementation  of  the  PSP  programme  in  the  Ghanaian  case  has  in  practice exaggerated  the  effect  of  this  incoherence.    Where  the  hybrid  contract,  with grantor  and operator working  in  parallel,  entails  the  secondment  of  staff  from the former to the latter, the flexibility assumed to be natural to the private sector is inhibited, with effects on performance and operation.  These issues are taken up in further detail in the following chapter.     
7.3  Institutional  importance:  PSP,  institutional  capacity  and 
‘governance’  The history of privatisation in developing countries demonstrates, as described in  chapter  three,  a  revision  of  the  approach  taken  in  implementation.    This revision  incorporates a  growing  recognition of  institutional  importance  for  the successful  operation  of  PSP,  with  more  recent  programmes  incorporating  the recognition  of  at  least  sufficient  regulation,  but  furthermore  the  nature  of  the local institutional environment more broadly.  It is the purpose of this section to consider the coherence of the PSP programme in Ghana with this broader trend and reform agenda, and to consider its location within the broader ‘governance’ programmes being implemented in the country.  It is maintained here that while project  documentation  provides  a  rhetorical  commitment  to  such  reform ambitions,  the  practical  reality  demonstrates  a  more  close  alignment  with underlying theory.  Operation of the PSP programme diverges from the idealised form deriving from underlying theory. 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‘Governance’ reform and manifestation in water sector PSP  Chapter three describes the apparent shift in approach taken by the sponsors of privatisation  through  the  period  of  the  expansion  of  the  programme  from  the 1990s.  This has been conceptualised variously as, for example, a shift to a ‘post‐Washington  consensus’  (Fine,  2003a)  or  ‘second  wave  neo‐liberalism’  (Smith, 2004),  and  has  been  considered  necessary  for  the  less  problematic implementation and operation of PSP in developing countries.  The reification of this  shift  is  apparent  in  the  broader  reform  programmes  initiated  in  Ghana, described  in  chapter  five.   These  incorporate  a  coalescence of  sponsor  funding under  a  multi‐donor  budget  support  (MDBS)  programme,  entailing conditionalities  are  attached  to  the  totality  of  funding  (ODI,  2007).    Such conditionalities  are  broad  in  their  scope:  the  growth  and  poverty  reduction strategy  (GPRS)  attempts  to  revise  the  structure  of  governance  within  the country, following a particular conception of governance as defined by the IMF:   “Ghana  must  redefine  the  role  of  the  state  as  the  policy  manager  for development and the economy, enforcer of law, rules and regulations and a provider of public utilities and services.   Public sector reform involving the right‐sizing of the public service, restoring competitive conditions of service and SOE reform is a sine qua non for provision of an enabling environment for private sector development and the effective provision of public services.  Progressive  public  sector  reform  is  required  significantly  to  improve capacity and efficiency.   A continuous process of reform is also required to enable the public service to accommodate its changing role in relation to the private business sector and civil society.”  (IMF, 2003:40‐41)   Within  the  context  of  the  water  sector  in  Ghana,  the  conception  of  the ‘enabling’  state  is  reified  in  terms  of  the  concern  for  the  improved  capacity  of sector  institutions,  the  decentralisation  of  control  and  decision‐making  within the  structuring  of  the  sector,  and  the  depoliticisation  of  sector  institutions.  Regarding  the  PSP  contract,  this  can  be  seen  in  the  establishment  of  certain procurement  procedures  for  funding  associated with  the  Urban Water  Project (World Bank, 2004a),  the  establishment of  a  ‘Project Management Unit’ within the Water Directorate for the purposes of administering the contract (ibid.; WD Consultant,  2009),  or  the  procedures  for  the  appointment  of  personnel within the sector (GWCL 2006a & 2006b; Ministry representative, 2009).  The National Water  Policy  (MWRWH,  2007)  considers  reform  of  the  sector  in  a  similar manner,  with  the  need  to  “deepen  democratisation  of  society,  through transparent  and  accountable  leadership,  and  adherence  to  the  rule  of  law”.    It may  further be  seen  in  the  sponsor documentation  regarding  the project, with concern  for  ‘capacity  building’  being  component  to  the  Urban Water  Project  – seen in the funding support for the regulator, for example (World Bank, 2004a).  Sponsor concern for the adequate capacity of other sector institutions is further evident where concerning the state company (ibid.).  Following the introduction of  PSP  the  role  of  GWCL  shifts  to  that  of  infrastructure  investment  and administration of  the contract,  the  latter of which provides novel requirements of the company.  This required capacity of the company is further recognised by 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the  company  itself,  in  2006  at  the  start  of  the  contract,  with  decentralisation being key:   “Strategic actions: […] Establish  a  total  framework  of  delegated  authority  down  through  the  new organisational structure to ensure decision making at the lowest appropriate levels.  This will require extending formal authority for expenditures within plans and budgets and for staff matters down the line.  As far as practicable authority  limits  should be  compatible with  scope of  job,  responsibility  and individual experience.”  (GWCL, 2006a: 40)   “Critical success factors and project risks: […] 1:    Critically  essential  will  be  the  degree  of  autonomy  that  the  Board  of Directors  will  have  in  taking  a  professional  stance  in  the  recruitment process.  It is important that competent management is employed to lead the new operation and that political influencing shall be avoided at all cost in the implementation of the recommendations.   2:   That overall project  implementation coordination shall be provided and clearly defined criteria in terms of deadlines, cost, quality etc. are adhered to. 3:    The  speed with which  the new organisation  is  put  in  place  in  terms of recruitment of key staff, especially in the first batch priority positions of the Managing  Director,  the  ICT  Director,  and  the  Finance  Director.”    (GWCL, 2006b: 2)    While  the  documentation  from  the  state  company  here  demonstrates recognition  of  the  reform  of  the  institutional  structure  within  which  the  PSP contract  operates,  it  is  further  noteworthy  that  this  recognition  is contemporaneous  with  the  start  of  the  contract.    This  is  indicative  of  the problematic implementation of a purported revision of approach to acknowledge the  significant  of  institutional  context.    The  incorporated  ‘capacity  building’ component  of  the Urban Water  Project would  only  become  active  at  the  same time as the contract itself.   Thus, were the capacity building to be sufficient and effective,  it  is  expected  to  be  so  immediately  for  the  administration  of  the contract  to  be  effective  – PSP design  in  this  respect  appears  sub‐optimal.    The timing of  implementation may however be  irrelevant  considering  the extent of the capacity building component: it has been noted in the previous chapter that capacity building for the regulator is likely to be insufficient, with the regulator consistently operating with  insufficient  financing.   The  capacity of other  sector institutions to perform required functions is also questionable (also noted in the preceding chapter).  Thus, while there is rhetorical commitment for the capacity building  associated  with  PSP,  the  mode  of  implementation  and  the  extent  of commitment appear questionable.     The questionable commitment to, and implementation of, an institutional reform  programme  is  furthered  when  considering  the  operations  of  sector institutions.    Sector  institutional  reforms  are  primarily  intended  to  promote  a particular form of governance and mode of organisational operation.  In practice, however,  intended  reforms,  and  the PSP  contract  itself,  are  implemented  in an environment  where  historically  developed  norms  remain  the  primary 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determinant  of  operation.    Political  intervention  and  management  remain  the key determinants of policy implementation, and of the reception, interpretation, and commitment  to proposed  institutional  reforms.   Near universal  among  the respondents  providing  evidence  for  the  consideration  of  this  aspect  of  service provision  and  PSP  implementation  was  the  concern  that  political  influence remains considerable despite attempted reforms, and that the engrained nature of  the  normalised  mode  of  operation  was  unlikely  to  recede  in  prominence (Ministry  representative,  2009;  WD  Consultant,  2009;  PUWU  representative, 2009; MP, 2009).     Considering  the expression of concern  for  independent and professional appointment of personnel in senior positions found in the documents relating to the  restructuring  of  GWCL,  the  reality  remains  distant  from  this  objective (Ministry  representative,  2009).    The  GWCL  redesign  documents  express  the concern  for  the  importance  “that  competent management  is  employed  to  lead the new operation and that political influencing shall be avoided at all cost in the implementation  of  the  recommendations”  (GWCL,  2006b:  2),  and  the  need  to “conduct  a  selection  interview  for  the  appointment  of  Directors  and Departmental Heads  for all  suitable candidates”  (GWCL, 2006b: 27).   However, even  where  revised  appointments  procedures  are  effected  internal  to  the organisation,  where  senior  roles  are  considered,  the  external  influence  of  the Public Service Commission remains:  “In  terms  of  appointments,  because  the  Public  Services  Commission  is  the agency  that  vets  and  recommends  for  appointment  to  especially  the managing directorship. […]  You have to apply either internally or externally, then  the  public  services  commission  interviews  and  recommends  to  the office of the president for the appointment.   So that has political, you could say that has political input.”  (Ministry representative, 2009)  Similarly, political  influence  is noted  in  the decision‐making process within  the organisation, for example relating to the financing of operations:   “But  again,  the  fact  that  government  owns,  also  inhibits  the  ability  of  the management  to  take  certain  decisions.    The  government  owns  it,  and  if  it wants money to expand its systems it has to borrow and government has to provide.    So  it’s  not  strictly  like  a  private  enterprise where  the  board  can take a decision to go and borrow money for certain things.  The whole thing, the  government  is  still  exercising  huge  control,  therefore  to  a  large  extent inhibiting  the  ability  of  the  management  to  make  certain  decisions.”  (Ministry representative, 2009)  Where  political  management  and  intervention  is  normalised,  the  political allegiance  of  those working within  the  institutions  is  perceived  to  be  of  great importance.    Where  a  change  of  government  occurs,  it  is  assumed  that  those existing staff within  institutions, at  least at a senior  level, have an allegiance to the previous administration: 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“This  year,  several  head  of  state  institutions  have  moved,  and  those sympathetic of the ruling party have come to replace them.  The last time in 2000 when there was a change,  that was happening.   Most committees are dissolved and new committees set up.   [The managing director of GWCL] is about to be replaced…  Some of them were playing their cards… they were not openly supporting one party,  […]  trying  to hide  the party  they actually belong to.   So  in  this case,  I don’t know if he actually belongs  to one party, but  because  that  [previous]  government  appointed  him,  the  perception  is there –  in general he was expected to be removed,  though he tried to hang on.”  (GII representative, 2009)  While the negative impact of such a mode of operation and organisation is noted by the former Minister, the admission of his own party’s role in this normalised mode of organisation is admitted:   “It is quite detrimental [to the operation of the state company], and I believe that, I have said it and I will say it again any time that I get the opportunity in parliament  I will  say,  it  is  not  good  for  development.    They  should  assess each  and  every  individual  on  his  merit.    Take  the  case  of  the  electricity corporation, the managing director, he’s worked all his life in the electricity corporation,  and  through  the  ranks  to  be  promoted  to managing  director.  Now  they  come  in  and  they  say  ‘alright  you  go,  because  we want  to  take somebody who is of this tribe’.  You know ethnicity is a problem in Ghana, no matter how people describe, you  tell  them I say ethnicity  is a problem.   So they get […] of the Rawlings tribe, then he comes, and he changes everybody there […].  So what we are saying is that, let them continue with the work – there’s  no  reason  to  change  to  NDP,  but  we  did  the  same  so  we  are  also guilty.  So that’s why people are being changed, I feel very sad about quite a whole lot of things.  Now, sitting back with the wisdom of hindsight, some of the  things were wrong, and they made… two wrongs do not make a right.”  (MP, 2009)    The coherence of the programme, and assumed conditions deriving from the  theoretical  rationale, with  the host  environment may be undermined.    The normalised culture of political management entails  that  the  turnover of staff  in senior  positions,  including  Managing  Directors  for  the  state  company,  is significant  and  thereby  threatens  consistency  of  programme  implementation.  The culture of assumption of allegiance of those working within institutions, and the  assumption  that  allegiance  is  necessary  for  the  operation  of  institutions, demonstrates the engrained and normalised nature of this mode of organisation (GII  representative,  2009;  GACC,  2001).    This  politicisation  of  institutions  is mirrored  in  other  aspects  of  the  sector  institutional  framework  (Azeem,  2007; GII, 2007b & 2008a),  for example where procurement agencies are considered, where   “The  heads  of  all  the  tender  committees  are  politicians,  headed  by representatives of  the ruling party  […].   People who have  funded the party think  there  is  a  duty  to  award  the  contracts  to  repay  support.    There  are cases where, in giving contracts, it says that the beneficiary pays something 
  151 
to  the  party  account,  or  does  he  hold  a  party  card.”  (GII  representative, 2009)    The normal mode of organisation of the institutional environment within which  PSP  is  implemented  is  contrary  to  that  assumed  and  necessary  for  the operation  for  the  PSP  programme.    The  failure  to  account  for  the  host institutional  environment  thus  aligns  this  case of  PSP  in  the water  sector with those earlier examples described in chapter three.  It is described in this earlier chapter  that  where  there  is  a  failure  to  account  for  local  conditions  the performance  and  operation  of  PSP  is  affected  in  such  a  way  as  to  appear divergent  from that proposed and envisaged by proponents of  the programme.  Indeed  such  a  process  underlies  the  revision  of  approach  in  the  sector,  that conceptualised as incorporating an increased acknowledgement of the role of the state,  revision which appears  to be absent, or  least only rhetorically present  in the case of Ghana.  Such a judgement of the implementation of PSP in Ghana, and the  degree  of  institutional  coherence  present  here,  is  consistent  with  other studies of the sector in the country:     “Without government  capacity,  or  “good governance”, no  reform processes can be successful (Green, 2003).  The lack of this capacity, the preoccupation of  government  agencies  in  consolidating  their  power  in  the  absence  of strategic directions and  the  lack of political and economic compliance with the implementation of reforms in general had been observed by various key informants.   They were considered as cross‐cutting structural  impediments to  any  national  reform.    Investments  were  driven  by  what  donors  are prepared and willing to finance, “… rather than what has been determined to be  strategic  directions  for  the  Government  of  Ghana,  a  consequence  being the  declining/diminishing  investments  by  GoG  in  those  priorities”  (The Royal  Danish  Embassy,  2002:  33).    Likewise,  in  the  organisation  of  the GWSC/GWCL  a  persistent  lack  of  a  “culture  of  reform”  was  noted.    Amis suggests  that  this  could  be  generalised  to  the  entire  public  sector  reform process  in  Ghana:  “…  despite  a  substantial  amount  of  rhetoric,  there  has been  almost  no  reform  on  the  ground.    Arguments  about  efficiency  gains through private  involvement are simply  irrelevant  if  the overriding  logic of institutions is patronage” (Amis, 2004). […]  If  implemented, the reforms in Ghana’s  sub‐sector  of  urban  water  supply  were  going  to  be  incomplete, unsustainable  and  misdirected.    They  did  not  sufficiently  address  the important  issues  of  sector  coordination  in  the  face  of  weak  national institutions and structural  interdependencies based on patronage  relations among  the government,  regulator, provider and clients.”    (Fuest & Haffner, 2007: 186&189)  The  observations  of  Fuest  &  Haffner  here  align  with  the  experience  of privatisation as noted in the above responses from participants engaged for the present research.   Similarly, Osumanu (2008) considers that “the independence of  the  PURC  and  metropolitan  assemblies  remains  fragile  because  of  regular political  interference”  (2008:  108).    The  continued  relevance  of  patronage politics  for  the  operation  of  sector  institutions  is  further  consistent  with  the broader  analysis  of  the  public  sector  provided  by  Handley  (2008;  see  chapter 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five).   Where government  indicates a shift  to sector  institutional governance of greater coherence with that promoted by sponsor agencies, such as the National Water Policy (MWRWH, 2007), such policy fails to be manifest in any legislation, rendering the commitment rhetorical:   “It hasn’t found a lot of expression, in terms of practice, in the way that, it has not  been  operationalised.    What  is  the  sense  of  policy  if  it  is  not  to  be operationalised?  You require laws, because, you do the policy and then you make the laws to operationalise those policies there hasn’t been any kind of legislation that will actually lock us into that kind of arrangement.”  (ISODEC representative, 2009)    The  failure  to  ensure  capacity  of  sector  institutions,  the  continued operation of  these  institutions  in modes  that  run contrary  to  those assumed  in the rationalising theory and programme, is furthered by the failure to ensure an appropriate  institutional  structure  is  in  place.   While  the  reform  of  the  sector incorporates  the multiplication of agencies  (regulator,  licensing agency, project management  unit,  private  sector  etc.)  and  the  associated  attempt  for  the decentralisation  of  power,  critical  reforms  have  been  overlooked.    This  is apparent  in  the  structure  of  regulation  in  the  country.    The  preceding  chapter describes  the  mediated  regulation  of  the  private  company,  with  the  regulator regulating  the  state  company and  thus only  indirectly  the private  company.    It appears that this structure derives from the continuation of the state company as holder of water use licenses for domestic and municipal use (as a public utility).  Water  Resources  Commission  documentation  demonstrates  that  such  licenses are  held  only  by  the  state  company,  with  no  licenses  granted  to  the  private company (WRC, 2006 & 2007).    It  follows that, considering the functions of the regulator, as set out in the Public Utilities Regulation Commission Act (1997), it is the state company, as license holder, that is to be regulated.  Consequences of this structuring of regulation are demonstrated in the preceding chapter, with a mediated  relationship  between  provider  and  regulator  leading  to  problematic data transfer and communication.  The significance attached, by the sponsors of the programme,  to  the  establishment  of  a  project management unit within  the Ministry  for  the  administration  of  the  contract  appears  inconsistent  with  the failure  to  consider  the  structure  of  regulation  under  which  the  private  sector operates.    It  may  be  argued  that  the  ‘flexibility’  considered  necessary  for  the private sector  to demonstrate  its purported  inherent efficiency, as noted  in  the preceding  chapter with  reference  to  various  aspects  of  the  contract,  is  further evident here – with the private company being subject to the intervention of only one  other  agency  (the  state  company)  rather  than  two  (state  company  plus regulator).     The  failure  in  the  Ghanaian  PSP  programme  to  account  for  and incorporate  local  institutional  norms,  as  historically  dependent  and  developed within this particular context, entail  incoherence in the implementation of such policy.    It  may  be  maintained  that  the  introduction  of  privatisation  in  an environment  where  there  remains  an  institutional  condition  that  is  so incoherent entails inevitable divergence in operation and performance from that envisaged.    The  sequencing  of  implementation  is  therefore  critical  to  the 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operation and performance of the PSP programme.  The acknowledgement of the critical nature of  the  institutional environment within  the broader approach of the  sponsors  fails  to  be  translated  in  this  case,  with  implementation  typically following  more  closely  the  underlying  theoretical  framework  –  aligning  with purported  inherent  characteristics  of  public  and  private  sectors.    The significance  of  sequencing,  as  demonstrated  in  previous  instances  of privatisation,  has  not  impacted  on  the  scheduling  of  the  programme  in  Ghana (see also Fuest & Haffner, 2007).   
Commercial operation: implications for the scope of PSP and regulation  A final aspect of PSP in Ghana to be considered is the coherence of the underlying tenets of the programme, as requiring full cost recovery from service provision (as a means of improving sustainability), with the desire for improved access and provision.    This  is  reified,  once  more,  in  the  structuring  of  regulation  in  the country.  The requirement for full cost recovery has implications in terms of the extent of PSP within the sector, and subsequently the potential  for competition (surrogate  as  effected  by  the  regulator)  to  be  realised.    The  mode  of implementation of PSP in Ghana can be seen to be sub‐optimal in the restriction of  this  potential  competition,  thus  undermining  purported  efficiencies  to  be gained  through  the  private  sector.    This  contradiction  of  the  reality  of  service provision and the potential for the effective implementation of PSP is derivative of  the  underlying  contradiction  of  profitability  in  a  context  characterised  by requirements of significant investment and natural monopoly.      The  importance  of  competition  in  the  internalisation  of  externalities  of activity, and the parallel costs of failed attribution of property rights in the public sector, are component  to  the underlying  theories rationalising  the  introduction of the private sector (chapter two).  Where established in the context of a sector characterised  by  natural  monopoly  such  competition,  and  subsequently  the effects of  this effect of property rights attribution,  is  to be effected through the regulatory  agency.    It  is  described  in  chapter  two  that  the means  by which  to effect competition through a regulator  is  limited with the primary means being through surrogate competition and performance comparison between providers.  In the case of the Ghana water sector, the potential for this process to be realised is seriously limited.  This is true firstly in the establishment of PSP with only one operator:  the  initial  lease  contract  developed  in  the  country  provided  for  two operators, but this structure has been abandoned with the implementation of the management  contract  (Fuest  &  Haffner,  2007;  World  Bank,  2004a).    The limitation of PSP to one operator immediately undermines the potential for the regulator  to  effect  surrogate  competition.    Contrary  to  the  assessment  of performance  by  reference  to  comparative  alternate  providers,  the  regulator  in Ghana  is  limited  to  the  comparison  of  performance  to  historical  records,  to performance aspirations noted in government and sponsor documentation, or to comparative operators in other countries.  This latter possibility is attempted in an  assessment  of  the  performance  of  the  state  company prior  to  privatisation, but such comparisons in critique of the operator are easily disputed, by the state company, as “it would be misleading to compare utility companies with different levels of infrastructure” (GWCL statement in PURC, 2005a).  The implications of 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this  structure  of  regulation,  as  deriving  from  the  information  asymmetries inherent to the sector, are noted  in 2002 where referring to the state company (Aryeetey,  2002).    The  introduction  of  PSP  fails  to  resolve  this  issue,  thus continuing a process which determines the inherent advantage of the operator in relation to the regulator.  It is interesting to note the comparison of this aspect of regulation to that in the UK.  Chapter two describes the activity of the regulator in  effecting  competition,  and  notes  the  UK  experience  where  the  decreasing number  of  companies  through  mergers  entails  referral  to  the  Competition Commission.  Such a consideration is not evident in Ghana, and the provision of such an overseeing agency is absent.      The failure to ensure a structure of privatisation that permits the effective regulation  of  the  privatised  water  sector  is  a  further  illustration  of  the inconsistent application of the purported acknowledgement of the importance of the  institutional  environment  in  which  the  programme  is  implemented.    The inhibiting of  the potential  effectiveness of  regulation,  and  the  failure  to  ensure such  effectiveness by  the  sponsors of  the programme,  is  extended  through  the operation of the programme.  The limited basis of private sector operation in the sector  derives  from  the  commercial  viability  of  provision.    This  is  limited  in Ghana  to  the  urban  context,  with  peri‐urban  and  rural  provision  considered appropriate  for  alternative  service  providers  and  the  CWSA  respectively  (see chapter  five).    The  limited  scope  of  the  private  sector  is  however  furthered through the operation of the programme.  This is true firstly through the process by which the private operator can effectively reduce the scope of the systems to be subject to contracted requirements through the identification of  ‘snag items’ (section 6.2).  Furthermore, it has been indicated that the reduction in the scope of  PSP  is  to  be  continued  when  the  contract  is  renewed,  changed  to  lease contract or concluded.  According to representatives of the sponsor agency:   “So  the  rationale,  the  essence  is  that  in  the  future,  I  personally  see  that  a number of these systems will be going to the small towns. […]  Out of the 80 systems that are now in the urban system, only about 20 of them can really be considered urban – so if it comes to that, from the 210 systems which we thinking  of  for  two  separate  operators,  you  may  not  need  two  separate operators  because  now  you’d  be  talking  about  20  or  30  thereabouts.”  (World Bank representatives, 2009)  The failure to consider, on the part of the sponsor agency, the implications of a reduction  in  the  scope  of  PSP  and  the  continuation  of  a  single  provider  is symptomatic  of  the  general  approach  taken  with  the  management  contract.  While  there  is  certain  commitment  to  improved  procedures  for  the implementation  of  PSP,  as  coherent with  the  general  approach  taken  in  policy programmes  in  developing  countries,  the  practical  manifestation  of  this rhetorical commitment  is often  lacking.    It may be maintained, once more,  that the  failure  to  consider  the  importance  of  regulation  and  the  institutional environment further favours the operator: information asymmetry is likely to be more  significant  and monitoring more  costly  where  this  sector  structure  is  in place.  The problematic implementation of PSP in this instance derives, of course from  the  particular  characteristics  of  the  resource  and  sector,  factors 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contradictory  to assumed conditions necessary  for  the proposed advantages of private sector operation.  
Summary  The above discussion demonstrates that the introduction of PSP in the Ghanaian water sector has, at one level, been accompanied by a rhetorical commitment to an  increased  recognition  of  the  importance  of  the  institutional  context  of implementation.   At  another  level however,  the practical manifestation of  such an  apparent  commitment  is  brought  into  question  either  where  measures intended  to  improve  institutional  capacity  are  insufficient  or  where  such  a commitment  is contradicted by the particular mode of PSP established.   This  is true  where  restructuring  of  the  sector  is  inconsistent  and  incoherent  with existing  norms,  with  a  commitment  to  underlying  theory  and  associated characteristics of public and private sectors.   Regulation is a particular example of  this,  with  the  establishment  of  a  structure  that  obfuscates  the  relationship between regulator and operator.  There is, furthermore, a failure to consider the implications of the reduced scope of PSP, deriving from the limited commercial viability of provision, in the inhibiting of the potential for regulation to perform its intended function.  This inconsistent and incoherent implementation of PSP in the Ghanaian water sector can be seen to be indicative of the various aspects of the  critique  established  in  chapter  two,  that  concerning  the  limitation  of  the underlying  theoretical  framework  in  accounting  for  variable  environmental contexts and the role in extra‐economic factors in this variation.  The connection between  weaknesses  and  assumptions  as  identified  and  the  factors  identified here are taken up in greater detail in the following chapter.   
Conclusions and discussion  The  above  description  of  PSP  as  implemented  in  the  Ghanaian  water  sector demonstrates  the  importance  of  factors  of  an  extra‐economic  and  institutional nature  in  the  determination  of  operation  and  performance  of  the  programme.  The  primary  findings  of  the  chapter  concern,  firstly,  the  import  of  the grantor/operator  relationship  in  determining  the  resolution  of  non‐contracted issues which have proven to be critical in the operation of the service provider.  Contributing  the  antagonistic  relationship  between  grantor  and  operator  are various  technical  factors  including  baseline  data,  RRR  and  revenue  funding,  in addition  to  responsibility  for  different  aspects  of  service  provision  and  the associated  residual  control  which  contribute  to  varying  public  claims.    The antagonistic  relationship  between  parties  has  contributed  to  the  protracted resolution of non‐contracted issues,  including those which relate directly to the evaluation of the performance of the private operator.  Secondly, the existence of a  contradictory  institutional  and  organisational  culture  contributes  to  the incoherent and partially problematic implementation of the PSP contract.  This is exaggerated where the private sector operates in parallel to the public, with poor differentiation  in  organisation.    Thirdly,  the  location  of  the  PSP  programme  in broader  trends of  reform programmes demonstrates an  incoherence with such 
  156 
reform, typically evident in rhetoric commitment only, with inconsistent regard for issues of governance and institutional structures.      In each of these areas, the form of PSP contract implemented in Ghana has a  particular  significance  in  terms  of  the  impact  on  the  performance  and operation  of  the  contract.    Because  the  contract  takes  a  ‘hybrid’  management form, the additional complexity of this has various negative effects on operation.  This  is  most  significant  when  considering  the  administration  of  revenue  and repairs and maintenance funding, which has contributed to antagonism between parties,  and ultimately has had a detrimental effect on  the sustainability of  the provider,  if  only  temporary.    Furthermore,  where  the  contract  permits  the restructuring  of  the  provider,  under  the management  of  the  private  company, there  is  resistance  due  to  the  continued  public  sector  nature  of  the  seconded staff.     It  is  also  worthy  to  note  that  the  evidence  presented  in  this  chapter suggests that the  limited form of acknowledgement of  institutional  importance, as  conceptualised  in  the  ‘post‐Washington  consensus’,  is  inadequate  where applied  in  the  Ghanaian  context.    Conceptualising  the  state  as  an  ‘enabling’ institution,  facilitating the operation primarily of  the private sector, necessarily disregards the persistence of normalised modes of operation in the host country.  The  lack  of  comprehension  of  local  variation  entails  a  failure  to  recognise  the historically  developed  modes  of  operation  and  their  persistence  through  the recent  period,  together  with  their  contribution  as  a  form  of  resistance  to  the proposed  reforms  associated with  the  consensus.    Furthermore,  the  proposed recognition  of  the  import  of  governance  and  the  institutional  environment appears  to  be  typically  rhetorical where  evident  in  the Ghanaian water  sector.  Capacity  building  measures  are  likely  to  be  insufficient,  and  the  failure  to establish  a  consistent  reform  of  the  institutional  environment  undermines  the operation of the PSP programme, particularly when considering regulation.   The evidence presented here provides a basis for the substantiation of the critique of  the underlying theoretical rationale  for privatisation on the grounds that  it  is  necessarily  limited  in  the  conception  of  the  political,  social  and institutional environment as a determinant of performance of service provision.  It is demonstrated here that where the assumed complete contract is absent, the determining  factors  in  operation  and  performance  are  those  of  an  extra‐economic  nature.    The  particular  institutional  and  organisational  cultures  and norms existent within the country provide an important environmental factor in describing  how  non‐contracted  issues  may  be  resolved.    The  PSP  programme implemented in Ghana in fact provides a significant basis for the determination of  performance  and  operation  by  these  extra‐economic  factors,  due  to  the various  ambiguities  in  the  contract.    Indeed,  the  importance  of  these  other factors  for  the performance of  the PSP programme  is well  recognised by  those working in the sector:   “Contracts don’t do things on their own, it is human beings that use contracts to administer a place, and when these orchestrations are going on, definitely, when  these  cultural  differences  are  going…    The  human  factor  influences 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Correlating  performance  and  operation  of  privatisation  in  Ghana  with 
critical aspects of the rationalising theory   The  preceding  chapters  outline  the  conditions  found  in  the  water  sector  in Ghana, and the performance and operation of the PSP contract in relation to both technical,  and  social,  political  and  cultural  factors.    It  is  apparent  from  the evidence  presented  in  these  chapters  that  the  implementation  of  PSP  in  the water  sector  in  Ghana  has  failed  to  align  with  the  proposed  improvements central to the theoretical rationale underlying the programme, deriving from the proposed inherent qualities of public and private sectors.  Indeed, performance, where quantifiable, has not changed significantly from that of the previous state service  provider.    While  this  performance  is  not  extreme  when  considered relative  to  other  cases  of  privatisation,  it  is  consistent  with  the  trend  for divergence from that proposed, with the private sector returning performance to levels  achieved  previously  under  the  state  provider.    Beyond  quantifiable performance  change,  what  is  more  important  in  the  determination  of  the implementation  of  the  programme,  and  the  divergence  from  performance  and operation as proposed, is the incidence of dispute and renegotiation, a trend with which  the  Ghanaian  case  is  further  consistent.    Thus  counterpart  to moderate change  in  performance  has  been  the  various  complications  encountered  in implementation,  deriving  significantly  from  the  form  and  quality  of  contract established,  and  the  extra‐economic  factors  that  subsequently  determine negotiation and dispute.  The purpose of this chapter is to assess each aspect of technical,  and  social,  political  and  cultural  factors,  as  previously  outlined,  by reference to their relation to the underlying theory and critique thereof.  In this endeavour, the contribution of the particular aspects of the underlying theory to the practical  implementation may be realised.   This  in  turn provides a basis by which  to make  a  critical  appraisal  of  the  validity  of  the  underlying  theoretical rationale for privatisation,  for the application to the water sector  in developing countries.      Following  from  the  evidence  presented  in  the  preceding  chapters,  the discussion  here  maintains  that  the  PSP  programme  as  implemented  fails  to encompass and account  for conditions present  in the water sector  in Ghana.    It further  maintains  that  the  conditions  found  in  this  context  in  fact  contradict those  assumed  in  the  rationalising  theory,  and  this  contradiction  has implications  for  operation  and  performance  of  the  PSP  programme.  Assumptions central to particular rationalising theories, for example relating to complete  information or  contracts,  to principal‐agent  relations,  are manifest  in practical  implementation  of  policy  based  on  this  theory.    Further  assumptions regarding inherent qualities of the individual, of public and private sectors, and of institutional environments, are also observable.  It is further maintained here that the particular form of PSP programme implemented in Ghana ‘hybrid’ form of contract established in the country, which, through ambiguous responsibilities and  distortion  of  risk,  has  contributed  to  the  problematic  operation  of  the programme.    Furthermore,  an  implicit  acceptance of  the  limitations of  the PSP 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programme within  the Ghanaian water  sector  reduces  the  scope  and potential contribution to the improvement of service provision.  Also, where attempts are made,  in  line  with  the  ‘post‐Washington  consensus’  approach,  to  engage  and modify  national  institutions  to  comply with  a  particular  narrow  conception  of the state, implementation is met with resistance or local mutation.      There  are  therefore  overarching  themes  which  are  central  to  the assessment  of  the  validity  of  the  theoretical  rationale  for  application of  PSP  in the water sector in developing countries.  The first is the failure of the theory to account for conditions encountered in this context.  Secondly where assumptions central to the theory are contradicted by conditions encountered, the import of extra‐economic  factors  is  increased.    Thirdly,  the  particular  form  of  contract established  in  Ghana  increases  the  potential  for  dispute  and  negotiation,  and subsequently the import of extra‐economic factors in resolution.  Finally, where an implicit acceptance of the limitations of the PSP programme are evident, these further  inhibit  the potential  improvement of service provision  through the PSP programme.    These  themes will  be  discussed  here  by  reference  to  the  various levels  of  critique  described  in  chapter  two.    The  initial  section  considers  the inconsistencies,  weakness  and  problematic  assumptions  of  the  privatisation theories in general terms, their manifestation in the Ghanaian water sector, and their  impact on operation and performance.   The  second  section  considers  the ramifications  of  the  broader  weakness  of  the  theoretical  rationale  in  the exclusion  of  consideration  of  extra‐economic  factors  in  the  determination  of performance and operation – particularly significant in the case of water sector PSP in Ghana.   
8.1  Privatisation  theories  within  themselves:  weaknesses  and 
inconsistencies as reified in the Ghanaian case  The particular theories that substantiate the introduction of the private sector in service  provision  are  premised  on  various  assumptions  for  their  associated propositions to hold true.  In practice, as has been noted in chapter three and as evidence from Ghana suggests, the implementation of privatisation in the water sector  typically  diverges  from  the  assumed  and  idealised  conditions  of  the rationalising  theory.   The  following discussion considers  the various aspects of PSP in the Ghanaian water sector that demonstrate the validity, or otherwise, of policy based on such theory for application in this context.  It will be maintained here  that particular  assumptions, weaknesses  and  inconsistencies  as  identified in  chapter  two  are  manifest  in  implementation,  or  have  repercussions  where confronted with contradictory conditions.  
Public choice theory  The relevance of public choice theory to PSP in the Ghanaian water sector can be seen in the mode of implementation of the programme.  The underlying tenets of the theoretical  framework significantly  inform the particular approach taken in the country.    It  is obvious  from the evidence of PSP  in Ghana  that  the mode of implementation is significantly shaped by the concern for the private sector to be 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uninhibited in its operation, and in particular a concern to restrict the impact of public sector institutions on the operator.  Regarding the permitting of flexibility to the operator, there is evidence in various aspects of the contract implemented that  such  flexibility  is  apparent.    This  is  true  with  regard  to  the  financing structure of the PSP programme – for example where the operator is permitted control  of  the  revenue  account  (with  vague  disbursement  and  monitoring requirements) and associated RRR fund, and where the operator is permitted to identify snag items (see section 6.3).   It is further evident in the allowing of the contract to commence without baseline data (the private sector not being subject to  publicly  determined  baselines),  with  the  result  that  the  private  sector  has been  allowed  to  operate  without  being  subject  to  such  baseline  data  in  the determination of performance (section 6.2).  The failure to establish penalties for data  reporting  permits  the  private  sector  flexibility  in  this  aspect  of  operation (section 6.5).  It may also be maintained that the concern for the private sector to be  uninhibited  by  intervention  of  public  agencies  is  manifest  in  the  failure  to establish  direct  regulation  of  the  private  company,  with  mediated  regulation through the state company reducing the intervention of the regulatory agency in the operation of the provider (section 7.3).  It is noted by sponsors and authors of  the  contract  in  the  country  that  the  mode  of  implementation  of  PSP  is specifically concerned with the ability of the private sector to operate in such a way  as  to  be  uninhibited  by  intervention  from  public  and  political  agencies (section 7.1).     Beyond  the  flexibility  permitted  the  private  sector,  influence  of  public choice theory is  further demonstrates  in the structuring of the PSP programme and  the  institutional  environment  within  which  the  contract  operates.    The conceptualisation  of  the  public  sector  as  inherently  inefficient,  and  subject  to associated costs in terms of reduced total welfare, is considered manifest in the Ghanaian  context  in  the  evidence  regarding  the  politicisation  of  operation  of public  agencies.    Such  a  conception  is  not  without  validation  considering  the evidence noted in chapter five and subsequently within the present research in chapter seven.  The programme undertaken in the water sector, of which PSP is component,  seeks  to  reform  the  sector  through  restructuring  to  align  the institutional  environment with  such  a  conception.    Thus  the  concern  is  for  the decentralisation of power, with the multiplication of sites of administration and the  introduction  of  agencies  proposed  to  be  independent  from  central government  (chapter  five).    Sector  agencies  are  therefore  considered  to  be  at lesser risk of the politicised operation considered the manifestation of inherent public sector  inefficiency in this context.   While this structuring of the sector  is consistent  with  the  underlying  tenets  of  public  choice  theory,  the  practical realisation of such intentions fail to be comprehensive and consistent.  Evidence of  PSP  in  other  developing  countries  (chapter  three)  suggests  an  increasing realisation of the relevance of institutional capacity for the administration of the programme.    In  the  Ghanaian  case  public  choice  theory  is  apparent  in  the structuring of the sector, yet the broader trends demonstrating a moderation of the  tendency  to undermine  the capacity of  the public  sector  is not consistently mirrored in the water sector.   The structuring of the sector in such a way as to establish  the  state  as  independent  enabler  of  private  sector  operation  is undermined  where  capacity  of  sector  agencies  is  insufficient  and  structuring 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obfuscates  the  functioning  of  the  state  vis‐à‐vis  the  private  sector.    This  is apparent  when  considering  the  regulator:  the  PSP  programme  fails  to  assure sufficient  capacity,  and  the  sector  is  structured  in  such a way as  to necessitate the  mediation  of  regulation  of  the  service  provider  (sections  6.4  and  7.3 respectively).   The moderation of  the  tendencies of public  choice  theory based policy appears absent in the Ghanaian water sector.      Beyond  the  structuring  of  the  sector  in  Ghana,  the  concepts  associated with  public  choice  theory  have  further  implications  for  the  operation  of  the private  sector  in  this  context.    Counterpart  to  public  choice  theory  is  the underlying  assumption  of  the  sufficient  attribution  of  property  rights  to  the private sector.   The purported  inherent characteristics of  the public sector and the  actions  of  the  individual  therein  have  costs  associated:  in  terms  of  the inefficient use of  resources,  and  in  terms of  the monitoring of  activity  to avoid such inefficiencies.   Externalities associated with service provision in the water sector  fail  to  be  internalised  by  the  private  operator.    It  has  been  described previously  the  inherent  characteristics  of  the  water  sector  which  undermine assumptions necessary for the validity of purported benefits of private operation of service provision (chapter two).   The role of the institutional environment in the provision of a coherent framework within which the private sector operates is implicit  in theory and was absent in sector policy through the early stages of privatisation  (chapter  three).    The  Ghanaian  experience  demonstrates  an acknowledgment  of  the  relevance  of  such  an  environment,  when  the  broader reform agenda  for  the  country  is  considered  (chapter  five).    The experience  in the  water  sector  provides  a  more  inconsistent  and  contradictory  picture however.    The  inherent  costs  of monitoring  a  private  company  operating  in  a natural  monopoly  environment  are  acknowledged  only  in  the  form  of  limited capacity  support  for  the  regulator  (section  6.4).    Capacity  support  for  the administration of  the contract  for  the  state  company –  the central  agency with oversight  responsibilities  –  receives  little  consideration  (sections  6.4  &  7.3).  Similarly,  through  the  process  of  sector  restructuring  there  are  significant oversights  which  in  practice  increase  the  costs  and  obstructions  in  the monitoring of the private sector.  This is true in terms of the establishment of a sole operator thus leading to more problematic regulation (section 7.3), and the mediated nature of regulation  in the sector (sections 6.5 & 7.3).   Thus not only does  the  PSP  programme  undertaken  in  the  water  sector  have  inherent  costs which  contradict  underlying  assumptions  of  the  rationalising  theoretical framework,  but  the  particular  mode  of  implementation  in  Ghana  exaggerates these  costs  further.    The  rationale  for  privatisation  is  therefore  significantly undermined  where  applied  in  this  context:  the  costs  of  monitoring  public agencies  as  identified  by  Coase  (1960)  and  Niskanen  (1975)  are  equally applicable to the private sector.   The explicit desire for the private sector to be uninhibited by the public sector, where the structuring of the sector inhibits such monitoring,  contributes  to  this  process:  the  commitment  to  purported characteristics  of  each  sector,  and  the  (ideological)  commitment  to  their application  in  policy  in  conditions  which  undermine  necessary  assumptions, underlies this divergence in theory and implementation. 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Property rights theory  The manifestation  of  the  concerns  and  propositions  central  to  property  rights theory  are  apparent  primarily  in  the  technical  aspects  of  performance  of  the privatisation programme in Ghana, and in particular the design and operation of the  contract.    Transfer  of  risk  and  liability,  a  complete  transfer  of  interest between each party, information certainties, assumed commitment of each party and  substantially  complete  contracts  provide  the  basis  upon  which  claims  of property  rights  theory  are  made.    Where  applied  in  the  water  sector,  in developing  countries,  and  in  a  sub‐optimal  manner,  these  propositions  are undermined  however.    The  Ghanaian  case  provides  an  instance  which demonstrates the difficulties in establishing the idealised conditions of property rights  theory,  with  problems  of  information  asymmetry,  subsequent  moral hazard  and  adverse  selection,  and  principal‐agent  problems  undermining purported improvements and demonstrating the over‐simplified conceptions of the underlying theory.   As  is  described  in  chapter  two, much  of  the  critique  of  property  rights theory  finds  a  basis  in  information  economics:  the  introduction  of  asymmetric information undermines the proposed completeness of contracts and transfer of interests between parties (e.g. Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975b & 2000).  In the case of Ghana, information regarding water service provision, and the various aspects which comprise the activities of the private operator, is significantly incomplete ex‐ante  and  asymmetrical  ex‐post.    As  observed  in  chapter  six,  information regarding various aspects of service provision in Ghana is either incomplete or is disputable.  This is most notable where baseline data is concerned (section 6.2), with  ex‐post  resolution  being  rationalised  by  the  requirement  for  improved metering, with existing data being disputable.   The PSP programme in Ghana is thus  established  with  a  basis  of  information  asymmetry  designed  into  the contract:  the data necessary  for  the evaluation of performance and subsequent incentive  structures  is  absent  from  the  contract.    Section 6.4  further  describes the  shortfall  in  capacity  of  sector  institutions  in  the  administration  and monitoring of  the contract,  such  that  the  information asymmetry designed  into the contract is augmented by a likely failure to correct this asymmetry ex‐post.  It is maintained here that this scenario provides the basis for various elements of implementation which  correlate with  those  aspects  of  the  critique  of  property rights theory noted in chapter two: moral hazard and potential adverse selection (e.g.  Akerlof  (1970),  Spence  (1973),  Williamson  (1971),  Stiglitz  (e.g.  1975b  & 2000)),  principal‐agent  problems  (e.g.  Sappington  (1991),  Sappington  and Stiglitz (1987), Hart (2003)), and subsequent failure to establish property rights with consequences for the internalisation of externalities associated with service provision.      Regarding the allocation of risk and liability, the design of the contract in a  sub‐optimal  and  incomplete manner  provides  the  basis  for  the  distortion  of transfer, and subsequently insufficient incentive for improved performance.  The distortion  of  risk  and  liability  transfer  is  engrained  in  the  contract  in  various ways.  Firstly, the inclusion of snag items which may be identified by the private operator,  and  subsequent  to  agreement  by  the  technical  auditor  be  removed 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from  the  responsibility  of  the  operator,  provides  a  significant  basis  for  the revision of  contract  terms ex‐post  (section 6.3).   The  inclusion of  snag  items  is intended  to provide  flexibility  in  the contract due  to  the unknown condition of infrastructure in the sector.  This is the first element of flexibility permitted the operator,  described  by  the  proponents  of  the  programme  (e.g.  World  Bank representative, 2009) as both incentivising the initial engagement of the private sector and subsequently providing the operator with sufficient flexibility so as to be unhindered  in their exhibition of efficiency.    In practice  it has permitted the operator to, to a degree, determine ex‐post the terms and scope of the contract and  their  liability  therein.    The  role  of  the  technical  auditor  as  arbiter  in  the determination  of  a  ‘List  A’  to  which  contractual  terms  apply,  and  a  ‘List  B’  to which  they  do  not  (Fichtner,  2007),  effectively  removes  the  determination  of contract and subsequent outcomes from the principal.      The nature of the contract and its ‘hybrid’ form permits further distortion of  risk  and  liability.    The  desire  to  allow  the  private  operator  a  degree  of flexibility  in  its  operation  underlies  the  decision  in  contract  design  to  assign responsibility  for revenue collection and disbursement to the operator (section 6.3).  The arrangement of responsibilities in such a way is intended to permit the operator  to  execute  its  duties  without  undue  intervention  from  the  grantor.   This  is  furthered  by  the  inclusion  of  such  vague  contract  terms,  as  noted  in chapter  six,  which  allow  the  operator  to  determine  disbursement  of  revenue without  any  significant  control  by  the  grantor.    Asymmetrical  information between  grantor  and  operator  provides  a  basis  for  the  operator  to  take advantage  of  this  control  over  finance.    The  efficiency  of  operation  intended through the establishment of such measures is undermined by the distortion of liability and risk in favour of the agent, and to the cost of the principal.    Further  distortion  of  the  transfer  of  risk  and  liability  is  evident  in  the incentive structure  in  the contract.   Following  from the absence of competition and thus market discipline, penalty and incentive for the private operator must be contained within contractual terms.  In fact, the contract established in Ghana is  bereft  of  detail  regarding  such penalty  and  incentive.    Conditions present  in the water  sector,  and  the  standard of  infrastructure at  the  time of  inception of the contract, determine that the capacity to establish baseline data was limited.  The subsequent inclusion of contractual terms to establish baseline data ex‐post provides the potential for distortion of risk (section 6.2).  Because no penalty is included in the contract for non‐establishment of this data (GWCL, 2005), there is reduced incentive for the private sector to engage in this process.  Indeed, the contract further allows the private sector operator to propose their own penalty regime ex‐post, based on the baselines to be established (GWCL, 2005).  This and other  contract  penalty  measures  are  criticised  by  the  technical  auditor  as insufficient for improved performance (Fichtner, 2007).  There is subsequently a deficiency in the means by which to measure performance of the operator, and from which to apply penalties for substandard performance.  This is a significant failure  in  the  design  and  implementation  of  PSP  in  the  case  of  the  Ghanaian water  sector,  the  propositions  of  property  rights  theory  being  undermined where risk and liability are not transferred and residual control rights remaining with one party (e.g. Klein et al (1978), Williamson (1979), Hart (2003)). 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 The sub‐optimal design of the contract in Ghana is further evident in the requirements  for  the  transfer  of  data  between  operator  and  grantor  (section 6.5).  This is recognised by consultants to the state company (GWCL, 2005a & b), where  it  noted  that  the  contract  permits  the  possibility  of  insufficient  data transfer  to  the  grantor  thus  threatening  the  responsibilities  of  the  grantor  in conforming to its own performance contracts established and monitored by the State  Enterprise  Commission.    Combined with  the  recognition  by  the  technical auditor  of  the  failure  in  data  transfer  required  to  establish  baselines  for  the measurement of performance and subsequent application of penalties (Fichtner, 2007),  it  is  obvious  that  the  conditions of  information  transfer  and availability for  each  party  are  insufficient  for  the  operation  and  performance  of  PSP  as intended.    Such  conditions  of  asymmetrical  information  contradict  those assumed within property rights theory (e.g. Stiglitz, 2000).  The degree to which information is known by each party determines the potential for the transfer of interest  between  principal  and  agent,  and  furthermore  the  potential  for  the principal  to  monitor  the  agent  in  the  execution  of  contracted  responsibilities.   The conditions present in the context of the Ghanaian water sector and the PSP contract  established  therefore  undermine,  firstly,  the  potential  transfer  of objectives  from principal  to agent,  and secondly,  the  subsequent monitoring of execution of those objectives.      Beyond  contractual  terms  the  design  of  the  PSP  programme  in  the Ghanaian  water  sector  has  further  implications  for  the  validity  of  the propositions  of  property  rights  theory.    Ambiguity  in  the  contractual  terms  is combined  with  the  existence  of  multiple  principals  (section  2.2).    Within  the terms  and  context  of  the  contract,  the  principal  exists  as  the  grantor, with  the contract determining the transfer of objectives from this principal to the agent.  In practice however, there are further principals that affect the execution of the contract  including:  the  regulator  PURC,  the  Ghanaian  government,  the  World Bank as sponsor of the programme, and the technical auditors of the contract.     The regulator,  in setting the tariff under which the operator executes  its responsibilities, determines the revenue available to the operator and therefore the  efficiency  of  operation  required  by  the  operator.    Thus  while  the management  fee  is  intended  to  determine  improved  efficient  operation  by  the private sector, in reality, because of the ambiguous terms of the contract and the ability  to  utilise  revenue  for  operations,  the  regulator  then,  as  determinant  of revenue,  becomes  a  principal  to  the  agent.    Because  of  the  information asymmetries that exist in the sector, the poor quality and disputable information, and  these  are  exaggerated  because  of  the  mediated  relationship  between regulator  and  operator  (GWCL  being  the  mediator),  the  potential  for  the regulator  to  function as  intended  is  limited.   The peculiar structuring of PSP  in this  case  exaggerates  the  potential  effect  of  information  asymmetries,  with multiplied principals each having access to, and incentive to maintain, particular information.    In addition to regulator, other principals  include the technical auditor of the  contract  in  their  role  in  arbitration  between  contract  parties,  and  in 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determining  appropriate  conditions  for  those  contract  terms  intended  to  be finalised ex‐post.   This may include, for example, determining which snag items proposed by the operator are indeed sufficiently inhibitive to be removed from contractual  terms.    In  this particular example,  the  technical auditor performs a significant role in the determination of the scope of the contract.   In arbitrating between  parties  and  ultimately  certifying  a  ‘List  B’  of  water  systems  to  be excluded from contractual terms, the auditor defines terms of operation for the private  operator  that  may  not  coincide  absolutely  with  those  of  the  grantor. Asymmetric information once again contributes to the problematic operation of the  auditor:  it  is  noted  by  the  auditor  that  the  operator  provides  insufficient information  for  the  decision‐making  process.    Non‐penalised  delays  in information  transfer  may  in  this  sense  be  in  the  interest  of  the  operator:  the delaying  of  the  establishment  of  contract  terms.    Similarly,  in  arbitration between parties, following from the various disputed aspects of the contract, the Government of Ghana acts as a further principal to the agent.    The  factors  described  here  which  contribute  to  the  divergence  of  the formulation of privatisation from the propositions deriving from property rights theory  are  exaggerated  in  this  instance  by  the  particular  mode  of implementation,  for  example  regarding  the  ‘hybrid’  nature  of  the  contract.  However  it  should  further  be  noted  that  the  establishment  of  a  management contract  in  itself,  regardless  of  the  particularities  of  its  implementation, contributes to the exaggeration of this divergence.  In addition to the multiplicity of  principals  which  results  from  this  formulation  of  privatisation,  the  parallel operation  of  private  and  state  companies  has  implications  in  terms  of  the realisation  of  interest  of  the  principals.    In  the  context  of  a  lease  contract,  the interests  of  the  ultimate  principals  characterised  as  the  government  and subsequently broader population may be more  easily  transferred  to  the  agent, the private sector, without the obfuscation of the increased number of principals and the parallel responsibilities of private and state companies.  In practice, the management contract is here demonstrated to operate to the detriment of these ultimate principals.   Because of  the division of responsibilities  for management (the private  company)  and  long  term  investment  (the  state  company),  there  is the  potential  for  interests,  and  subsequently  capacity  to  implement  these responsibilities, to diverge.  It has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters that  the  division  of  interest  here  proves  problematic  in  implementation.    The failure to specify absolutely the activity of the private sector entails that where the private sector engages in opportunistic behaviour this is to the detriment of the  state  company  as  principal  in  their  long  term  interests.    On  the  contrary, where  the  long  term  investment  interests,  in  addition  to  the  management  of service provision, are integrated within the remit of one party such divergence is unlikely.    Therefore  the  assumption  of  complete  contracts  in  this  instance contributes  to  the  detriment  of  the  long  term  interest  of  state  company  and ultimate principals of government and broader population.    It  follows  from  the  above  discussion  that  the  propositions  of  property rights  theory  cannot  be  assumed  to  manifest  in  improved  performance  and operation  of  services  under  the  private  sector.    Information  asymmetries,  and incomplete  and  sub‐optimal  contracts  provide  the  basis  for  much  of  this 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divergence  of  practical  implementation  from  rationalising  theory.    Where distortions  in  risk  and  liability  allocation  occur,  where  incentive  and  penalty measures  are  ambiguous  or  insufficient  as  motivating  measures,  where information  transfer  and  subsequently  monitoring  are  inadequate,  and  where multiple principals with varying  interests exist,  the validity of  the  rationalising property  rights  theory  for  application  in  this  context may  be  questioned.    The practical manifestation of policy based on assumptions of  such  theory,  and  the inadequate consideration of contradictory conditions, is in fact the establishment of  a  foundation  for  the  increased  relevance  of  extra‐economic  factors  in  the determination of performance and operation.    Regarding the origin of  the private company, AVRL,  in  two public sector corporations,  it  is  not  evident  that  such  origins  differentiate  the  operation  of AVRL from any other private sector water service provider.  The actions of AVRL in terms of their exploitation of poor contract design and ambiguities in terms is consistent  with  that  expected  of  any  other  private  company.    Indeed  the implementation of the programme in Ghana is consistent with others elsewhere, with  opportunistic  behaviour  on  the  part  of  the  operator,  in  terms  of  ex‐post moral  hazard  in  reinterpretation  of  contract  terms,  reduction  of  risk  exposure and  so  on.    The  intended  introduction  of  a  commercial  mode  of  operation  is further  evident  in  Ghana,  with  implications  for  the  coherence  with  existing institutions  and  modes  of  organisation.    The  performance  and  operation  in Ghana  is  further  consistent  with  that  more  generally  in  the  trends  identified, with dispute  leading to renegotiations and cancellations, and the evident noted through  the  experience  of  Ghana  demonstrates  the  critical  contribution  of  the mode  of  implementation,  the  standard  of  contract  established  and  the administration thereof.      The  conditions  noted  here,  and  their  undermining  of  assumptions inherent to the property rights framework, are exacerbated by the limitation of competition  in  the sector  in Ghana.   This  is  true  firstly  in  the development and form  of  the  management  contract  –  the  establishment  of  one  operator,  thus increasing  the  significance  of  the  role  of  the  regulator  in  effecting  competition and  the  increased  importance  of  information  flow  from  the  operator  –  and, secondly,  the  actual  and  proposed  further  reduction  in  the  scope  of  the privatisation programme – thus  inhibiting any future potential  for competition.   Regarding  the  first  aspect,  the  establishment  of  the  PSP  programme  in  Ghana followed a protracted design and tendering process, as described in chapter five, consequent of  limited and reducing  investor  interest  in PSP  in  the  sector.   The establishment of the management contract undermined some of the few avenues for  competition,  in  particular  the  potential  for  effective  surrogate  competition under the regulator: the existence of one operator reduces the potential for the regulator  to monitor  performance  and  potential  improvements  in  efficiency  of operation, and make subsequent tariff revisions.  This capacity is further limited by  the  quality  of  data,  and  where  the  only  benchmark  data  by  which  to determine performance is historical, and with such data being subject to dispute.  The potential for the disciplining effect of surrogate competition effected by the regulator  is  thus diminished  through  failure  to  establish  sufficient  and  reliable means by which to determine variation in performance (section 6.3). 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 Regarding  the  second  aspect  of  competition  in  the  sector,  just  as  it  is limited by the form of PSP implemented,  the performance and operation of  the programme  since  its  inception  suggests  the  scope  of  the  programme  may  be reduced thus threatening potential competition in the future.  It is apparent from the data of the technical auditor that the scope of the contract, and thus PSP is to be reduced through the course of the five year management contract (Fichtner, 2007;  section  6.3).    The  means  by  which  this  process  occurs  is  the  provision within  the  management  contract  for  the  identification  of  snag  items  by  the operator, which  it  considers  insurmountable within  the period of  the  contract.  Subsequent  to agreement with  the grantor and certification by  the auditor,  the revised scope of the contract may be reduced to those systems which are most practicable with other systems excluded from contract terms.  Therefore, just as in the PSP contract design where unprofitable rural areas are excluded, through the course of PSP unprofitable urban areas are excluded.  With each reduction in the  scope  of  PSP  the  potential  for  competition  is  reduced,  thus  inhibiting  the potential for effective regulation and subsequent monitoring of performance and efficiency.      Considering  this,  the  intentions  expressed  by  the  World  Bank representatives  (2009;  section  7.4)  for  the  further  reduction  in  the  number  of systems  to  be  serviced  under  any  future  PSP  programme  threaten  to  further undermine  the  potential  for  surrogate  competition  and  subsequent  effects  on efficient private sector operation.      The  assumptions made  in  the  underlying  theory  of  property  rights  are thus shown to be problematic where privatisation is implemented in the context of the Ghanaian water sector.  It possible to identify various aspects of the critical assessment  of  the  theoretical  rationale  for  privatisation  that  are  supported  in this  context,  including  moral  hazard  and  potential  adverse  selection  (e.g. Eisenhardt,  1989;  Grossman  &  Hart,  1981),  residual  control  rights  being allocated to the private sector (Hart, 2003), the existence of multiple principals (e.g.  Laffont  &  Tirole,  1991),  significant  transaction  costs  (e.g.  Stiglitz,  2000) including  those  of  sector  institutions,  and  the  sub‐optimal  design  of  contracts (section 2.2).     Moral  hazard  is  evident  in  various  aspects  of  the  programme implemented  in Ghana.   Firstly,  the decision  to  formulate baseline data ex‐post inception of the contract, entails the principal cedes control of essential aspects of the contract, commitment of the private sector is assumed to exist ex‐post, as is the transfer of objectives and interests to the agent.  Secondly, the inclusion of snag items which determine the scope of systems to which contract terms apply ex‐post provides  a means by which  the private  sector  can  reduce  liability,  and alter  the  transfer  of  rights  intended  ex‐ante.    Thirdly,  the  control  of  revenue collection  accounts,  and  the  freedom  in  disbursement  thereof,  provides  the operator  a  basis  for  opportunistic  behaviour  to  the  detriment  of  the  principal and  their  objectives.    Fourthly,  the  design  of  the  contract  in  such  a  way  that penalties  and  incentives  for  the  operator  are  either  lacking  or  inadequate,  for example  in  the  resolution  ex‐post  by  recommendation  of  the  operator,  entails that control in this respect is ceded to the operator.  Fifth, the requirements for data transfer between the parties is threatened by the lack of penalties for non‐
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compliance,  with  the  potential  for  asymmetric  information  –  this  not  only jeopardises the potential to monitor the operator, but further affects the ability of the regulator to execute its intended functions.  In each of these instances, the residual control rights of  the various aspects of service provision belong to  the private  operator.    Thus,  in  the  case  of  Ghana,  the  contract  design  determines significant potential opportunism for the private sector.      In  various  respects  the  contract may  also  be  considered  sub‐optimal  in establishing a basis for these various aspects of moral hazard.  Firstly, regarding baseline  data,  the  potential  for  opportunism  in  this  respect,  and  dispute following  from  this,  is  recognised  by  those  designing  the  contract  but  is nevertheless  integrated  in  the  final  contract.    The  anticipation  of  dispute underlies  the  failure  to  establish  baselines,  with  those  responsible  fearing dispute  of  data  and  metering  ex‐post.    However,  the  decision  to  initiate  the contract without any such data simply provides the same possibility of dispute – as  has  been  the  case  in  practice.    Thus,  the  establishment  of  baseline  data  ex‐ante,  utilising  improved  metering,  would  have  avoided  this  aspect  of  moral hazard.   Secondly, sub‐optimal design is also evident in respect of the inclusion of  inadequate  penalty  and  incentives  for  the  inducement  of  operator  action.  Where  the  contract  stipulates  penalties  are  to  be  decided  ex‐ante,  following  a recommendation  by  the  operator  on  the  scale  of  penalty,  such  explicit acceptance of moral hazard could be avoided by the stipulation of penalties ex‐ante – this of course would follow the establishment of baseline data from which performance  may  be  assessed.    Thirdly,  and  related  to  this  second  point,  the potential  opportunism  which  follows  from  non‐compliance  with  data  transfer requirements  could be prevented  through  the  inclusion of  penalties  from  such non‐compliance.   Each of  these aspects  results  in a practical manifestation of a contract  where  the  effect  of  property  rights  transfer  is  significantly  reduced: after three years of a five year contract, there remains to be a transfer sufficient to realise the proposed value of privatisation, a significant failure in this example of PSP.   The  failure  to consider  these various aspects of contract design, which would  restrict  associated  opportunism,  offers  a  basis  upon  which  to  question both the capacity of the institutions responsible for designing and administering privatisation in Ghana, and the motivation for such failure – questions taken up in section 8.2 below.  The reduced scope of the contract, from an initial five year period  (which  is  already  short  relative  to  other  water  sector  contracts  –  see chapter  three),  further  reduces  the  potential  for  the  impact  of  implicit  control mechanisms.    Such  mechanisms  are  noted  by  Williamson  (1971)  and  Arrow (1969) as providing a implicit means by which to counter potential opportunism: the  long  term  interests  of  each  party  are  similar,  for  example  repeat  business may restrict opportunist behaviour (section 2.3, 2.4).   There is no such implicit control mechanism apparent in the Ghanaian water sector.      In  parallel  to  the  existence  of  various  forms  of  moral  hazard  and  the exacerbation of these through sector structuring, the costs of administering the contract  are  increased where  institutional  responsibilities  for  the  resolution of the  various  resultant  disputes  are  considered.   Within  the  field  of  transaction cost  economics,  such  costs  are  proposed  to  be  the  determining  factor  in  the selection  of  the  optimum  mode  of  economic  organisation,  and  in  the  case  of 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Ghana such transaction costs may be significant.  The ex‐post resolution of non‐contracted issues, and the intervention of a regulatory agency as is typical in the water sector, provide the basis for the existence of transaction costs.  Thus, they exist  in  the  resolution  of,  and  dispute  relating  to,  baseline  data,  snag  items, revenue accounts and disbursement thereof, the failure to establish penalty and data  transfer  regimes,  and  in  the  intervention  of  the  regulatory  agency.    The costs by nature are therefore not only  in  terms of  finance, but  in  terms of  time taken  for  dispute  and  resolution,  and  consequent  loss  of  purported improvements associated with the programme.      It  is  obvious  from  the  various  aspects  of  the  implementation  of privatisation  in  the water  sector  that  the  purported  advantages  accruing  from the introduction of the private sector may be undermined in the Ghanaian case.  It  is  apparent  from  the  evidence  presented  in  the  preceding  chapters,  and  the correlation  with  theory  and  critique  presented  here,  that  the  conditions  and mode  of  implementation  found  in  the  Ghanaian  case  significantly  limit  the incidence  of  proposed  advantages.    Incomplete  and  asymmetric  information, combined with a  sub‐optimal  contract, provide a basis  for  the  relevance of  the various  aspects  of  principal‐agent  theory.    The  failure within  the  rationalising theory  to  sufficiently  consider  the  significance  of  asymmetric  information, subsequent  principal‐agent  problems,  and  the  relevance  of  the  local environment and conditions, demonstrates the questionable validity of property rights  theory  for  application  in  this  context.    The  proposed  advantages  of  the introduction  of  the  private  sector  are  obfuscated  by  the  complexities  of implementation and administration,  and  thus where  the private  sector may,  in the  idealised  world  of  the  abstract  economic  modelling,  provide  efficiency  of operation, the case of Ghana demonstrates that the context and environment of implementation  determine  the  undermining  of  any  potential  to  achieve  these propositions.    
Summary  The introduction of the private sector in the provision of water services in Ghana is  rationalised  by  the  purported  improvement  in  efficiency,  sustainability  of services  and  greater  total  welfare  that  would  follow.    The  mode  of  economic organisation,  and  the  resolution  of  externalities  through  either  government  or private sector approach, is dependent on the associated costs of each approach.  The rationalisation of  the  introduction of  the private sector  finds a basis  in  the costs  associated  with  government  intervention,  and  the  efficiencies  to  be realised  in  private  resolution  (Coase,  1960;  Barnett  &  Yandle,  2009).  Assumptions are made when proposing such costs and efficiencies however, and as  has  been  demonstrated  here,  the  import  of  minimal  transaction  costs  and sufficient attribution of property  rights  is  significant.   While  it  is apparent  that the  operations  of  the  government  and  public  sector  in  Ghana  have  associated costs,  the  assumptions  underlying  the  proposed  efficiencies  are  shown  to  be problematic  in  this  case.   Water  service  provision  has  inherent  and  significant externalities, described in chapter two, which provide a foundation immediately contradictory  to  conditions assumed: natural monopoly  infers  the  intervention of an external regulating agency, and the nature of the resource infers inevitable 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political  interest.    In  addition  to  these  factors  basic  to  any  private  sector participation  in water  service  provision,  information  economics  and  principal‐agent  problems  indicate  further  significant  undermining  of  purported improvements.    Incomplete  and  asymmetric  information  in  the  Ghanaian  case leads  to  problematic  establishment  of  property  rights,  with  a  failure  in  the transfer  of  interest  from  principal  to  agent.    Instances  of  moral  hazard  and opportunism  are  frequent  and  considerable,  and  inhibit  the  operation  of  the contract as envisaged.  These conditions are exacerbated firstly by a sub‐optimal contract  design,  with  various  deficiencies  advancing  this  moral  hazard  and opportunism.   Secondly,  it may be observed that the deference to public choice theory  leads  to  a  failure  to  consider  the  inevitable  role  of  public  sector institutions in the operation of the contract, resulting in a shortfall in capacity of such institutions to perform intended roles.  The evaluation of PSP in the Ghana is  therefore  complex,  but  it  is  possible  to  assess  the  implementation  of  the programme in this case to be problematic, sub‐optimal, and incoherent with the host environment.  The evidence from Ghana demonstrates the weaknesses and simplicity  inherent  to  the rationalising  theoretical  framework where applied  in the context of the water sector in developing countries.     
8.2  Assumptions  underlying  the  theoretical  rationale:  extra­economic 
factors impacting performance and operation  As  a  further  consideration  of  the  validity  of  the  rationalising  theoretical framework  for  application  in  the  water  sector  in  developing  countries,  it  is necessary to align the performance and operation of PSP in Ghana to the critique reviewed  in chapter  two regarding more substantial assumptions of  the nature of  the  individual  and  the  disregarding  of  the  extra‐economic.    Such  extra‐economic  factors  are  of  particular  relevance  in  the  case  of  Ghana,  beyond  the institutional  considerations  inherent  to  the  implementation  of  privatisation  of water services,  the  institutional condition and capacity, and  the hybrid  form of contract  established,  provide  contradictory  tendencies  to  the  assumed conditions underlying the theoretical rationale.  Similar contradictory tendencies find  a  basis  in  the nature  of  the  resource  as  an  objectively  determined human need,  with  such  normative  judgements  providing  paradoxical  reality  to theoretical  paradigms.    Following  from  this,  it  is  possible  to  consider  the motivations  for  application  of  policy  founded  on  a  particular  theoretical framework which provides  so  little  consideration of  environmental  conditions, in particular where they are likely to be so contradictory to those assumed.  
Limitations  of  the  rationalising  theoretical  framework:  extra­economic 
determinants of PSP performance and operation  Considering  the  performance  and  operation  of  PSP  as  implemented  in  the Ghanaian water sector as reviewed in chapters five to seven, it  is apparent that significant in the determining factors are those of an extra‐economic nature.  Of particular  importance  in  the  Ghanaian  case  is  the  sub‐optimal  contract established, and the hybrid nature thereof.  The import of extra‐economic factors in  this case provides an  illustration of  the problematic assumptions underlying 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the  theoretical  framework  rationalising  the  introduction  of  the  private  sector.  The  consideration  of  the  optimum mode  of  economic  organisation  and  service provision as is inherent to the motivation for PSP implementation, finds a basis in the costs associated with each of public and private sectors.  However, as will be  maintained  here,  assumed  conditions  as  underlying  the  rationalisation  for PSP  in  service  provision  are  contradicted  in  this  case,  with  consequences  in terms  of  operation  and  performance.    Insufficient  property  rights  provides  a foundation  for  the  import  of  extra‐economic  factors,  with  associated  costs, where ambiguities and incomplete contracts exist.  This is evident in the case of Ghana when considering the inhibiting effect of the relationship between grantor and  operator,  the  parallel  and  interrelated  operation  of  each  sector,  and  the failure to consider and provide sufficient institutional capacity.    Optimal provision, and the efficiency of the provider, is at the basis of the rationalisation of the introduction of the private sector.  However, the utilisation of property rights and public choice theories, as components to the rationalising framework  for  PSP,  in  this  context  demonstrates  a  failure  to  consider  the assumptions necessary for their validity in policy implementation.  The idealised modelling of  the private and public sectors, based on an abstract conception of the  individual,  is  contradicted  where  implemented  in  the  water  sector  in developing  countries,  with  implications  in  terms  of  costs  associated  with  the mode of organisation.  The contrast in preference for public and private service provision  is  dependent  on  the  resolution  of  externalities  associated  with economic  activity.    Preference  for  the private  sector operation  is  shown  in  the work of Coase (1960), as a  foundation to subsequent component theories, with externalities proposed to be better resolved through establishment of property rights:  costs  associated  with  the  public  sector  and  government  intervention renders  the private  sector  preferable  (section 2.1).    Coase  is  explicit  in  stating necessary  assumptions  however:  appropriate  property  rights  should  be established and transaction costs should not be inhibitive.   Where developed in the  particular  theories  of  public  choice  and  property  rights,  such  assumptions appear secondary to the power of the concept of the individual in the elaboration of  an  abstract model  validating  private  sector  operation.    Certainly, where  the programme  is  implemented  in  the  water  sector,  as  has  been  discussed, environmental  conditions,  and  their  implications  for  transaction  costs  and property rights, are secondary to the idealised mode of organisation.      Property  rights  and  transaction  costs,  as  identified  by  Coase  as  being critical to the appropriate mode of economic organisation, are determined by the form  of  contract  and  administration  thereof.    Such  assumptions  are  implicit within  the  particular  theories  rationalising  PSP,  a  presumed  coherent environment  and  institutional  framework  integral  to  the  operation  and performance  as proposed.   The  conception of  the  individual  as  inherently  self‐interested and utility maximising provides  the defining  factor  in each of public choice and property rights theories.  Such a conception provides the basis for the abstract  economic  model  which  rationalises  implementation  across  a  globally uniform  environment:  variation  in  institutional  form  and  capacity  is  not accounted for.  Parallel to this is the ideological conception of the small state, the limiting  of  the  individual  in  government,  and  the  organic  development  of  laws 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(section 2.1).  The basis for the failure to account and provide for the capacity of state and institutional structures is established.   Transaction costs arising from the existence of conditions contradictory to those assumed are thus not factored into  the prioritisation of PSP or  the particular mode of  implementation of such programmes.      Evidence  from  the  introduction  of  PSP  in  the  water  sector  in  Ghana demonstrates  that  assumptions  integral  to  the  realisation  of  benefits  as proposed  are  undermined  with  consequences  for  operation  and  performance.  Regarding the first assumption, property rights fail to be established in coherent and  complete  form,  primarily  due  to  the  sub‐optimal  and  incomplete  contract.  Subsequently where  resolution  of  issues  deriving  from  this  failure  is  required, transaction  costs  impinge  significantly  on  operation  and  performance  – undermining  the  other  significant  assumption  –  with  administration  of  the contract incoherent and renegotiation typical.     Of particular importance in the Ghanaian case is the sub‐optimal contract established, and the hybrid nature thereof.   The contract established provides a significant basis for the ex‐post increase in importance of extra‐economic factors in determining performance  and operation.   Where  incomplete  contracts  exist, the potential impact of ex‐post renegotiation and dispute increases.  In the case of  Ghana,  the  design  of  the  PSP  contract  increases  the  potential  for  such eventuality.    This  is  apparent  in  the  desire  of  those  proponents  of  the  PSP contract  for  the private  sector  to be able  to operate with minimal  intervention and  interference  from  grantor  and  sector  institutions  as  was  possible.    Thus flexibility  for  the  operator  designed  into  the  contract,  with,  for  example,  the inclusion of  access  to  revenue accounts  finance  for  general  administration  and maintenance  costs,  and  the  provision  for  snag  items  to  be  identified  by  the operator  and  subsequently  removed  from  its  remit.    Attempts  to  design  a ‘hybrid’  contract,  where  the  operator  is  allowed  increased  flexibility  to demonstrate their purported efficiency of operation, therefore contribute in this context  to  the  basis  for  ex‐post  renegotiation  and  subsequently  the  import  of extra‐economic factors.  The effect of this aspect of contract design is paralleled where  contract  ambiguities  and  other  aspects  of  sub‐optimal  design  are considered.  The primary aspect to impact performance and operation here is the failure  to  establish  baseline  data  and  any  sufficient  ex‐post  arrangement  to establish  to  data.    Insufficient  and  ambiguous  penalties  and  incentives,  for example  relating  to  data  transfer  or  to  performance  improvements,  provide further instances of weakness in contract design and operation that increase the import of extra‐economic factors in ex‐post renegotiation and resolution.     Considering  the  foundation  for  increased  import  of  extra‐economic factors  in  the  ex‐post  renegotiation  provided  by  the  contract  design,  evidence suggests  further  extra‐economic  factors  impinge  on  the  renegotiation  process.  Negotiation  following  from  the  various  factors  which  remain  ambiguous  or unknown  ex‐post  entails  the  import  of  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between grantor and operator.   This is demonstrated to have significant implications for the  resolution  of  such  non‐contracted  factors,  and  subsequently  for  the operation and performance of the programme.  In addition, the prioritisation of 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the  implementation  of  PSP  and  failure  to  sequence  investment  appropriately provide  a  basis  for  ex‐post  conflict.    Parallel  operation  of  public  and  private sectors,  and  the  particular  mode  of  management  contract  implemented, contribute  to  this  process:  responsibilities  for  different  aspects  of  service provision, combined with ambiguity in the particular conditions of this, leads to conflicts in the implementation of the programme, and the public representation thereof (section 7.1).  Such contradictions, conflicts and subsequent antagonism evident  in  the  relationship  between  grantor  and  operator  represent  a  field  of extra‐economic  factors  which  fail  to  be  accounted  for  in  the  underlying theoretical  framework.    They  further  contribute  to  significant  costs  in administration,  not  considered  in  the  rationalising  of  the  programme  and  the particular mode of  implementation.   This process  furthermore undermines  the possibility  of  the  development  of  implicit  control  mechanisms  (section  2.2), whereby common understanding and norms of operation, as well as  long‐term mutual  interest, entail  that disputes and non‐contracted  issues will be resolved with minimal costs.    The particular form of PSP established in Ghana has further repercussions for the potential for improvement in performance and operation.  This has been shown  in  respect  to  the  parallel  operation  of  private  and  public  sectors,  with staffing and organisational arrangements impinging on an idealised independent operation  of  the  private  sector.    This would  be  true where  any  private  sector operator  takes  on  service  provision  with  previously  public  sector  staff,  with acquired  employment  rights  impinging  on  organisation  of  operations.    It  is however exaggerated in the case of Ghana where staff remain employees of the grantor, being seconded to the operator.  Expectations of service conditions and promotion  provide  a  resistant  force  to  the  proposed  reorganisation  under  the private sector.  The continued relevance of the public sector in this respect is not considered  in  rationalising  theory,  and  provides  an  inhibitive  force  to  the proposed commercialisation of operations under the private sector.    The  broader  institutional  environment  provides  further  evidence  of  the problematic  implementation  of  the  PSP  programme  within  this  context,  with normalised  modes  of  operation  and  insufficient  capacity  demonstrating incoherence  and  the  import  of  such  extra‐economic  factors.    While  there  is incorporated, within documentation relating to the programme, a recognition of the significance of a coherent and adequate institutional environment, it may be maintained  that  this  is  either  rhetorical  commitment  to  such  provision  or implementation  is  flawed.    This  may  be  demonstrated  where  considering regulation  of  the  operator,  firstly  with  regard  to  the  structuring  of  such regulation, with the grantor being the regulated body and the operator therefore being  regulated  indirectly.    It  is  secondly  evident where  the  structuring  of  the programme entails a single operator, undermining the potential for the regulator to provide surrogate competition as necessary within this sector –  the reduced and  reducing  scope  of  PSP,  deriving  from questionable  commercial  viability  of operation,  undermines  this  likelihood  further.    Finally,  it  is  evident  in  the financing  of  the  regulator,  with  funding  associated  with  the  programme insufficient  to  permit  the  functioning  of  the  agency.    The  failure  to  ensure  the coherence  and  adequate  condition  of  the  institutional  environment 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demonstrates a divergence from the, at  least rhetorical, commitment evident in the broader reform agenda being undertaken  in Ghana.    It demonstrates, more obviously,  a  manifestation  of  the  underlying  theoretical  rationale  for  the programme, which  fails  to  consider  the  costs  associated with  operation  of  the private sector, in general terms but in particular where in this particular context – monopoly conditions and contradictory institutional environment.    
Limitations  of  the  rationalising  theoretical  framework:  normative  judgements  of 
need  In addition to the implications for the potential to account for variation in local context  and  institutional  environment,  the  theoretical  rationalisation  for privatisation,  and  the  particular  conception  of  the  individual  inherent  therein, prove problematic where accounting for normative judgements on water service provision.  As has been described in chapter two, there appears to be a paradox between  the  theoretical  framework  and  associated  conception  of  individual determinant  of  their  need,  and what  is  typical  in  practice,  where  objective  or normative conceptions of human need provide a basis for social policy (Doyal & Gough, 1991).  The very basis for introduction of PSP in water service provision, as propounded by sponsors of the programme, is the improved sustainability of the service as a basis for subsequent expansion of provision.   At the same time, The Ghanaian Government is signatory to international covenants regarding the right to water as an essential physiological need and therefore human right (see chapter five).  The paradox is thus established in practice in the Ghanaian case.      Regarding  the  PSP  programme,  the  paradox  between  theory  and  sector policy contributes to the basis for the divergence in proposed operation and that realised.    The  inherent  contradiction  between  market  based  provision,  which underlies the desire for full cost recovery in services, and sector requirements in developing  countries  such  as  Ghana,  is  manifest  in  various  areas  of  the  PSP programme in the country.  Noteworthy here is the effect realised in the form of contract  established  and  the  repercussions  which  follow.    A  lease  contract, requiring  investment  for  the  expansion  of  services  (following  from  the normative  judgement  regarding  the  benefits  of  such)  failed  to  attract  investor interest, thus forcing a management contract.  The subsequent parallel operation of grantor and operator contributes to the problematic implementation observed in Ghana: the inevitable role of the public sector, and political interest in service provision,  entail  divided  responsibilities  –  disputed  where  ill‐defined.    The contradictory  tendencies  of  the  underlying  theoretical  rationale  and  the aspiration  for  universal  service  provision  are  further manifest  in  the  reducing scope  of  the PSP programme.    In  addition  to  the  reduced  scope  evident  in  the shift to management contract, the utilisation of a single operator and the reduced number of systems to which PSP applies  is demonstrative of this contradiction.  The  failure  to  successfully  incorporate  these  contradictory  ideals,  full  cost recovery  and  universal  service  provision,  leads  in  the  case  of  Ghana  to  the undermining  of  the  operation  of  the  PSP  programme:  the  functioning  of regulation  is  increasingly undermined by  the  implications  of  full  cost  recovery for  the  scope  of  PSP  (reduced  systems  and  a  single  operator  undermines  the potential to implement surrogate competition).  Of course, the very requirement 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for a regulatory agency  is based partly on the requirement to maintain socially acceptable pricing in a monopoly environment, thus deriving from the normative judgements of need.      It  may  be  maintained  therefore  that  within  the  context  of  the  water sector,  the  failure  at  a  theoretical  level  to  account  for  the  reality  of  normative conceptions of need provides  the basis  for a policy programme which neglects the needs of service provision within that context, and which furthermore denies the social reality of the institutional environment within which the programme is located.  Practical manifestation of this is policy that is misaligned with the needs of  service  provision  and  expansion  thereof,  and  in  fact  contributes  to  the problematic implementation of such policy and the successful operation thereof.      
Theory as ideology  It  is  apparent  from  the  above  discussion  that  the  validity  of  the  theoretical rationale for privatisation may be questioned where applied in the water sector in developing  countries  such as Ghana.    Propositions of  the particular  theories underlying the implementation of PSP in the water sector become invalid where assumed conditions are contradicted by  the existing environment.   This  is  true for  both  public  choice  and  property  rights  theories,  with  various  associated propositions  subsequently  shown  to  be  questionable  in  practice.    It  is  further maintained  above  that  the  commitment  to  implementation  of  policy  based  on such  theory may  in  fact  contribute  to  the  import  of  extra‐economic  factors  in resolution  of  problematic  implementation.    The  disparity  in  assumed  and  real conditions,  and  subsequent  divergence  in  proposed  and  real  performance, prompt  the  questioning  of  the  motivation  for  application  of  such  a  policy programme deriving from this theoretical paradigm.    This  commitment  to  a  privatisation  programme  rationalised  by  the particular  theories  outlined  in  earlier  chapters  is  demonstrated  in  the implementation  of  a  contract  with  obvious  and  significant  failings.    While contracts  are  inevitably  incomplete  and  will  incorporate  proposed  means  of resolution, these means of resolution are an inhibitive cost to the propositions of the underlying theory – and these are significant in the case of Ghana due to the occurrence of dispute.  In addition to these inherent transaction costs, the design of  the  contract  is  sub‐optimal  in  terms  of  the  inevitability  of  moral  hazard consequent  to  its design,  and  the various  issues  that  could have been  resolved prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  contract.    The  contract  in  Ghana  was established with various critical elements left to ex‐post resolution, when these unknowns  could  have been  resolved prior  to  commencement.    This  is  true  for baseline data,  for systems to be designated as  ‘snag  items’, and for penalty and incentive regimes.  It is also the case that improved specificity regarding revenue collection  and  disbursement  and  data  transfer  would  lessen  the  likelihood  of dispute.  Had such issues been clarified prior to the contract, ex‐post dispute and negotiation would have inevitably been reduced in scope.    In practice however, the  contract  has  been  established  with  such  unknowns  included,  and  an apparently insufficient regime of ex‐post resolution incorporated. 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It has been expressed by those involved in the design of the contract that many  of  these  factors  exist  as  a  means  by  which  to  allow  the  private  sector flexibility  in  their  operations,  thus  not  being  inhibited  by  government intervention.  Such an intention may coincide with the underlying conception of the  state  as  associated  with  privatisation  theory,  but  in  practice  it  is  a  tacit recognition  of  the  capacity  provided  to  the  private  sector  for  opportunistic behaviour under the veil of ‘flexible’ and thus ‘efficient’ operation.  It is therefore possible  to question  the motivations  for  the  implementation of  such a contract with obvious but preventable flaws – it is unlikely the cost of ex‐ante resolution would  be  greater  than  that  ex‐post,  considering  the  impact  of  disputes  and negotiations.    This  question  may  equally  be  applied  to  the  motivation  for implementing  the  programme within  an  environment  with  apparently  lacking capacity.    A  failure  to  provide  such  capacity  indicates  that  commitment  to  the propositions of public choice theory undermines the performance and operation of  the  contract.    In  ignoring  such  basic  prerequisites,  the  contract  and  its designers  shift  significant  potential  for  opportunism,  and  power,  toward  the private  sector.    The  asymmetry  of  information  existent  ex‐post  –  information required  for  the  resolution of  those various contract  terms noted above –  is  in the  favour of  the private  sector.   The asymmetry of  capacity evident  in  the ex‐ante period,  in the establishment of a sub‐optimal contract,  is only exacerbated ex‐post.       Evident contradiction between theory and practice raises the question of the motive  for  implementation of policy based on  such  theory.   As  is noted by Udehn  (1996,  see  chapter  two),  the  potency  associated  with  the  neo‐classical theoretical  framework  beyond  its  abstract  theoretical  basis,  derives  from  the inherent,  notional,  qualities  of  universality  and  objectivity.    The  supposed universal  character  of  the  individual,  as  self‐interested  and  utility maximising, and  the  associated  conceptualisation  of  the  structure  of  the  state‐individual relation,  provides  significant  power  as  a  basis  for  the  rationalisation  for  social policy without regard  for host environment.    It  is maintained by Udehn (1996) that  the  theoretical qualities of  the neo‐classical  framework  take on a meaning and  power  in  their  reception  and  utilisation  in  broader  social  analysis  and beyond which is not explicit in the theoretical detail.      In the case of PSP in the Ghanaian water sector, it is apparent that the PSP programme based  on  this  theoretical  framework  is  implemented  in  conditions and an environment contradictory  to  that assumed.   Considering  the operation and performance of PSP  in  this context,  it  is reasonable  to propose to question the validity of  the  theoretical model utilised.   Considering  the history of PSP  in the water sector in developing countries (as described in chapter three), and the typically contradictory conditions found therein, it is reasonable to question the motive  for  the  repeated  application  of  this  theoretical  model  in  this  context.  Consequently, does the notional potency of the theoretical model preclude such analysis of host conditions and the validity of the model in that context?  Thus, as Udehn (1996: 189) may ask, does  the  theoretical model move beyond  its strict theoretical  basis  and  come  to  take  on  an  ideological  force:  “a  theory  that misrepresents  reality  and  introduces  bias  in  order  to  justify  a  free  market society”?  It may be maintained that, considering the various stages and levels of 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PSP which demonstrate  the problematic,  sub‐optimal and  ill‐considered design and  implementation,  theory  in  this  instance  takes on an  ideological  form.   The influence  of  theoretical  framework  rationalising  PSP  is  obvious  in  the  form  of programme implemented.   It  is also apparent that theoretical concepts, and the potency  thereof,  influence  the  decision  making  and  design  process  –  the undermining  of  the  public  sector  and  provision  of  flexibility  for  the  private sector – even where the practical manifestation of such design undermines the operation  and  performance  of  the  programme.    This  influence  demonstrates  a utilisation  of  theoretical  concepts  beyond  the  idealised  conditions  found  in abstract  economic  models.    The  utilisation  of  such  concepts  beyond  their theoretical  capacity  undermines  the  required  appraisal  of  the  host environmental  conditions  and  thus  the  design  required  for  successful implementation.  Global uniformity and absence of institutional consideration as central  to  the  rationalising  theoretical  framework  further  contributes  to  this.  There  is  thus  a  misrepresentation  of  reality  within  the  water  sector  in  the developing  country  context  as  a means  of  implementing  a  particular model  of economic organisation, one detached  from the actual environmental conditions evident in this context.   Such an implementation of a demonstrably limited and simplistic  model,  which  is  acknowledged  by  at  least  some  of  theorists  upon which the theoretical model is based (e.g. Coase, 1960; Buchanan, 1962), shows the  ideological  potency  of  associated  conceptions  yet  also  their  manifest implications for policy.   
Conclusion and discussion  Preceding chapters have considered the propositions of rationalising theory for privatisation,  the  associated  weaknesses,  inconsistencies  and  problematic assumptions, and the apparent manifestation of  these where the programme is implemented in the water sector in the case study country of Ghana.  It has been the purpose of  this  chapter  to  establish  the  extent of  the  connections between the  factors  identified  in  the  critical  appraisal  of  the  theoretical  rationale,  and performance and operation of privatisation where implemented in this context.  The  evidence  from  Ghana  suggests  that  there  are  various  levels  at  which  the factors  identified  in  the  critical  assessment  are  manifest  in  the  divergence  of performance and operation from that proposed within the theoretical rationale.  The  contract  has  been  demonstrated  to  be  incomplete  in  various  critical respects, resulting in various instances of moral hazard, distorted risk allocation, and the  increased import  in the  intervention of  institutions  in the resolution of associated  disputes.    The  propositions  of,  in  particular,  property  rights  theory are  undermined  where  assumed  conditions  are  contradicted  in  practice.    The importance of the social, political and institutional environment is demonstrated further  in  the  reception  of  the  programme,  its  administration  and  coherence with  the  national  framework  including  those  agencies  responsible  for monitoring,  regulation  and  resolution  of  non‐contracted  issues,  as  well  where the  private  firm  is  intended  to  operate  in  parallel  with  the  state  holding company. 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 The  theoretical  framework  underlying  privatisation  rationalises  the exclusion  of  the  political,  social  and  environmental  environment  from consideration in development of the policy programme.  The over‐simplified and abstract modelling of economic exchanges is notably detached from the reality of social  and  economic  contexts  within  which  privatisation  is  implemented,  and this  is  evident  in  the  case  of  Ghana.    Thus  where  the  assumptions  of  those theories  are  undermined  by  actual  conditions  in  implementation,  particularly regarding  complete  contracts,  the  inevitable  role  of  the  social,  political  and institutional  environment  in  the  resolution  of  non‐contracted  issues  is  not accounted  for  by  the  theory  and  is  limited  in  recognition  in  the  policy programme.  Where the role of this environment is recognised by those sponsors of  the  privatisation  programme,  resulting  limited  practical  manifestation demonstrates  typically  rhetorical  nature of  such  recognition.    Furthermore  the conceptualisation of  the role of  the state  is  that which may be aligned with the ‘post‐Washington  consensus’:  the  state  is  considered  as  facilitator  of  private sector  operation,  regardless  of  existing  institutional  structures  and  norms  of operation.  Intervention of government is undesirable, regardless of whether this contradicts  the  actuality  of  local  norms  and  practices,  or  contradicts  the inevitability of  intervention  in a  resource provision characterised by politically sensitive features of public and merit good or human right.      It  is  further  apparent  in  the  case  of  Ghana  that  the  particular mode  of implementation  exacerbates  the  undermining  of  assumptions  inherent  to  the theoretical rationale.  The contract established incorporates numerous elements which are left to ex‐post resolution, including those integral to the assessment of performance  of  the  private  sector  operator.    The  inclusion  of  these  numerous factors  provides  an  enhanced  likelihood  of  ex‐post  opportunistic  behaviour, dispute  and  negotiation.    It  follows  that,  considering  this  increased  likelihood which has been shown to be evident in practice, the role and import of the social, political  and  institutional  environment  is  also  increased.    In  attempting  to provide  the  private  sector  increased  flexibility  in  its  operations,  those responsible for the programme design in fact move the practical implementation of  privatisation  further  from  the  idealised  conditions  of  the  rationalising theoretical framework – and thus making the undermining of assumptions have greater  negative  ramifications  for  the  operation  and  performance  of  the programme than otherwise may have been the case.      Considering the apparent contradiction between the theoretical rationale for privatisation and the conditions found in the water sector in Ghana, and the contribution  of  this  to  the  performance  and  operation  of  the  programme,  it  is possible to question the validity of this theoretical framework application in such contexts.   Considering the typical conditions  found  in the water sector, and the nature of the resource itself, the failure to account for the inevitable intervention of government provides a basis upon which particular theories are undermined.  The  inevitable  role  of  extra‐economic  factors  is  thus  established,  and contradictory to the theoretical rationale.  This divergence of actual conditions of implementation from rationalising theory is furthered where the programme is implemented  in  local  environments  which  prove  to  be  contradictory  to  the assumed  institutional  coherence  associated  with  the  theoretical  rationale  – 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Conclusions:  reappraising  privatisation  and  theoretical  validity; 
implications of the Ghanaian experience for broader trends in PSP   At the outset of this thesis, it was described that the performance and operation of  privatisation  in  the water  sector  in  developing  countries  typically  follows  a trend  that  significantly  diverges  from  those  essential  propositions  associated with the underlying rationalising theory.  The subsequent intention has been to attempt  to  account  for  this  divergence  through  the  analysis  of  potential weakness,  inconsistencies  and  problematic  assumptions  in  the  underlying theory,  and  consequently  confirm  their  manifestation  in  the  problematic implementation of the programme in the case study country of Ghana.  Preceding chapters  describe  the  correlation  of  aspects  of  the  rationalising  theoretical framework,  and  the  associated  critique,  noting  that  the  problematic implementation of the PSP programme can be attributed to the manifestation of various of these aspects.  The following discussion provides an assessment of the process by which divergent performance and operation of the PSP programme is realised,  the  contribution  of  the  particular  mode  of  implementation demonstrated  in  Ghana,  and  the  potential  implications  for  the  broader  PSP programme where applied in the water sector in developing countries.      The  central  argument  made  here  concerns  the  derivation  of  divergent performance  and  operation  from,  initially,  incoherent  and  invalid  theoretical basis  for  the  programme,  subsequent  sub‐optimal  and  ideologically motivated implementation, and,  finally, consequences which may undermine the potential for  successful  operation  of  the  programme  in  the  future.    Following  from  the evidence revealed in Ghana, it will be maintained in the first section here that the problematic  implementation  of  PSP  derives  from  an  incoherent  rationalising theory,  the  manifestation  of  which  is  evident  in  the  design,  structuring  and administration  of  the  programme.    The  basis  for  the  trend  for  dispute, renegotiation  and  cancellation  typical  of  water  sector  PSP  is  thus  established, and  underlies  subsequent  manifestation.    This  is  demonstrated  where  the particular mode  of  implementation  of  PSP  in Ghana  is  considered, with  a  sub‐optimal  and  ideologically  determined  form  of  PSP  exaggerating  the  inherent incoherence of theory and context, further contributing to the trend established in the sector.   It follows, it will be proposed here in the second section, that the trend  established  in  the  sector  finds  an  inevitable  progression  in  the manifestation of PSP in Ghana – one which potentially threatens the viability of the PSP programme as typically structured.   This concerns the repercussions of decreasing  investor  interest  (deriving  from  the  incoherence  of  theory  with sector  conditions)  in  terms  of  concessions  made  to  the  private  sector  to engender  their  involvement  (realised  in  permitted  opportunism),  and  the consequences  for  the  structuring  and  necessary  intervention  of  sector institutions (the capacity and functioning of, for example, the regulator).  Where concessions  determine  opportunism,  the  result  is  necessary  institutional intervention  for  dispute  resolution  and  renegotiation  –  institutions  denied capacity consequent to ideological commitment to theoretical conceptions.   
  181 
  
9.1  Reappraisal  of  theoretical  validity  and  coherence  with  sector 
conditions  The Ghanaian  experience  of  PSP  in  the water  sector  demonstrates  consistency with the broader trend for dispute and subsequent renegotiation of contracts.  In the exposition of the factors which underlie this trend, this thesis has utilised the rationalising  theory  underlying  the  programme  as  an  explanatory  framework.  The  following discussion draws together  the evidence  from preceding chapters in an analysis of the apparent incoherence of theory with existent conditions.   It is maintained here that the utilisation of this rationalising theoretical framework has  inevitable  consequences  for  the  functioning  of  the  PSP  programme,  such consequences  being  consistent  with  those  of  the  broader  trend  characterising PSP in the sector.  It is possible therefore, as will be maintained here, to question the  validity  of  the  rationalising  framework  for  application  in  this  context.    In addition,  the  particular  mode  of  implementation  in  Ghana,  with  a  deficient contract  demonstrating  sub‐optimal  execution,  demonstrates  the  role  of ideological  commitment  to  theoretical  concepts,  in  this  case  leading  to  the exaggeration  of  problematic  implementation  and  subsequent  divergence  from purported operation.   
Problematic implementation: incoherence of theory and water sector conditions  Evidence  from  the  water  sector  in  Ghana  demonstrates  the  contradictory processes  in  play  where  privatisation  is  implemented  in  such  a  sector  in developing countries.   It is evident that the form of programme implemented is coherent  with  the  underlying  theoretical  framework,  and  that  this  framework informs the approach of those responsible for the design and administration of the contract.  While the programme thus derives from this particular theoretical framework,  its  implementation  inevitably  encounters  conditions  contradictory to those assumed within this rationale and which are necessary for the validity of associated  propositions.    This  contradiction  can  be  found  in  three  aspects  of provision.    The  first  is  the  inherent  problems  offered  by  the  water  sector, including  those  deriving  from  natural  monopoly  conditions,  and  include furthermore  the apparent paradox of  conceptions of water as a  right and need relative  to  underlying  conceptions  of  the  individual  essential  to  theory.  Contradiction is found, secondly, in the broader political, social and institutional environment  hosting  the  PSP  programme.    The  underlying  theoretical framework provides a rationale for the absence of such an environment from the policy and programme design process,  and  is  thus as an explanatory  factor  for the  failure  to  account  for,  and  provide  sufficient  capacity  for,  this  institutional environment.   Contradiction  is  further  found,  thirdly,  in  the  location of  the PSP programme  within  the  broader  institutional  programme  being  employed  by sponsor IFIs.  Such a programme, coherent with the ‘post‐Washington consensus’ recognised as being  employed  in developing  countries more broadly,  explicitly acknowledges  the  importance  of  institutional  capacity  in  the  success  of development  policy  –  as  seen  in  Ghana  GPRS  programmes.    The  failure  to 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acknowledge and provide sufficient capacity for water sector institutions for the administration of PSP in this case thus appears inconsistent.      A  number  of  research  questions  were  identified  in  chapter  four,  being drawn  from  the  preceding  description  rationalising  theory,  critical  assessment thereof,  and  the  trends  of  implementation  of  the  programme  in  developing countries  generally.    The  overall  motivating  question  was  that  regarding  the divergence  of  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed:  why  is  there  a divergence  in  the  propositions  associated  with  the  theoretical  rationale  and actual performance and operation of the programme where implemented in the water sector in developing countries?  In the context of this thesis this question has  been  addressed  by  reference  to  the  critical  analysis  of  this  motivating rationale  and  alignment  of  practical  implementation  with  those  weaknesses, inconsistencies  and  problematic  assumptions.    As  the  central  motivating question  with  which  this  research  has  been  concerned,  the  corresponding central  conclusion  that  may  be  provided  in  response  is  that  the  underlying rationale  and  the  associated  effect  on  the  practical  form  of  privatisation  may contribute  to  the  trends  characterising  privatisation  in  the  sector.    The  data revealed  in  the  implementation  of  privatisation  in  the  water  sector  in  Ghana demonstrates  that  the  utilisation  of  the  particular  rationalising  theoretical framework for the programme has implications in the performance and form of operation  that  results.    This  is  evident  at  various  levels  of  analysis,  but  can primarily  be  seen  in  relation  to  the  form  of  contract  implemented  and  the deficiencies  thereof,  and  the  intervention  and  relevance  of  the  political,  social and institutional environment within which the programme is implemented.  It is maintained that this evidence in the case of Ghana supports the contention that the  failure  to  account  for  these  elements,  which  are  so  integral  to implementation,  in  the  underlying  theoretical  rationale  contributes  to  the divergence in performance and operation of privatisation.  It further maintained following  the  evidence  from  Ghana  that  the  commitment  to  the  privatisation programme  in  such  contradictory  conditions,  and  its  derivation  from  this theoretical rationale, exacerbates the divergence in performance and operation.  This commitment  further contributes to the conflicting trend present  in Ghana, and  aligning  with  water  sector  privatisation  in  other  countries,  for  the programme  to  be  characterised  by  dispute,  conflict  and  renegotiation.    The failure  to  account  for  conditions  in  the  sector  is  evident  in  relation  to  the commercial  viability  of  service  provision.    The  trend  in  Ghana  indicates  the reduction  in  scope  of  privatisation  –  both  through  the  period  of  the  contract under  review  and  potentially  for  the  succeeding  contract  should  there  be  one.  The  failure  to  account  for  conditions  in  the  sector  is  also  evident  where institutional  importance  is  overlooked  in  the  design  of  the  programme.    It  has been  maintained  in  relation  to  this  that  the  theoretical  foundations  of privatisation  rationalise  the  exclusion of  the  institutional  environment  and  the import thereof in the implementation of the programme.     Other research questions considered the manner and extent to which the particular  aspects  of  this  theoretical  rationale  contribute  to  this  divergence  in performance.   The first of  these other research questions relates to the specific contribution  of  the  points  noted  in  the  critical  appraisal  of  the  underlying 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rationale to performance and operation: to what extent, and in what ways, do the component theories of this rationale, and their weaknesses, inconsistencies and problematic  assumptions,  contribute  to  this  divergence  in  performance  and operation  from  that  proposed?    Subsequently,  the  aspects  of  the water  sector, and their coherence with the underlying theoretical framework are considered:  in  what  respects  do  the  conditions  typically  found  in  the  water  sector  in developing  countries  undermine  the  validity  of  the  theoretical  framework  for application in this context?  In addition to the particularities of the water sector, the import and implications of local contextual and environmental conditions are considered: to what extent are local conditions – social, political and institutional norms and capacities –  recognised  in  the  form and mode of  implementation of the privatisation programme?  The application of the privatisation programme in apparently contradictory conditions subsequently raised the issue of motivating factors  for  this  application:  does  ideological  commitment  to  the  programme, founded on an inherently flawed theoretical model and applied in contradictory conditions,  negatively  affect  the  likelihood  of  coherence  with  local environmental conditions and thus more successful operation?  These questions have been addressed with assessment at various levels of privatisation of water services in Ghana, and considering the data revealed in this context, it has been maintained  that  the  validity  of  the  theoretical  framework  rationalising privatisation  is  undermined  considering  performance  and  operation  and  the contribution towards this of failings in this framework.      The  first notable aspect of privatisation  in Ghana  that  substantiates  this claim  of  questionable  validity  is  that  relating  to  the  contract  that  has  been established.    It  has  been  noted  in  the  preceding  chapter  that  the  contract  in Ghana has various elements which validate the critique of property rights theory offered  by  information  economics,  principal‐agent  theory  and  transaction  cost economics.    The  numerous  and  significant  deficiencies  in  the  contract  provide evidence of moral hazard, opportunistic behaviour, the failure to allocate rights and  risk  appropriately,  and  significant  costs  of  institutional  intervention  and administration  –  all  aspects  associated  with  the  critique  offered  by  principal‐agent and  transaction cost economics  literature.   This  is  true  in  relation  to  the lack  of  baseline  data  in  the  contract,  from  which  performance  of  the  private operator is to be assessed, and this has consequences in ex‐post in terms of the lack of ability to apply penalties or incentives associated with performance, the extensive  ex‐post  process  of  resolution  and  negotiation,  and  the  associated disputes  between  parties  that  have  characterised  the  contract,  and  which remained  at  the  time  of  research  (three  years  into  a  five  year  contract) significant  obstacles  to  the  operation  of  the  contract  as  intended.    It  is  further true in relation to the inclusion of ‘snag items’ in the contract which significantly alters  the  degree  of  transfer  of  rights,  with  an  associated  distortion  of  rights attribution and  residual  rights of  control being  located with  the private  sector.  Further  distortions  of  the  transfer  of  rights  is  seen  in  the  ceding  of  control  of revenue and its disbursement to the private sector, the incomplete or suboptimal penalty  and  incentive  structure,  and  the  existence  of multiple  principals.    The asymmetry of information in the sector underlies much of these various aspects of  problematic  implementation  of  theory.    The  transfer  of  property  rights,  the associated internalisation of externalities is thus undermined and significant and 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evident  potential  opportunism.    The  consequence  of  this  failure  to  formulate property  rights  theory  in  a  complete  contract  is  not  only  the  undermining  of proposed performance improvements, but more noteworthy in this instance the contribution  of  these  various  deficiencies  to  the  likelihood  of  and  manifest dispute and renegotiation process.   A failure to account for such possibilities in the rationalising theory provides a basis for such eventualities.      The failure to account for such conditions further demonstrates the water sector provides a context which undermines the assumptions of the underlying theoretical  rationale,  and  this  is  demonstrated  in  various  respects.    The necessary  intervention  of  a  regulator,  deriving  from  natural  monopoly conditions and the nature of the resource as merit good and human right, implies information asymmetry, multiple principals and transaction costs contradictory to  the  proposals  of  property  rights  theory.    The  particular  configuration  of regulation  in Ghana  further confuses  the  transfer of  rights and objectives, with the regulatory agency having direct regulation of the state holding company and only indirectly the private operator.  In practice this intended operation is in fact undermined by  the  informal  interaction of  the  regulator  and private  company.  The evidence of Ghana further demonstrates the reducing scope of privatisation with  respect  to  the  extent  of  service  provision  under  the  programme.    The contract  has  resulted  in  practice  in  a  reduction  of  the  number  of  provision systems  to which  contractual  terms apply,  and  indications of  sponsors  suggest this reduced scope will be confirmed in any future contract.  These among other instances  of  non‐commercial  operation  demonstrate  that  the  water  sector  in practice  provides  contradictory  conditions  to  those  assumed,  undermining  the proposed improved mode of operation and performance.      The  presence  of  contradictory  conditions  deriving  from  the characteristics  of  the  water  sector  are  paralleled  by  those  presented  by  the political, social and institutional environment in the developing country context.  The environment  in Ghana demonstrates an  incoherence with  those conditions assumed  within  the  rationalising  theory,  and  necessary  for  the  validity  of associated claims.  It has been demonstrated that the role and mode of operation of the state in this context diverges from that assumed and idealised within this theoretical  framework.    This  is  evident  in  the  typical  and  normalised mode  of operation of national institutions, with inevitable intervention in the sector due to  political  sensitivity  or  water  pricing  being  paralleled  by  norms  of  political management  within  the  sector  and  associated  agencies.    This  evidence  of resistance  to,  and mutation  of,  the  privatisation  programme  is  contrary  to  the assumed coherence of the institutional environment inherent to the rationalising theory.  The potency inherent to the rationalising theoretical framework derives from  the  over‐simplification  of  economic  transaction,  established  in  abstract economic  modelling  which  excludes  the  inevitable  complexities  of  both incomplete  contracts  and  the  intervention  and  import  of  institutional environments in the determination of the outcomes of such transactions.  In this sense,  the utilisation of  this particular  framework provides a basis  from which proponents  of  the  programme  can  disregard  the  inevitable  role  of  this institutional environment and the intervention of incorporated agencies.  This is seen  in  the  history  of  privatisation  in  developing  countries,  with more  recent 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limited  recognition  of  institutional  role.    In  the  case  of  Ghana,  this  limited conception is manifest in several respects.  Within the context of the sector itself, it is the case that capacity of sector institutions to perform administration of the privatisation contract is typically lacking.  This is demonstrated in the case of the regulator  that  has  persistent  and  significant  shortfalls  in  budgetary requirements  through  the period  of  its  operation.    It  is  notable  in  the  broader institutional  context  in  terms  of  the  resistance  and  local  mutation  of  policies intended  to  provide  accountable  and  transparent  operation  of,  for  example, procurement  procedures.    This  absent  or  limited  conception  of  the  role  of  the institutional environment in the performance and operation of the privatisation contract is rationalised by the exclusion of such considerations in the underlying theoretical  framework.    In  this  sense,  local  conditions  –  social,  political  and institutional  norms  and  capacities  –  fail  to  be  recognised  in  the  rationalising theory, and are subsequently recognised in only a limited sense in the practical implementation of the programme.    
Sub­optimal and inconsistent implementation  In  these various aspects of  implementation of PSP  in Ghana,  it  is apparent  that there  are  multiple  occasions  on  which  it  may  be  considered  that  there  is demonstrated  both  sub‐optimal  and  inconsistent  execution.    In  each  case evidence  suggests  the  contribution  to  the  problematic  performance  and operation  of  the  programme  and  deviation  from  that  proposed.    Sub‐optimal implementation  is evident  firstly  in  the  failure  to establish baseline data  in  the contract,  the  foundation  of which  being  substandard metering  and  a  failure  to consider the capacity for establishing such data.   Most substantially, this aspect of  PSP  in  Ghana  demonstrates  a  prioritisation  of  the  implementation  the programme  ahead  of  implementation  with  such  basic  information  being available.  This prioritisation is either demonstrative of significant incompetence on the part of those responsible for the programme, or is representative of a bias in  preference  of  a  particular  contract  partner.    The  latter  possibility  may  be substantiated  by  the  deficiency  of  data  ex‐ante  (as  acknowledged  by  the sponsor),  and  subsequently  the  possibility  of  opportunistic  behaviour  on  the part of the private operator.  This position is compounded by the neglect, further evidence of sub‐optimal implementation, to establish sufficient penalties for the delay  or  failure  to  establish  such  data:  this  may  further  be  considered incompetence  or  bias  in  the  favour  of  the  private  operator.    The  particular structuring of PSP in the Ghanaian case provides further evidence which may be considered sub‐optimal, with subsequent questions as to the motivation for this aspect  of  implementation.    This  is  true  in  the  sense  that  the mediation  of  the relationship  between  regulator  and  operator,  by  the  intermediary  of  the  state company,  restricts  the  capacity  of  the  former  to  function  as  intended  (data transfer being a primary reason here).      In addition, inconsistency in the application of the theoretical framework is evident in the case of Ghana.   The rationalisation of  ‘flexibility’ offered to the private  sector,  permitting  the  demonstration  of  their  purported  inherent efficiency,  may  be  found  in  the  underlying  theoretical  framework:  the intervention  of  an  inherently  inefficient  public  sector  would  disrupt  the 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operation of  the programme.    This  process  however  ignores  the  consequences for  the very  same  inefficiencies where  resulting  from a private  sector which  is not  subject  to  sufficient  rights  transfer or monitoring.   Once again,  such short‐sightedness  may  be  considered  incompetent  or  biased.    This  is  continued  in structuring of the private operator and the staffing thereof: where secondment of staff is established, the ‘flexibility’ considered necessary is absent.  In the context of  a  five  year  management  contract,  the  resolution  of  this  organisational incoherence  of  public  and  private  sector  is  evidently  inhibiting.    Inconsistent implementation is further evident when considering the PSP programme in the context of the broader interests and intentions of sponsoring agencies in Ghana.  The  GPRS  strategies  established  in  the  country  demonstrate  a  concern  for  the reform of broader institutional processes, as well as a concern for accountability and transparency in governance.  Yet such a concern is significantly absent from the  PSP programme  in  the water  sector:  sector  institutions  suffer  a  significant shortfall  in capacity, notable in the case of the regulator and the state company and their ability to administer the programme.  Furthermore, the establishment of  a  Programme  Management  Unit  (PMU)  by  the  sponsor  agency  is demonstrative of distrust of the host institutions and their presumed activity in intervening  to  the  detriment  of  the  programme.    This  separation  of administration  of  the  programme,  by  an  agency working within  the  host  state structure  under  the  aegis  of  the  sponsor  agency,  may  further  undermine  the development  of  capacity  of  this  host  environment  –  contradictory  to  the intentions of the broader ‘post‐Washington consensus’ and GPRS.    
Incoherence and sub­optimal implementation: a basis in ideological commitment?  The utilisation of an apparently over‐simplified theoretical framework that lacks the capacity to account for conditions present in the water sector in developing countries  demonstrates  a  process  that  instigates  the  questioning  of  the motivation for the implementation of a privatisation programme based on such a framework.    The  utilisation  of  such  a  theoretical  framework  which  fails  to account for the conditions present – those associated with the water sector and with  the political,  social and  institutional environment  found  in  the developing country context – further provides a basis for the divergence in performance and operation from that proposed.  In one sense the increased recognition of the role of  institutions  in  the  operation  of  privatisation  contracts  is  an  implicit acknowledgement of the inherent deficiencies of the rationalising theory: it is an attempt to integrate institutions into the programme, yet remains limited in the water  sector,  and,  where  implemented  more  broadly,  is  ideologically  aligned with the conception of  the role of  the state as associated with this theory.   The conception  of  the  state  as  manifest  in  the  limited  incorporation  of  the institutional  environment  in  the  privatisation  programme  is  that  which  aligns with  the  individual‐state  relation  of  underlying  economic  theory,  with  the intention  being  a  limited  intervention  of  the  state  –  its  primary  role  being  the provision of an environment  facilitating the operation of  the private sector.   As has been noted previously, such a conception is undermined both by the nature of water as a resource and the state responsibilities which follow from this, and by the real conditions  found  in developing countries –  typified  in Ghana where political  management  is  both  normalised  and  expected.    This  application  of 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theory, outwith its conceptual basis and capacity, is combined with those various aspects  of  sub‐optimal  and  inconsistent  implementation,  demonstrative  of potential  incompetence  and,  in  various  aspects,  partiality  to  the  private  sector based on the purported characteristics of public and private sectors.     It  may  be  considered  therefore  that  some  element  of  ideological commitment to the idealised conceptions of the rationalising theory underlie the prevalence and mode of  implementation of privatisation  in the water sector, at least  in  the  case  of  Ghana.    While  this  ideological  commitment  in  this  sense provides a motivating factor for the implementation of the programme, it further provides motive for the particular form of implementation in Ghana – that which in  fact  exacerbates  the  divergence  of  performance  and  operation  from  that proposed.  This is evident in the attempts by those responsible for the design of the contract to provide flexibility to the private sector operator.  This is evident in the design of the functioning and scope of both public and private sectors  in the Ghanaian programme.   Firstly,  in  this endeavour  the  intention has been, as aligning  with  the  conception  of  the  state  and  its  role  associated  with  the theoretical  framework,  to  limit  the  potential  intervention  of  the  state  in  the operation of the private sector.  This may be seen in the limitation of the role of the public sector in the administration of the programme, with the provision of parallel donor sponsored administrative body.  It is further realised with respect to  the  functioning  and  scope  of  operation  of  the  private  sector.    Through  the establishment  of  a  ‘hybrid’  contract  the  private  sector  is  permitted  considered ‘flexibility’.   Thus the private  firm has control over the revenue account and  its disbursement, they benefit from the incorporation of snag items in the contract, and through other means that reduce the potential inhibiting of operation of the private  sector.   The design of  the PSP programme  in Ghana  is  such  that where there is demonstrative preferencing of the private sector.  This is rationalised by the reference to inherent inefficiency of the public sector, with parallel efficiency of the private sector.  Thus, in this respect ideological commitment is evident in the  attempt  to  provide  an  environment  in  which  the  private  sector  is  free  to operate without restraint and thus realise  its purported  inherent efficiency.    In practice  however,  the  provision  of  flexibility  to  the  private  sector  entails  the flexibility  to  act  opportunistically,  for  example with  regard  to  the utilisation of revenue  streams  or  the  determination  of  scope  of  contract  terms  through  the identification of snag items.    The  provision  of  flexibility  to  the  private  sector  may  be  considered  a normative  judgement  regarding  the  rent‐seeking  which  follows.    Idealised ‘independent’ operation permits opportunism on the part of  the private sector: rent‐seeking by the private operator is deemed as permissible, in contrast to that purported  inherent  to  the public  sector.    Such normative  judgement  regarding the permitting of opportunism, and its derivation from conceptions of purported inherent  characteristics  of  public  and  private  sectors,  demonstrates  an ideological  alignment  with  these  particular  conceptions  as  deriving  from  the rationalising  theory.    In  reality  however,  such  an  attempt  has  provided  the foundation  for  the  manifestation  of  those  weaknesses,  inconsistencies  and problematic assumptions in the form of opportunistic behaviour, and ultimately dispute  between  parties.    It  may  be  concluded,  considering  this  experience  in 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Ghana,  that  the  ideological  commitment  to  the  particular  rationalising  theory underlies  the  implementation  in  evidently  contradictory  conditions  –  and  thus providing a basis for the manifestation of these contradictions in practice – but, furthermore,  provides  a  basis  for  the  inauthentic  realisation  of  the  theory, through  the  permitting  of  flexibility  to  the  private  sector  –  and  therefore providing  a  foundation  for  the  exacerbated  experience  of  these  contradictions.  Furthermore, where theory is implemented in an environment characterised by conditions contradictory to those assumed, the consequence is the realisation of an  incomplete contract.   Where  incompleteness exists, where  factors cannot be contracted for, there is a demonstrated prioritisation of private sector interest as based on an commitment to particular conceptions of private and public.   
9.2  The Ghanaian experience and implications for broader trends in PSP   The above discussion demonstrates the questionable validity of the rationalising theoretical  framework  of  PSP,  the manifestation  in  the  process  of  dispute  and renegotiation,  and  the  exacerbating  role  of  sub‐optimal  implementation  and ideological  commitment  within  this  process.    The  exposition  of  factors underlying  divergent  performance  and  operation  thus  provides  a  means  by which to assess broader trends in PSP in the water sector.  The experience of PSP in  the  Ghanaian  water  sector  is  consistent  with  the  general  trend  developed where the programme has been implemented in other developing countries.  Yet it  further  demonstrates  a  potentially  problematic  future  for  the  programme  in this  context:  the  underlying  incoherence  of  the  programme  with  conditions found in the water sector in developing countries determines a reducing investor interest  and  this  ultimately,  as  will  be  maintained  here,  undermines  the successful operation of  the programme.   Thus, despite particular aspects of  the PSP  programme  which  may  be  improved  following  the  analysis  of implementation in Ghana, the realisation of such improvements is subject to the process  by  which  concessions  to  the  private  sector  are  made  (consequent  to reduced investor interest).  
Locating the Ghanaian experience within broader trends in PSP  The  evidence  revealed  in  the  Ghanaian  water  sector  is  coherent  with  the characteristics and trends  identified  in much of  the  literature which focuses on privatisation in the sector.  This is true primarily in relation to performance and outcomes  of  the  programme,  and  the  incorporation  of  privatisation  into  the institutional  environment  in  developing  countries.    The  performance  of privatisation  in  the  Ghanaian  water  sector,  where  quantifiable,  has  seen negligible change in the period of operation of the private firm, as compared to previous performance of the public utility.  This, of course, may be attributed to the  failure  to  establish  baselines  for  performance  assessment,  and  this  further contributes to the problems in quantifying the operation of the private firm.  In this sense Ghana is consistent with other instances of privatisation in the water sector in developing countries, as reviewed in chapter three.  While the Ghanaian case  may  be  considered  a  less  extreme  example  of  the  dispute‐renegotiation‐cancellation  process  (the  contract  is  in  operation,  cancellation  has  not  been 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mooted), it remains the case that this instance of PSP demonstrates problematic implementation consistent with other instances globally.  It should also be noted that  the  Ghanaian  contract  had  progressed  only  to  year  three  at  the  time  of research,  with  extreme  cases  of  the  dispute‐renegotiation‐cancellation  more likely as contracts progress.   The negligible  improvement  in performance  from the  introduction  of  the  programme,  which  is  itself  a  return  to  performance achieved  previously  by  the  public  operator,  is  consequent  of  factors  which underlie  this  dispute‐renegotiation‐cancellation  process.    It  is  also  consistent with  the  disparity  and  divergence  of  proposed  improvement  and  actual performance and operation.   Significant parallels with other instances of PSP are thus seen in outcomes of the policy: dispute and renegotiation has been evident  in Ghana and forms a major  restraint on  the progression of  the  contract,  and  this  confirms  the more general  trend  demonstrated  in  other  countries  having  implemented privatisation.    What  is  revealed  in  Ghana,  and  the  data  utilised  here,  is  the specific reasoning behind such dispute and renegotiation – and potentially more significantly, the fact that such potentialities are designed into the contract and privatisation  programme.    The  form  of  privatisation  implemented  in  Ghana  is further  evidence  of  the  trend  in  privatisation  in  the  sector  in  developing countries,  which,  as  noted  in  chapter  three,  has  shifted  from  long‐term  lease contracts with  transfer of  responsibility  for  investment,  to  shorter‐term,  lower risk  management  contracts.    Indeed,  the  evidence  from  Ghana  suggests  that within the period of the contract, and subsequently should a further contract be awarded,  the  scope  of  the  contract  is  being  reduced  further.    This  factor  is further evidence of the contradiction in application of privatisation in the water sector: where significant sunk costs are required to expand service provision (or even to maintain or repair existing networks), such operations are typically not commercially viable.    In  this  respect, data  from Ghana confirms  the experience elsewhere, where private firms frequently lack the incentive to invest.      Further  to  the  contract,  its  form  and  the  performance  and  outcomes  of privatisation,  the  experience  revealed  in  Ghana  confirms  other  aspects  of  the programme  experienced  elsewhere  in  developing  countries.    This  further correlation  concerns  the  approach  of  the  sponsors  of  the  programme  to  the political, social and institutional environment of the host country, and the means by which these contextual conditions are incorporated into the programme.  The evidence  from Ghana  is  coherent with  the analysis of  those authors describing typical  development  in  the  sector  as  being  characterised  by  an  underlying mistrust  of  the  state  while  increasingly  being  paralleled  by  a  purported recognition  of  the  import  of  local  variation,  at  least  at  a  rhetorical  level.  Described  as  the  ‘post‐Washington  consensus’,  the  purported  increased recognition of institutions is evident in the Ghanaian case in the broader reform agenda  –  as  part  of  the  IMF  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy.    As  has  been  noted however,  this agenda promotes a particular conception of  the role of  the state, and is not necessarily coherent with the political, social and institutional context of  the  host  country.    Within  this  encompassing  reform  agenda,  the  particular formation  of  the  privatisation  programme  may  appear  inconsistent:  the inevitable  intervention  of  the  regulatory  agency,  for  example,  is  not 
  190 
comprehensively  incorporated  into  the programme, with  funding necessary  for the  execution  of  its  functions  typically  lacking.    As  noted  above,  the rationalisation of this apparent contradiction between privatisation practice and rhetoric,  may  be  considered  to  be  the  exclusion  of  such  factors  from  the underlying  rationale  for  privatisation.    What  is  evident  in  the  privatisation programme  in  Ghana  is  a  mistrust  of  the  national  state,  in  the  form  of privatisation that has been established, for example in the contractual attempt to avoid  any  intervention  of  state  agencies.    It  is  apparent  that  the  privatisation programme is therefore inconsistent with the broader reform agenda (at least at the  rhetorical  level)  of  those  international  sponsoring  agencies,  and,  in  fact, where  the  underlying  mistrust  of  the  state  is  manifest  in  the  privatisation contract,  the  intervention  of  agencies  of  this  state  is  made  increasingly  likely through the increased possibility of dispute.    
Implications of incoherence for the potential operation of PSP in the water sector  The  basis  of  the  privatisation  programme  in  the  requirement  for  full  cost recovery within service provision instigates a reappraisal of the potential for the programme to operate successfully within  this context.   Commercial operation, and apparent  incoherence with  the  inherent nature of  the water sector, entails that there is a history of intervention of political agencies where continuation of service  provision  at  socially  acceptable  standards  is  threatened.    This  is demonstrated  in  chapter  three  with  reference  to  the  broader  experience  of privatisation,  with  this  factor  contributing  to  the  dispute  and  renegotiation process  characterising  the  sector.    This  process  contributes  to  the  difficulty  in the  achievement  of  commercial  viability  over  long  term  contracts  where investment is necessary, with private sector interest in such forms of PSP being increasingly  seriously  limited.    The decreasing  interest  of  the private  sector  in investment in turn determines the form of contract which may be undertaken in the  sector.    As  has  been  demonstrated  in  previous  chapters,  this  entails  the establishment  primarily  of  management  contracts.    The  scope  of  PSP  is  thus reduced:  the  private  sector,  and  risk  aversion,  determines  that  their  role  is limited  to  those  aspects  of  service  provision  reliant  on  already  existing infrastructure – typically restricted in the developing country context.      The  consequence  of  this  trend  is  manifest  in  the  Ghanaian  case:  a management contract with limited role for the private sector.   However,  it may be maintained, considering the experience of PSP in Ghana, that the trend for the reduced  scope  for  the  private  sector  threatens  the  potential  for  successful operation of the programme: the scope of private sector involvement is reduced so significantly, and the distortion of risk so substantial, that the operation of the programme is inevitably incapacitated.  It is obvious from the preceding analysis of PSP in Ghana, utilising the rationalising theory as an explanatory framework, that the ideological commitment to the introduction of the private sector as the means  by  which  to  reform  service  provision  in  fact  contributes  to  the undermining of this very programme.  The introduction of the private sector in a limited number  of  systems  in  the  country  determines  that  a  single  operator  is adequate, and the future likelihood of the shift to two operators appears unlikely considering  the  apparent  reduction  in  systems under  private  control  –  in  turn 
  191 
determined  by  the  commercial  viability  of  systems  in  the  country.    Thus,  the functioning of regulation of the private sector, through surrogate competition, as necessary in the water sector, is undermined through this process.     Furthermore, the lack of investor interest not only determines the shift to a management contract, but it further determines a significant distortion of risk within  this  contract.    The  experience  in  Ghana  suggests  this  is  evident  in  the attempt  by  those  sponsoring  and  designing  the  contract  to  permit  the  private sector significant flexibility in their operations, which entails the reduction in the potential  intervention  by  the  public  sector.    This  ideologically  determined conceptualisation of the inherent capacities of public and private sectors entails in practice the permitting of significant opportunism for the private sector.  This process  of  course  undermines  the  very  rationale  for  the  introduction  of  the private sector as a means by which to  limit  the effect of such practice by those active  in  the public  sector.    It  further  entails  however  the necessary  and more costly activity of institutions active in the sector where dispute and renegotiation consequent  to distorted risk allocation occurs.   This  is evident  in Ghana where negotiations,  inevitable  considering  their  incorporation within  contract  design, require the intervention of the state company in its administering of the contract, the  contract  auditor  and  furthermore  the  government  in  mediation  of negotiations.      The problematic commercial viability of PSP in the sector, the decreased investor  interest,  and  the  consequent  reduction  of  the  scope  of  private  sector operation  thus  leads  to  two  processes  which  undermine  the  potential  for  the functioning of the programme as anticipated.  Firstly, the regulation of the sector is  undermined  through  the  increasingly  problematic  implementation  of surrogate  competition.    Secondly,  the  increased  role  of  institutions  in  the administration  of  PSP  increases  associated  costs  and  the  likelihood  of intervention of those institutions which privatisation was purported to limit.      The  repercussions  of  the  decreasing  commercial  viability  of  service provision, decreasing  investor  interest, and subsequent  increasing distortion  in risk  allocation  are  therefore  apparent  in  the  increasing  role  of  the  institutions active  in  the  sector.   Considering  this  experience of PSP  in Ghana,  implications for the broader PSP programme should be noted.   The experience in Ghana is a direct  consequence  of  previous  instances  of  PSP  in  the  sector,  whereby incoherence of the programme with sector conditions entails a typical result of dispute,  renegotiation  and  cancellation  of  contracts.    The  trend  for  decreased investor interest and subsequently reduced scope of the private sector in service provision thus appears to be furthered when considering PSP in Ghana.   This is true where the private sector is permitted reduced risk and liability in the design of, and through the course of, the management contract.  If this is a progression in  the  sequence  of  PSP  in  the water  sector  in  developing  countries,  it may  be maintained that the viability of the programme has deteriorated to the point that the  concessions  made  to  the  private  sector,  as  necessary  to  engender  their involvement  in  the  programme,  come  to  undermine  the  functioning  of  the programme  –  and  subsequently  therefore  the  potential  to  realise  purported advantages associated with  the private sector.    If  this  is  the  inevitable, or even 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likely,  form of PSP where private sector risk aversion  increases and  interest  in involvement  declines,  then  the  experience  of  PSP  in  Ghana  indicates  costs associated  with  this  form  of  PSP  are  likely  to  be  more  significant  than  is anticipated, with little realisation of purported benefits of the programme.      The parallel process to this development in the trend of decreased private sector interest and associated consequences where risk allocation is distorted is the  failure  to  provide  adequate  structuring  and  sufficient  capacity  to  the institutional  framework.    The  trend  for  dispute  and  subsequent  renegotiation and  cancellation  of  contracts  has  entailed,  in  the  broader  PSP  programme,  a recognition,  at  least  at  a  rhetorical  level,  of  the  role  of  institutions  in  the successful operation of PSP.  This is further coherent with broader programmes of  governance  reform  being  pursued  in  developing  countries.    Such  a commitment is evident at a rhetorical level in the Ghanaian water sector project: practical manifestation of this is limited, with insufficient capacity provided and institutional  structures  which  obfuscate  the  operation  of  sector  institutions (regulation  being  the most  obvious  and  significant  example).    Considering  the increased role of the institutional framework following from the particular mode of  implementation,  deriving  from  risk  averse  private  sector,  the  failure  to consider these aspects of  the  institutional environment seems short‐sighted.    It has been maintained above that this is likely to due the conceptualisation of the public  sector,  and  the  purported  inherent  inefficiency  thereof,  thus  leading  to reluctance to assign funding and status.      The  apparent  reluctance  to  engage  in more  substantial  support  for  the institutional  framework  is  therefore  likely  to  be  problematic  where  this framework  performs  an  increasingly  significant  role  in  the  determination  of contract operation and performance.  Thus in parallel to the undermining of the functioning  of  the  PSP  programme  likely  to  follow  where  risk  distortion  is significant,  as  in  the  case  of  Ghana,  the  failure  to  account  for  this  framework within  rationalising  theory  appears  increasingly  incoherent.    Should  this  be  a further component to the development of the trend in PSP in the water sector in developing  countries,  the  divergence  between  manifest  performance  and operation  from  that  purported  to  be  inherent  to  the  private  sector  is  likely  to continue.      The value of  the approach undertaken may be seen  in  this exposition of the  potential  functioning  of  the  PSP  programme.    Utilising  a  framework  of analysis which considers  the underlying  rationalising  theory and  its associated critique,  it  is  possible  to  expose  the  particular  aspects  of  contract  design  and administration  contributing  to  the  process  of  dispute  and  renegotiation characteristic  of  the  sector.    Furthermore,  it  exposes  the  process  of  increasing distortion  of  risk  and  concession  to  private  sector  –  and  the  subsequent implications  for  institutional  functioning  and  capacity,  which  provide  the potential to undermine the operation of PSP programme where implemented.     
  193 
Implications for the particular mode of implementation of PSP programmes  The above discussion demonstrates the problematic implementation of a policy programme  founded  on  such  incoherent  and  invalid  theory,  as  well  as  the implications  of  the  power  of  associated  theoretical  concepts  for  the  mode  of implementation  realised.    The  privatisation  programme  as  implemented  in developing countries, and of which Ghana is a coherent yet particular case, has a considerable history of  failure  to  improve water service provision.    It has been demonstrated  in  this  thesis  that  the  particular  theoretical  framework  upon which the programme is based is significantly incoherent with conditions found in  this  context,  and  validity  for  sector  programmes  should  be  questioned.  Consequently a reappraisal of sector policy appears necessary.    It has not been the  purpose  here  to  provide  a  value  judgement  as  to  the  preferred  mode  of service provision, public or private.  What has been intended, and to this extent achieved,  is  the better understanding of  the value of underlying  theory  for  the service provision reform programme that  is widely  implemented  in developing countries.  Subsequently it is possible to consider the implications for the future course  of  policy  development.    It  is  the  case  that  the  particular  mode  of privatisation  programme  implemented  in  developing  countries,  as  rationalised by  such underlying  theory,  has  significant  deficiencies  in  capacity  to provide  a coherent and workable solution to improved service provision.  It is not the case that  privatisation  itself  is  inherently  unworkable  where  applied  in  the  water sector:  this  is  demonstrably  true  when  considering  other  applications  in developed countries such as the UK.  What has been shown however, is that the application of such programmes in developing countries hold such commitment to  underlying  concepts  –  in  part  ideologically  compelled  –  that  there  results  a mode  of  implementation  that  has  inherent  and  unresolvable  problems.  Therefore without significant reappraisal of the mode of implementation, which forces  a  detachment  from  these  underlying  theoretical  concepts,  it  may  be maintained  that wherever  privatisation  is  applied  in  this  context  it  is  likely  to encounter  problematic  implementation with disputes  and  renegotiations  likely (in  this  sense  the  evidence  from  Ghana  is  both  a  particular  case  but  also emblematic  of  the  broader  trend  in  developing  countries  water  sector privatisation).    It  can  be maintained  that where  privatisation  is  to  be  attempted,  there should  be  greater  attention  paid  to  prerequisites  necessary  for  the  better operation  of  such  a  programme.    Deriving  from  evidence  revealed  in  the Ghanaian  case,  this  may  be  considered  to  be  true  for  the  contract  and  terms, condition  of  information  and  distribution  thereof,  institutional  capacity, infrastructure condition and the commercial viability of systems, coherence with both host environment and broader reform agendas being employed within that environment.  Within each of these various aspects of service provision there are means by which revision of approach may be identified.      It  is obvious from the experience of privatisation in Ghana that the form of contract established contributes significantly to the ex‐post performance and outcomes,  in  particular  in  terms  of  delay  and  dispute  between  parties.    The apparent  means  by  which  to  improve  this  problematic  implementation  of  the 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programme  may  be  identified  as  increasing  the  specificity  of  contracts,  thus reducing the potential for opportunistic behaviour through the execution of the contract.    Following  from  this,  it  could  be  inferred  that  future  PSP  policy  and contracts should improve specificity consequent to the implementation in Ghana.  This  is  certainly  true  in  the  sense  that  there  is,  firstly,  unnecessary  ambiguity, and  secondly,  problematic  haste  in  the  implementation  of  the  contract  under consideration.  The very basic requirement to establish baseline data from which performance  may  be  assessed  and  incentive  structures  applied,  absent  in  the case  of  Ghana,  is  an  obvious  recommendation  to  be made where PSP policy  is implemented elsewhere.  In this instance a more highly specified contract would reduce  the  likelihood  of  dispute  and  renegotiation,  this  through  the  reduced requirement  for  the  interaction  of  parties  outwith  contract  terms  and  the increased  strain  which  this  places  on  the  relationship  between  these  parties.  The experience of Ghana thus demonstrates that the designing of the contract to intentionally  incorporate  a  significant  number  of  unspecified  terms  is  likely  to lead to extensive ex‐post dispute and negotiation, and elimination of this likely to better align implementation with that proposed.     It  remains  the  case  however,  that  the  specification  of  all  aspects  of operation of the service provider would be extremely complex, and as such some means of the resolution of unknowns is required ex‐post.  Where attempts were made in the Ghanaian contract to define an ex‐post means of resolution of these unspecified terms, they have proven to be inadequate – for example with regard lack  of  penalties  relating  to  transfer  of  data  between  parties.    The  failure  to specify more precisely the method by which data was to be agreed ex‐post has likely been the most significant factor in the problematic implementation of the programme  in  Ghana.    It  may  be  maintained  that  the  contract  contained  an unnecessary number of unspecified  terms that have contributed  fundamentally to  the  problems  in  implementation  and  divergence  in  operation.    Yet  where unknowns are inevitable, the Ghanaian experience demonstrates the importance of  highly  specified  procedures  for  resolution  ex‐post.    Where  such  a  PSP programme  is  to  be  implemented,  therefore,  in  addition  to  the  adequate specification  of  contract  terms,  the  specification  of  means  of  resolution  and negotiation  between  parties  ex‐post  is  also  critical  to  implementation.    The Ghanaian case demonstrates that ambiguity in the requirement of each party for the resolution of,  for example, baseline data,  in addition to the lack of penalties for  this,  contributes  significantly  to  the  instance  of  dispute  and  renegotiation.  This  requirement  to  integrate  the  means  of  ex‐post  resolution  within  the contract structure is contrary to the underlying assumptions associated with the rationalising  theoretical  framework.    Underlying  assumptions  include  the completeness of  contracts,  and  thus ex‐post  relations between contract parties are not  integrate at this basic  level.   The case as researched here demonstrates the  importance  of  such  means  of  resolution,  including  the  role  of  sector institutions  in  this  resolution  of  unspecified  eventualities,  and  the  essential nature  of  such  considerations  for  the  implementation  of  policy  where  ex‐post complexities are  inevitable.    In  turn,  the sequencing of  implementation,  so  that adequate means  of  resolution  –  and  the  institutions  involved  in  this  process  – exist to provide this function. 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 Further implications that follow from the form of the contract established in Ghana relate to the apparent attempt to permit flexibility to the private firm.  In practice  the design of  the  contract  in  such a way permits  the private  sector increased  freedom  to  operate  as  they  please:  the  sponsors  of  the  contract describe  this  as  a  means  by  which  to  extract  maximum  efficiency  from  the operator, in reality however it is a further means by which to distort risk transfer – shifting risk  towards  the government.   This mode of  risk  transfer  is however evidently  problematic:  the  desire  to  permit  flexibility  for  the  private  sector  is tacit consent for the private sector to behave opportunistically.  With regard this mode of privatisation,  it may therefore be maintained that,  if  this  is  the chosen approach  of  sponsor  agencies  for  other  privatisation  programmes,  it  is  both inherently  flawed  and  biased  toward  the  private  sector.    In  addition  to  these particular aspects of the Ghanaian experience, the short period of the contract – as  is  typical of  the  trend of water  sector  contracts –  in  itself  inhibits  the  likely resolution of disputes.   It as been the case in Ghana that disputes deriving from the contract have extended until at least three years into the five year contract.  Thus,  should a  resolution be  found,  the contract  is  in  fact only applicable  from the resolution date onwards:  the penalties and  incentives  for performance rely on this resolution.  At best, therefore, the terms of the contract apply for two of five years ‐ were a longer contract established this resolution would at least have a longer period to have the purported effect.      It  has  been  noted  in  chapter  three  that  the  commercial  viability  of privatisation  in  the  water  sector  has  been  questionable,  with  various  firms expressing the opinion that service provision in developing countries typically is not  viable  for  private  enterprise.    The  experience  of  Ghana  demonstrates  that this  is  true  in  this  context:  the  identification  of  snag  items,  and  subsequently systems  which  are  excluded  from  contract  terms,  demonstrates  that  where systems require  investment  for  their operation on a commercial basis  they are rejected  by  the  private  sector.    This  indicates  therefore  that,  in  the  Ghanaian context, there is a requirement for functioning systems as a prerequisite for the operation  of  the  private  sector.    The  attempted  application  of  a  privatisation contract  to systems that are  inadequate at  the  inception of  the contract will be deemed not commercially viable.      Finally, the implementation of a privatisation contract in an environment with political,  social and  institutional  conditions  that  contradict  those assumed may be likely to encounter problems which contribute to divergent performance and  operation  from  that  proposed.    It  has  been  noted  here  that  the implementation  of  the  privatisation  programme  in Ghana  appear  to  contradict some  of  the  purported  objectives  of  the  broader  reform  agenda  sponsored notably by the IMF.   The mistrust of national state institutions is evident in the mode of implementation: parallel systems of administration for the contract are established  –  such  as  those  relating  to  procurement  procedures,  or  the PMU – alongside agencies of  the national state.   Such systems are contradictory to  the rhetorical commitment to reform of the institutional environment.  Furthermore, where  this  rhetorical  commitment  is made,  the  basis  of  reform  is  particularly limited in its conception of the state, and meets with local resistance and a lack of commitment, as well as differentiated local reception and mutation. 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 As noted above with reference to the role of the institution environment in  the  ex‐post  resolution  of  non‐contracted  factors,  the  sequencing  of programme  implementation  is  critical  where  reforms  of  the  institutions  are attempted.  The Ghanaian case demonstrates the problematic implementation of a  programme  which  assumes  a  certain  condition  of  this  institutional environment and relies on this for implementation as proposed.  Where broader reforms are attempted to better align institutional conditions to those assumed, the progression of such attempts is underdeveloped relative to the requirements of the PSP programme.  As such, the Ghanaian case further indicates that where such PSP policy is attempted, sequencing relative to attempted broader reforms, which  may  provide  a  coherent  host  environment,  is  critical.    While  in  Ghana attempts  to  revise,  for  example,  procurement  procedures  or  staffing  selection may be ongoing,  their development  is not  in  line with requirements of  the PSP programme.   As such, prior to the furtherance of these broader reforms,  it may be  considered  that  sector  policy  should  follow  a  form  more  appropriate  to developments  in  the  host  environment.    It  may  of  course  be  argued  that  the development of parallel systems of PSP administration are a means of doing just this,  but  in  practice  it  has  the  effect  of  undermining  the  development  of  such institutions within the national state institutional framework.    The  promotion  of  a  particular  nature  of  the  state  in  Ghana  is  not  the purpose of this thesis, a value judgement is required for the preferencing of the continuation  of  nationally  or  international  derived  and  developed  state structures,  or  some  combination  of  these.   What may  be  considered  here,  and therefore  contribute  to  the  development  of  subsequent  sector  policy,  is  the potential revisions which may contribute to the  implementation of  this  form of PSP which better  aligns  to  that proposed.    In  this  sense  the nature of  the host institutional  environment  and  its  relation  to  the  PSP  programme,  and  the implications of the Ghanaian experience, should be noted.   The approach to the incoherence of the host environment in Ghana has been, as been noted above, to operate  a  parallel  administrative  structure  while  broader  governance  reforms are  instigated.   However,  there  is  a  demonstrated  resistance  to  reforms  in  the mode  of  operation  of  sector  institutions  to  attempted  revision  to  better  align with  an  idealised  ‘enabling  state’.    In  addition  to  the  parallel  operation  of administrative  element  such  as  the  PMU,  this  demonstrates  the  fallacy  of  the implementation  of  short  term  programmes  with  extensive  requirements  in institutional  revision.    Ghana demonstrates  the  problematic  implementation  of what may  be  considered  an  indeterminate  state  between  an  idealised  form  of PSP  programme  and  existent  governance  structures,  where  rhetorical commitment  with  parallel  administrative  structures  provides  a  basis  for problematic  and  delayed  implementation.    Prerequisites  and  sequencing  are, once again critical.    Of course, to what degree these particular aspects of the PSP programme may be modified for the more successful realisation of the purported benefits of private sector operation is determined in parallel with the perceived and actual private  sector  interest  in  investment.    Where,  as  noted  above,  the  trend  for decrease  in  such  interest  determines  increasing  distortion  in  risk  transfer  and 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increased permitting of opportunism to the operator, the concessions evident in Ghana  may  be  repeated.    Where  this  is  the  case,  the  trend  for  dispute  and subsequent renegotiation and cancellation is likely to continue, together with the divergence  in  performance  and  operation  from  that  proposed.    To  this  extent, PSP in the water sector in developing countries may be considered as something of  a  vicious  circle, whereby problematic  implementation  (having a basis  in  the incoherence  with  sector  conditions)  determines  reduced  investment,  in  turn determining  greater  concessions  to  the  private  sector,  with  consequences evident  in  the  increased  role  of  (insufficiently  equipped)  institutions  with associated costs. 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Appendix A:  
Fieldwork implementation: data selection, collection and analysis  Research design and methodology, and the basis thereof, have been described in chapter four.  Subsequently, the background to privatisation in the water sector in  Ghana  is  provided  in  chapter  five,  with  the  scope  of  programme implementation  and  responsible  agencies  described.    It  is  the  purpose  of  this appendix  to provide  information regarding  the  implementation of  the research design  and methodology  in  the  context  of Ghanaian water  sector privatisation.  Fieldwork  in  Ghana  was  undertaken  in  2009,  three  years  into  the  five  year management contract which commenced in June 2006.   This appendix contains information  on  the  particular  agencies  and  actors  which  provide  the  data sources  for  the  research  undertaken:  including  the  selection  and  sampling process  for  interview  participants  and  the  various  forms  of  documentation relating  to  programme  implementation.    It  is  further  described  here  the administration  of  data  collection,  the  means  by  which  data  was  collected,  the means  of  recording,  and  the  difficulties  and  limitations  encountered  in  the process.    Finally,  the  appendix  considers  the mode  of  analysis  of  data  and  the identification  of  themes  and  issues  pertinent  to  the  research  questions  and hypotheses established in chapter four.   
A.1  Data sampling and selection  In the context of this research, data sampling and selection is determined by the research design and questions, and the methodology which follows from this.  In the  context  of  researching  privatisation  in  developing  countries,  it  has  been determined in chapter four that the most valuable and coherent approach is that of  the case  study.    It  follows  that  the  sampling and selection of data  sources  is occurs  at multiple  levels  and  in multiple  spheres,  such  triangulation  providing breadth  and  depth  in  the  construction  of  a  case  intended  to  be  an  instructive example of more general phenomena.  The utilisation of the case study approach, together  with  the  research  design  of  a  hypothesis  testing  nature,  further determines that sampling and selection is purposive: the bulk of the population, and the particular actors and agencies of interest and relevance, are known prior to  research.    Considering  the  purposive  nature  of  investigation,  and  the utilisation  of  triangulation  in  this  endeavour,  the  following  discussion  reviews the  particular  sources  utilised  in  research,  and  the  sampling  and  selection decisions made.  Included here are the sources and their relation to the research questions  and  hypotheses  developed  in  chapter  four,  and  subsequently  the implications of selection for generalisability and reliability of research.   The scope of research is defined in chapter  four: as  is coherent with the theoretical framework established in chapter two, and subsequently the review of  implementation  as  described  in  chapter  three,  the  scope  of  research  can  be considered  by  reference  to  two  broad  spheres  of  exploration.    Firstly  that relating  to contract performance and compliance, and secondly  that  relating  to the  extra‐economic  determinants  of  performance  and  operation  of  the 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• Capacity  (technical,  financial,  human  resources)  for  administration  of contract 
• Aspects  of  provision where  information  is  incomplete,  or  deficient,  and therefore subject to dispute 
• Means, and extent, of transfer of risk and liability – including distortions incorporated as a means of attracting private sector investment 
• Incorporation of means by which to reconcile commercial operation (full cost  recovery)  with  social  objectives  (service  expansion),  thus  the consideration of public opposition   A  framework  for  sampling  is  thus  established:  documentation  relating  to performance,  compliance,  the  establishment  of  requisite  institutional environment,  in  addition  to  the  contract,  defines  the  scope  of  enquiry  here.  Considering  the  nature  of  the  contract,  however,  and  its  status  of implementation (third year of five years), the requisite documentation may not exist  or  be  available.    It  is  advantageous  therefore  to  complement  available documentation  with  evidence  acquired  through  the  interview  of  those  actors engaged in the sector in various roles.   The actors and agencies responsible for implementation or otherwise engaged in the sector are described in chapter five.      Similarly,  regarding  the  second  sphere,  political,  social  and  institutional factors  which  contribute  to  performance  and  operation  divergent  from  that associated  with  the  rationalising  theory,  these  extra‐economic  factors  are selected  purposively  by  reference  to  the  actors  and  agencies  engaged  in  the sector.    As  is  noted  in  chapters  two  and  three,  the  environment within which privatisation is implemented is critical to the performance and operation of the contract,  in  particular where  there  are  significant  information deficiencies  and asymmetries.    The  particular  aspects  of  the  political,  social  and  institutional environment which require exploration are the following, from chapter four:   
• The establishment of a regulatory agency 




• The  legal  and  legislative  framework  enabling  regulatory decisions  to  be implemented 
• Commitment  or  otherwise  of  actors  in  the  national  state  institutional framework to privatisation and its mode of implementation 
• The  extent  and  nature  of  transaction  costs  associated  with  the administration and monitoring of privatisation 
• The incorporation of public consultation in the privatisation process and the impact of public opposition 
• Evidence  and  impact  of  contradictory motives  for  action:  public  service and universal service provision 
• The  impact  of  contradictory  tendencies  of  commercial  operation  and universal service provision or expansion of services  Sampling and selection of data sources is thus determined by the above scope of exploration of the extra‐economic factors relating to performance and operation of  privatisation.    Research  of  actors  and  agencies  therefore  requires  to  be coherent with these aspects of the research design.   While  indications as to the nature  of  the  issues  and  their  prevalence  in  Ghana  is  possible  through documentation, it is more likely that factors relating to the attitudes, perceptions and  reception  of  the  privatisation  programme  is  to  be  acquired  through  the interview of actors engaged in the sector.    The information acquired from the relevant actors and agencies, relevant to the evaluation of both technical, and political, social and  institutional  factors contributing  to  performance  and  operation,  are  as  follows,  initially  here  the secondary data sources:  
• GWCL  (Ghana Water Company Limited): performance and other data  in Annual Reports  to  2003  (GWCL,  2000,  2001,  2002,  2003); Management Contract with AVRL  (GWCL,  2005);  2006 documentation  relating  to  the institutional  redesign  of  the  company  (GWCL,  2006a,  2006b);  2009 presentation to coalition of water sector NGOs (CONIWAS) concerning the status of contract operations (GWCL, 2009). 
• PURC (Public Utilities Regulatory Commission): Annual Reports covering the  operation  of  the  agency  since  inception  1998  (PURC,  1998,  1999, 2000,  2001,  2005d,  2006,  2007);  various  policy  documents  concerning social  water  tariffs  and  provision,  and  activities  of  the  agency  (PURC 2005b, 2005c, 2008, undated); 2005 review of GWCL performance (PURC 2005a;  unpublished  data  regarding  various  aspects  of  performance  and operation of GWCL and AVRL to 2009 (PURC, 2009). 
• AVRL (Aqua Vitens Rand Limited): Annual Reports for period of operation from 2006 (AVRL, 2007, 2008, 2009a); 2009 presentation to coalition of water  sector NGOs  (CONIWAS)  concerning  changed modes  of  operation (AVRL, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e). 
• Fichtner  (technical  auditor  of  contract,  as  established  within  the programme  documentation):  2007  report  of  technical  performance  and operation to date (Fichtner, 2007). 
• World Bank:  documentation  relating  to  the  development  of  programme prior  to  implementation  (World  Bank,  2004a,  2004b);  documentation 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relating  to  status  of  financial  disbursement  associated  with  the programme, covering years of implementation (World Bank, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
• GII  (Ghana  Integrity  Initiative):  various  documentation  relating  to  the activity  of  the  NGO  in  monitoring  developments  in  transparency  and accountability  in  the sector and public service more generally,  including initiatives  associated  with  the  GPRS  implementation  (Azeem,  2007, undated; GII, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b). 
• Water  Directorate,  Ministry  of  Water  Resources,  Works  and  Housing: national  water  policy  and  various  associated  documentation  (MWRWH, 2004, 2007, undated). 
• ISODEC  (Integrated Social Development Centre):  various documentation relating to the response and interaction of NGOs and community groups with the government and programme (e.g. ISODEC, 2001a, 2001b). 
• Parliament  Library:  various  Acts;  Hansard  reports,  parliamentary debates. 
• GACC  (Ghana  Anti‐Corruption  Coalition):  documentation  relating  to  the prevalence of, and attitudes to, corruption practice in the Ghanaian public sector. 
• Press  reports:  concerning  various  aspects  of  the  programme,  including the relationship between parties, public interaction, labour relations and so on. 
• Public Procurement Authority: agency monitoring procurement in public bodies, general reports concerning conditions and trends in this area. 
• Project  Management  Unit:  contract  frameworks  documents;  public relations  material  concerning  development  and  implementation  of  the programme.  In addition the following agencies were also engaged in the process of interview, some agencies with multiple respondents:  
• PURC (Public Utilities Regulatory Commission): two interviews with two representatives responsible with regulation of the water service provider and  the  sector  more  broadly,  including  alternative  modes  of  provision (PURC Representatives, 2009). 
• World  Bank:  interview  with  two  representatives  associated  with programme  design,  implementation  and  administration  (World  Bank representatives, 2009). 
• PUWU  (Public  Utilities  Workers  Union):  two  interviews  with representative associated with workers at GWCL and seconded to AVRL, and the proposed reforms of the company (PUWU representative, 2009). 
• NCAP  (National  Coalition  Against  Privatisation):  interview  with representative associated with activities related to introduction of private sector (NCAP representative, 2009). 
• Member  of  Parliament:  interview  with  Member  of  Parliament,  former Minister associated with development and implementation of programme (MP, 2009). 
• GII (Ghana Integrity Initiative):  two interviews with two representatives associated  with  research  on  transparency  in  service  delivery,  and 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accountability  and  transparency  in  the  broader  Ghanaian  public  sector (GII representatives, 2009). 
• Consultant  to  Water  Directorate:  interview  with  representative associated with consultancy to the Water Directorate through the period of  the  development,  implementation  and  operation  of  the  contract  (WD Consultant, 2009). 
• Water  Directorate,  Ministry  of  Water  Resources,  Works  and  Housing: interview  with  representative  associated  with  the  administration  and implementation  of  the  programme  (concurrently  Managing  Director  of GWCL,  although  recently  appointed  at  time  of  research)  (Ministry representative, 2009). 
• ISODEC  (Integrated  Social  Development  Centre):  interview  with representative  associated  with  the  interaction  of  NGOs  and  community groups  with  government  through  the  period  of  development  and implementation of the privatisation programme (ISODEC representative, 2009). 
• CONIWAS  (Coalition  of  NGOs  in  Water  and  Sanitation):  interview  with representative associated with the interaction of water companies (GWCL and AVRL) with NGOs and community groups (CONIWAS representative, 2009).   The  data  sources  utilised  therefore  comprise  a  broad  framework encompassing  relevant  actors  and  agencies  responsible  for  the  design, implementation and administration of the privatisation programme.  It has been attempted to incorporate representation from all relevant parties, including the service  provider,  the  sponsoring  agency,  sector  institutions,  political representation,  labour  representation,  and  the  representation  of  NGOs  and community groups.    In  this sense  they are coherent with  the scope of  research determined  in  chapter  four,  and  subsequently  the  theoretical  framework  to which results may be generalised.  It is obvious that these agencies are particular to the Ghanaian context.  However, considering the review of privatisation across developing  countries  more  generally  (chapter  three),  the  replication  of  actors and  agencies  across  different  contexts  appears  typical.    In  this  sense,  when combined with the research design and hypotheses developed, application of the same  approach  across  different  contexts,  for  the  purpose  of  understanding divergent performance and operation of privatisation from it’s validating theory.  This is true for example for the regulator, for the sponsor agency, for the sector institutions,  for  the  NGOs  and  community  groups  engaged  in  the  sector,  for labour representatives etc.   What  is perhaps unusual  in the Ghanaian case, and this is noted in chapters seven and eight, is the continued existence of the state holding  company,  and  the  relationship  between  this  and  the  private  company and other sector institutions including the regulator.  It is noted in these chapters that  such a  structure  is  a  result  of  the  reduction of  risk  transfer  to  the private sector,  and  as  such  may  be  indicative  of  other  future  sector  privatisation programmes,  considering  the  trend  of  reduced  interest  in  investment  by  the private sector: replication of this structure may therefore be replicable in future programmes. 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 Where available, subjective experience, local interpretation and reception of  the  privatisation  programme  have  been  acquired  through  interviews  with relevant  actors  engaged  in  the  sector.    Through  such  interviews  it  has  been possible to approximate an explanation for the divergence between performance and  operation  of  the  programme  and  that  proposed  within  the  rationalising theory.    Interviews  further  provide  evidence  which  fills  gaps  in  documentary evidence, or explanatory factors where these are absent or questionable within documentation.    In  addiction  this  documentation  contextualises  the  opinions, subjective interpretations and local reception of the programme as expressed in interviews.    In  the  case of Ghana  the  sampling  and  selection of documentation has been determined significantly by availability of data.   As has been noted  in chapters six and seven, the capacity of sector institutions for the administration of  service  provision  is  inhibited  by  financial,  technical  and  human  resources constraints.   Typically  this results  in  the  failure  to generate  information on  the performance  of  service  provision,  including  both  that  relating  to  water production and distribution but also that relating to financial performance.  This is particularly true for the state water company, and has been for some period in time,  and  there  are  inevitable  repercussions  for  other  agencies  engaged  in  the sector.    Regardless,  where  data  has  been  generated  it  has  often  been  made available  –  for  example  that  through  the  regulator.    Elsewhere,  sector institutions’ libraries have provided various documents relating to performance and operation of those institutions.     Sampling  of  data  has  been  at  least  in  part  determined  by  the  ethical dimension  of  selection  of  participants  with  requisite  authority  to  engage  in research and provide information.  Thus, were an individual active in the sector, junior in their institution, to be relevant to research relevant authority should be sought.    In  practice  however,  through  the  course  of  research  in  the  sector  in Ghana, this has not been necessary.  By the nature of research, those individuals with  relevant  experience  and  knowledge  are  those  in  positions  of  authority within  their  institutions:  they are  the  individuals who have been, and who are, instrumental  in  the  design,  implementation  and  administration  of  the programme.      As described in chapter four, ethical concern further determine selection and  sampling  to  the  extent  that  consideration  should be made of  the potential harm,  the  requirement  for  informed  consent,  and  the  potential  invasion  of privacy.   The requirement for informed consent has been observed in sampling through  the  selection  of  participants willing  and  able  to  provide  this,  research required  no  incorporation  of  those  unable  to  provide  consent,  and  where unwilling  research  was  not  undertaken.    Invasion  of  privacy,  as  described  in chapter  four,  has  been  limited  by  the  necessary  inclusion  of  participants  in research only in their professional capacity.  The nature of potential harm is not conceptualised as physical, but more likely professional or personal in the nature and  extent  of  information  that  is  revealed,  and  the  potential  repercussions thereafter.    The  consequent  approach  involves  the  assurance  of  maintaining confidentiality and anonymity in records of research.  Research is thus guided by these considerations and those in chapter four, and by associated requirements under  the  relevant  ethical  approval  process  of  the University  of Hertfordshire. 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Approval for research from the ethics committee of the University was acquired prior to fieldwork (protocol number BS/R/029 08).   
A.2  Data collection  Subsequent to the sampling and selection of interviews and documentation, it is necessary  here  to  describe  the  process  of  data  collection.    Fieldwork  was undertaken  in  a  six  week  period  in  August  and  September  2009,  thus  in  the fourth  year  of  the  five  year  management  contract.    The  various  actors  and agencies necessary for requisite data collection, as defined above, typically exist in  Ghana  in  the  capital  Accra,  or  have  offices  here,  and  this  location  therefore provided  the  hub  for  fieldwork.    The  implementation  of  interviews,  as  is described  below  includes  the  process  of  contact,  development  and  design  of interview  framework and questions,  the recording of data, and a  record of any limitations  and  difficulties  encountered  in  this  process.    Similarly,  the documentation  regarding  privatisation  in  Ghana  requires  consideration  of  the potential access and publication issues that may be associated.    
Collection in the field: interviews and secondary data  The  purposive  sampling  and  selection  process  determined  a  majority  of participants  could  be  contacted  prior  to  entering  the  field,  primarily  through email.    The  degree  and  frequency  of  email  usage  in  Ghana  does  not  compare equally  to  that  in  what  may  be  termed  developed  countries,  with  the technological factors and the persistence of alternative modes of communication providing  a  basis  for  this.    Frequently  therefore,  specific  arrangements  were made while in the field; this was also true for those participants whose identity and relevance was revealed through the research process, and the data provided through  other  participants.    Following  initial  contact  and  arrangement  of meeting,  letters  were  submitted  prior  to  interview  concisely  describing  the nature  and  intentions  of  research,  the  right  to  refuse  participation  and  the anonymisation of data in research (an example text is shown below).  Interviews were generally conducted in the participants place of work, or alternatively in a neutral venue such as a café or restaurant, at times convenient to the participant.  Recording of interviews was undertaken by means of digital voice recording with consent of the participant, with accompanying written notes where appropriate.     “Re: PhD Research  I  am  a PhD  student  at  the University  of Hertfordshire  in  the UK,  and  I  am conducting  research  into  provision  of water  services  in  urban  Ghana.   My research  focuses  on  the  restructuring  of  the  sector  from  the  late  1990s onwards,  and  considers  operators,  regulator,  alternative  service  providers and  the  broader  institutional  environment,  including  governmental  policy.  The  research  is  of  an  academic  nature  and  is  not  associated  with  any commercial organisation. 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I would be very grateful  if you would permit me to interview you at a time that is convenient.  The interview would last approximately 45 minutes.  The  research  complies  with  ethics  protocol  at  the  University  of Hertfordshire.    Any  data  that  you  provide me with will  be  treated  in  total confidence and the interviewees are treated anonymously.   You should also be  aware  that  participation  is  absolutely  voluntary  and  that  you  have  the right to not take part and also that you may withdraw at any time.” (Example of text of consent letter)    The interviews, as described in chapter four, take a semi‐structured form, permitting the incorporation both of those issues raised in the research design, hypotheses  and  questions,  but  also  interests  and  perceptions  which  the participants  choose  to  raise  through  the  course of  conversation.    In  this  sense, the  structuring  of  interviews  is  consistent  with  the  research  design:  aligning closely with reasonably well defined scope of research – that which follows from the theory and practice of privatisation outlined in chapters two and three, while including sufficient flexibility for the expression of subjective interpretation and local  reception  of  the  privatisation  programme  as  is  necessary  to  explore  the divergence between this theory and practice.   Questions used in the  interviews inevitably  varied  by  relation  to  the  role  and  experience  of  the  participant.  Therefore,  representatives  of  the  regulator  were  questioned  on  the  capacity, means of operation, relationship with state and private company and so on, and furthermore  specifics  regarding  performance  of  the  service  provider  over  the period in question.  Similarly, representatives of the sponsor agency, those of the consultants to the water directorate and the directorate itself, and the Member of Parliament,  were  questioned  about  the  details  of  the  contract  development, disbursement of funding, performance of the operator, the future form of water service provision and privatisation in Ghana etc.  NGOs and associated coalitions were questioned on the interaction of such organisations and community groups with  the  formal  privatisation  programme,  broader  public  interaction  with  or opposition  to  the  programme,  the  performance  of  associated  programmes  of accountability and transparency and their manifestation in and implications for the water sector, etc.     Further  to  the  more  specific  questions,  various  themes  frequently appeared and were common across the various actors and agencies represented.  Of particular note here, and this  is central  to some of the conclusions drawn in chapters six, seven and eight, is the relationship between contract parties.  Prior knowledge  of  the  sector  in  Ghana  determined  the  particular  structure established  in  the  country:  the  continued  existence  and  relevance  of  the  state water company, working in parallel with the private sector company.  What was revealed however  through the course of  fieldwork was  the extent  to which  the nature  of  this  relationship  determined  the  performance  and  operation  of  the programme.    Thus,  the  subjective  interpretations  and  local  reception  of  the programme, made apparent only through the interaction with those working in the  sector,  reveals  this  critical  factor  in  the privatisation programme  in Ghana, that  not  appreciable  through  documentation  relating  to  the  programme.    The revelation  of  this  theme,  and  others  relating  to  the  extra‐economic  factors 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determining performance and operation, through interviews of those engaged in the field demonstrates the value of the constructivist and interpretivist approach in  research  in  this  context.    Repeat  interviews were  occasionally  necessary  to follow up such themes revealed in initial meetings.   Documentation  relating  to  the  implementation  of  the  privatisation programme  in  Ghana  has  been  obtained  from  a  variety  of  sources.    Purposive sampling  and  selection means  these  various  sources  are  across  a  spectrum  of actors  and  agencies  with  various  roles  in  the  water  sector.    As  noted  in  the previous  section,  these  include  the  service  providers  (state  and  private),  the regulator, sector institutions, NGOs and community groups, sponsor agencies etc.  In  practice  this  has  entailed  accessing  the  libraries  of  these  various  agencies, typically  publicly  accessible  by  arrangement,  this  is  particularly  true  of  sector institutions,  parliament  and  NGOs  and  community  groups.    Documentation acquired here  includes annual  reports,  consultancy documents,  various  studies and so on.   Other data not publicly available or unpublished was acquired from various  agencies,  through  contacts  made  through  the  course  of  fieldwork.  Included  here  are,  for  example  the  data  on  performance  and  operation  made available  through  the  regulator,  presentations  made  to  NGOs  and  community groups etc.    
Access to data in the field: sensitivity surrounding the PSP programme  Considering  the nature  of  provision  of water  services,  its  nature  as  public  and merit good, combined with the history of failure in implementation, it is was not unexpected  that  data  collection  should  entail  some  problems.    As  has  been described  in  chapter  three  the  history  of  privatisation  in  the  water  sector  in developing  countries  has  been  the  subject  of  public  controversy  where attempted, primarily due to the nature of  the resource, and the qualities which contribute to the characterisation as a public and merit good.  Subsequently the history  of  attempted  implementation  contributes  further  to  potential controversy,  where  the  record  of  the  programme  demonstrates  significant divergence  from  proposed  improvements,  as  is  the  subject  of  this  thesis.  Therefore,  where  attempted  these  two  factors  play  a  role  in  the  process  of implementation,  and  this  has  certainly  been  the  case  in  Ghana.    Chapter  five describes the process of PSP design and implementation, changes in the form of contract,  and  the  public  opposition  that  developed  through  this  process.    It  is within  this  environment which  research  is  undertaken,  and  thus  these  factors have a bearing on the process of data collection.     The nature of  the environment  in this respect was most evident, as may be expected, where the research of executors of the programme were concerned.  While proponents of  the programme were receptive  to  interviews,  for example the  World  Bank,  Minister  and  Member  of  Parliament,  the  state  and  private companies  were  resistant  to  engage  in  the  research.    Attempts  were made  to incorporate the perspective and experience of the private company, beyond that information  available  in  publications  such  as  their  annual  reports.    In  practice however,  despite  attempts  through  various  means  of  contact,  there  was  no willingness  to  participate  in  research.    Similarly,  the  state  holding  company, 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despite attempts through various means of contact, were not willing to provide information  or  participate  beyond  information  available  through  publications and  data  made  available  through  the  regulator.    In  each  case  there  may  be varying  reasons  for  this  resistance.   The private  company will  inevitably  resist supporting exploration of such a programme, the performance and operation of which diverges from that proposed and contracted.  The state company, and this has been noted in chapters six and seven, have a history of failure in production of  required data  for other sector  institutions  (e.g.  the regulator), and resist  the exposure  of  such  failings  and  those  of  the  administration  of  service  provision more generally.  It is the case therefore that representation in interview has not been  acquired  for  these  agencies.    While  this  is  regrettable,  it  is  possible  to construct a reasonable picture of the relationship between these parties through other  interviews  (often  involving  individuals who  have  previously worked  for either  party,  or  who  are  close  to  or  involved  in  contract  reviews)  or documentation.      Just  as  these  factors  impact  the  incorporation of  a  totality of  actors and agencies  in  the  interview  process,  a  similar  effect  is  seen  in  regard  the acquisition  of  documentary  data.    As  with  the  interview  process,  the  two agencies most liable are the state and private companies, for those reasons noted above.   Regarding  the private company annual and monthly  reports have been acquired,  demonstrating  performance  and  operation  as  considered  by  the company  itself.    Regarding  the  state  holding  company,  as  is  noted  above,  the capacity  of  the  company  for  the  generation  and  publication  of  data  has  been seriously  limited  from approximately 2004 onwards.   This  is noted  in chapters six and seven with  respect  to  the  implications  for  the  regulator.    It has  further implications with regards the availability of reports, investment plans, and other data  relating  to  performance  and  operation  of  the  service  provider.    Beyond these  agencies  the  availability  of  data  and  documentation  has  been  less restricted.  The regulator has provided more extensive unpublished data relating to  performance,  including  the  various  aspects  of  operation  of  the  service provider which  factor  into  the  regulatory decision making process.   The active NGO and community group sector in Ghana provides further means of accessing documentation  and  data  relating  to  privatisation.    This  is  true,  for  example, where  the  report  of  the  technical  auditor  is  concerned,  with  this  data  having been  previously  utilised  in  the  public  domain  and  being  publicly  available through  an NGO  library.    Finally,  one  further  limitation  is  the  degree  to which Hansard  reports  are  up‐to‐date,  with  some  delays  inhibiting  the  appraisal  of parliamentary process where privatisation is concerned.      It  is  therefore true that the nature of  the programme as  implemented in the water sector proved  inhibitive  to data collection  in  those areas noted.    It  is also true however that the condition of institutions and governance found more generally  in  the  developing  country  context  is  likely  to  have  an  impact  on  the capacity for data collection.   The quality of data recording in the country, noted above with  regard parliamentary  records,  is  indicative of  this.    In  this  instance the quality of data is more likely to be due to capacity in terms of finance, human resources and technology for the recording of data.  This is replicated at least in part  where  the  state  company  is  concerned,  with  capacity  in  these  various 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respects  likely  to  be  inhibiting  data  recording  and  production  –  although  the publication  of  data  is  likely  limited  further  by  sensitivity  regarding  the performance of the company historically.     Sensitivity regarding  the performance of  the state provider  is  replicated elsewhere  in  this  context,  and  this  is  associated  with  the  concern  of  sponsor agencies supporting broader revisions in the mode of governance.  Transparency and  accountability  are  key  themes  in  this  attempt  at more  general  revision  in Ghana (see chapter five), and subsequently data recording and management are bound up with these concerns.   Without such a framework being established in the country, there is the potential for an inhibiting effect on the ability to acquire sufficient  data  for  research.    While  the  broader  standard  of  accountability, transparency  and  data  recording  and monitoring  has  not  directly  affected  the present research, it remains the case that the norms and modes of operation in terms of public sector governance will inevitably have a concurrent effect on the standard of data recording and availability in the water sector.  These issues are evident  in  the  sector  where  data  production  and  transfer  between  service provider and sector agencies is considered in chapters six and seven.   
A.3  Data analysis  Following  data  collection,  analysis  was  undertaken  comparative  to  intended research  goals  expressed  in  chapter  four.    The  research  design  developed  in chapter  four  incorporates  the  theory rationalising privatisation and  its critique as  reviewed  in chapter  two, with  the  typical performance and operation of  the programme as reviewed in chapter three.  It is described in chapter four that the performance  and  operation  of  privatisation  may  be  assessed  by  reference  to, firstly,  technical,  and,  secondly,  political,  social  and  institutional  factors  which contribute to the divergence from that proposed within the rationalising theory.  This is consistent with the critique applied to this theoretical framework; where, firstly, there are inconsistencies and problematic assumptions within the theory itself which  contribute  to principal‐agent problems  for example, with potential moral  hazard  or  adverse  selection  associated  with  the  contract  implemented; and, secondly, the extra‐economic factors associated with transaction costs and the  broader  critique  of  the  neo‐classical model which  impact  the  operation  of privatisation,  deviating  from  the  idealised  economic  model  proposed.    The research design developed therefore provides a means by which analysis of data may be undertaken: considering the linear, hypothesis testing nature of research the alignment of results with this framework is consistent.      Analysis  of  data  is  therefore  undertaken  thematically with  reference  to the  research  design  developed  in  chapter  four.    This  is  the  case  initially  with regards the two broad spheres of exploration: technical, and political, social and institutional.   Within these two spheres there are further themes determined in part  by,  and  consistent  with,  those  issues  raised  in  chapter  four,  but  also determined significantly by the data revealed  in the course of  fieldwork.   Thus, within the sphere of technical factors contributing to divergence in performance and operation from that proposed, includes themes including those related to the 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distortion of risk transfer, the attempted limitation in public sector intervention, evidence  of  asymmetry  and  incomplete  information,  and  the  implications  of these factors in terms of principal‐agent and associated moral hazard problems.  Within  the  sphere  of  political,  social  and  institutional  factors,  incorporated themes  include  the  relationship between  grantor  and operator  of  the  contract, the  prevailing  institutional  culture,  and  the  normalised  politicised  modes  of operation within the sector.      Through  the  course  of  fieldwork  and  the  data  revealed  therein,  various themes are identifiable which correlate with the questions raised in the research design.    Regarding  the  technical  factors  impacting  performance  and  operation, these  typically  derive  from  the  contract  and  lack  of  specificity  of  associated terms.   This  includes  firstly,  the  significance of  the  failure  to establish baseline data for the contract, from which performance is to be measured.  This appeared repeatedly in evidence from various sources across the sector: NGOs, regulator, labour  representatives,  sponsor  agencies  and  the  grantor  itself.    Similarly,  the attribution of control of revenue accounts, in addition to maintenance funding, to the operator was frequently cited as a significant obstacle.  Information flow, and responsibility for data reporting between operator and grantor was further cited as an important factor in inhibiting operations.  These issues arose in numerous interview and documentation sources, including those of the regulator, the state holding  company,  labour  and  sponsor  representatives,  and  so  on.    The implications  of  these  factors  for  the  validity  of  the  theoretical  framework  are assessed in greater detail in chapters six and eight, though it may be noted here that they substantiate aspects of the critique which highlight problems deriving from  incomplete  or  asymmetric  information,  consequent  principal‐agent  and moral hazard problems.      Regarding the political, social and institutional factors which contribute to divergence in performance and operation from that proposed, there are similar recurrent issues arising in the data acquired in fieldwork in Ghana.  It is noted by various sources in interviews and documentation that the relationship between contract  grantor  and  operator  provides  a  significant  obstacle  to  the  smooth operation of the programme.  Representatives of various agencies, including the regulator,  water  directorate  consultant,  labour  union,  and  the  Member  of Parliament note  the difficulties caused by an acrimonious relationship.   Causes are  attributed  to  both  the  development  of  privatisation  and  the  rhetorical characterisation of each party, and subsequently the incomplete information and contract  implemented  –  and  this  is  supported  in  documentation  from  the technical auditor and state company.  Furthermore, the nature of the programme as  implemented  in  Ghana  entails  the  parallel  operation  of  state  and  private companies,  with  the  latter  operating  with  seconded  staff  of  the  former:  the consequence  is a contrast  in modes of operation, organisational structures and staff  advancement,  creating  resistance  to  proposed  reforms  (noted  by  various sources including the labour, consultant, sponsor ministry representatives).  This apparent incoherence with local modes of operation is continued in the broader institutional  environment  with  politicised  management  being  typical  and contradictory  to  the  idealised  independent  operation  of  sector  institutions including the regulator and stat company, and affecting processes  including  for 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example procurement (from representatives of the consultant, ministry,  labour, NGOs and Member of Parliament,  and various documentation  including  that of the state company, regulator and NGOs).  As is noted in chapters seven and eight, these  themes  revealed  in  the  course  of  fieldwork  in  Ghana  align  with  various aspects  of  the  critique  of  the  rationalising  theoretical  framework  of  the programme,  including:  the  failure  to  incorporate  institutional  significance  and variance  into  the  underlying  rationale,  with  associated  significant  costs  and obstacles;  the  apparent  contradiction  between  commercial  operation  and universal service provision, with the inevitable political interest and intervention in the sector.    Themes  identified  in  data  analysis  therefore  provide  a  basis  for  the substantiation  or  otherwise  of  hypothesised  connections  between  the divergence  in  performance  and  operation  of  privatisation  from  that  proposed within the rationalising theory.  It further provides a basis for the analysis of the potential  contribution  of  weaknesses,  inconsistencies  and  problematic assumptions  to  this  divergence.    It  is  therefore  the  case  that  the  subjective experiences  revealed  through  research  in  Ghana,  and  the  recurrent  themes identified in data analysis, provide a means by which to reveal the relevance of such  aspects  of  the  underlying  rationalising  theoretical  framework  for  likely outcomes  in  implementation,  with  potential  implications  for  the  revision  is future programmes. 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